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7Abstract
T his th e s is  is a n  investiga tion  of the  in te rre la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  
no tions of 'm ean ing ' a n d  'h isto ric ity ', o f the  m a n n e r  in w inch they  in fo rm  or 
reflect concep tions of collective o r  ‘soc ia l’ being  a n d  of individuality , a n d  o f th e  
w ays in w hich  th e se  d im en sio n s  a re  prim ord ially  experienced  by h u m a n  beings. 
This investiga tion  co n ce rn s  p rim arily  th e  phenom enological a n d  h e rm e n e u tic  
trad itio n s  a n d  especially  H eidegger’s  fo rm ulation  of the  no tion  of h is to ric ity  a s  
correlative to  the  'even t' o f t ru th  u n d e rs to o d  in te rm s of a n  in te rp lay  be tw een  
d isc lo su re  an d  co n cea lm en t (aAf)0eia) an d  G ad am er's  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
'm ean ing  a n d  h isto ric ity ’ a s  a n  in d isp en sa b le  coup le t for b o th  p h ilo sop h ica l 
h e rm en eu tic s  an d  th e  social sc iences.
N evertheless th e  p re se n t inq u iry  does n o t co n te n t itse lf w ith  a n  
explora tion  of th e  n o tio n s o f 'm ean in g ' a n d  h isto ricity ' w ith in  th e  co n fines  of th e  
phenom eno log ical-herm eneutic  tra d itio n , b u t  ra th e r  a tte m p ts  to  a t ta in  a  m ore 
ad eq u a te  g ra sp  of th o se  co n cep ts  by  a  critical Ju x tap o sitio n  o f H eidegger a n d  
G adam er w ith  a c c o u n ts  th a t  have  th e  'social' a s  th e ir  po in t of d e p a r tu re . T h u s , 
H eidegger’s fo rm ula tions o n  h is to ric ity  are  no t only exam ined  in  re la tio n  to  h is  
'im m ediate ' legacy of G erm an  th o u g h t  -especia lly  Hegel an d  N ietzsche- b u t  a re  
also  c o n tra s te d  w ith  co n cep tio n s o f h is to ry  p e rta in in g  to  th e  M arx ist tra d itio n  
and  especially  C a sto riad is’ co n cep tio n  o f th e  socia l-h isto rical.
In effect, th e  c o n tra s t  b e tw een  'h isto ric ity ' a n d  th e  w orkings o f 'a c tu a l ' 
h isto ry  h a s  a rg u ab ly  p reven ted  a  g e n u in e  d ialogue betw een  the  M arx ist a n d  th e  
phenom enological cam ps. F a r from  being  concerned  w ith  a  sy n th e s is  o f th o se  
trad itio n s  o r from  being  p reo ccu p ied  w ith  justify ing  e ith e r o f th e m  I have  
a ttem p ted  to  show  th a t  a  com bined  read ing  of b o th  is in d isp en sa b le  for th e  
d isc lo su re  of the  e ssen tia l d im en s io n s  of h is to rica l experience. C a s to ria d is ' 
em p h asis  o n  th e  ‘m agm atic ’ c h a ra c te r  of u n co n sc io u s  s ign ifica tions a n d  h is  
g round ing  of soc ia l-h isto rica l 'in s titu tin g ' on  the  unconscious, to g e th e r  w ith  
H eidegger's a tte m p t to lin k  th e  p rim o rd ia l experience of h is to ry  w ith  m y th  have  
given m e occasion  to  d isso c ia te  th e  very n o tion  of 'm ean ing ' from  th a t  of 
'rationality '.
T h is sh o u ld  n o t be in te rp re te d  a s  a  re jec tion  of ra tion a lity  o r a s  a n  - a t  
bo ttom - e th ica l invocation  of a  r e tu rn  to  a  pre-C ritical ph ilo soph ica l p o sition  
b u t ra th e r  a s  a n  a tte m p t to  in d ica te  th e  prim ordial m a n n e r  in  w hich  h is to ry  is 
accessib le  in  experience a n d  w h ich  arg u ab ly  p recedes an y  th e m atic  theo riz in g  
of th e  h is to rica l realm . I have  Anally a ttem p ted  to  show  th e  a n tin o m ie s  
in h e ren t in  any  a tte m p t to  g ra sp  ‘ra tion a lly ’ th e  socia l-h isto rica l by a  d e ta iled  
explora tion  of G ad am er's  am b iv a len t concep tion  o f tra d itio n ’ a n d  'p re ju d ice '. 
G adam er’s  concep tion  of th e  ‘fu s io n  o f ho rizons’ gave m e occasion  to  reOect 
fu rth e r on  th e  m a n n e r  in  w h ich  h is to ry  an d  t ru th  a re  m ade co rre la tive ly  
accessib le  in  th o u g h t, in  experience , a n d  in  h is to rica l praxis.
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9Introduction
T he very title  of the  p re se n t w ork  m ight a t  first seem  qu ite  vague, 
p e rh a p s  even puzzling , an d  th u s  in  need  of exp lana tion . Indeed, 'meaning, 
historicity a nd  the conceptua lisa tion  o f  the socia l m igh t even  seem  an  'in su lting ' 
title  to  all tho se  conv inced  e ith e r a b o u t th e  need  to free o n e se lf  from  th e  ‘b u rd e n  
of h is to ry  an d  tra d it io n ’ or a b o u t the  p rim acy  of 'a c tu a l ' h is to ry  an d  the  need  for 
th e  consc ious, p la n n e d  tran sfo rm ation  of socio -h isto rical fo rm atio n s w ith  the  
aim  o f a tta in in g  a  m ore ‘h u m a n e ’, en ligh tened , an d  a u to n o m o u s  s ta te  of 
socie ta l-ind iv idual b e in g 1, n o t to  m en tion  th o se  c o n te n t w ith  the  recu rren t, 
q u asi-apoca lyp tic  y e t b an a l invocation  of th e  "end o f h isto ry". To th is  s ta te  of 
affa irs one could  u n d o u b ted ly  add  th e  c u rre n t p reo ccu p a tio n  w ith  the  
fo rm ula tion  of " th eo ries  of m eaning", o r th e  equally  fe rv en t belief in  the  
“liq u ida tio n  of m ean ing", w h a t B aud rilla rd  (1989: 9) for ex am ple  h a s  called  the  
“percep tib le  ev ap o ra tio n  of m ean in g ” (and its  rep lacem en t by sim ulation), w hich  
- i f  ta k e n  seriously- w ould  su g g es t th a t  th e  su b jec t m a tte r  o f th is  th e s is  is - a t  
b es t- obso lete .
N evertheless, th e  s ta r tin g  po in t of th e  p re se n t e n q u iry  is som ew hat 
d ifferen t a n d  does n o t  re s t c o n te n t w ith  sim ply tak in g  s id e s  in  c u rre n t d eb a tes  
o r w ith  u ncritica lly  accep ting  th e  p resence, ab sen ce , o r th e  com m only  perceived
1 This imagery of freeing oneself from the burden of historical time and tradition is often related to 
imageries o f America. Wagner (1998a: 80-82) sees this attitude, characteristic of what he terms “pure 
modernity", epitomised in the phrase “A beginning from nothingness and complete self-knowledge”. In the 
author's view this phrase may be seen as providing the basic ingredients from which “images of America 
could be produced”. In contrasting the case of the French and the American revolutions, the author is 
furthermore able to conclude that the society founded after the American Revolution due to the lack of 
history and tradition seemed to be the first societal formation for which the conception of an autonomous 
creation o f its institutions was viable.
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m ode o f b e in g  of an y  of the  ‘co n cep ts ' m en tio ned  above. leather, th e  need  for 
th e  p re s e n t  investiga tion  to ad d re ss  th e  no tio n s of m ean ing  and h is to ric ity  an d  
th e ir  p e c u lia r  co n n ec ted ness  w ith  th e  m a n n e r  in  w hich  th e  socia l is 
co n cep tu a lised  -o r  Ja ils to a tta in  th e  s ta tu s  o f a  concept first m a d e  itse lf 
a p p a re n t  in  light of th e  acknow ledgem ent of th e  elu sive  a n d  inescapable n a tu re  
of th e  s ta te  o f affa irs th a t  th e  p re se n t th e s is  a t te m p ts  to g ra sp . I c a n n o t th in k  
of an y o n e  w ho  h a s  exp ressed  th e  p ro b lem atic  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  ‘‘m e an in g ”, 
“h isto ry", a n d  “being" in a  sh a rp e r  m a n n e r  th a n  J a n  P a iocka. Indeed , the  
th in k e r  is  convinced  th a t  the  am b ig u ity  w ith  w hich  the  co n cep t of “m ean ing" is 
v ested  is  p rim arily  th e  re su lt of a n  “a p p a re n t  obviousness" th a t it s h a re s  w ith  
“all b a s ic  co n cep ts, w hich are  so  com m on  th a t  th e ir  n a tu re"  i Patocka, 1996: 53) 
re s is ts  th e  ru le s  of defin ition  so d e a r  to  trad itio n a l logic. More im p o rtan tly  
P a to ck a  sh o w s th e  inescapability of th o se  co n cep ts, w hich  he sees  a s  often 
g en e ra tin g  a n  uncritical d isp o sitio n  tow ard s th e  so-called  “inescap ab le  
c o n cep tu a l tools", i.e. th e  accep tan ce  o f th e ir  “self-evidence . To recognize the  
problem atic n a tu re  of m eaning  - a n d  h isto ry - w ould  th e n  be to  ag ree  w ith 
P a to ck a  a b o u t  the  need  to  be “no le ss  op en  a b o u t th e  m ean ing fu l th a n  for the  
m e an in g less"  s ince  it is a rguab ly  th e  “sam e beings" th a t  “m a n ifes t them selves 
now  a s  m ean ing fu l, now  a s  m ean ing less"  (Patocka, 1996: 57). I w ou ld  not 
n e v e rth e le ss  like to  p rejudice th e  q u e s tio n  of th e  significance of th is  p rob lem atic  
n a tu re  o f “m eaning" by following P a to c k a  in h is  a rg u m e n t i h a t  “h u m a n  life is 
n o t p o ssib le  w ith o u t e ith e r a  naïve o r  a  critically  acq u ired  confidence in  an  
a b so lu te  m eaning" (Patocka, 1996: 58). D esp ite  the  u n d e n iab le  force o f th is  
a rg u m e n t, it m ight be preferable if w e sh ifted  o u r  a tte n tio n  from  th e  p rob lem  of 
th e  c o n tr a s t  betw een  "absolute" a n d  “relative" m ean in g  a n a  the  cen tra lity  th is
conveys to Is su e s  of "values” a n d  “socia l ac tio n ”, so  a s  to  m ake available the  
ve iy  essen ce  o f the  h isto rica l. P roperly  sp eak in g  h isto ry  c a n n o t “have” a 
m ean in g  o r “m ean ings", s ince  it of all “beings" is r a th e r  p e .ce ived  a t  tim es a s  
m eaningfu l a n d  a t  tim es a s  m eaning less, to  u se  P a to ck a 's  w ords. In stead  of 
in te rp re tin g  th is  in te rp lay  betw een  th e  “presence" a n d  "absence” of m ean in g  a s  
a n  attribute o f the  h is to rica l “realm ", w ould  it n o t be  p referab le if we sim ply 
viewed the  h is to rica l a s  th e  locus of m e an in g  lest w e tre a t  b o th  “m ean in g ” an d  
“h is to ry ” a s  objects p e rta in in g  to  th e  ju r isd ic tio n  of sjiecific sc ien ces or 
a lternatively  a s  being  g ra sp ab le  a t  th e  m arg in s  o f in te rd isc ip linary  re sea rch ?  
Indeed , b o th  th e  no tion  o f “m eaning" a n d  th e  “h is to ric a l” a s  su c h  a re  from  the  
o u ts e t  of th is  th e s is  regarded  a s  q u estio n s  ra th e r  th a n  a s  delitiable "en tities”.
It sh o u ld  be a lso  m ade c lea r th a t  th is  th e s is  does n o t a tte m p t to 
e s ta b lish  a n y  s tra igh tfo rw ard  -e v e n  less a  causa l- re la tio n sh ip  betw een  
co n cep tio n s o f the  'socia l' a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g s  of 'h is to ry '. In fact, r a th e r  th a n  
m a k in g  s tro n g  cla im s o n  th e  issu e  it w as d eem ed  preferab le  to  p>oint to 
concep tions o f collective o r 'socia l' b e ing  th a t  overtly  o r secre tly  coexist w ith 
co n cep tio n s o f h isto ry . A ctually , it cou ld  be even a rg u e d  th a t th is  coexistence is 
very  rare ly  h a rm o n io u s  a n d  th a t  in  rea lity  very o ften  w ith in  (he b o u n d a rie s  of a  
co n cep tu a l fram ew ork  one of th e se  ‘co n c e p ts ’ lim its th e  o ther, a lth o u g h  th e re  is 
certa in ly  no  w ay - a n d  p e rh a p s  no  reason- to derive a  sy stem atic  re la tio n sh ip  
betw een  th e  tw o concep ts. The id e a  th a t  the  very  conception  o f th e  'social' 
m ig h t have lim iting  effects for a n  o p en  concep tion  o f the  h isto rica l m igh t seem  
s tran g e , b u t  it  is ac tu a lly  g ro u nd ed  o n  the  o b se rv a tio n  th a ' the  em ergence of 
th e  no tion  o f the  ‘socia l’ a n d  th e  early  s tages  o f ‘social sc ience’ re su lted  in a 
n eu tra liza tio n  of th e  possib ilities in h e re n t in the  field of political ac tion . Society
"as  a n  object o f th e  social sc ien ces” b e ing  ra th e r  a  p o st-revolutionary d iscovery  
a s  W agner su g g es ts , signified a  p re c a r io u s  linkage betw een  “free ac tion  an d  
p red ic tab le  o u tco m e”, w hich  re su lte d  from  th e  tendency g e n e ra te d  by th e  
A m erican  a n d  th e  F rench  rev o lu tio ns  to s tu d y  “w hat h e ld  h u m a n  b e ing s  
to g e th e r” a n d  how  th e ir  lives cou ld  be  organized in 'a sso c ia tio n s ' or ‘socia l 
m ovem en ts ' w ith in  'polities' a n d  ‘n a tio n -s ta te s ' an d  "w hat re g u la ritie s  [of action] 
c o u ld  be expected  if people w ere p erm itted  to do so ...w ith o u t im posed  
restric tio n s"  fW agner. 1998b: 244-245 ). H an n a h  A rendt ha.-, righ tly  d e tec ted  in 
th e  "action of th e  social sc ien tis ts"  a  c ru c ia l a sp ec t of th e  v ic to ry  of m a n  q u a  
an im a l laborans, w hich  sh e  saw  a s  b e ing  com plete due to  th e  dem olition  o f th e  
“ce rta in ty  of im m ortality" th a t  befell w es te rn  h u m an ity  ever s in c e  the  a d v en t of 
C a rte s ia n  d o ub t. T his tr iu m p h  o f th e  anim al laborans, is  it n o t  a n  ob lite ra tio n  
o f th e  “revelatory  ch arac ter"  of a c tio n  p ro p er an d  a  lack  o f  the  ab ility  to 
"p roduce  s to ries  a n d  th u s  becom e h is to ric a l” (Arendt. 1958: 3 2 0 - 325)? A rend t 
a n sw e rs  th is  q u es tio n  in  th e  affirm ative w hile also  d e tec tin g  in  th is  'm o d em ' 
a t t i tu d e  a  severing  from  the  “so u rc e  from  w hich  m e an in g fu ln e ss  sp rin g s in to  
a n d  illu m in a tes  h u m a n  ex isten ce”. T h a t th is  deprivation  is in  A ren d t's  view no t 
on ly  c h a rac te r is tic  of social scien tific  th o u g h t b u t  ra th e r  th e  m a in  a t tr ib u te  of 
m o d e m  ph ilo sophy2 is a p p a re n t  in  h e r  po lem ics ag a in st th e  p h ilo so p h e rs  w ho 
"becam e e ith e r ep istem olog ists, w orry ing  a b o u t a n  over-all th e o ry  of sc ien ce” or 
“b ecam e w h a t Hegel w an ted  th e m  to  be, the  o rgans ol th e  Zeitgeist, th e  
m o u th p iece s  in  w hich  th e  genera l m ood of tim e w as ex p ressed  w ith  co n cep tu a l 
clarity" (Arendt, 1958: 294). T he H egelian  conception  of h is to ry , an d  especially
: Wagner (2000) expresses a similar insight in arguing that the “discovery” o f society in early sociological 
accounts should be seen as an even in political philosophy and that consequently sociology can be regarded 
as a 'transformed' and 'empirical' version of political philosophy.
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the  concep t o f G eist a rg u ab ly  p re se n t u s  w ith  a  riddle a .,d  d esp ite  A rend t's  
a tta c k  on  Hegel one can n o t b u t  agree w ith  P a tocka on  the  ind isp en sab ility  of 
Hegel's in s ig h t concern ing  the  im possib ility  of seeing po litics a s  being 
e stab lish ed  o n  th e  “co n sc io u s  freedom ” of one p erso n  alone -s a y  o f a  ru ler ' o r 
the  p h arao h . P a tocka certa in ly  ta k e s  A ren d t's  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  labour, 
work, an d  p ro d u c tio n  qu ite  seriously  a n d  th is  w hy he sees  in th e  o rg an isa tio n  
of w ork "w hose goal is to s u s ta in  life a n d  its  order" only the  “fo u n d a tio n  of 
religion a n d  pow er" (Patocka, 1996: 147-148). Conversely, he tra c e s  th e  g round  
of politics in th e  sep a ra tio n  betw een  w ork  a n d  p ro d uc tio n  th a t  freed  -so m e- 
ind iv iduals for political life, m aking  th u s  possib le  th e  beg inn ing  o f h is to ry  - in  
th e  s tr ic t s e n se -  in  the  co n te x t of th e  G reek  polls.
R evealing  tho u g h  th e se  concep tions m ay be in  d isclosing  a sp e c ts  of th e  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  th e  o r ien ta tio n s  o f h u m a n  beings in  th e  w orld, h isto rical- 
political p ra x is  an d  the  p o s tu la tio n  of a  'socia l' reality  u n d e rly in g  h u m a n  
ac tio ns an d  a sp ira tio n s , th e y  still re p re se n t only a  sm all p artic le  in  th e  ‘o cean ’ 
of re levan t id e a s . Indeed th e y  are  m entioned  h ere  n o t a s  u n sh a k a b le  't ru th s ' 
b u t  solely a s  p o in ts  of d e p a rtu re  for th e  p re se n t enqu iry , H eidegger’s  reflections 
on the  G reek p o lis  being a  co n sid erab le  p a r t  o f the  first c h a p te r  o f th is  thesis , 
even if in  a  sligh tly  in d irec t a  m ann er. Indeed H eidegger's reflec tions on  th e  
Antigone  a re  o f  g rea t in te re s t, since they  do n o t ap p ro ach  th is  m a ste rp iece  of 
the  c u ltu re  o f th e  A then ian  dem ocracy  from  a m o d ern  d em ocratic ' perspective. 
Heidegger's re fu sa l to a d d re s s  the  p rob lem  of th e  c lash  betw een  th e  “law of the  
fam ily” a n d  th e  “law  of th e  sta te"  in  the  H egelian fash ion , o r  even h is  
unw illingness to  com m en t on th e  g u lf betw een  h u m a n  a n d  divine law 
m asterfu lly  n a r ra te d  by Sophocles c a n  be seen  a s  b o th  a  d isad v an tag e  an d  a
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m erit of h is  rea d in g  of the  A ntigone. T h u s , a ltho u g h  H eidegger successfu lly  
re s is ts  th e  te n d e n c y  -in h e ren t in  m any  m o d em  th in k e rs-  to idealise  th e  G reek 
experience o f d em ocracy  he is  a t  th e  sam e  tim e liable for a lm o st en tire ly  
b y pass in g  th e  q u e s tio n  of m o d e m  dem ocracy . It h a s  to  be rem ark ed  tho u g h  
th a t  th e  p ersp ec tiv e  from  w h ic h  H eidegger’s  in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  A ntigone  is 
ca rried  o u t in  th is  c h a p te r  is n o t p rim arily  political. If it w ere, H eidegger's 
sc a tte re d  re m a rk s  a b o u t th e  in a d e q u ac y  o f p a rlia m en ta ry  dem ocracy , h is  open 
enm ity  to  co m m u n ism  an d  h is  su p p o rt  to N azism  w ould have  b een  su fficient 
g ro u n d s  for a b a n d o n in g  an y  fu r th e r  inqu iry  in to  H eidegger's th o u g h t. In stead , 
th e  a tte m p t w as m a d e  in th is  f irs t  c h a p te r  firstly  to  s itu a te  H eidegger's tho u g h t 
w ith  regard  to  e a r lie r  ph ilo soph ica l developm ents a n d  secondly , to  give a  first 
a c c o u n t o f h is  th e o r isa tio n  of h is to ric ity  in  re la tio n  to h is  v id e r  p ro ject in  h is 
m ajo r w ork. B eing a n d  Time.
An ex p la n a to ry  no te is  in d isp en sa b le  here . Any a t te m p t to  derive a 
sy stem atic  ex p o sitio n  of the  n o tio n  of historicity  in  H eidegger's th o u g h t h a s  to 
decide w h e th e r  th e  ph ilo sophy  o f th e  ‘la te r  Heidegger', is co m p atib le  w ith  h is 
ph ilo soph ica l e lab o ra tio n s  p r io r  to th e  “tu rn" . A lthough th is  co n ce rn  is no t 
ce n tra l to  th e  p u rp o se s  of th is  th e s is  - fo r it is n o t concerned  w ith  a  sy stem atic  
in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  no tion  o f h is to ric ity  th ro u g h o u t H eidegger's oeuv re3- it h a s  
to  be rem ark ed  th a t  for a  v a rie ty  of re a so n s  I op ted  for 'relative c o n tin u ity '. This 
I regarded  a s  e s se n tia l  m ain ly  b e cau se  th e  ‘com plete ru p tu re ’ h y p o th e s is  very 
conven ien tly  d isso c ia te s  H eidegger’s  la te  ph ilosophy  from  th e  th in k e r 's  political
1 Hans Ruin (1994) attempts a systematic ‘tracing’ of the theme of historicity throughout Heidegger's work 
with paradigmatic rigour. It seems to this reader that in a manner reminiscent of Gadamer, Ruin (1994: Iò­
n i  legitimises the postulation of some ‘continuity’ in Heidegger's oeuvre by rightly linking the problem of 
historicity with the “happening o f disclosedness” and by showing that Heidegger's “version of
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‘b lu n d er' th a t  H eidegger h im self a t t r ib u te d  to h is  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h isto ricity . 
Bold tho u g h  th is  ‘confession’ m ight se e m  it h ad  a  very p ecu lia r  effect in  the  
reception  of H eidegger’s  th o u g h t, s in c e  it im plied th a t  th e  p h ilo sop h er h ad  
g rasped  som eth ing  very sign ifican t w ith  h is  n o tio n  of his t oricity  b u t  h ad  to  
ab an d o n  th is  line of en q u iry  b e c a u se  o f  the  u n fo r tu n a te  ev en t of h is  political 
involvem ent. H eidegger h a s  of co u rse  a lso  spoken  of th e  im p asse  of h is  early  
th o u g h t an d  of th e  need  to perform  th e  fam o us ‘tu r n ' in  th in k in g  b u t  th is  hard ly  
changes the  m a in  im pression  on th e  is su e . S tran g e  tho u g h  it m ight seem  th is  
se lf-in te rp re ta tion  of H eidegger w as a lm o s t tak en  a t  face v a lue  in  th e  p re se n t 
work. I say  a lm ost b ecau se  it w as p la in  to  m e th a t  if H eidegger h ad  uncovered  
a n  e ssen tia l d im ension  of the  h is to r ic a l being of h u m a n s  a n d  if indeed  th is  
d im ension  w as inextricab ly  linked  w ith  h is  rec a s tin g  of Ih e  q u es tio n  of th e  
"m eaning of be ing” a n d  w ith the  c o n c u rre n t q u es tio n in g  o f th e  h is to ry  of the  
w est seen  in  te rm s  of the  h isto ry  of m e ta p h y sic s , th e n  th is  q u es tio n  could  no t 
be dropped  a t will4. W hat w ould fu r th e rm o re  be m ore p lausib le , H eidegger's 
alleged ’confession ' th a t  h is  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h is to ric ity  w as responsib le  for h is  
political involvem ent, o r  th e  p o s tu la tio n  th a t h is  political o p in io ns m igh t have 
interfered  w ith  h is  acc o u n t of h is to ric ity ?  I re fu sed  to  tak e  an y  of th o se  op tions 
very seriously . The first req u ires  t h a t  we tak e  one of th e  m o st in fluen tia l 
p h ilo sophers  o f the  tw en tie th  ce n tu ry  fo r a  fool, th e  second  That som e ‘p u rg in g ’ 
of H eidegger's u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h is to ric ity  from  its  ‘ideological’ co m p o n en ts  
w ould resto re  th e  concep t in  its  im m a c u la te  s ta tu s . R a th er for m e H eidegger's
Ursprungphilosophie" is ultimately dependent on the "affirmation o f its historicity” and on the choice to 
“operate from within it’ (Ruin. 1994: 25).
4 This dropping of the question of historicity is even philosophically unthinkabc. if Gadanier is right that 
Heidegger’s questioning of western metaphysics was an attempt to "open a dimension in which, as with
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b lu n d e r’ w as all of th e se  th in g s  together, b u t  m o s t im p o rtan tly  it po in ted  m e to 
th e  am bigu ity  in h e ren t in  h u m a n  p rax is  a n d  gave m e th e  .dea  of ju x tap o s in g  
allegedly politically  ’p rogressive’ a c c o u n ts  o f h is to ry  w ith  H eidegger's a c c o u n t of 
h isto ricity .
Not on ly  did th is  idea  give b ir th  to  th e  second  c h a p te r  o f th e  th e sis , b u t 
a lso  it is re sp o n sib le  for a  ce rta in  tw o-d im ensionality  th a t c h a ra c te r ise s  th is  
tex t a s  a  w hole. The re a d e r  w o n 't m iss  th is  ju x tap o s itio n , w h ich  in  th e  first 
c h a p te r  ta k e s  m ain ly  th e  form  o f a n  e v a lu a tio n  o f A dorno, D errida  a n d  
C a sto riad is ’ c ritique  o f H eidegger's p ro ject ta k in g  p lace  th ro u g h  th e  freq u en t 
in se r tio n  of foo tno tes. In ad d itio n  to  m ak in g  th e  foo tno tes q u ite  im p o rta n t for 
th e  a p p rec ia tio n  of th e  p re sen t w ork, th is  p rim ary  a n d  e lem en ta ry  form  of a  
c o n tra s t  b e tw een  H eidegger an d  ‘p rogressive  th in k e rs ’ g e n e ra te d  th e  n eed  for a  
m ore explicit ju x ta p o s itio n 5 o f th e  h e rm en eu tic -p h en o m en o lo g ica l trad itio n  a n d  
th o se  a p p ro a c h e s  -b ro ad ly  sp eak in g  of M arx is t origin- th a t  p lace  th e  “socia l” a t  
th e  cen tre  o f th e ir  reflections on  h isto ry .
‘historicism’ historicality would no longer serve as a limiting hindrance to truth and the objectivity of 
knowledge” (Gadamer, 1994: 86).
5 I often use the word ’compass' to indicate my interest in the conceptual space’ opened up by the 
juxtaposition between the two traditions. It has to be remarked though that this ‘word’ is not systematically 
elaborated and thus it should not be seen as a concept proper. Also, the way I use the term here should not 
be confounded with Foucault's more ‘rigorous’ use of the term compasse.
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T h us, th e  second  c h a p te r  of my th e s is  is a  m ore 'p ro n o u n c e d ' an d
them atic  ju x tap o sitio n  betw een  C asto riad is ' conception  of ‘h e  social-historical
an d  H eidegger's u n d e rs tan d in g  of au th e n tic  h isto ricity  in te rm s  of fate an d
repetition . T he question  n a tu ra lly  a rises  w hy of all th e  p o ss ib le  can d id a te s
'belonging' to , or having som e so rt of allegiance w ith  the, M arx is t trad itio n
C asto riad is  w as selected  for th is  pu rpose . T his selection  m ig h t a p p e a r  ever
s tra n g e r in  ligh t of the  fact th a t  M arcuse h a s  briefly been  a  s iu d e n t  of Heidegger
an d  th a t  h is  early  work w as a n  a ttem p t to bridge the  p h ilo so p h y  of Being a n d
\
Time w ith  M arxism . In th is  resp ec t M arcuse of all M arx ist’ th in k e rs  w ould 
seem  to  be th e  'evident' o r even 'unavoidable ' choice. In t r u th  th e  choice of 
C asto riad is  w as partly  d ic ta ted  by the  cou rse  o f the  inquiry  a n d  p artly  re la ted  
to  my ea rlie r in te re st in C asto riad is ' th o u g h t. In an y  ca se  it  is I believe 
ind isp u tab le  th a t  C asto riad is  is  the  only th in k e r  w ho saw  th e  socia l an d  th e  
h isto rical a s  essen tia lly  one dom ain , a s  essen tia lly  'so c ia l-h is to rica l'. More 
im portan tly  C asto riad is  rightly  detected  in  M arxist p h ilo so p h y  of h isto ry  a 
tendency  to  n eu tra lise  th e  dynam ic an d  unexpected  a s p e c ts  of h isto rica l 
existence, by  prejudicing the  very ou tcom e of h isto rica l ch a n g e . C asto riad is ' 
critique of M arxism  is qu ite  im p o rtan t for the  add itiona l re a s o n  th a t  it traces  
the  o rigins o f th is  n eu tra lisa tio n  in  the  very co n cep tua lisa tio n  o f  th e  social by 
allegedly 'o rthodox ' M arxist accou n ts. In th is  sense , h is  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  
socia l-h isto rica l in s titu tio n  an d  h is  rad ical theo risa tion  of th e  u n c o n sc io u s  a s  
the  locus o f the  em ergence of the  radically  new  in h isto ry , q u a lified  h im  a s  
ind isp en sab le  for the  p u rp o ses  of my thesis . Not only C a s to r la d is ’ positions 
provide a  s ta rk  c o n tra s t w ith  H eidegger's in s is tence  on th e  rep e titiv e  c h a ra c te r  
of h is to rica l en ac tm en t, b u t  a lso  tho se  an tith e tica l a n d  co n flic tin g  acc o u n ts
;
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seem  to be g ro u n d e d  on  the  perceived u rg en cy  for a  th o u g h t a n d  p rax is  th a t  
su rp a sse s  th e  ho rizon  of “w este rn  m e ta p h y s ic s” (Heideggir) o r  of “inh erited  
ph ilosophy” (C asto rlad is). In th is  c h a p te r  1 asp ired  to  show  how  b o th  th e se  
acc o u n ts  o p e ra te  from  th e  in te rp re ta tiv e  sp a c e ’ opened  u p  t  ” th e  p o stu la tio n  o f 
a  fu n d am en ta l a n tith e s is , nam ely  a n  a n tith e s is  betw een  au th e n tic ity  a n d  
in a u th en tic ity  in  th e  case  of H eidegger an d  th a t  of a  b re a c h  betw een au to n o m y  
an d  he teronom y  in  the  ph ilosophy  o f C asto riad is . F u rth e rm o re , C a s to riad is ’ 
g round ing  of h is to ry  o n  th e  m agm a-like s ign ifica tions of th e  u n c o n sc io u s  
provided m e w ith  an  invaluab le  lin k  betw een  h is to rica l p rax is  a n d  m ean ing . 
Im portan tly , it a ls o  po in ts  beyond  th e  u s u a l iden tifica tions o f th e  d im en sio n  o f 
m ean ing  w ith  e ith e r  ra tion a lity  o r lan gu ag e  to  th e  n e th e r  reg ions o f th e  
u n co nsc io u s. In  th is  se n se  it h a s  to  be rem ark ed  in  p ass in g  th a t  H ab e rm as’ 
‘e x c u rsu s ’ o n  C a sto ria d is  fu n d am en ta lly  m is u n d e rs ta n d s  the m o st im p o rta n t 
d im ension  of C a s to ria d is ' th o u g h t, n am e ly  th a t  if th e  'im ag inary  d im en sio n ’ is  
indeed  m a g m atic  in  n a tu re , th e n  i t  c a n n o t be ev a lu a ted  e ith e r  from  th e  
perspective o f no rm ativ ity  o r from  th e  d im en sio n  o f speech  a s  H a b e rm a s’ 
critique seem s to  suggest6. The re a d e r  sh o u ld  be  also  w arn ed  off from  
in te rp re tin g  m y ow n critica l re m a rk s  o n  C a sto riad is  a s  ind ica ting  a  p reference  
tow ards th e  H eideggerian  n a rra tiv e  th a t  follows th e  p re se n ta tio n  a n d  critica l 
evaluation  of C a sto riad is .
R a th e r it  C  no t only C a sto riad is  b u t  a lso  th e  trad itio n  of w es te rn  o r 
h u m a n is t  M arx ism  th a t  is evoked once  m ore in  the  th ird  ch ap te r, w h ich  a s  th e  
prev ious c h a p te r s  is subd iv ided  in to  tw o p a r ts . T he first p a i t  is a  co n fro n ta tio n
6 See for instance Habermas' thesis according to which "Castoriadis lacks a solution, because his concept 
of society in terms o f fundamental ontology leaves no room for an intersubiective praxis for which
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of G ad am er’s fo rm ula tion  o f the  H eideggerian  concep tions on m eaning  and  
h isto ric ity  an d  h is  a tte m p t to  e s ta b lish  a  m ode of cognition  app rop ria te  for 
ph ilosophy  an d  th e  G eistesw issen sch a ften . Given th a t  G adam er explicitly 
s trives to  overcom e the  confines posed  by  c u rre n t epistem ological accou n ts, it 
w as deem ed  n ecessa ry  to  begin o u r  inqu iry  into G ad am er’s  th o u g h t by 
c o n tra s tin g  h is  ‘ontology’ w ith  th e  fu n d am en ta l a ssu m p tio n s  of epistem ological 
schools so a s  to  gain  a  c le a r  insigh t o f th e  m a n n e r in  w hich  epistem ology h a s  
co loured  -b u t  a rg u ab ly  n o t d is to rted - h is  own philosophical project. The 
a tte m p t w as a lso  m ade to  s itu a te  G ad am er’s a ttitu d e  w ith regard  to the  long 
trad itio n  in  G erm an  th o u g h t, w h ich  strived  to  re s is t the  dom ination  of 
techn ica l-sc ien tific  reaso n in g . T his h a s  p resen ted  me w ith the  o ppo rtun ity  to 
trace  p o in ts  of convergence no t only betw een  G ad am er an d  h is  ’im m ediate 
h e rita g e ’ of G erm an  idealism , the  R om antics, an d  th e  various g u ises  of 
phenom enology, especia lly  H u sserl a n d  Heidegger, b u t a lso  w ith the  intellectual 
trad itio n  of ’w este rn  M arx ism ’. T he linkage w ith  G erm an  Idealism  an d  the  
R om antics is p rim arily  d isc u sse d  th ro u g h  a n  eva lua tion  of G adam er’s 
ap p ro p ria tio n  of th e  n o tio n  of Bildung, while h is overall a tte m p t to free 
ph ilosoph ical reflection  from  techn ica l re a so n  is d iscu ssed  in con junction  w ith 
the  reflections of W eber, A dorno, a n d  H orkheim er on in s tru m e n ta lity , H u sserl’s 
critique  of the  sc ien ces in  th e  Crisis a n d  Heidegger's reflect ¡¡ins on  technology. 
The second  p a r t  o f th is  c h a p te r  is a  m ore explicit theo risa tion  of the  place 
occup ied  by trad itio n  a n d  th e  sy stem atic  re la tionsh ip  betw een  ’trad itio n ’ an d  
G ad am er’s  equally  h e re tica l conception  o f the  no tion  of prejudice. T his en ta ils  
th a t  th e  whole co n cep tio n  of the  E n lig h ten m en t regard ing  the  in n er logic
socialized individuals are accountable", or the remark that “Castoriadis perm is no difference between
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b ind ing  toge ther tru th  a n d  freedom  is  once ag a in  closely exam ined  a n d  cas t 
in to  d o ub t. O nce m ore, th is  allowed m e to critica lly  engage w ith  th e  M arxist 
trad itio n , especially  th ro u g h  a n  ap p re c ia tio n  of the  u n fav o u rab le  s ta tu s  
a ttr ib u te d  co n cu rren tly  to m yth  a n d  ra tio n a lity  by A dorno a n d  H orkheim er. 
T his led m e to  co n sid er m ore closely  th e  p rob lem  of p re jud ice ' seen  a s  
ideological d is to rtio n ' - a  fact th a t  acco rd in g  to  a s  d iverse c ritic s  of G ad am erian  
h e rm en eu tic s  a s  H ab erm as an d  R ico eu r re m a in s  allegedly unacknow ledged  or 
inadequate ly  a d d re sse d  in  G adam er’s  ph ilosophy- a n d  th u s  to a  co n sid era tio n  
of th e  M arxist concep tion  of ‘c la s s -c o n sc io u sn e ss ’ a n d  its  p o s tu la te d  effects for 
the  M arxist concep tion  of history . 1 c o n d u c t th is  relatively b<ief- b u t  c ru c ia l for 
the  p u rp o se s  o f th e  p re se n t thesis - d isc u s s io n  p rim arily  by  a n  ev a lu a tio n  of 
L ukács ' e lab o ra tio n s  o n  the  issu e  a s  developed in  h is  H istory a n d  C lass  
C onsciousness. G ad am er's  a t t e m n t to  e lab o ra te  a  'h is to rica l h e rm e n e u tic s ’ by 
m e an s  of th e  a b an d o n m en t of t h e  w idely accep ted  d is tin c tio n  betw een  
'trad itio n ' an d  h isto rica l re sea rch ’, o r  betw een  ‘h is to ry  a n d  know ledge’ po in ted  
m e to  th e  need  to  explore m ore closely  h is  n o tio n  o f the  fu s io n  o f ho rizon s’, to 
w hich  th e  first p a r t  of th e  fourth  c h a p te r  is ded ica ted .
Like m o st of the  key -fo rm ula tions in  th e  h is to ry  o f th o u g h t th e  concep t 
of th e  'fusion ' is  vested  w ith a  fam iliarity  th a t  a rguab ly  leaves it open  to  
m is in te rp re ta tio n s  m aking  a t  the  s a m e  tim e its  m ost im p o rta n t d im en sio n s  
a lm o st inaccessib le . E specially  in  re c e n t  epistem ological a c c o u n ts  th e  concep t 
of th e  'fu sion ' is  given su c h  a n  e x tra o rd in a ry  trea tm en t th a t  it is  a lm o st 
dep ic ted  in te rm s  of a  m echan ism . Not on ly  does th is  dep ic tion  en ta il a n  
ob litera tion  of th e  theoretica l p o sitio n s  th a t  G ad am er a p p ro p ria ted  in  o rd e r to
meaning and validity” (Habermas, 1987: 330-331).
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devise th is  concep t, b u t  It m ore im p o rtan tly  can ce ls  th e  o rd in a l  concep tion  of 
th e  ‘fu sio n ’ In te rm s  of a n  ‘even t’, i.e. In te rm s  o f ‘h is to rica l p rax is’. In  o rder to 
b e t te r  g ra sp  th e  m ode o f being  o f th e  ‘fu sion ’ th e  d isc u ss io n  in th e  firs t p a rt of 
th e  c h a p te r  is c o n d u c ted  by exploring  th e  close links b e tw een  the  co n cep t of th e  
‘fu s io n ’ a n d  H eidegger’s  ‘h e rm e n e u tic s  of facticity '. F u rth e rm o re , a  specific yet 
s u b s ta n tia l7 in s ta n c e  o f th e  ‘fu sio n ’, viz. the  ev en t of ’t r u th ’ m ade accessib le  In 
th e  very experiencing  o f th e  w ork  of a r t  is m ade th e m a tic  a n d  p o in ts  of 
convergence betw een  G adam er, W alte r B en jam in  an d  H eidegger o n  th e  issu e  
a re  explored. T he  final p a r t  of th e  th e s is  is a t  first g lance  co n cern ed  w ith the  
p rob lem s of co n tin u ity  a n d  ru p tu re  b u t  in  essen ce , it is  « re th in k in g  of th e  
re la tio n sh ip  b etw een  ‘p a s t’, ’p re s e n t’ a n d  ’fu tu re ’, of th t 'fleeting' an d  the  
‘e n d u rin g ’ a s  th e y  converge in  o u r  experiencing  of h is to rica l tim e. T he read er 
m ig h t be puzzled  by th e  fact th a t  a  sec tion  on  h is to rica l tim e b eg in s  by a 
d isc u ss io n  of th e  G ad am er-D errid a  d eb a te  -o r  sh o u ld  I s a y  t ,e failure  to  have a 
p ro p e r d eb ate- on  th e  n a tu re  o f language. N evertheless s ince  G ad am er’s 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  “fu sion  o f horizons" a n d  h is  ’d ialogical m odel’ w ere bo th  
u n d e r  critica l s c ru tin y  o n  the  a s su m p tio n  th a t  they  d isc lo se  G ad am er’s  alleged 
su p p re ss io n  of ‘d ifference’, of ’d isc o rd ’, a n d  u ltim ate ly  o f h ie ‘O th e r’ the  only 
v iable op tion  w as for m e to  s ta r t  w ith  th is  ju x tap o sitio n .
The in tro d u c tio n  o f two e s sa y s  w ritten  by  G a d a m e r th a t  explicitly  tack le  
th e  prob lem  o f co n tin u ity  an d  ru p tu re  a s  well a s  th e  p ecu lia r re la tio n sh ip  
betw een  w h a t w e cou ld  te rm  th e  sign ificance o f the  h is to rica l ‘ev en t’ a n d  th a t of 
th e  ’ex isten tia l m o m en t’ d ras tica lly  ch an g es  th e  scenery . Finally, it prov ides m e 
w ith  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  conclude th e  c h a p te r  w ith  a  co m p ariso n  betw een  th e
7 Substantial since the experience of art is o f paramount importance for the development o f Gadamer's
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p ecu lia r re ta in in g ' of th e  o rig in ’ in  H eidegger's th in k in g  o f h is to ry  in  close 
re la tion  to  th e  even t of t r u th  in  h is  P arm enidis  an d  a  s im ila r  p h en om en o n  
c h a ra c te r is tic  of G ad am er's  fo rm ulation  of th e  fusion '.
reflections on a conception of truth that surmounts the conceptual confines of science.
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Chapter One
Heidegger on
The question of Being, Dasein, and Histov icity 
Introductory Remarks
The a im  of t h i s  c h a p te r  is  to  explore th e  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  H eidegger's 
a tte m p ts  to  d ev ise  a  rad ica l o r fu n d a m e n ta l ontology am t h is  e n d eav o u r to 
g round  th e  n o tio n  of h is to ry  on  a u th e n tic  tem p o ra lity  a n d  h isto rica lity , w hile 
su b s titu tin g  h i s  concep tion  o f th e  D ase in  for th e  no tion  of ind iv iduality . T he 
first p a r t  of t h e  ch a p te r is  a n  a t te m p t to  s itu a te  H eidegger's allegedly novel 
conception  o f  th e  m ean ing  o f B eing in  th e  w ider co n tex t of th e  ph ilo soph ical 
trad itio n  a n d  to  critically  a s s e s s  th e  ob jec tion  th a t  h is  fu n d a m e n ta l ontology is 
an tith e tic a l to  a  critica l a n d  a u to n o m o u s  th e o r isa tio n  o f th e  soc ia l-h is to rica l 
dom ain . T he  seco n d  p a r t  o f  th is  c h a p te r  is a  m ore explicit th e o risa tio n  o f the  
way in  w h ich  a u th e n tic ity  is  re la ted  to  h is to rica l p rax is  bo th  o n  th e  'ind iv idual'
an d  th e  co llective levels.
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1.1 Recasting the ontological question: The Hermeneutic Project of 
Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology
It Is well know n th a t  H eidegger’s  m ain  in ten tio n  in  i-eing & T im e8 is to 
c a s t  an ew  -or p e rh a p s  accord ing  to  th e  p h ilo sop h er’s  o w r conviction to  cast 
properly  for th e  first tim e9 in  th e  h is to ry  o f ph ilosophy- th e  question  o f B eing10, 
o r m ore acc u ra te ly  th e  q u es tio n  co n cern in g  th e  “ m ean in g  of Being This 
la tte r  a n d  m ore specific fo rm ula tion  is  corrective of th e  first in  th a t  it directly 
p o in ts  to  th e  fac t th a t  Being h a s  a lw ays a lready  b e e n  in te rp re ted , a lth o u g h  the  
in te rp re ta tio n  itse lf h a s  b een  o b lite ra ted  (B&T: 21). O r ra th e r , it is in  th e  very 
n a tu re  of th is  in te rp re ta tio n 11 to  co n tin u a lly  conceal th e  d isc lo su re  o f Being, 
m ak ing  a  re fo rm u la tion  o f ” the  fu n d a m e n ta l q u es tio n  ” n ecessa ry  (B&T: 24-25). 
M eaning an d  question  c a n  be th u s  s e e n  a s  com plem en ting  one an o th e r , if 
m ean in g  is indeed  th o u g h t o u ts id e  th e  fram ew ork  of m e taph y sic s  an d  its 
em p h a s is  on  th e  concep t of e ssen ce . M ean ing  is in  th is  in te rp re ta tio n  a n  ac t of
8 See Heidegger 1962, hereafter referred to as B&T.
9 Thus, Heidegger's thought had a significant and almost immediate impact on young philosophy students 
in Germany; a success partly based on what was perceived as the radically innovative character of his 
philosophising. Gadamer gives an account of the tremendous influence Heidegger’s thought had on the 
generation o f students returning from World War I, and who “shattered by the collapse of an epoch wanted 
to begin completely anew” that places great emphasis on the fact that "Heidegger'; thought seemed to defy 
any comparison with what philosophy had previously meant” (Gadamer. 1967/1976: 229).
111 For a brief but elucidating account concerning the evolution o f Heidegger's thought and his early 
attempts at a formulation o f the question concerning the meaning o f “ being ”, especially with regard to his 
indebtedness to Fran/. Brentano’s Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seieiuten nach Aristoteles 
(Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 1862), and to Husserl’s Logical investigations, see Farrell Krell. 1993: 4-9; 
Bieinel 1993: 19 ff. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the aforementioned question can be articulated 
in three differentiated although interconnected dimensions, which result in the following modifications of 
the question itself: I. "The analytic question: What is the meaning... of the expression ‘Being’ (Sein)T' 2. 
"The metaphysical question: What is Being? Or, What is the ground of Being?” and 3. “The theological 
question: Why is there Being (rather than nothing at all)?” (Solomon, 1972: 1911
11 The nature of this interpretation is perhaps too difficult to accommodate in the beginning of our 
excursion in Heidegger’s thought. Nevertheless, it has to be said from the outset that in Heidegger’s 
radicalisation of the hermeneutic claim, interpretation is the essential condition for both his concept of 
historicity and for that situation which he describes as “ the disclosedness of Being ”.
Indeed, one has to contend with the assertion that this “ontological turn ” that classical hermeneutics 
underwent in Heidegger’s thought, means that it should be no longer “ seen as just a method for
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questioning, an d  m ore specifically “ a  q u es tio n  th a t  does l o t  aw ait a  specific 
an sw er, b u t  in s tead  po in ts  in a  c e r ta in  d irec tion  for in q u iry ”. M oreover, th is  
allegedly n o n -sta tic , n o n -m e tap h y sica l u n d e rs ta n d in g  o 1' m ean in g  is a lso  
a p p a re n t  b eh in d  H eidegger's in tro d u c tio n  of a n  “o rth o g rap h ica l a rc h a ism  in 
spelling  th e  te rm  'Seirí a s  'S eyrí in  o rd e r  to  u n d e rsc o re  its  c h a ra c te r  a s  a  verb" 
(G adam er, 1 9 8 5 /1989b: 111; see a lso  Heidegger, 1998c: 75). H eidegger is in 
fact in  th is  early  a tte m p t a lready  a w a re  of the  p rob lem  th a t  w as d es tin ed  to 
occupy  h is  la te r  w ritings, nam ely  t h a t  “ even w h en  we ask . W hat is Being, we 
keep  w ith in  a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  is, th o u g h  we a re  u n ab le  to  fix 
co n cep tua lly  w h a t th a t  is signifies." 12(B&T: 25). T h u s , a lth o u g h  th is  fac tu a l, 
average " u n d e rs ta n d in g  of Being d o es  n o t even allow  for a  c le a r  g rasp in g  of the  
ho rizon  in  te rm s  of w hich the  m e a n in g  of B eing is fixed, it n ev erth e le ss  
n e c e s s ita te s  the  fo im u lation  of th e  c o n c e p t13 of Being. A dditionally  it allow s for
understanding, but also as an ontological theory o f  the being o f understanding and of its conditions of 
possibility.” (Ruin 1994: 73)
2 cf. The following passage: “ The difficulty to which thoughtful utterance is subject has appeared often 
enough...The little word is, which speaks everywhere in our language, and tells ot Being even where it does 
not appear expressly, contains the whole destiny o f  Being -from the eo tiv  yap >f Parmenides to the is of 
Hegel’s speculative sentence, and to the dissolution of the is in the positing of the Will to Power with 
Nietzsche.” (Heidegger 1969: 73 hereafter referred to as ID). It is in this respect that Being and Time has 
been characterised as monumental, in that it made philosophy sensitive to the “ verbality ” in the word “ 
being ", to what constitutes an event in it, contrary to the habitual usage which refers to being “ as if it were 
substantive, even though it is a verb par excellence.” (Levinas 1985: 38). Levinas refers in this passage to 
the event o f appropriation, to this singulare tantum, which although not “ a happening” or an "occurrence" 
in the traditional understanding of the terms, is pertinent to the belonging together of Dasein and Being. It 
is this event that according to Heidegger constitutes the possibility of Dasem overcoming “the mere 
dominance of the [technological] frame [in order to] turn it into a more original appropriation" (ID: 36-37).
12 Heidegger does not deny that Being has been the presupposition of all ontology up to his days. This 
would be absurd, since without this presupposition “ there could have been no ontological knowledge 
before”. Nevertheless, b • claims that philosophy failed to elevate this understanding to the status of the 
concept (B&T: 27). Caputo, in his interpretation o f Being and Time, rightly underlines the close linkage 
between philosophy’s alleged failure to conceptualise Being and its subsequent failure in the 
conceptualisation of Dasein: “We do not know (wissen) what Dasein and a fortiori Being itself mean; we
lack a conceptual fix (begrifflich ftxieren) on them. But we always and alre.iJy move about within an 
understanding of them...and the task of hermeneutic phenomenology is to raise this pre-understanding to 
the level of an ontological concept" (Caputo, 1987; 67).
26
a n  inqu iry  in to  th e  in filtra tion  of th is  average u n d e r s t a t i n g  o f B eing w ith  
trad itio n a l th eo ries  a n d  op in io ns concern ing  th is  issu e  (loc. sit).
W h a t is th e n  a sk ed  a b o u t in  th e  q u estio n  of Being? How m u s t  we th in k  
th is  d eterm inan t of th e  e n tit ie s14, w h ich  H eidegger w a rn s  \w  “ is n o t  itse lf a n  
en tity  ”?  Partly , th e  an sw er lies in  th is  decisive h a lf  h e rm e n e u tic  half- 
phenom enological s te p  w hich, w hile re fu sing  B eing’s s ta tu s  a s  a n  en tity , 
a tte m p ts  to  q u estio n  th e  Being o f th e  en titie s  them selves, in  su c h  a  w ay a s  to  
allow  e n titie s  to  “ becom e accessib le  a s  they  are in them selves."  (B&T: 26 . 
em p h as is  added). T h u s , from  th e  o u ts e t  the  H eideggerian  n a rra tiv e  o f Being is  
n o t d es tin e d  to be 5iqyr|cn<; tru0ou nvoq IS, a  “m y th ica l” trac in g  b ack  o f th e  e n titie s  
to  th e ir o rig in 16. In s te ad , H eidegger in tro d u ces  th re e  d is tin g u ish e d  th o u g h
14 Heidegger formulates this in the following manner: “In the question we are to work out, what is asked 
about is Being- that which determines entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, 
however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of entities is not itself an entity” (B&T: 25-26).
15 An allusion to Plato’s Sophist, and specifically in the dialogue between Tneaetetus and the visiting 
philosopher from Elea: “ They each [i.e. philosophers, or philosophical schoolsl appear to me to tell us a 
myth, as if we were children. One tells us there are three beings...another one says that there are two 
beings...our Eleatic tribe...tells us their myth on the assumption that what they call all things are just one." 
(Sophist, 242c-d: 263). Gadamer remarks that in other parts of the Sophist, the stranger from Elea 
expounds the “two basic modes o f manifestation o f beings as motion and rest", which seem to exhaust 
“completely the possibilities of the manifestation o f Being”. Nevertheless in Gadamer’s reading of this 
dialogue the stranger’s intention is not to “understand Being as the universal genus which differentiates 
itself into these two aspects o f Being”. Plato is then seen as rather intending to show that in speaking about 
being “a differentiation is implicit which does not distinguish different realism(s) of Being but rather 
suggests an inner structuredness of Being itself’and which furthermore shows that the two aspects in 
question are not mutually exclusive but “mutually determining”. The true philosopher -in  contrast with 
the sophist- is thus only able to think “the togetherness of Being (the affirmation) and Non-being (the 
negation) which constitutes the nature of beings”, while “the later Heidegger’’ is said to take up the 
question at “this point”, i.e. to the realisation that the determinate mode in which eide are made manifest as 
“unchangeable determinateness” determines the very meaning of unconceaiment and consequently amounts 
to the abandonment of the question concerning the meaning of Being (Gadamer, 1094: 83-84).
16 The way in which Heidegger understands myth is, in this context, quite obscure, although it could 
arguably be interpreted as synonymous to metaphysical thought. It is clear though, that in his view, 
"mythical”, or “metaphysical” accounts attribute the existence of entities to its origination by a primal 
source, which is in turn conceived in the mode o f  an entity. Consequently, the ontological difference, viz. 
the difference between Being and beings is obliterated. In this context it might be helpful to pay heed to 
the specific importance that, even in later writings, Heidegger attributes to the oblivion of the 
aforementioned difference. Thus, oblivion and difference form a couplet, the lattei referring to "what is un- 
thought", the former is “what gives us thought”, and although oblivion is understood by Heidegger as “a 
veiling o f the difference as such, thought in terms of Af|0q (concealment)”, it nevertheless “does not 
happen to the difference only afterward, in consequence of the forgetfulness o f Being”. Rather, the
in te rc o n n ec ted  levels of in q u iry  -the  fu n d am e n ta l/o n to lo g ic a l l7, the  ontological 
in  th e  fam iliar s e n s e  of th e  te rm , an d  th e  on tical- w h e re u p o n  th e  priority  o f th e  
q u es tio n  of B eing is  g ro u n d ed  (B&T: 31). In H eidegger’s p ro je c t o f fu n d am en ta l-  
ontology we e n c o u n te r  the refo re  a  rad ica lisa tio n  of trad iV o n a l ph ilosoph ical 
c la im s over th e  leg itim isa tio n  of scientific d isco u rses  a n d  p rac tice s , a s  th in k e rs  
like K ant a n d  Hegel p ro n o u n ced  th e m .18 A ph ilosoph ical p ro je c t th a t  in q u ire s  
in to  th e  possib ility  of (n a tu ra l) sc ience  a s  su ch  (Kant) o r th a t  a im s  a t 
su b o rd in a tin g  th e  sc ien ces  to  th e  ph ilosoph ical “ Science o f th e  Idea " (Hegel), is 
h ere  p ro n o u n ced  to  be in a d e q u a te 19 a n d  endow ed w ith  a  c e r ta in  k ind of naiueté. 
T he ontological p rio rity  of th e  q u estio n  of Being is th u s  su m m a rise d :
“oblivion belongs to the difference because the difference belongs to oblivion”(IIf 50-51-emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, this attempt to surmount the problems allegedly inherent in “mythical” accounts does not 
entail the abolition of the notion of the origin in Heidegger's thought, as we wdl attempt to show in the 
development of our presentation.
17 Although Heidegger sketches this distinction in the context discussed above, the term fundamental 
ontology is introduced for the first time in page 34, para.4.
18 The affinities, as well as the differences of the project o f fundamental ontology with Husserl’s 
phenomenology, both with regard to the critique o f scientific reason and to the perceived urgency for a 
philosophy of the origins should also be accounted for in this context. Obviously, Heidegger’s own 
position towards Husserl was less explicitly formulated and this is the reason why I find it preferable to 
defer this discussion until later. I would nevertheless like to draw the reader s attention to a passage 
supporting the interpretation offered above concerning the radicalisation o f "traditional” philosophical 
claims, while exemplifying a certain reproach on Heidegger’s part even against Husserl’s version of 
phenomenology: “For we should have to be certain beforehand that phenomenological inquiry today has 
reached the centre of philosophy’s problems and has defined its own nature by way o f their possibilities. 
As we shall see, however, this is not the case- and so little is it the case that one of the main purposes of 
this course is to show that, conceived in its basic tendency, phenomenological research can represent 
nothing less than the more explicit and more radical understanding of the idea o f  a scientific philosophy 
which philosophers from ancient times to Hegel sought to realize time and again in a variety of internally 
coherent endeavours” (B nP: 3-emphasis added).
It nevertheless seems ro me quite clear that Heidegger’s alleged “contempt” , or his "negative attitude” 
towards the empirical sciences is directly connected with a certain interpretation on Heidegger’s part of 
certain sections of Hegel’s writings. This can be seen if we consider e.g. the following passage from 
Hegel’s Science o f  Logic: ’The consideration of this stage belongs to the doctrine o f spirit proper, which 
would embrace what is the subject matter of ordinary empirical psychology, but which, to be the science of 
spirit, must not go empirically to work, but be scientifically conceived. Spirit is i.' this stage finite spirit, in 
so far as the content o f its determinateness is an immediate, given content; the science of finite spirit has to 
display the process in which it liberates itself from this its determinateness and goes on to grasp the truth of 
itself, which is infinite spirit" (Hegel, 1969: 782). It has to be remarked tha' in Hegel’s terminology 
science denotes his own speculative philosophy, which in Hegel’s eyes shoulc, be able to provide “the 
various sciences" with the context whereby they would strive to attain their aims. Philosophy could be thus 
said to be for Hegel the unconditioned in contradistinction with the empirical sciences, which are conceived
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B asically a ll ontology, no m atter how rich and firm ly  com pacted  o> a system  
o f  categories it has a t its disposal, rem ains blind and p erver ted  from  its ownm ost 
aim , if  it has not f ir s t adequately c larified  the meaning o f  Being, ut.d conceived  
th is  clarification a s  its fundam ental task. (Loc. sit).
“ B lind  to its ow nm ost a im  H as th e  u rgency  o f the  H eideggerian  pro ject 
re a c h e d  its  apex w ith  th is  p h ra se , a  rea l in su lt’ to  the  ph ilosoph ical legacy? 
A nd if so , h a s  H eidegger m ade c lear th e  w ay in  w hich  h is  p ro tect is to  be carried  
o u t?
P resum ab ly , a  fu r th e r  ju s tif ic a tio n  is  requ ired  b o th  w ith regard  to th a t  level 
w h ich  h e  earlier relegated  to  the  low est s ta tu s  (for th e  tr ip a r tite  div ision  of the  
levels o f  inquiry  is in a  s e n s e  h ie ra rch ica l20), a n d  w ith  regard  to  th e  en tity  " in 
w hich  th e  m ean ing  o f Being is to  be d isce rn ed  " (B&T: 26).
A s regards th e  second  leg o f th e  afo rem en tioned  ta sk s , D asein  is 
u n d e rs to o d  a s  th is  en tity  w hich  is on tically  d is tin g u ish e d  from  o th e r  en titie s  in
as dependent on “some specific context of opinions, theories, attitudes, and values" (Solomon, 1983: 179; 
see also Hegel, 1977: 23 ff, where the philosopher attacks the disciplines of histoi \ and mathematics).
20 That this hierarchy is not incontestable is rather too obvious. Adorno offers an interesting and 
provocative reversal of this, using the analogy o f the edifice. If the philosopher is said by Heidegger 
(always according to Adorno's polemical interpretation) to be the “ architect who presents and develops the 
blueprint o f the house, |then] the sociologist is like the cat burglar who climbs the walls from outside and 
takes out what he can reach". But this acceptance of the analogy on Adorno's part signifies only his 
willingness to “ interpret positively the function...[Heidegger] gave sociology for philosophy.” (Adorno. 
1977: 130). Of course, “ philosophy ” in this context stands primarily -if not exclusively- for Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology, which given its popularity at the time -a popularity that Adorno all too readily 
acknowledges- represents an influential and therefore dangerous example of a philosophical attitude that “ 
only veils reality and eternalises its present condition”. Moreover, the question of being itself is said to 
exemplify this attitude since it assumes that “ being itself is appropriate to 'hought and available to 
it...|whereas)...The idea of being has become...an empty form principle whose archaic dignity helps to 
cover any content whatsoever ” (Ibid., : 120). In this respect, and in defence ot Heidegger’s definition of 
fundamental-ontology one could cite one of his most important and subtle critics who contented that “ 
(fundamental] ontology would be distinguished from all the disciplines which exoloie that which is., while 
forgetting that in speaking of these beings they have already understood the meaning o f the word being.
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th a t  its  Being is alw ays " a n  issu e  for it i ts  d is tinc tiv e  o n to  al c h a rac te r is tic  is 
i ts  being  ontological 21 (B&T: 32). The p rio r ity  of D asem 22 is fu rth e rm o re  
e s ta b lish e d  on  th e  g ro u n d s  of its  be ing  th e  on ly  en tity  h av in  ' th e  “ d e te rm in a te  
c h a ra c te r  o f ex istence  ”, w hile it is  c o n s id e re d  a s  th e  on ly  en tity  th a t  could  
provide “ th e  ontico-ontological co n d ition  for th e  possib ility  of an y  ontology.” 
(B&T: 34). Now, a lth o u g h  fu n d a m e n ta l on to logy  m u s t be so u g h t in the  
existen tia l analy tic  o f  D asein, th e  ro o ts  o f th e  la t te r  a re  o n rical-existentiell an d  
by  a  w ay of detour  H eidegger a n n o u n c e s  th e  ontical priority  of th e  q u es tio n  of 
B eing  23(loc. sit).
F a r  from  rem oving  all am bigu ity , th e  on tico -on to log ica l p rio rity  of D ase in  po in ts  
to  th e  very difficulty o f D ase in ’s  a tte m p t to  m a k e  m an ifest to  itse lf  its  “ow n 
specific s ta te  of Being ” 24. In o th e r  w ords th e  m ultip lic ity  of in te rp re ta tio n s
without, however, having made it explicit. These disciplines do not worry about such an implication." 
(Levinas, 1985: 38-39).
21 Dasein’s being ontological is not in this context tantamount to the development of an ontological inquiry 
“ explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities ”, but rather as “ being in such a way as having an 
understanding of Being” This is the reason why Heidegger also defines Dasem in this context as pre- 
ontological.
22 Although the question has yet to remain open, whether the aforementioned priority is tantamount to a 
reduction of"  material ontology ” to the “ realm of subjectivity, within the depths of which it searches for 
what it was not able to locate in the open fullness of reality ”, as Adorno (1977:123) argued.
23 More emphatically put, Dasein has in a phenomenological manner “ revealed itself as that entity which 
must first be worked out in an ontologically adequate manner...” and since we are going to occupy 
ourselves with the question of being, Dasein is proved to be the this entity which “ in its Being lalready 
comports itself) towards what we are asking about when we ask this question.” This entails that the 
question of Being consists precisely in the radicalisation “o f an essential tendeni v-of-Being which belongs 
to Dasein itself- the /ire-ontological understanding of Being.” (B&T: 35, emphasis added). Additionally, 
and by way of anticipation, it has to be noticed that the prefix ip  re) is not used in an accidental manner; it 
rather already “points to Dasein’s temporality.” (Biemel 1993: 59).
24 The acknowledgment of this difficulty is o f course all but new in the history ot philosophy. Socrates in 
his discussion with Phaedrus (229e- 230) announces in quite an urgent manner both the opacity of human 
existence and the subsequent need for philosophy to begin with a thorough examination of the human 
being: “cpol 86 ttp6<; auiu ou8apuj<; earl ayoXij t 6  86 afrtov, to iplXc, t o u t o u  t 6 6 i : o u  Suvapui tree xard t o  
AcXipucbv Ypapga yvcuvai epaurdv yeXetov 8f| pot ipaivETai t o u t o  e t i  ayvoouvra id  aXXdxpta o k o t t e i v ”  
(nXdxiuv. 2000: 76), which in Nehamas and W oodruffs translation reads: “But I have no time for such 
things; and the reason, my friend, is this. 1 am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know 
myself; and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that” (Plato, 
1997: 510). I think it would be preferable if the -otherwise good- translation reai “being still ignorant o f ” 
instead of “before I have understood”, since apart from being a more literal transl ition o f the ayvoouvra, it 
also points directly to the celebrated “Socratic ignorance". It has to be remarked though, that the affinity
30
alw ays a lready  available a t  th e  on tico -ex isten tie ll level In te rru p ts  th e  a tta in m e n t 
of a  ju s tified  in te rp re ta tio n  of (D ase in ’s) Being an d  th e  re so rt to  a n  ex isten tia l 
p rim ordiality  th a t the  la tte r  re q u ire s  (B&T: 37).
T hus, the  ex isten tia l analy tic  o f D ase in  h a s  to  be provision. 1 in  th a t  it sh o u ld  
co n ten t itse lf in sim ply m aking  m a n ife s t the  " Being o f th is  f .i ti ty  [i.e. D asein] ” 
a s  th e  very possibility  of th e  a t ta in m e n t of a n  horizon in  te rm s  of w hich “ th e  
m ost p rim ordial way of in te rp re tin g  Being ’’ w ould b e  m ade possib le . T he 
philosophical ta sk  being th u s  c o n s tru e d , H eidegger h a s  to  ta k e  reco u rse  to 
D asein ’s  everydayness, th a t  b e in g  the  essen tia l a n d  p e rs is te n t s tru c tu re s  
p o ssessed  by factical D asein , w h ere in  D asein  could  be show n a s  it “ is  ” 
proxim ally an d  for the  m ost p a r t  (ibid: 38-39).
Allegedly, th is  s tep  ju s t if ie s  Heidegger’s  choice to  point to  “ tem porality  a s  
the  m ean ing  of Being of th a t  e n t i ty  ” w hich h e  h a s  prev iously  n am e d  D ase in 25. 
F u rtherm ore , once the  a fo rem en tio n ed  ch a rac te r is tic  o f tem pora lity  h a s  b e e n  
d em o n stra ted  Heidegger w ould  b e  able to  in te rp re t D ase in ’s s tru c tu re  a s  m o d es  
of tem porality , w hich is co m m on ly  held to  be the  incom ple te  ta s k  Heidegger se t 
for h im self in  Being an d  Tim e 26 (B&T: 39).
between the priority of self-examination advocated by Socrates in the aforementioned Platonic dialogue- 
and indeed in many other occasions- should not be overemphasised, although one could argue that with the 
concept of being-towards-death Heidegger moves more explicitly into this more "personal” type of 
investigation. It also seems to this reader that despite the similarities with Husserl’s attempt to radicalise 
the Cartesian quest for certainty, Heidegger — or what seems to be the most fruitful interpretation o f his 
thought- would like to break with the lack o f clarity regarding “the meaning o f 'he Being o f the suin’ in 
Descartes' most celebrated dictum, “cogito ergo sum" (see B&T: 46).
Reflecting on his usage o f the term Dasein several years after the publicati >n of B&T and obviously 
irritated by its reception by academic circles, Heidegger explicitly rejects tin idea of Dasein being a 
substitution for the term consciousness, “ as this were simply a matter o f using different words’”. Rather, 
he insists, Dasein “ names that which is first of all to be experienced, and subsequently thought 
accordingly, as a place- namely as the locality o f the truth o f Being." (Heidegger, [ ’949] 1998: 283).
26 Neither the second part o f the book, nor the third division of the first part en'itled “ time and Being ’’ 
were ever published, although the section on Kant’s concept of schematism *t >m the second part was 
published independently as a book entitled “ Kant and the Problem of Metaphy v.cs ” (Biemel, 1993: 38). 
In this sense, Heidegger’s project is said to have failed or at best to have been mcomplete. The former 
assertion is closely linked with a suspicion with regard to the kind of question asl. d by Heidegger in Being
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At th is  point, a  d isc u ss io n  concern ing  th e  concep t o f ton e  th a t  H eidegger 
a t te m p ts  to e s ta b lish  in  c o n trad is tin c tio n  to  th e  'trad itio n a l' o n e  (w h ich  qu ite  
in te re stin g ly  co m p rises  th e  whole h is to ry  o f th o u g h t from  A is to tle  to  Bergson) 
h a s  to  be firs t fo rm u la ted  by m e a n s  o f o u r  pay ing  a tte r .d o n  to  H eidegger's 
a t te m p t to th in k  of tim e a s  c o n s titu tin g  th e  ho rizon  w hereby any  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
of b e ing  is o b ta ined , w hile the  very  concep tion  o f tim e h a s  co be  g e n e ra te d  by 
D ase in 's  tem porality . T h e  cen tra lity  a ttr ib u te d  to  tim e c a n  serve a s  t h e  vehicle 
for th e  d es tru c tio n  o f tra d itio n a l ontology, in  illu m in a tin g  tim e’s  im p o rta n c e  
b o th  w ith  regard  to th e  c o n s titu tio n  o f en titie s  a s  tem pora l o r  s u p ra - te m p o ra l 
a n d  by  ind ica ting  th e  linkage betw een  a n  co ncep tion  o f tim e  a n d  the  
tra d itio n a l d ichotom y b e tw een  Being a n d  non-B eing. W hat is m ore , i t  is Being 
itself, an d  n o t ju s t  e n titie s  in  tim e, th a t  becom es allegedly acc e ss ib le  (visible) in 
i ts  tem p o ra l c h a rac te r , w h ich  sh o u ld  n o t be  ag a in  u n d e rs to o d  in  th e  tra d itio n a l, 
privative fash ion  of so m e th in g  a -tem p o ra l being  ju x ta p o se d  10 te m p o ra l  en titie s  
(B&T: 39-40). W hat is th e n , th e  specific im p o rtan ce  of th e  te m p o ra lisa tio n  of 
th e  “ h u m a n  Being " t h a t  th e  sign ification  “ D asein  " a t te m p ts  to  b r in g  to  the  
fore, an d  in w h a t specific w ays do es it illu m in a te  B eing a s  su c h ?  F u rth e rm o re , 
w h a t k ind  o f experience  o f t r u th  does th is  unconcealm env  a t te s t  to ?  W hilst 
a tte m p tin g  to  m ake head w ay  tow ard s th is  d irec tion  we sh o u ld  p a y  heed  to
and Time pointing at the same time to his inability to escape the “ enhanced circle of the philosophy of the 
subject ” (Habermas 1985:152). The latter assertion, although recognising Heidegger’s inability to 
overcome metaphysics understands itself as somehow remaining “within Heidegger's thought”, while 
maintaining that in order to attain the destruction of metaphysics Heidegger had literally to “ change 
horizons ” so that along with the concept of time he had to rid his philosophical framework of all the 
themes dependent upon it. As a result, Dasein, finitude, historicity “ will no longer constitute the 
transcendental horizon of the question of Being, but in transition will be reconstituted on the basis of the 
theme of the epochality o f Being.” (Derrida 1982:64). This seems to me to be an allusion to Heidegger's 
Identity and Difference where Heidegger points to the “ historic, always epocha' . haracter" o f  the clearing 
of Being (ID: 67). However, it is not clear to me how the question o f Being could be asked from within the 
alternative horizon that Derrida promulgates, and how distinctive an idea o f epcchality could be from that 
of historicity.
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H eidegger’s in s is te n c e , tha t be ing  the  h ig h est in  ran k , the q u estio n  of B eing 
cond itions no t on ly  ph ilosophy27 an d  language28, b u t  a lso  h u m a n  ex istence  a s  
su ch .
A ccordingly, th e  e n tire  range of possib ilities29 o f th e  alwa- s  h isto rical being- 
th e re  th a t  D a-se in  alw ays is, a re  said  to  be g ro u nd ed  on th e  "power" g en era ted  
from  w ith in  a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of Being, even if th e  la tte r is a n  “indefinite" one 
(IM: 83). W ith th i s  move H eidegger w ishes to  in troduce  h is  read ers  to  a 
concep tion  of know ledge, t ru th  an d  experience th a t goes well beyond  the  
confines of t ra d it io n a l logic. If it is possib le  th a t  Being be u n d e rs to o d -a n d  we 
m ay w ish  to  ad d  a lso  experienced- in  certa in  w ays, th e n  irrespectively  o f th e  
ind e term inacy  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f th is  s ta te  of affairs. Being m u s t  have a  m ean ing , 
it m u s t open  its e lf  u p  to h u m a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  (IM: 84). W h a t is m ore, it is 
exactly  th is  d isc lo su re  of B eing th a t is co n stitu tiv e  of th e  h u m a n  e lem en ts  in 
h u m a n  beings; it is  th e ir  specific h isto rica l b e ing -there  (loc. C it.)
T his co n ten tio n  p o in ts  tow ards a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of the  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  
Being a n d  th e  D ase in , w hich is  deeper an d  m ore originary  th a n  it is com m only  
th o u g h t. In th is  con text, H eidegger's co m posu re  to p e n e tra te  beyond  the  
horizon  opened  u p  by  the  d icho tom ous sub jec t-ob jec t re la tio n 30, shou ld  be  seen
:7 Philosophy, understood in this context as the discipline lacking an object, signifies for Heidegger the 
process, which “must at nil times achieve being (in its appropriate manifestness) ¡.new” (1M: 85, emphasis 
added).
2* It is indicative in this respect that in the absence of the human ability to roughly distinguish between the 
“being” and the “not-being" of the essent (a state of affairs rendered “the indetc ‘inmate understanding of 
Being” in Heidegger’s terminology), language and consequently the constitution o f  “the speaker” would be 
both ontologically impossible (1M: 78 and 82).
29 That is the authentic affirmation of one’s historical being-there, and/or an indifferent -and for this very 
reason inauthentic- attitude towards it, are both equally grounded on specific ways of understanding Being 
in a preliminary manner (see IM: 83).
111 Castoriadis speaks o f  what he calls the “inherited philosophy” in terms very similar to Heidegger’s 
treatment o f “western metaphysics”, although he identifies the obliterated element in the history of 
philosophy not in "the Being of beings" but in the "social historical”, that being “the proper domain and 
mode of being and.. .the de jure and de facto ground and medium of any thought”. This move is o f crucial
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a s  a n  a t te m p t to libera te  th in k in g  from  th e  te n e ts  of com m on sen se  rea lism , 
a n d  its  S u b jec tiv is t co u n te rp a rt. We a re  th u s  in tro d u ceo  to  a  “m ysterious" 
m u tu a l re la tio n sh ip  betw een  Being an d  D asein , w here th e  l i t t e r ’s  ex isten ce  is 
g ro u n d ed  o n  the  d isc lo sed n ess31 o f th e  form er, a lth o u g h  th is  does n o t en ta il 
th a t  Being b eco m es d e p e n d e n t on  D asein . In a  ce rta in  sen se , D ase in  is  show n  
to  be “th e  m e asu re  of all th in g s”, in  th a t  Being’s  d isc lo su re  becom es 
in c o m p reh en sib le  an d  indeed  u n th in k a b le  w ith o u t th e  active involvem ent on 
th e  p a rt o f h u m a n  beings. T he active n a tu r e  of th is  involvem ent sh o u ld  n o t be 
m is in te rp re te d  a s  en ta ilin g  an y  k ind  o f c ru d e  decision lsrn , s in ce  a lth o u g h  
D ase in  c an , a n d  indeed sh o u ld , s trive to  p e n e tra te  B eing by q u es tio n in g  it, i t  is 
B eing th a t  h o ld s  sw ay over h u m a n s , “a p p re h e n s io n  is th e  h a p p en in g  th a t  h a s  
m a n ” (IM: 141). D ase in ’s  e ssen ce  b eco m es th e n  on ly  th in k a b le  by m e a n s  of 
th is  re la tio n sh ip , a s  H eidegger’s  id io syncra tic32-b u t  no t u n p reced en ted - *12
importance since it denies that Heidegger’s thought succeeded in overcoming the subject-object dichotomy 
and thereby places him within the “inherited” philosophical tradition, which has posited “a polarized 
couple: the subject or ego on the one hand (psyche, animus, transcendental consciousness, ego, Dasein as 
the je  eigenes, j e  meinesY the object or world on the other hand (cosmos, creation, nature, transcendence. 
Welt and/or Being)’’ (Castoriadis, 1997: 376-377).
11 Heidegger distinguishes between the “uncoveredness” o f a being and the “disclosedness" o f its being, 
while he attributes a certain primacy to the latter, as the necessary precondition of the former (PP: 72).
12 Heidegger is well aware of the oddness of his interpretation- also coupled by several non-traditional but 
equally ingenious translations from the Greek- which brings the thoughts of t‘ie two great Presocratics 
closer than one could normally dare suggest, in his arguing that “Heraclitus to whom is ascribed the 
doctrine o f becoming as diametrically opposed to Parmenidis’ doctrine of being, says the same as 
Parmenidis." (IM: 97- emphasis added). A further explication of the philosophical grounds of this 
interpretation can be found in the Heraclitus Seminar, where Heidegger underlines the difference between a 
pre-conceptual understanding of yiveau; (the act o f begetting) in Heraclitus and the modern concept of 
becoming, which he summarizes as follows: “ When Heraclitus thinks o f ytveai. in yivopcvuiv he does not 
mean becoming in the modern sense, he does not mean a process (Heidegger & Fink 1993: 8).
May’s (1996: 56, n.153) suggestion that Heidegger does not receive the impetus for his “new poetic 
thinking” neither from the pre-Socratics, nor “from western (theo)-mystical thinking, nor from Nietzsche’s 
poetic thinking” may in this context be illuminating with regard to Heidegger’s intentions. On the other 
hand, there are instances where May’s argument becomes one-sided by blatantly assuming that Heidegger’s 
ideas concerning Being and Nothing would be almost impossible without the influences exerted upon him 
by the -“alien” to the west- Eastern tradition and especially by Daoism (see esp. p 42-43 and 51-57). That 
this argument entails a certain interpretation on the author’s part with regard :o the possible ways of 
thinking opened up by the aforementioned thinkers is to my mind undeniable. Besides, it has been argued 
(Yannaras: 1998), with a rigour that matches May’s argument, that Heidegger’s thought regarding Being 
and nothing reveals certain similarities with that of Dionysius de Areopagite. whom Heidegger explicitly
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in te rp re ta tio n 33 of H erac litus  a n d  P a rm e n id is  a tte m p ts  to show. Irrespectively  
of w h e th e r  we a re  willing to  follow th is  H eidegger's move or not, we sh o u ld  
em p h asize  th a t  H eidegger sp e a k s  h e re  of a  "sam enes-." w hich h a s  th e  
" in ex haustib le  r ich n ess  o f w h a t on  every sing le  day is a s  th ; ugh  th a t day  w ere 
its  f irs t” (loc. Cit.) an d  h a s  therefore n o th in g  to do w ith  a n  em pty  iden tifica tion  
of th e  two g rea t th in k e rs , w ho acc o rd in g  to H eidegger were n o t yet 
"ph ilo sop h ers” 34 (WP: 45).
mentions in the Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology. With this remark I do not aim at undermining May's 
contribution to Heidegger's scholarship, which indeed seems to me extremely significant. Nor do I wish to 
avert one’s attention from Heidegger's interaction with the East, which as Parkes (1996) convincingly 
shows is also extended to a more direct exchange between Heidegger and modern Japanese philosophy, 
especially that of Kuki Shu/.o. I am only concerned with the consequences of what could be called the 
“westernisation” o f a series of thinkers, that being their violent incorporation -  of which Heidegger himself 
is not innocent and the pre-Socratics are by no means the only victims- into a rigid line of development that 
philosophical thought has allegedly undergone. More emphatically put. I am of the opinion, that this 
peculiar genealogy, ever recurrent under many guises since Nietzsche’s identification of Socrates as the 
“first theoretical man" and also encapsulated in the idea of “western metaphysics”, has proved to be more 
of a hindrance to the attempt to “think thinking itself’ than one might nowadays be willing to admit. Yet. 
one might still feel the need to ask whether the form that the West’s obsession with overcoming 
metaphysics has assumed, prevents a genuine dialogue with past thinkers, the thoughts of whom lay bare, 
maimed, and lifeless in Procrustes' bed.
”  I am referring here mainly to a precedent in Hegel’s treatment o f Parmenidis and Heraclitus. In his 
discussion on quantity in the Science o f Logic and in attempting to show the fallacies resulting from Kant's 
alleged proof of the antinomies o f pure reason, Hegel consents that the dialéctica' doctrines o f the ancient 
Eleatic school, “especially those concerning motion.. .have for result the pure being o f Parmenidis, in that 
in them is demonstrated the dissolution of all determinate being; they are thus themselves the flux of 
Heraclitus (Hegel 1969: 198). It goes without saying that contrary to Heidtgger’s account here the 
difference between the two doctrines is dialectically sublated  in favour of becoming.
34 Heidegger could be interpreted here as pointing towards a certain discrepancy, preserved in language, 
between the Avqp Otkóaoipoi; and the philosophical (philosophish; philosopiiique) man. Thus, Avf)p 
<piXóao<po<; signifies someone who ipiXel t o  ootpóv ( literally, “loves” the wise), which Heidegger 
interprets as an attunment to being expressed in the mode of Ev I lavra This "marvel”, according to 
Heidegger, in order to sustain the attack of sophistry, had to be preserved by “men who trailed in the way 
which leads to this marvel”, while this preservation took the mode of a nostalgic tendency towards the 
wise. In the process, the t o  ootpóv tptXciv as correspondence wi .,., or attunment to the wise, becomes a 
“peculiar tendency towards the wise” which establishes ipiAoootpict (WP: 41-43) Arguably, this change 
signifies a loss; a loss o f the Ev nóvra understood asD Kóogo^, as the light -or the Heraclitean fire- which 
brings entities to unconcealedness and gathers them in a unique collection (Heidegger, 1998b: 61). Here 
Heidegger provides us -in a manner that permeates his oeuvre as a whole- with a non-historiographical 
account of decline with regard to both the history o f  philosophy and history as such, since the two are 
thought by Heidegger in their belonging-together (see e.g. WP: 35). In technical/ historiographical terms 
his project of fundamental ontology was abandoned by the time he gave his Paris lecture entitled Wliat is 
That, Philosophy? Nevertheless, I think that the question is asked from within tilt problematique opened up 
by Being and Time, at least as far as “the question o f the meaning o f being” and Mat concerning the “truth 
of being" (see e.g. Aylesworth 1993: xii) or what in the aforementioned lecture could be termed as "the 
question of the way to Being" are far from being incommensurable with one ano her. In the same breath.
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T h u s  “th e  s a m e ” (to Auto), Is f i r s t  and  fo rem o st  to  b e  c o n s tru e d  a s  the  
topos w here th e  possib ility  of a  g e n u in e  d ialogue w ith  th e  ph ilosoph ical 
trad itio n  is opened  u p . A d ialogue p ro p e r  is  co n s tru ed  in  th is  con tex t a s  speech  
in  th e  sen se  of 6iaAeYeo0ai„ w hich  is a lso  opoAoyEiv, viz. “spying w h a t B eing is 
a s  long a s  it is”35 (WP: 55).
T herefore, if H eidegger w ishes to  avoid  ab su rd ity , h is  c o n te n tio n  th a t  
H erac litu s’ “doctrine  o f becom ing” a n d  P a rm en id is ' "doctrine of being”, "say  the  
S a m e”, can  only be in te rp re te d  in  th e  s e n s e  ind icated  above viz. in th e  sen se  of 
a n  Opo-Aoyia nepi iou a u io u .36 S eco n d ly , an d  by defau lt, To Auto becom es the  
locus w here from  we c o u ld  th in k  th e  e s se n c e  of m a n  in  its  re la tio n sh ip  to  being, 
o r ra th e r  m a n  a s  being  "essen tially  th i s  re la tio n sh ip  of re sp o n d in g  to  B eing”, 
a n d  being  ”only  this" (ID: 3 1 -em p h as is  added). In w h a t w ays does th is  pointer *15
and although I wholeheartedly embrace Heidegger’s intention to re-think along the pre-Socratics the origins 
of thought, to “step back” as it were from the modern technological" framework" and in keeping silent “to 
save thinking from humiliation” (see ID: 49 ff; Heidegger 1989: 57), I cannot but point once more to the 
reservations I raised earlier (n.20), while making here the additional point that, in my view. Heidegger’s 
understanding of the West is pivotal to the construction of his account concerning the history of 
metaphysics. More cautiously put, it is crucial for us to discern the ways in which he defines Europe 
(Europa), the West (Abendland) and the East and to account for the position attri.“ tted by the thinker to the 
early Greek thought that nourished in Minor Asia (see e.g. the oscillating remarks on the issue throughout 
Heidegger, 1998b). In this respect, it is interesting to cite Renti Brague’s remark concerning “Heidegger’s 
negative attitude towards the Roman experience” o f  Europe, developed especially in his lectures on 
Parmenidis of the winter semester in 1942-1943 (Brague, 1992: 44). In other words, Brague argues that 
"Roman experience", having a secondary nature with regard to both its Greek and Jewish origins, is 
conceived by Heidegger as a loss with regard to the experience of an origin .
15 OpoAoydv (ent-sprechen) is thus for Heidegger the most genuine mode of Dasein's partaking in Being; 
a partaking that is best exemplified in the dawn o f thinking itself, in the great age o f Parmenides, when “the 
saga of the being o f the essent itself partakes o f the (hidden) essence of the being of which it speaks” (IM: 
98). What is perhaps intended here is the exemplification of a certain homology between being and being- 
human preserved in language in an ambivalent form (the homologous in opo-/.oydv) and o f its verbal 
expression (i.e. opoAoydv as saying). I cannot help but linking this sense o f ogokoydv with Heidegger’s 
remark that Heraclitus " has described no phenomena; rather he has simply seen them” (Heidegger & Fink 
1993: 14).
*  This Heidegger's interpretation could be seen primarily as an attempt to overcome the traditional 
philosophical distinction between being and becoming, being and appearance, being and thought etc., in 
order to allow for a thinking which could grasp Being and Nothing in their belonging-together (see IM: 85). 
I think that this move is also consonant with his attempt to make Being thematic u more efficient a manner 
than any previous philosopher.
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su cceed  In going beyond  the  “zoological” defin ition37 of h u m a n  b e ing s  th a t  
accord ing  to  H eidegger h a s  sh a p e d  “the  W estern  doctrine  o f m a n ”, hav ing  
co n seq u en tly  defined th e  n a tu re  o f “all psychology, e th ic s, theory  o f know ledge 
a n d  anthropology"? (IM: 142). In p u rsu in g  th is  q uestion , w< could  p e rh a p s  gain  
som e in s ig h t w ith reg ard  to th e  “being" a n d  the  “th e re '-b e in g  o f D a-sein . 
H eidegger provides u s  w ith a n  in te rp re ta tio n  of the  often  c ited  H erac litean  
fragm en t38 53: 'TIoAepos navirov pev  rta tqp  eon , ndvrcov 6e PamAeug, Kai xou§ 
pev Geoug e6et§e roug 6e avGpcbnoug, toug pev fiouAoug en o iq ae  roug 6e 
eAeuGepoug39 ", T his H eidegger in te rp re ts  in qu ite  d irec t a  m a n n e r  to  ind ica te  17*9
17 This has to be an indirect reference to the Aristotelian definition of man as "4i>ov Xoyov ir/Lov" which 
according to Heidegger ascribes a certain animality to the human being (IM: 141-142). It is strange that 
Heidegger being so much concerned with the re-interpretation of the philosophical legacy of the west 
contents himself on this occasion with such an unambiguous translation of the word ¡¿bov. Accordingly, he 
is not able to investigate the possible compass between the Greek and the modern conceptions of animality 
and humanity. The compound word Ztb-ov (literally meaning living being) contains an explicit reference 
to the linkage between Hie and being, while the word animal makes explicit reference to the psychical 
(anima meaning wind, air; breath; life; soul, mind; ghost, spirit according to the Collins Latin Dictionary). 
It may be well known that Heidegger rejected the category o f life as philosophically inappropriate (see e g. 
Heidegger [1919/211 1998: 15), but this hardly makes up for the omission pointed to above, since even if 
one wishes to follow this Heidegger’s suggestion, one has still to consider that actually Heidegger only 
presents us with grounds for rejecting the modern concept of "life” and its applications in phenomenology. 
Actually, in his "Letter on Humanism” Heidegger acutely acknowledges the possibility o f there being a 
different conception of “life" in Greek thought, but he all too readily covers this finding up, by collapsing 
¡¡tOT| into "animalitas". Consequently, for Heidegger, with “animal, zoon, an interrelation o f life is already 
posited that necessarily lies in the interpretation of beings as zoe and physis, w.thin which what is living 
appears. Above and beyond everything else, however, it finally remains to ask whether the essence of man 
primordially and most decisively lies in the dimension of animalitas at all" (Heidegger, 1993: 227; see also 
his remarks on the issue in B&T: 47). Hans Jonas rightly alludes to a certain “verbal sophism" in this 
Heidegger’s argument. With recourse to Plato’s Timaeus (30c) Jonas concludes that "life" in its Greek 
conception refers to any animated being, ultimately to the “ensouled univer-e as a whole", and that 
consequently no “lowering o f man is implied in placing him within that [cosmic] scale and the bogy of 
animality in its modern connotations is slipped in surreptitiously". More importantly, according to Jonas, 
what remains unacceptable for Heidegger is the “placing o f ’man’ in any scale, that is, in a context of 
nature as such" (Jonas, 1992: 333). This again is only made possible by the Chiistian devaluation of the 
“beast" and the subsequent contrast with "man”, which allegedly signifies a break with the ancient position 
on the issue, since the immortality attributed to the human soul places human beings outside the sphere of 
nature. The "existentialist argument", consists then in a sophism, since in playing with the ambiguity of the 
word “animal”, it “conceals this shift o f basis o f which that ambiguity is a funt non, and fails to meet the 
classical position with which it ostensibly argues” (Jonas, 1992: 333).
’* This fragment came down to us via the works of Hippolitys. I cite the Greek edition o f Heraclitus’ 
complete fragments (1992: 76), which follows the standard edition of H. Diels and W. Kran/ Die 
Fragmente der Volsokratiker, Berlin, 1951; Heidegger also uses the latter.
19 A standard translation would run “ War is the father and king/master of everyth ng (that is), and it shows 
those to be men and these to be gods, those to be slaves and these to be free”. As it is the case with every
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th a t  th e  ex istence  of h u m a n  beings Is th e  o u tco m e of th is  UoAepog40, w hile the  
la tte r  cond itions th e  m an ifes ta tio n  of h u m a n s  th e  “se p a ra tio n  of g o ds a n d  m en, 
in  the  e ru p tio n  of b e in g  i ts e lf .  O n th is  b a s is , H eidegger (iM: 140) m a k e s  the  
following rem ark s:
1. The essen ce  of b e ing  h u m a n  is essen tia lly  a  q u e s tio n  a n d  never a n  an sw er.
2. The c h a ra c te r  of th is  q u estio n  is h is to rica l, o r ra th e r  th e  q u e s tio n  itse lf is 
“the  very e ssen ce  of h is to ry ”.
3. T here is a n  e s se n tia l bond  betw een  th is  q u es tio n  an d  th e  q u esd o n  
concern ing  Being.
More im p o rtan tly , th e  q u e sd o n  co n cern in g  th e  h u m a n  e ssen ce  is  s a id  to be 
"h istorically  m e ta -p h y s ica l” a n d  its  a d e q u a te  fo rm u la tio n 41 lies th e re fo re  beyond 
th e  scope o f tra d itio n a l m etaph y sic s  “w hich  re m a in s  essen tia lly  p h y s ic s"  (Ibid.).
single Heraclitean fragment, the text is quite obscure and it is regrettable that Heidegger does not give an 
account of the whole fragment but restricts his interpretation to the separation of the human and the divine. 
This way the part referring to slavery and freedom remains unconcealed, and while it is only logical to 
assume that the differentiation between slavery and freedom is a refetence to social-historical 
developments, the indeterminacy of the sentence coupled with Heraclitus’ notoriously enigmatic style 
which earned him the name of Z koteivoi;  (the Obscure) does little to solve the riddle.
411 It is quite important th„t in this context Heidegger avoids translating the word tidXepo ,^ thus maintaining 
the plurality o f its significations in Greek. Indeed, TtdXcpoq could be understood as a cosmological principle 
pertaining to cosmic warring forces, as a social principle, or as an ontological ptmciple, which accordingly 
permeates every possible level of analysis. Heidegger holds fast to this last signification, which is quite 
consonant with what Heraclitus says in fragment 79: “Et66vai 5r| tov 7t6XEgov covra §uv6v, Kai Sucqv £ptv, 
Kat ytvdpEva ndvra tear' £ptv teat ypEtov ”, which can be roughly translated in the following manner:” We 
must know that war is common/universal and that strife is justice and that of necessity everything becomes 
of strife" (Heraclitus 1992: 84). It is in the light of this fragment that Heidegger attempts a translation of 
both tioXegoi; and Aiicq which runs: “it is necessary to bear in mind setting-apait <Aus-einander-Setzung> 
as essentially bringing-together and order <Fug> as contending." (IM: 166). This interpretive attempt at a 
translation is in fact nothing less than an account concerning the age-old problem of the one and the many, 
of the coexistence of diversity and unity, as the following passage makes clear: “We know that this unity is 
never empty indifference; it is not sameness in the sense o f mere equivalence Unity is the belonging- 
together of antagonisms. This is original oneness” (IM: 138). I deliberately used above the expression 
“account” rather than “solution" to indicate the persistence with which thi- enigma defies thought 
throughout the history o f philosophy.
41 In fact Heidegger suggests that the question be reformulated so as to read, "Who man is" instead of “what 
man is”. This formulation would then have the double advantage o f pointing simultaneously to the 
emergence o f selfhood as a process peculiar to man's historical existence and to the relation of this 
emergence with the advent o f being (see IM: 144). We can grasp better what is meant here if  we consider 
Heidegger's contention that existence is the essence of Dasein, whereby existence “formally indicates that
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T h ese  re m a rk s  a re  coup led  by th e  th in k e r’s  a t te m p t to  rec la im  voeiv for 
ph ilosophy . Noeiv Is  here  co n cep tua lised  in  th e  specific m ode of an  
a p p re h e n s io n * 42, w h ic h  is linked  w ith  Being43. W h at Moeiv signifies for 
H eidegger c a n  be b e s t  u n d e rs to o d  if w e tak e  a  c lo se r loo', a t  th e  place th a t  
Siavoia a s  "the u n ve iling  exhib iting  of so m eth in g ” (BP: 2 16) o ccu p ie s  in h is  
th o u g h t.
Aiavoia, o r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a s  “th e  unveiling  exh ib iting  o f so m e th in g ”-though t 
a long  th e  p h e n o m e n o n  of ap o p h a n tic  t ru th -  signifies for th e  p h ilo so p h e r th is  
possib ility  o f th e  in te llec t in  th in k in g  a s  " a  free co m p o rtm e n t o f th e  h u m a n  
b e ing ” to  "m eet su ita b ly  o r to m iss  th e  en tity  th a t is given to it” (BP: 216-217). 
A sse rtion  a s  “com m u n ica tiv e -d e te rm in a tive  ex h ib itio n ” m a k e s  w h a t  is ta lked  
a b o u t in  it acc ess ib le44, in  th e  m a n n e r  o f unveiling, o f “le ttin g -b e -en co u n te re d ”, 
o f "m aking  m anifest" . C onsequen tly , aAr|0Eueiv, w h ich  H eidegger - in a move 
th a t  goes s im u lta n e o u s ly  “b a c k ” to, a n d  “beyond" i ts  G reek  o rig in s  - in te rp re ts
Dasein is as an understanding potentiality-for-Being, which, in its Being, makes an issue of that Being 
itself’ (B&T: 274).
42 Apprehension does not stand in this context for a pre-defined faculty belonging to a “subject”. It rather 
points to a process in which “man first enters into history as a being, an essent. i.e. (in the literal sense) 
comes into being" (IM: 141-emphasis added).
41 In order to attain this formulation Heidegger takes recourse to Parmenidis’ eighth fragment «raurov 8' 
¿an voeiv te icon oukevcv E o n  vbqpa», which he renders “the same is apprehension and that (i.e. vor|ga) for 
the sake of which apprehension occurs” (IM: 137).
44 In a reference to Heraclitus. Heidegger interprets «X.6yo<; ippd^ojv onux; EyEt» as “it (i.e. X6yo<;) tells how 
entities comport themselves", while insisting that for those who “are lacking in understanding, what they do 
remains hidden- kav0dvEi...[and it therefore] sinks back into hiddenness”. He is then able to conclude that 
in a pre-philosophical way o f  understanding it, the Greeks made it “self-evidently” basic that a-),!j0ciu 
belongs to X6yov It might be interesting to note that in proposing this definition o f truth in Heing 
and Time, Heidegger concedes that he has not yet "shaken off the tradition” but that he has rather 
"appropriated it primordially” (B&T: 262). TEuipyoukr):; (1992: 396-97) rightly suggests that this move 
consists an attempt to return to a path of thought opened up by Heraclitus, whe i from Plato and Aristotle 
allegedly deviated substituting the Idea (I8ia) for the primordial phenonenon o f  aXr|0£ia. The 
implications of this reorientation for thought are quite significant since the abandonment of a 
“correspondence theory o f truth" makes the ontological structures o f being' perceivable, at least in 
principle. It nevertheless seems that in the development of his thought Heidegger abandoned the idea of 
there having been an original understanding of truth among the Greeks. Ruin suggests that far from 
indicating a sheer failure, this development permitted the philosopher "to specify that in the end his thesis
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a s  " to  p lu ck  so m eth in g  o u t of Its co n cea lm e n t [Aav0dvf,iv], to m a n ife s t or 
reveal”. Is now to  su b s ti tu te  for t ru th  in  th e  se n se  of veritas  (BP: 215). More 
im portan tly , t ru th  a s  uncovering  does n o t re fe r exclusively, o r even p rim arily  to 
en titie s  in  th e  world; it h a s  ra th e r  to  be  c o n s tru e d  a s  “a  way of B eing  for 
D ase in ”. Of co u rse , en tities  a re  uncovered  a n d  in  th is  w ay we co n sid er th e m  to 
be  tru e , b u t  w h a t is "prim arily  t ru e ” is  D ase in , no t only on  the  g ro u n d s  of its 
be ing  b o th  th e  ag en t of an d  th e  n ecessa ry  co n d ition  for all uncovering , b u t  also 
b e c a u se  d isc lo sed n ess  "is th a t  b asic  c h a ra c te r  o f D asein  accord ing  to  w h ic h  it is 
its  there"45 (B&T: 263).
It becom es th u s  a p p a re n t th a t  for H eidegger, aAqGeia a s  th e  m ost “p rim ord ia l 
p h en om en o n  o f t r u th ” (loc.cit), viz. t r u th  in  th e  m ode o f d isc lo sed n ess  is  tied  u p  
b o th  w ith  a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of being  a n d  w ith  a n  illum ination  of th e  h u m a n  
D asein , while th e  two a re  in sep a rab le46. In w h a t w ay th o u g h  does H eidegger 
th in k  th e  n a tu re  of d isc lo sed n ess  a n d  w hich  is  th e  fu n d am en ta l c h a ra c te r is tic  
he  therefo re  a t tr ib u te s  to D asein?  Two th in g s  seem  to  be of equal im p o rtan ce  
w ith  regard  to  H eidegger’s  a tte m p t to  provide a n  an sw er to tills  q u e s tio n .
was never a historical-philological one, but rather a task for present and future philosophy to explore and 
articulate”(Ruin. 1994: 221-222).
45 Ruin (1996: 224) suggests that in the horizon of Being and Time the account concerning Dasein’s 
disclosedness indeed corresponds to its there-being and that it could be best unde stood as exhibiting what 
he terms “the totality o f the hermeneutic situation”. In this situation according to the author we experience 
a coming together o f different levels of comportment: of '* the historicity of Dasein, the hermeneutic 
exploration of Dasein, as well as of the meaning of being, and finally also the appropriation o f the history 
of philosophy”. It furthermore points to the possibility o f the initiation of "philosophical questioning” itself 
(Ibid: 110). It has to be reminded that in Heidegger's thought the term “hermeneutic situation” denotes the 
totality of the “presuppositions” pertinent to any interpretation as they are expiessed in am  fore-having, 
fore-sight, and fore-conception. Accordingly, Heidegger's strategy in Being and Time is formulated from 
the standpoint of the clarification of those presuppositions, since if an Interpretation aims to be an 
ontological one, it is required that “in general the hermeneutical situation shall be one which has been made 
secure in conformity with the phenomena” and that “the whole of the entity” which this interpretation has 
taken as its theme “has been brought into the fore-having" (B&T: 275).
46 A complementary formulation offered by Heidegger indicates that even the separation between human 
beings and Being is dependent upon or “comes to light in their togetherness”. With regard to this originary 
separation which in fact is equally a belonging, the dichotomy between “being and thinking” is said to be 
derivative and devoid of meaning (IM: 141).
V
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First, o rig inary  d isc lo sed n ess  is n o t an y  longer d irectly  traceab le  th ro u g h  
reference  to th e  c o rp u s  of th e  ph ilo soph ica l o eu v res  of the  w est.
S econd , an d  by d e fau lt, in o rd e r to  recover th e  orig inal m e an in g  of aAtjSeta we 
w ould  have to  s e e k  for its  p o ssib le  p rese rv a tio n  in  m e , e poetic  m odes of 
d isco u rse  h a n d e d  dow n to u s  by  trad itio n . In  a  m a n n e r  rem in iscen t of 
N ietzsche, H eidegger tu r n s  th e n  h is  gaze to w a rd s  G reek tragedy  an d  he 
a tte m p ts  to  locate  th e  "poetic p ro jec t o f being  h u m a n ” in  thi c h o ru s  (lines 332- 
75) from  th e  A ntigone of S ophocles47 (1M: 146). H is in .e rp re ta tiv e  pro ject 
revolves a ro u n d  th e  first co u p le t o f v erses, w herefrom  th e  sign ifications 
p e rtin e n t to th e  r e s t  o f the  lin es  a re  a rticu la ted :
47 It is important to note that Heidegger explicitly rejects that his interpretation concerns Sophocles’ 
thought as such; he does not even attempt to provide us with an interpretation o' this tragic text (i.e. of the 
Antigone) as a whole. (1M: 148). The chorus being thus de-contextuali/.ed, it becomes virtually impossible 
for us to discern the reasons Heidegger had for attributing to it such a central character. It has been 
suggested that Heidegger made it central merely on the grounds that chorus praise Creon, the "impious 
dictator of the polis o f Thebes”, whom allegedly “Heidegger clearly regards as the authentic man par 
excellence”. The point is then made that Heidegger is in truth alluding to Hitler nimself and that his whole 
account of the Antigone is but an apologetics o f Nazi politics (Burns 2(XX): 227-228). Although it is at best 
intriguing that Heidegger's account misses Sophocles’ critical attitude against ncn-democratic regimes, this 
argument equally misses the ambiguity o f the chorus lines in interpreting them as an unequivocal praise. In 
the textual context the chorus responds to Creon's anger that his command ,o leave Polynices' body 
unburied as a punishment for his revolt against his rule, was not obeyed. Ciron is not yet aware that 
Antigone was the person who transgressed the law of the polis and his anger doe- not appease up until the 
end of the play, when he “comes to his senses” and realizes (lines 1090 ff.) thai he is responsible for the 
deaths of his niece Antigone, his son Aemon and his wife Euridike. In this context, a comment on the 
compass between “Creon’s law" and the law o f the polis proper in classical antiquity, that being of the 
instituting of law under a democratic regime would have been quite fruit''ll for Heidegger’s own 
reflections. This would not cancel nevertheless, either the violence inherem in human action, or the 
ambiguity inherent even in collective lawgiving. More importantly, Gadamer’s (1998: 104-105) discussion 
of Aristotelian ethics pointed me to the possibility o f Heidegger’s choosing this passage from Sophocles as 
an indirect dialogue with Aristotle. For, if o Seivog is used by Aristotle in corniest to tgpdvpatg to signify 
the person who misuses power by being indifferent to ethical postulates, then Hen "gger might be very well 
trying to expand on -and perhaps subvert- the insight concerning the intellect that is constituted in such a 
manner as to disregard good  and evil. Furthermore, unlike Hegel, Heidegger nisses the opportunity to 
comment on the conflict between politics and ethics, between the law of the pole and the law o f the family, 
or between what Sophocles says through Antigone about a certain compass between human and divine law. 
It might not be incidental that Heidegger opted to bypass the question of the aforementioned compass even 
in the case where Eugen Fink raised it explicitly in the Heraclitus Seminar (s»< Heidegger & Fink 1993: 
25). What is most regrettable though, is that Heidegger does not comment on t closing verbal exchange
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There is much that is strange, but nothing 
That surpasses man in strangeness (IM: 148)48
H eidegger In s is ts  th a t  th e  G reek w ord  6eivov exem plifies in the  best 
possib le m a n n e r  the  G reek experience  o f m a n  an d -o n e  m av a d d  h ere  w ith o u t 
being  u n fa ith fu l to H eidegger’s  in ten tio n s- o f being. T h is experience  h a s  the  
advan tage over th e  m o d em  one, in th a t  it p o in ts  to  the  ab y sm a l c h a ra c te r  of 
m a n ’s  being  a s  it does n o t co n ten t itse lf  w ith  th e  fixed a ttr ib u te s  of 
personality '19.
C entral in H eidegger’s a c c o u n t is the  n o tio n  of Seivov a s  th e  pow erful “in  the  
sen se  of one w ho u se s  power, w ho n o t only  d isp o ses  of pow er <Gewalt> b u t  is
between Creon and the chorus, concerning fate, prudence, and mortality in then belonging-together (lines 
1310-1324).
J* The original reads: "lloiAd ta Scivci KovStv avOpcbttou Savorepov nth- '' (EoipoicA.f|i; 1992: 52). 
Heidegger opts for translating 6ctv6v as “unheimlich", which in the English edit-,on is rendered mainly to 
read “strange”. We will have occasion in the development of the presentaiion to comment on the 
significance of Heidegger’s appropriation of the verses. For the moment we will content ourselves with 
making the main significations of the word available to the reader. Actvov thus in ancient Greek could be 
normally used to denote: I) the awesome, 2) danger or something dangerous, 1) the marvelous, 4) the 
mighty, 5) the intelligent or even the canny (LtagaTtiicoi; 1994: 248).
44 Heidegger actually extends his argument to point out that “among the Greeks there were no personalities 
(and for this reason no supra-personality)” (IM: 148). This remark should bf closely linked with his 
criticism of Karl Jaspers' employment of the notion of the person: “Rather, we need to see that 
experiencing in its fullest sense is to be found in its authentically tactical context o f enactment in the 
historically existing self. And this self is in one way or another the ultimate quesOon o f philosophy. It will 
not do to bring in the notion of the person on occasion and apply it to philosophical results” (Heidegger 
[1919/21) 1998: 30). If we try to interpretatively link both remarks, it can be said that on the one hand 
Heidegger points to the theological origins of the notion o f the person, rejecting its employment on the 
grounds of its being originated outside the boundaries of legitimate philosophical-phenomenological 
discourse. On the other hand, the idea o f the person is viewed by Heidegger as nothing more than a stale 
abstraction and therefore as an obstacle for the uncovering of the basic structi,res o f  the historical self. 
Thus, in a sense his analytic of the Dasein in being and Time is prefigured in this etrly text on Jaspers.
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vio len t 50<gew alt-tatig>  inso far a s  th e  u s e  o f pow er is th e  b a s ic  t ra it  n o t only o f 
h is  ac tio n  b u t  a lso  of h is  being-there" (IM: 149-150- e m p h a s is  added). G iven 
H eidegger's co n te n tio n  concern ing  th e  rec ip ro ca l n a tu re  of t 'a s e in  a n d  B eing it 
com es a s  no  s u rp r is e  w h en  he  a t t r ib u te s  violence  to  be  th e  m a in  c h a ra c te r is tic  
of th e  en tire ty  o f th e  e s se n t (IM: 150). D a se in  is th e n  sa id  tc  be  the  vio lent o n e  
in th e  qualified  se n se  th a t  its  m ode o f b e in g , belongs to  th e  m ode of being  o f th e  
essen t. T h is  belonging  tog e th er th e n  is m a d e  m a n ife s t in  D ase in 's  
"fu n d am en ta l v io lence”, in  its  "m aking  u s e  o f pow er a g a in s t  th e  overpow ering” 
(loc. Cit). H eidegger seem s to  be conv inced  th a t  only th ro u g h  th e  in te rp re ta tio n  
of 6eivov d is c u s se d  above is it possib le  fo r th o u g h t to  have acc ess  to  D a se in ’s 
being  fu n d am en ta lly  hom eless. In  fac t h o m e le s sn e ss  is sa id  to  describe  in  th e  
b es t possib le  w ay  b o th  D ase in ’s being  in  th e  "m idst o f th e  overpow ering" a n d  its  
ability  to  " s u rp a s s  the  lim it of th e  fam ilia r < d as  H eim ische>" dM: 151).
In a  fu r th e r  ap p ro p ria tio n  of th e  c h o ru s  from  th e  A ntigone51, he tre a ts  th e  
d esc rip tio n  o f p a n to p o ro s  apo ros a s  a  c o u p le t, d e sp ite  th e ir  oeing  s e p a ra te d  by 
a sem i colon in  th e  tex t (see n .39). H eidegger's  tra n s la tio n  o f th e  tran sfo rm ed  
p assag e  is th e n  the  following: “E veryw here  jou rn ey in g , inexperienced  a n d
511 Heidegger wishes to introduce a notion of violence that goes beyond the “common usage of the word, as 
mere arbitrary brutality”. He thereby seems to imply that the latter is the product o f a moralizing discourse, 
the standards of which are drawn "from conventional compromise and mutual aid, and which accordingly 
disparages all violence as a disturbance of the peace” (IM: 150). At another, more illuminating passage 
Heidegger also points to the detrimental character of value judgements for the grasping o f the 
“mysteriousness o f the essence o f being human” (IM: 164). It is equally important to stress that in 
Heidegger’s thought, “violence" is the essence of every hermeneutic appropriation. Thus, the attempt at 
retrieval of the “primordial" is always considered by the philosopher to be violent, and therefore it is 
violence that “governs the task o f  destruction of the history of ontology”, which Heidegger announces to be 
his aim in paragraph 6 of Being and Time (see especially pages 44 and 49). Then :s nevertheless a problem 
regarding the violent nature of hermeneutic appropriation, namely that there is to criterion by which to 
ascertain whether the aforementioned violence succeeds in recovering an originury experience, or whether 
it is but a merely arbitrary violent act (see Caputo 1987: 63-64). it is furthermore dubious whether 
Heidegger’s insistence on the violent character of being/ being human and of interoretation in general is not
itself the product o f the attempt to liberate his thought from the restraints of morality.
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w ith o u t Issue, he  com es to no th in gn ess"  (Loc.clt). He is th u s  able to conclude 
th a t  w h a t th e  passage  really desc rib es  is m a n ’s v iolent m ak in g  a  p a th  o u t o f the  
fam iliar, only to  be befallen b y  ru in  an d  c a ta s tro p h e  (IM: 151 152).
D espite the  m erits  of su c h  a n  in te rp re ta tio n , it w ould  be equally  beneficial to 
tu rn  briefly o u r  gaze to w a rd s  som e cruc ia l o m issio n s un derly in g  it. 
U ndoubted ly , navtortopos a n d  artopog are  closely b o u n d  in  Sophocles' p assag e  
no t only etym ologically -th e  w ord  nopog being  th e ir  m u tu a l com ponen t- b u t  also 
in te rm s  of m ean ing . It is the refo re  equally  a c c u ra te  to d ed u ce  from  th e  tex t a 
sen se  of fu tility  or nullity  accom pany ing  h u m a n  endeavo rs  a s  Heidegger does. 
We have nev erth e le ss  to  a s k  ourselves w h e th e r th e  fac t th a t  th e  two 
d esc rip tio n s a re  also k ep t a p a r t  is of no  sign ificance for a  ph ilosoph ical 
in te rp re ta tio n . In the  c o n te x t of S ophocles’ tex t n av ionopog  h a s  the  double 
significance o f jou rney ing  a n d  developing d ifferen t a sp e c ts  o f xexvq, especially  
tho se  of language, tho u g h t, sheltering , a n d  politics. Anopoc, by being  directly  
linked  to th e  fu tu re  in th e  original text, is u sed  to e m p h a s ise  th a t h u m a n  
beings never  confron t so m e th in g  in  the  fu tu re  w ith o u t h av in g  any  re so u rc e s  a t 
th e ir  d isp o sa l52. The only th in g  th a t accord ing  to  th e  c h o ru s  they  c a n n o t really
”  dines 357-362) "Kat SuauiAiov Jiayiov uttalGpEia icai Suaopfipa ipeuyEtv pc/.", TruvtcmPpo;; 6iropo<; etf 
ouSev cpyETUi to pr.X/.ov; Ai8a povov tpEuijiv ouk EJtd^ETat...” (loipoxXij^ 1992: 54).
'2 ll is at first glance striking that Heidegger translates Ttopo^  exclusively as "way” or "path” omitting the 
word's equally importar.-and philosophically celebrated- meaning as “resource’ . In Plato's symposium 
(203 b-d) special significance is given to this second meaning, since Eros is considered thereby to be the 
begotten son o f Poros (Resourceful, Richness) and Penia (Poverty). Eros is then considered by his nature 
to be in an intermediate state of being between richness and poverty and more importantly between wisdom 
and ignorance. This makes it possible for Plato to argue in 204 b that “avayicaicv TOV T.poiru tpiXoaotpov 
rivui"(Il/.imj>v 1994: 145). which in Nehamas’ English translation (see Plato 1997: 487) is rendered "it 
follows that Love must be a lover o f wisdom”. Now, although it is debatable whether Eros should be 
translated as Love, the important point here is that the passages cited above inaugurate the understanding of 
philosophy as Eros, while it can be said that the latter acquires the status o f an ontological principle. 
Heidegger’s omission seems less intriguing if we consider his insistence that philosophy as Eros is a 
secondary experience and that it signifies already a decline from the original at'unement with being (see 
also n.22 above). Nevertheless, the theme of Eros permeates Greek literature or he whole and is of a far 
more ancient origin than classical antiquity. Traces of it can subsequently been found in the so-called 
Orphic Texts, where for instance Eros is called “the son of the everlasting night”, and to whom is
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confron t Is d ea th , so m eth in g  th a t  Is n o t m issed  Ir. H eidegger's  own 
tra n s la tio n 53.
Heidegger follows th e  sa m e  s tra te g y  w ith  regard  to  th e  lin es  t h a t  -alw ays 
accord ing  to  h is  in te rp re ta tio n - explicitly  po in t to the  polls a s  th e  h isto rical 
p lace  w here th e  u n co n c ea lm en t o f b e in g -h u m a n  is in a u g u ra te d . Here he 
cap ita lizes on  the  a n tith e s is  betw een  YtpinoAts a n d  AnoAi$, th e  fo rm e r ind icating  
th e  p ra ised  citizen, th e  la t te r  the  d isg rac ed  one, som eone w ho b e c a u s e  of one 's  
ow n ac tio n s  does n o t deserve  to  b e a r  th e  n am e of th e  citizen  a n y  lo n g e r54. W hat 
is im p o rtan t in th is  read in g  is th e  close linkage th a t  H eidegger w ishes to 
e s ta b lish  betw een  the  h is to rica l a n d  th e  political, alw ays from  th e  p ersp ec tiv e  of 
th e  d isc lo su re  of h u m a n  e ssen ce  a s  th is  la tte r  em erges from  D a se in ’s  p a rtak in g  
in  Being.
T he pow erful is ren d ered  ag a in  th e  o v era rch in g  princip le  of th is  d isc lo su re  an d  
H eidegger tu r n s  h is  gaze to  th e  trag ic  d im en sio n  of h is to rica l-p o litica l crea tion . 
A ccording to  th is  line o f th o u g h t, th e  very  sa m e  princip le  (i.e. pow er) th a t  allow s 
ce rta in  h u m a n s  to  becom e h is to rica lly  p re -em inen t iuvpinoAig) is a lso  
resp o n sib le  for the -r b e ing  co n sid ered  a s  o u tc a s ts , th a t  is a s  anoA is (IM: 152).
attributed- in Heideggerian terms- the quality of being the deity that was first brought to unconcealment: 
“...icuSpdv'Eptoia, NuKibq aEtyvf|Tqq uta k A u t 6 v ,  6 v  pa «iHivqra onAbrepot tcAii^ouat Ppoxol, npcbroq yap 
EipdvOq” (Optpucb KEtgEva. 1999: 17, line 15). What is more, even in the Antigone Sophocles feels the need 
to quote the famous passage from Homer’s Iliad, devoted to Eros’ invincible nature, its omnipresence and 
its taking hold of both gods and men making them manic. Heidegger unfor.unately did not think it 
necessary for his purposes to pay heed to this passage in his interpretation of the text. The passage though, 
is perhaps unsurpassable in poetic beauty and f u l l  o f  quite important significations and it is regrettable that 
here, for reasons regarding the economy of the text, I quote but the part of it, which reinforces my argument 
: “ E p c o q  u v i k u t e  pdyav, Epu><; o q  e v  K r f | p a o t  irbtTEtq...Kai a ’ o u t ’ aOavbrav t p u q . p o q  o u S e l q  ou0’ a p E p U o v  
o e  y' av0pibjt(DV, o 5' ¿ytov pbpqvev” ( l o i p o x A t i q  1992: 85, lines 76-84). In light o f  this, it seems quite 
plausible to conclude that although Heidegger attributed to the experience of being as violence a primordial 
character, the obliteration of the experience o f  being as Eros on his part shoulo not be considered as any 
less detrimental for his account o f philosophy.
" ‘Through no fight can he resist the one assault o f death" (IM: 147).
54 The connection is clearer in Sophocles’ text (lines 364-374) than in Heidegger's interpretation (see 
Eoq>oicAf|q 1992: 54).
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It is the refo re  th e  a c t of h is to rica l c rea tio n  a s  su ch  th a t  exem plifies th is  double 
a sp ec t of pow er, in  th a t it a t  th e  sam e tim e founds h is to ry  js  p lace a n d  expels 
the  fo u n ders  o u t o f  it55. Now, it is certa in ly  no t the  firs t tin  e th a t  th is  s ta te  of 
affairs is g ra sp e d  in  tho u g h t, n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  G erm an  ph ilosophy being  th e  
m o st rece n t56 a t te m p t to com e to te rm s  w ith  th is  p ecu lia rity  of the  h isto rica l 
realm . T he q u e s tio n  w ould th e n  be fo rm ulated  a s  follows In w h a t w ay does 
H eidegger a t te m p t to re in te rp re t h ere  th e  age-old p ro b lem  of h isto rica l p rax is, 
conceived a t  firs t a s  TpayiKfi eipcovia (tragic irony) by th e  G reek  trag ic  poets, an d  
su b seq u en tly  g iv en  the  in te rp re ta tio n s  o f the  cu n n in g  o f re a so n  by Hegel a n d  of 
the  e te rn a l re c u rre n c e  of th e  sam e  by N ietzsche?
T here  a re  a rguab ly  th re e  e lem en ts  th a t g ran t H eidegger’s  in te rp re ta tio n  
its  p ecu lia r pow er:
First, h is to ry  is  g iven  an  in d e te rm in a te  ontological s ta tu s  by being p laced  in the  
m idst of th e  overpow ering  Being an d  m a n 's  violent m a k in g  a p a th  o u t of it. 
Second, th is  m a k in g  a  p a th  o u t of Being, does no t on ly  en ta il D ase in 's  being 
expelled from  th e  h isto rica l p lace o f th e  polis a s  m en tio ned  above; it equally  
signifies D a se in 's  being en tan g led  in  th is  very p a th  a n d  consequen tly  D ase in 's  
being in a s ta te  o f  self-exile  from  Being (IM: 157).
”  “Pre-eminent in the historical place, they become at the same time apolis. without city and place, lonely, 
strange, and alien, without issue amid the essent as a whole, at the same time without statue and limit, 
without structure and order, because they themselves as creators must first create all this.” (IM: 152-153). 
Goudeli (1999: 273) rightly interprets this Dasein’s exemplification qua Seivdrazov as being directly linked 
with the self-realisation of Dasein’s radical ftnitude. Ironically, always according to this reading, the 
aforementioned realisation of futility, meaningfulness and nullity becomes ir. Heidegger's thought the 
essential element o f Dasein’s “meaningful existence”, in signifying a “dignified redemption from.. original 
finitude. an [heroic) act of artistic despair”, which exemplifies "the impossibility o f the confrontation of 
man with the prevailing whole, and yet the hidden charm of this vain ba ttle ..."(emphasis added). It has to 
be remarked though that Heidegger was well aware of -and tried to refute- similar interpretations of his 
work. One such occasion is when the philosopher attempts to discredit a view tnat would see his lecture 
on “What is metaphysics", as simply a defence o f a “philosophy of anxiety”, oi of a "heroic philosophy" 
(see Heidegger. [ 19431 1998: 234).
v’ "Most recent" is here meant with regard to Heidegger's own undertaking.
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Third, h is to ry  a s  place is conceived a s  the  s ta g e  for th i d isc lo su re  of the  
overpow ering57, the  la tte r  b e ing  confirm ed qua  h istory  in  h u m a n  w orks (IM: 
167). T h e  com plem entary  c h a ra c te r  o f the  th re e  aforem en tio n ed  e lem en ts  is 
qu ite  ea s ily  detectab le . The firs t an d  th ird  e lem en ts  a d d re s s  th e  h is to rica l from 
th e  a s p e c t  of Being an d  from  th a t  o f th e  D asein  in  th e ir  belonging-together, 
w hile a tte m p tin g  to avoid a  reification  o f the  h is to rica l a s  su c h . T his m ove is 
a lso  q u ite  co n so n an t w ith  H eidegger's u n d e rs ta n d in g  of a  reciprocal 
u n c o n c e a lm e n t of Being a n d  of h is to rica l D ase in ’s  own essen ce , a lready  
m e n tio n e d  above.
The se c o n d  a sp ec t becom es of c ru c ia l im p o rtan ce  o n ce  we reco n side r 
H eidegger's in sis tence  a b o u t a  c o n c u rre n t fo rg e tfu ln ess  o f be ing  a n d  an  
a b so rp tio n  by everydayness c h a ra c te r is tic  of m odern ity , a n d  h is  life long 
a tte m p t a t  recovering the  o rig inary  experience o f th e  c o u p le t D ase in /B eing , 
w ith  re c o u rse  to its  m a n ife s ta tio n  in  th e  inception  o f h isto ry .
If we co u ld  m om entarily  leave aside  a n  a s s e s sm e n t of th e  co n seq u e n c es  of 
ex trap o la tin g  an  inception  in  h is to ry 58 *w ith o u t p rov id ing  a n y  ju s tif ic a tio n  for 
th is , it w ou ld  be qu ite  u se fu l to  a t te n d  to H eidegger's u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th is  
h is to ric a l origin, s ince  it is q u ite  illu m in atin g  w ith  reg ard  to  h is  in te rp re ta tio n  of 
a u th e n tic  h isto ricity  a s  fateful rep e titio n  in Being a n d  Time.
51 This Heidegger’s thought is quite enigmatic in that it actually places the requirement of history as place 
of disclosure equally on Dasein's and on Being’s part. The relevant passage reeds: “ Man is forced into 
such a being-there, hurled into the affliction <Not> of such being, because the overpowering as such, in 
order to appear in its power, requires a place, a scene of disclosure" (IM: 162-161 .
58 Evidently what is meant here is an inception of history with regard to pre-hist trical times, the becoming 
human o f the human species, or put in the phenomenological jargon the extrapolation of a historicity as
against a pre-historicity, not explicitly present in Heidegger’s work but nevertheless developed later by 
Patocka in his Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History. Without disregarding the difference between 
Heidegger’s and Patocka's elaborations, it is worth noting that such a distinction brings Heidegger closer to 
the view he is trying to refute than he would be willing to admit.
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1.2 The Notion of the Origin and Authentic Repetition
In c o n tra s t  to  “scien tific” a c c o u n ts  p rev a len t un til th e  tu rn  of the  
tw en tie th  cen tu ry , w hich  d ep ic t h is to ry  a s  a  p rog ression  from  an  allegedly 
deprived s ta te  of affa irs experienced  by  p ro to -h u m an ity  to th e  su pe rio r one of 
m odern ity , H eidegger in tro d u ces  a  fa r r ich er, perplexing, an d  indeed 
in e x h au stib le  concep tion  of th e  b eg in n in g  a s  th e  "s tran g e st a n d  m igh tiest” (IM: 
158). It m igh t be  u se fu l to  p o in t from  the  o u ts e t  of o u r  investigation  to 
a c c u sa tio n s  ra ised  a g a in s t th is  H eidegger’s in te rp re ta tiv e  tw ist, a n d  w hich 
d e tec t in  it n o th in g  m ore th a n  a  n o sta lg ic  te n d e n c y  tow ards a n  elusive orig in59, 
a  p ess im is tic  o r even hostile  a t t i tu d e  to w a rd s  m odern ity , au ton o m y  an d  
technology60, o r a  politically  p e rilo u s a n d  ideologically ch a rg ed  apologetics61 of 
h is to rica l a n d  political re trog ression .
,9 In a discussion with Richard Kearney, Derrida comments: “there is still in Heidegger, linked up with 
other things, a nostalgic desire to recover the proper name, the unique name of Being. To be fair, however, 
one can find several passages in which Heidegger is self-critical and renounces his nostalgia: his practice of 
cancelling and erasing the term (i.e. Being] in his later texts is an example o f such a critique" (Kearney 
1984: I 10). Charles Guignon describes this nostalgic tendency in Heidegger's thought as a “mythos of 
pristine beginnings, a time of falling, and a final recovery of origins" as a recapitulation of “the traditional 
Christian model of creation, sinfulness and redemption” (see Guignon 1992: 141).
Rorty's criticism of Heidegger links directly Heidegger’s hostility towards technology and his political 
attitude, while implying a certain relapse to metaphysics on Heidegger’s part (Rorty 1989: 118).
It is important though that in Rorty’s depiction, and perhaps due to Rorty's own attempt at keeping the 
private separate from the public. Heidegger’s figure remains equivocal and his oeuvre is not rejected as a 
whole. Accordingly, for Rorty “. . .Heidegger as a philosophy professor who managed to transcend his own 
condition by using the names and words of the great metaphysicians as elements o f a personal litany, he is 
an immensely sympathetic figure. But as a philosopher of our public life, as a commentator on twentieth 
century technology and politics, he is resentful, petty, squint-eyed, obsessive -  and at his occasional worst 
(as in his praise of Hitler after the Jews had been kicked out of the universities), ci uel.’’(Ibid: 120).
61 See for example Habermas’ (1992: 194, 198- 200) criticism, according to which the whole idea of fate 
signifies an ideological commitment to Nazism, while historicity as the ontologi al precondition of history 
as derived from the existential analytic of Dasein, amounts to a sheer abstraction form concrete, real 
history. Habermas attributes this “mischief’ partly to Heidegger’s personality and partly to his “solipsistic 
method", which promulgates a radical breach between the natiral sciences and the 
“Geistrswissenschaften", while exposing Heidegger’s ignorance regarding the oecelopinents in the social 
sciences, especially those that occurred in France and the U S. (Ibid: 190).
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W hile it w ould b e  indeed perilous to  op t for ignoring th e se  acc u sa tio n s , it cou ld  
be equally  fa llac ious to  b y p a ss  a n  a s s e s sm e n t of th e  ph ilosoph ical im port th a t  
H eidegger's in te rp re ta tio n  b e a rs  for co n tem p o rary  tho u g h t.
T h ese  ob jec tions are a lso  im p o rtan t in  th a t  they  po in t to  a  ce rta in  d isc rep an cy  
b e tw een  a c c o u n ts  th a t m ake  th e  socie tal explicitly  th e m atic  a n d  ac c o u n ts  th a t  
fo cu s  p rim arily  on the  ontological q u e s tio n . In o th e r w ords, in  th e  co u rse  of 
th is  investiga tion  we will a tte m p t to  m ake  th e m atic  the  veiy co m p ass  betw een  
so c ia l theory  a n d  ontology, a s  a rtic u la te d  fro m  the  s ta n d p o in t of h isto ry .
Let u s  firs t occupy  ou rse lves w ith th e  question  of re trog ression . It is 
in d ee d  d o ub tfu l w h e th e r H eidegger's in s is te n c e  a b o u t th e  in e x h au stib le  
r ic h n e s s  of th e  origin sh ou ld  be  seen  a s  a  m ere ph ilosoph ical defence of 
re tro g ressio n . If th is  w ere the  ca se  th e n  w e w ould have n o th in g  b u t  a  naive 
inv ersio n  of th e  concep t o f p rog ress, w h ic h  w ould en ta il th e  inco rpo ra tio n  on 
H eidegger’s  p a r t  of an  e lem en t of c a u sa lity  an d  consequen tly  a  b la ta n t  re lap se  
in to  the  m etaph y sica l co n cep t of tim e he s tru g g led  to  overcom e.
H eidegger th o u g h , u n d e rs to o d  th e  b eg in n in g  of h isto rical h u m a n ity  a s  th is  
b re a c h  in th e  m idst o f Being, "into w h ic h  the  p re p o n d e ra n t pow er of being  
b u r s ts  in its  ap p earin g , in  o rd er th a t  th is  b reach  itse lf sh ou ld  s h a tte r  a g a in s t 
b e in g ” (IM: 163). T his is  w hy he  co n cep tu a lised  d is a s te r  n e ith e r  a s  a  fa ilu re  of 
th e  objectives se t o u t by h is to rica l peo p les , n o r a s  a  m isca lcu la tio n  in  the  
c o u rse  of h is to rica l ac tion , b u t  a s  th e  m o s t fu n d am en ta l t ra i t  of h is to rica l 
ex istence  (IM: 162-63). T here is in  fac t a n  inso luble am bigu ity  regard ing  the  
p la ce  occup ied  by "d isa ste r” in  th is  a c c o u n t, for d is a s .e r  is sa id  to  be 
equ ip rim ord ia lly  the  "deepest a n d  b ro a d e s t affirm ation of th e  overpowering", 
viz. of Being (Loc.ctt). How sh o u ld  we u n d e rs ta n d  th is  la s t  s ta te m e n t?  O u r
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ta sk  becom es even h a rd e r  if we co m b in e  it w ith  H eidegger's u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
h isto ry  a s  the  requ ired  s ta g e  for th e  d isc lo su re  of being, a lready  referred  to 
above. H eidegger's selection  o f th e  w o rd s req u irem en t ind  affirm ation  is 
certain ly  en igm atic , while it m o m en ta rily  p u ts  o u r  th o u g h ts  to  a  h a lt, for it 
w ould be too easy  a n d  p e rh a p s  too n a iv e  a  so lu tion  to  infer th a t  h e  is  thereby  
ascrib ing  a  p rede term in ing  activ ity  to  B eing. Is H eidegger n o t in s te a d  d irecting  
h is  th o u g h t in th is  p ecu lia r a n d  m y s te r io u s  linkage betw een  th e  b e ing  of th e  
e ssen t a n d  b e ing -h u m an , in  th is  coex istence  of strife an d  u n ity  th a t  h isto ry  
a t te s ts  to?
It seem s tho u g h  th a t  we still find o u rse lv es  en tang led  'n  a  circle , w here 
every th ing  is g en era ted 62 from  pow er, co n su m m a te d  by pow er a n d  re su ltin g  in 
new  m a n ife s ta tio n s  an d  c o n fig u ra tio n s  of power. Or ra th e r , p o w er is the  
in exh au stib le  p rinc ip le  th a t  un ifies a s  Aoyog a n d  se ts  a p a r t  a s  ¿pis, it is 
conceived a s  the  m a in  fea tu re  of b o th  th e  e s se n t a s  a  w hole a n d  o f D asein ’s 
existence.
In teresting ly , far from  providing u s  w ith  a  sh e e r  cosm ological princip le, 
H eidegger in tro d u ces  a  fu r th e r  d e te rm in a tio n  of pow er a s  e x p re sse d  by the  
s tra n g e s t of all beings, nam ely  D ase in . Here D asein  is u n d e rs to o d  a s  ac ting  
violently ag a in s t being  by concealing  it, b y  declining “all o p e n n e ss  tow ard  it", by 
denying its  om nipotence  th e  s ite  in  w h ic h  to m an ifest itself." (IM: 177). We have 
th u s  to  co n sid er to w h a t ex ten t, th is  “v io len t b reach" in the  m id st o f being  th a t
<l2 Here of course 1 am not referring to a generation o f Being by a kind of Supra-being, but to states of 
affairs occurring within the essent, as well as to historical events allegedly resuming from the mysterious 
linkage between Being and human beings. We must also keep in mind that Heidegger is still in this context 
occupied with an interpretation of Heraclitus and Parmenidis, and consequently with an interpretation of 
“Ev ndvia”, which for Heidegger does not have the meaning of the “one and only*’ which subsequently 
generates everything out of itself, but the meaning o f  “unifying” everything that is (Heidegger and Fink 
1992: 21). Moreover Heidegger is adamant that a Supra-being is inconceivable in the context of 
Heraclitus’ thought (Ibid: 46).
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Heidegger u n d e rs ta n d s  h is to ry  to  be, en ta ils  th e  concealm e i t  o r o b lite ra tio n  of 
being  th a t h is  ph ilo sop h y  a tte m p te d  to uncover. Again, th i q u es tio n  a r is e s  a s  
to w h e the r th e  a fo rem en tio n ed  unco verin g  is  a t  all v iable. In o th e r w ords, it is 
possib le th a t  H eidegger here  p o in ts  to a  ce rta in  im p en etrab ility  of Being. 
H istory a s  p lace  cou ld  th u s  be  in te rp re te d  a s  having a  twofold sign ificance: It 
could  be th e  th e a tre  w hereby  b o th  h u m a n  b e ing s an d  B eing s im u lta n e o u s ly  
m anifest th e m se lv es , b u t  a s  s u c h  a  place it cou ld  equally  provide th e  co n d ition  
for the  c o n c u rre n t  co n cea lm en t o f b o th  B eing an d  th e  h u m a n  “e s se n c e ”. It 
follows th a t  s u c h  a n  ad m iss io n  w o u ld  en ta il fu r th e r  ph ilo soph ica l im p lica tio n s 
regard ing  th e  n a tu r e  of p re sen ce  a s  su ch , s in ce  it w ould  '.hen  asc rib e  to  it a  
certa in  in c o m p le ten ess , o r  u n a tta in ab ility .
F u rth erm o re , in  H eidegger’s  th o u g h t, th is  concealing  is n o t th e  only affliction  
ag a in st Being t h a t  D asein  is c a p a b le  of. C ap ita lis ing  o n  th e  am bigu ity  o f the  
w ord "being” in  i ts  c o n c u rre n t ap p lica tio n  in  Being a n d  h u m a n  b e ing -th e re , 
Heidegger s u g g e s ts  th a t it is  d ea th , th is  “e n d  beyond all co n su m m a tio n " , th is  
"limit beyond  all lim its" (IM: 158), th is  “no t-being -the re" th a t  c o n s ti tu te s  the  
“su p rem e v ic tory  over being" (IM: 178). E ch o es of H eidegger's t re a tm e n t  of 
d e a th  in B eing a n d  Time a re  easily  recognisable; we th u s  have to  t r e a t  h is  
en igm atic u t te ra n c e  a b o u t “th e  su p rem e  victory" from  th e  doub le  perspec tive  
e labo rated  by th e  th in k e r in  th e  seco n d  div ision  of h is  m a g nu m  opus. H eidegger 
a tte m p ts  th e re  to  g round  D a se in ’s  a u th e n tic  po ten tia lity  of being-a-w hole, 
coupling it w ith  D ase in ’s  ab ility  to  m a in ta in  itse lf  constantly  . its  co n n e c te d n e ss  
of life, w hile a tte m p tin g  to sh ow  how  D asein  s tre tc h e s  itse lf as it w ere be tw een  
b ir th  an d  d e a th . O ne could  re m a rk  th a t th is  concep tion  of a  s tre tc h in g  im plies 
in  itself th e  n o tio n  of In com ple teness, w h ich  in  the  co n ta c t of H eideggerian
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th o u g h t is b e s t  exem plified once we tu r n  o u r  gaze to the  p a rad o x ic a l n a tu re  of 
one of th e  po les of 'h e  ab o v em en tion ed  s tre tch in g , nam ely  d e a th . The two poles 
of th is  ec s ta tic  re la tio n sh ip  a re  therefore asym m etrically  ti~  tie d , a t  least w ith 
regard  to  th e ir  p o ten tia l co n trib u tio n  to  a n  ex is ten n a l, an d  therefore 
“ontologically ad eq u a te"61 *3, in te rp re ta tio n  of D ase in ’s n a tu re . It is  u n c e rta in 64 
w h e th e r we cou ld  in te rp re t  H eidegger’s one-sided  inv es tm en t o n  th e  no tion  of 
d ea th  a s  a n  ind ica tion  th a t  he considered  b ir th 65 to be  le s s  equivocal an d  
therefore le ss  ph ilo soph ically  im p o rtan t a  concept.
It seem s m ore likely th o u g h  th a t  th e  cen tra lity  a ttr ib u te d  to  d e a th  by Heidegger 
is m ostly  re la ted  to d e a th ’s  overall p lace  in  th e  h is to ry  of p h ilo so p h y 66 a n d  to  its
61 Ii has to be reminded that for Heidegger only an existential interpretation can provide us with a
clarification of the entities under consideration in ontologically adequate a manner (see B&T: 276, and in 
relation to the interpretation of death, see Ibid: 376-77).
M There are passages in Being and Time that render such a claim rather improbable. On occasion 
Heidegger himself recognises the one-sided direction of his interpretation (e.g. B&T: 425), while in another 
place he is adamant that neither death nor birth can be seen as external to Dasein and in this sense as 
accomplished. Accordingly, for Heidegger “Understood existentially, birth is not and never is something
past in the sense o f  something no longer present-at-hund .tactical Dasein exists as born; and as born, it is 
already dying, in the sense o f Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein tactically exists, both the 'ends' and 
their 'between' are. and they are in the only way which is possible on the Basis o f Dasein's Being as care 
(B&T: 426).
65 In the philosophy of Hannah Arendt birth is given a central place and the concept o f natality, signifying 
the "new beginning inherent in birth", is primarily linked with action and therefore with the political realm. 
By making natality the central category of the political. Arendt subsequently attributes mortality to 
metaphysics, and although any explicit reference to Heidegger is missing, one cannot help but wonder 
whether this is not a point raised against this aspect of his philosophy (see Arendt 1958: 8-9). It might be 
interesting to point out that with regard to both “birth” and "death" Husserl emphasized that by belonging 
to a higher dimension, they "presuppose such a tremendous labour of explication pertaining to the lower 
spheres that there will be a long time before they can become problems to wort on”. In other words he 
considered the clarification of the problems o f transcendental subjectivity and inter-subjectivity as a 
necessary precondition for the subsequent illumination of the aforementioned concepts. This can be 
regarded as an indirect criticism to Heidegger, since Husserl’s Cartesian MeditaP >ns are posterior to Being 
and Time (see Husserl 1964: 142 and 156).
Obviously, Plato's Phaedo (8()e) inaugurates the long history of the concept where Socrates defines 
philosophy as "McXéiq Oaváiou". Derrida (1995: 12- 13), rightly points to (he affinity between this 
HEÍ-érn or empécela, i.e .his “attentive anticipation o f death, the care brought to bear upon dying” and 
Heidegger’s concept o f care (Sorge). He also expresses the amazement that many a reader must have 
experienced in reading Being and Time, when he refers to the fact that Heidegget does not quote Plato's 
Phaedo “not once...not even in the passages devoted to care or to the being towards-death” (Ibid: 14). 
Indeed. Heidegger only acknowledges the long history o f the concept of death i Christian theology “from 
Paul to Calvin’s meditateo futa rae vitae”, and then goes on to briefly consider its place in the philosophy of 
Dilthey, Simmel, and Jaspers (B&T: 494-495, n.vi (H. 249)).
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fitting b e s t  H eidegger's tre a tm e n t o f au th e n tic ity . Heidegge r em ploys in  fac t a 
tr ip a r tite  d is tin c tio n  betw een a n  a u th e n tic , a n  in a u th e n tic  a n d  a n  
u n d iffe ren tia ted  m ode of D asein ’s  co m p o rtm en t, a ttr ib u tin g  th e  possib ility  of an  
ontological in te rp re ta tio n  of D ase ln  to  th e  exam ination  of th e  s ta te  o f affa irs 
re su ltin g  from  D ase in 's  a u th e n tic  co m p o rtm en t, w hile a sc r ib in g  everydayness, 
th is  “B eing w hich is betw een  b ir th  a n d  d ea th" to  th e  re m a in in g  two m odes 
(B&T: 276). It could  be said  th a t  H eidegger gets ag a in  h im se lf  en tan g led  in  a 
circle, s in ce  d ea th  serv es  a s  the  c rite rio n  for d em arca tin g  a u th e n tic ity  from  the  
o th e r  m o d es  o f com portm ent, w hile s u c h  a  d em arca tio n  re m a in s  n o n sen s ica l if 
it is  n o t p re su p p o se d . N evertheless, H eidegger w ish es to a rriv e  a t  an  a u th e n tic  
in te rp re ta tio n  of d e a th  by firs t sh ow in g  the  aporias  p e r ta in in g  to  th is  
p h en o m en o n  itself a n d  th e  c o n se q u e n t in ad eq u acy  o f evervday  experience  to 
g ra sp  it in  essen ce . D eath  is the re fo re  sa id  on  th e  one h a n d  to signify the  
a tta in m e n t o f “w holeness"67 o n  D ase in ’s  p a rt, in th e  se n se  th a t  D asein  h a s
67 In this context wholeness should be rather understood in its ironic dimension as an exhaustion of one’s 
"potentiality-for-Being", as an annihilation o f one’s “Being towards” one’s possibilities for Being, which 
nevertheless does not amount to a completion proper, to the fulfilment of an essence, (see B&T: 279). 
Furthermore, in what should rather be understood as an allusion to Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit 
Heidegger attempts to establish the different modes o f fulfilment pertaining to the essent and to Dasein. 
with recourse to the metaphor of the fruit, which in ripeness “fulfils itself’. Of, course in Hegel’s case the 
introduction in the Preface o f the aforementioned Bildung metaphor aims at an illumination of the nature of 
truth, and the gradual -and according to mainstream interpretations also progressive- transformations it 
undergoes in human thought, and this is why Hegel says o f the bud that in the end "the fruit emerges as the 
truth o f it" (Hegel. 1977: 2; for a detailed account regarding the use of Bildung metaphors in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology see Solomon, 1983: 241-249). It is nevertheless arguable that tne notion of fulfilment in 
Heidegger, especially with recourse to Dasein should be understood always ii> connection with truth as 
<u.r\Ocia and it is in this context that we interpret this Heidegger’s move as an attempt to differentiate his 
thought from Hegel’s, 'ndeed, Heidegger recognises that although with “its Jeath, Dasein has indeed 
fulfilled its course", this does not in any way signify the exhaustion o f its “specific possibilities", since 
“even unfulfilled Dasein ends” and “Dasein may well have passed its ripeness before the end", while “for 
the most part Dasein ends in unfulfilmenl, or else by having been disintegrated and being used up (B&T: 
288). It is worth noticing that in Adorno's relentless critique of Heidegger the ironic dimension we 
attempted to indicate above is altogether missed, or rather it is not recognised is such, and Heidegger is 
said to propound Dasein's wholeness "despite historical experience" testifying to the contrary. 
Furthermore, this wholeness is according to Adorno merely formal, since it “i an not be the unity of the 
content of real life", it cannot be "sought in life as harmonious, articulated, and continuous in itself”. 
Consequently Dasein’s unity must be sought in a third term, alien both to life and Dasein. viz. death
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reac h e d  its  “p o ten tia lity  for being". O n th e  o th e r  h a n d  even  ! h is  qualified  sen se  
of “co m p le ten ess"  en ta ils  th e  im possib ility  of ex p erien c ing  1 lase in  a s  a n  entity , 
so th a t  th is  “g a in  becom es th e  u t te r  lo ss  of B eing-in-the- ,/orld” (B&T: 280). 
F u rth e rm o re , ev en  the  experienc ing  of th e  d e a th  of o th e r s  ieach es  u s  th a t  the  
“e n d  o f the  e n tity  qua  D ase in  is the  beginning  of th e  sa m e  en tity  q u a  som eth ing  
p re se n t-a t-h a n d " , in the  p ecu lia r m ode o f “B e in g -ju st-p resem -a t-h an d -n o -m o re"  
68 (B&T: 2 8 1 -28 2 ). H eidegger is h e re  re fe rring  to  the  m ultip lic ity  o f w ays th a t 
the  d ead  re m a in  “in -the-w orld”, th a t  b e ing  in  co m m u n ity  w ith  th e  living ones, 
a s  they  do n o t cea se  to  be th e  “ob jec t o f c o n ce rn ” for th o se  'left b e h in d ” in  the  
rite s  d ed ica ted  to  the  co m m em oration  o f th e  dead . H e also w ish es to  ind icate  
th a t  th is  w ay o f  experiencing  d e a th  is  a lw ays defective w ith  regard  to  the  ac tu a l 
experience of th e  “loss-of-B eing a s  s u c h  w h ich  th e  dy in g  m a n  su ffers"  (Loc.cit). 
The d e a th  o f o th e r s  is fu rth e rm o re  conceived a s  a n  o b s tac le  to  th e  a tta in m e n t of 
an  a u th e n tic  co m p o rtm e n t tow ard s d e a th  in yet a n o th e r , no  less  im p o rtan t a 
m an n er. W h ereas  in th e  firs t in s ta n c e  H eidegger a tte m p te d  to show  th a t  the re  
is of n ecess ity  a  rem a in d e r o f experience  to  w hich  we have no  a c c e ss  w h en  we 
a tte m p t to g ra s p  the  dying experience  o f o th e rs , now  h e  w ish es to  show  how  the  
d e a th  of o th e rs  conceals  th e  a p p re h e n s io n  of o n e ’s a u th e n tic  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
one 's  ow n d e a th .
Not su rp ris in g ly , th e  pub lic  sp h e re , th e  im p erso n a l D as M an is conceived 
a s  th e  b as ic  a g e n t of th e  a fo rem en tioned  co n cea lm en t, w hile th is  concea lm en t 68
(Adorno 1973: 145-146). It is worth noticing that at times even interpretations more sympathetic to 
Heidegger seem to miss this ironic dimension in simply stressing that “we car think o f a human as a 
coming-into-presence that comes to fulfilment throughout its life-time" (Guignor, 1992: 132). Although a 
corrective interpretation is furnished later in the text, when Guignon asserts thv Heidegger attempted to 
show “the possibility of constancy "(ibid: 139), the ambiguity still vanishes.
68 Heidegger here implies that what we encounter this way is not a being of Dasein’s mode but something 
relegated to the status o f an entity, which is either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand.
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is su p p o rte d  by D asein 's  being  for th e  m o s t p a r t "in the  u n t r u th ”, th a t  be ing  by 
covering u p  the  ow nm ost possib ilities  of its  being. A ccordingly, D as M an 
provide D asein w ith  a  form al a n d  the refo re  “em pty ” in te rp re ta tio n  o f d e a th  
w h ich  in tu rn  gives D asein  a n  “In ap p ro p ria te  ce rta in ty ” co n ce rn in g  the  
unavoidab le  of d ea th . T his ce rta in ty  a m o u n ts  to  a  sheei illu sion  in  th a t  it 
re m a in s  "objective” o r "em pirical” in  th e  gu ise  of th e  "death  o f O the rs"  a n d  fails 
to re la te  to D asein 's  own self, w hile veiling  the  indefin ite  c h a ra c te r  p e r ta in in g  to 
the  possib ility  of d e a th 69. In o th e r  w o rd s  D asein  fails to perceive its  ow n d ea th  
a s  b e in g  possible a t  any  m om ent.
Conversely, the  rea lisa tion  of th e  a fo rem en tioned  possib ility  o n  D ase in 's  p a r t 
e n ta ils  D asein’s ability  to com port i ts e lf  a u th e n tica lly  tow ard s d e a th . A u th en tic  
“B eing-tow ards death" is th e n  co n sid ered  by H eidegger to  be  g ro u n d ed  on 
D ase in ’s ability of being -ahead -o f-itse lf in  p ro jecting  itself, a n d  the refo re  on  the  
ex isten tia l-on to log ical p h en om en o n  o f c a re .70 Now, th is  b e in g -to w ard s  d e a th  is 
u n d e rs to o d  a s  a  m ode of being  w h ereb y  D asein  “is dying fac tica lly  a n d  indeed 
co n stan tly , a s  it h a s  n o t com e y e t to  its  d em ise”, w hile th is  dy ing  h a s  the  
c h a ra c te r  of a n  o rien ta tio n  tow ard s  a n  a u th e n tic  or in a u th e n tic  s ta n c e  w ith 
reg a rd  to d ea th  th a t allegedly d e fin es  D ase in 's  becom ing  a t  a n y  p o in t of tim e
69 It is really striking that Heidegger completely underestimates the role of emotional affection and its 
importance in shaping one's own comportment towards death. Adorno (1973: 15<>) interprets this omission 
as consisting strong evidence of Heidegger’s philosophy being "solipsistic”. Although this Adorno's 
assertion should not be treated as an apodeictic statement, it should be admitted that this omission should 
rather be attributed to the overall negative attitude Heidegger held towards anything public, and which 
arguably resulted in a less fruitful depiction of the compass between the impersonal "public" and human 
beings as non-interchangeable existents. Nevertheless, it should be also admitted in light o f the 
abovementioned remarks, that a more fruitful interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophising is still possible, 
given that appropriate attention be given to the ironic dimension o f death referred to above.
T" It should be reminded that in Heidegger’s elaboration care (Sorge), stands for the fundamental structure 
of Dasein (Biemel 199.3: 61), which cannot be traced back to "some ontical primal element, just as being 
cannot be explained in terms of entities”. It follows that Care must be conceptualised as a state of being 
always already underlying Dasein, and which is related to perfectio, to man’s transformation "into what he
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(B&T: 303-304 ). D e a th ’s  revelation  a s  a  possib ility  in  th e  se n se  m entioned  
above re s u lts  in  a n  "an tic ip a tion ” of th is  possib ility  by te rm s  of w h ich  D asein  
d isc loses “itse lf  to  itse lf ', w ren ch es Itse lf aw ay  from D as M a : a n d  co n seq uen tly  
d isc loses th e  possib ility  of its  (non-relational) a u th e n tic  ex istence , s in ce  the  
n o n-re la tio n a l c h a ra c te r  of d e a th  "as u n d e rs to o d  in an tic ip a tio n , ind iv idualises  
D asein  dow n to  itse lf ' (B&T: 307). T h u s , in  th is  con tex t we are p re se n te d  w ith 
a  concep tion  o f freedom , w hich h a s  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of a  deliverance  from 
D asein ’s  falling in  D as M an. At th e  sam e  tim e, it is conceived a s  a  freedom  of 
choice7' b e tw een  a u th e n tic  an d  in a u th e n tic  ex istence, betw een  th e  painful 
p rocess  of self-d iscovery  a n d  se lf-affirm ation  o n  the  one h a n a n d  th e  oblivious 
su rre n d e rin g  to  D as M an  on th e  o th e r .71 2 M oreover, a u th e n tic  be ing  is 
c h a rac te r ised  by  anx ie ty  a s  opposed  to  fear, w h ich  is a  defective o r in a u th e n tic  
m ode of an x ie ty , s in ce  it is  alw ays d irec ted  tow ard s e n titie s  e n c o u n te re d  w ith in
can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities”, while it is also pertinent to Dasein as an entity 
surrendered or thrown to the world of its concern (see B&T: 240-244).
71 Adorno interprets this as an advocating of decisionism and as an indication of a certain reification of the 
subject on Heidegger’s part, which in turn results in an obliteration of the societal and historical 
determination imposed upon the subject. Adorno (1973: 128), having accused Kierkegaard, “the 
grandfather of existential philosophy” of defining “right living” entirely “in term; o f decision”, attempts to 
further ground his criticism on Heidegger’s contention that Dasein is in “each case mine”, which Adorno 
interprets as a turning on Heidegger’s part of the “Hegelian dialectical unity of the general and the 
particular...into a relation of possession” (Adorno 1973: 114-115). Although Adorno's criticism with 
regard to Heidegger’s overall ambivalent attitude towards the societal and the ontic is well founded and 
justified, it seems quite plausible to suggest that the accusation discussed above must rather be seen as the 
outcome of a polemic against what Adorno defines as existential philosophy in general and Heidegger in 
particular, than o f a sober judgement. Again, Guignon has rightly suggested that this kind o f criticism 
against Being and Time overlooks the emphasis that this work puts on D aseins being embedded “in a 
wider communal context”, while he goes on to suggest that “to say that Dasein is thrown possibility is to 
say that our agency is always situated in a cultural context that provides the pool of possibilities from 
which we draw our concrete identities as agents of particular types.” (Guignon, 1992: 130).
72 It is important to note that since care is an existential ontological phenomenon it must also apply to 
inauthentic comportment, otherwise the whole conception o f Dasein becoming authentic would be absurd. 
Accordingly, although Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself is primarily construed as a departure from the “they- 
se lf’. even in being inauthentic Dasein is said to remain “essentially ahead o f itself., in face o f itself as it 
falls, land it) still shows that it has the State-of-Being o f an entity for which its being is an issue" (B&T: 
238). Biemel rightly suggests that since care is grounded structurally on temporality and its three ecstatic 
modes (i.e. past, present, and future), the future should play an important role als: in the case o f inauthentic 
Dasein. Unlike authentic Dasein though, inauthentic Dasein concerns itself with everydayness and 
consequently the "inauthentic future” has the character o f an “awaiting” (gewartuen) (Biemel, 1993: 65).
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the w orld (B&T: 234). O n the  con trary , b e ing -anx io u s71 is conceived a s  
d isclosing  the  world q ua  world, w hile by v irtue  of th is  d isc lo su re  D ase in ’s 
Being-free for "the freedom  of choosing itse lf a nd  taking ho'..I o f  i t s e l f  becom es 
m an ifest (B&T: 232). T h u s , being -tow ards-dea th , an tic ip a tion , a n d  anx ie ty  are  
conceived a s  resu ltin g  in D ase in 's  freedom  tow ards d ea ih , w h ich  is again  
theorised  in  te rm s of a  re lease  “from  th e  illusions of the  they"
M ost im portan tly , th is  s ta te  of affa irs  en ta ils  th e  co n c u rre n t d isc lo su re  o f the  
nu llity  of D ase in 's  ex istence, its  “th row ness  to  d e a th ” a n d  re s u lts  in  the  
em ergence of "an tic ipato ry  reso lu ten ess"  (B&T: 311 a n d  35<>). W ith  th is  move, 
H eidegger seem s "anxious" to e s ta b lish  the  possibility  of lU then tic  h isto rica l 
com portm en t, g ro u nd ed  ontologically on the  p h en om en o n  o f ca re  and  
ex isten tia lly  on th a t  of d ea th . Accordingly, the  a u th e n tic  a n tic ip a tio n  of d ea th  
on D ase in ’s p a rt an d  th e  re su lta n t au then tica lly  reso lu te  co m p o rtm e n t a re  said  
to provide D asein  w ith  the  possib ility  of choosing its  goal am o n g  th e  m any 
possib ilities  offered by trad ition , b y  “p u sh in g ” its  ex istence  in to  its  “flnitude" 
(B&T: 435). In tru th , Heidegger is  hereby  paving the  p a th  lo r th e  in tro d u c tio n  
of th e  no tion  of a u th e n tic  h isto ric ity  in the  m ode of fate a s  a u th e n tic  repetition . 73
73 Heidegger's discussion of anxiety links explicitly Heidegger’s thought in P"ing and Time with the 
writings of Kierkegaard. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to r. ace the specifics of the 
relationship between the two thinkers, it is worth noticing that according to some interpretations this 
relationship is deeper and more substantive than Heidegger himself would like to acknowledge. 
Accordingly, it has been argued that Heidegger’s project does not consist in raising Kierkegaard’s ontico- 
exislentiell analysis to the level of ontology, or as riding it of its theological concerns, as Heidegger himself 
would have it. Rather, three interconnected and basic Heideggerian notions, \ i / .  "the constancy of the 
self’, “temporality” and “repetition”, are seen as “directly drawn from Kierkegaard’s writings". More 
importantly, the main difference between the two authors is understood as the lack on Heidegger's part of 
this ironic dimension bestowed upon Kierkegaard’s writings by the pseudoninuly o f his authors. In this 
sense, the argument goes, Heidegger can be said to have taken “Johanes Climacus at his word", and 
therefore from a Kierkegaardian point of view. Being and Time could be said to be enframed in this nexus 
of significations that Kierkegaard calls “direct communication”. Furthermore, this reading traces a tension 
in Being and Time between the aforementioned Kierkegaardian motifs and “Husserl’s dream of a universal 
phenomenological science”, which allegedly prevented Heidegger from fully appreciating the “demands of 
the thoroughgoing destruction of the history of ontology” (Caputo, 1987: 82-83).
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Given th a t  au th e n tic ity  is u n d e rs to o d  by H eidegger a s  th a t  w hich  
“co n stitu tes ...[D ase in 's ) m ost ex trem e possib ility  o j  B eing  (Heidegger, 1992: 
10E), it is  n o t su rp ris in g  th a t  a u th e n tic  h is to ric ity  a s  a  c m c e p t  se rv es  a s  the  
g ro u n d  for an y  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h is to ry  a n d  for h istoriology a s  science. 
H istory, tim e a n d  d e a th  a re  in th is  c o n te x t th o u g h t to g e th e r !n a  m a n n e r , w hich 
does n o t g ra n t th e m  a  s ta tu s  ex te rn a l to  D ase in ’s  ex istence . In o th e r  w ords, 
they  a re  n e ith e r  en titie s  n o r ex p erien ces  e n c o u n te red  by a  su b jec t in  tim e74 b u t 
on  th e  co n tra ry , they  are  D asein , s in c e  they  a re  g ro u n d ed  u p on , a n d  the refo re  
a re  in  conform ity  w ith, D asein ’s ec s ta tico -tem p o ra l n a tu re . H eidegger a tte m p ts  
to  b rin g  all th e  a fo rem en tioned  e le m e n ts  coheren tly  to g e th e r  in th e  following, 
c ru c ia l p assag e:
Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is p e e  for its death 
can let itself he thrown back upon its factical "there" by shattering itself against death 
that is to say, only an entity which as futural, is equiprimordially in the process o f  
having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its 
own throwness and be in the moment o f vision for 'its time'. O ily authentic temporality 
which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate that is to say authentic 
historicality. (B&T: 437).
It is a t  first s tr ik in g  th a t  H eidegger ch o o ses  th e  w ord fate to  d esc rib e  a 
p h en o m en o n  th a t  properly  u n d e rs to o d  co n ce rn s  h u m a n  freedom  a s  ex p ressed
74 In ihis sense one has to agree with Francoise Dastur that death “is not an end in the sense o f what puts a 
stop to Dasein but is, on the contrary, the foundation of its finite existence, in the same manner, the 
finitude of time. ..is not an extrinsic limitation o f Dasein but, on the contrary, the origin and starting point 
of its very own Being, i.e. o f all possible projection- a limitation which, because it is internal, makes 
possible its own surpassing, i.e. makes possible both ekstasis and transcendence" i,Dastur, 1996: 165).
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in the  e n a c tm e n t of h isto rica l-po litica l p rax is a n d  self-affirm ation. Again, one 
m igh t n o t b u t  w onder w h e the r th e  conception  of a u th e n tic  h isto ricity  a s  
rep e titio n  necessarily  follows H eidegger’s e lab o ra tio n s on the  th ree  ecsta tic  
m odes o f tem porality , o r  w h e the r it is  also in ten d ed  a s  a  c ritiq u e  tow ards 
ph ilosoph ical o r scien tific  acc o u n ts  th a t  conceived of m odern ity  a s  a rad ical 
b re a k  w ith  trad itio n . How are  we th e n  to  u n d e rs ta n d  H eidegger's insistence  for 
the  need  of a n  ap p ro p ria tio n  of th e  in h eritan ce?  Again, how  should  th is  
in h e r ita n c e  be u n d e rs to o d  an d  w h a t k in d  of repetition  does it en ta il?  Is the re  
n o t a  ten s io n  in h e re n t in  th is  k in d  of reason ing , a  gu lf b etw een  w hat is 
u n p reced en ted  a n d  excep tional in  h is to ry  an d  th a t w hich  m erely  rep roduces 
itse lf a s  it w ere?
Concluding Remarks
In th is  c h a p te r  I a tte m p te d  to show  th a t  H eidegger's fu n d a m e n ta l ontology is 
n o t incom patib le  w ith  c ritica l co n cep tio n s of h isto ry . O n the  con trary  it w as 
a rg u ed  th a t  if c o n s id e re d  together th e se  conflicting ac c o u n ts  c a n  provide u s  
w ith  a m ore a d eq u a te  fram ew ork w herefrom  to th in k  th e  social h isto rica l realm . 
I a lso  a tte m p te d  to  sh ow  how  H eidegger's conception  of h isto ry  a s  place h a s  the  
ad v an ta g e  of link ing  th e  very no tion  o f h isto ry  w ith  th a t  of m e an in g  an d  how  it 
p o in ts  to  the  en igm atic  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  Being a n d  b e ing -h u m an .
1 hope I have convincingly  e s ta b lish e d  th a t  far from  p re se n tin g  u s  w ith a 
so lip sistic  concep tion  o f th e  h u m a n  being, H eidegger m a n a g e s  to  cap tu re  the  
elusive re la tio n sh ip  betw een  the  ind iv idual a n d  collective m o d es of h isto rical 
p rax is, d esp ite  the  fac t th a t  th e  m ode of being  of b o th  th e  collective an d  the  
ind iv idual is sa id  to  be p rim arily  In au th e n tic . The a ttem p t will be m ade to
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fu r th e r  e lu c id a te  the  n a tu re  of h is to rica l p rax is  in the  following c h a p te r , by 
ju x ta p o s in g  H eidegger's u n d e rs ta n d in g  of a u th e n tic  h is to ric ity  a s  fateful 
rep e titio n  w ith  C a sto riad is- defence of h is to rica l crea tion  in  th e  m ode o f an  
u n co nd itio n ed  em ergence o f "the rad ically  new  ”.
Chapter Two
The Dynamics of Historical Time: A  Narrative on Heidegger and
Castoriadis
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Introductory remarks
T h e  a tte m p t h a s  been  m a d e  so far to  exem plify the  close re la tio n sh ip  
betw een  H eidegger s  recastin g  o f th e  fu n d am en ta l q u estio n  o f being  a n d  h is 
a c c o u n t o f  h is to ric ity  in  Being a n d  Time. T h is w as fu rth e rm o re  coup led  by the 
in ten tio n  to  d raw  th e  read e r 's  a t te n tio n  to th e  perp lex ing  linkages a n d  im p asses  
betw een  a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h is to ric ity  a s  the  m ode o! b e ing  p ecu liar to 
D asein , a n d  w h a t is com m only  u n d e rs to o d  u n d e r  the  ru b ric  of "real" or 
“concrete" h isto ry . In th is  c h a p te r , the  a im  is. by tem porarily  su sp e n d in g  any  
ju d g e m e n t co n cern in g  the  a lleged  incom patib ility  of the  aforem en tioned  
p rinc ip les , to c o n tra s t  H eidegger's acc o u n t o f h isto ricity  w ith  C asto riad is’ 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  social h is to rica l, so a s  to  a t ta in  a  m ore d e ta iled  p ic tu re  of 
th e  p ro b lem  in q u estio n .
B efore v en tu rin g  a  m ore de ta iled  e lab o ra tio n  o f the  afo rem en tioned  two 
p h ilo sop h ica l a c c o u n ts , it sh o u ld  be no ted  th a t  In C a s to n a d is ' th o u g h t the  
concep t o f  h is to ric ity  b e a rs  d iffe ren t sign ifications th a n  in th e  ca se  of Heidegger. 
T h us, it m ostly  d e n o te s  a  s ta te  o f affairs p ecu lia r  to  th e  in s ti tu tio n s  of Legein 
an d  T eu k e in , in o th e r  w ords it d irec tly  refers to  th e  so c ia l/h is to r ic a l in stitu tio n , 
while it  signifies u n iq u e  s ta te s  of affa irs c h a ra c te r ise d  by indeterm inacy , 
d isco n tin u ity , ru p tu re  w ith  th e  "fam iliar" a n d  th e  '‘o rd in ary ”, a n d  u ltim ately  
u n pred ic tab ility . It h a s  becom e a lm ost cu s to m a ry  to  th in k  th e  problem  of
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h is to rica l tim e in  close co nnection  w ith  th e  p rob lem  of time per se. W hile it is 
d ifficult to e s ta b lish  th e  specific m ode o f  the  relationship  b e tw een  a  certa in  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f tim e a n d  a  “co rresponding" u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h is to rica l tim e, 
it is  still w orth  try ing  to exam ine th e  in te rre la tio n s  betw een  them . T h u s , the  
s tra te g y  of th e  p re se n t ex cu rsion  in  th e  th o u g h t of H eidegger a n d  C asto riad is  
will b e  to first tu r n  o u r  gaze tow ard s  th e ir  respective  critiq u es of “tra d itio n a l” or 
“inh erited "  co n cep tio n s of time.
2.1 Time, Creation, Institution: Castoriadis’ critique of Inherited Thought
In h is  p a p e r  “Tim e a n d  C reation" C asto riad is  beg ins h is  critique  of 
“in h e r ite d ” co n cep tio n s o f tim e by  a rra n g in g  th e m  in  the  following schem a: 
T im e is u su a lly  conceived e ith e r a s  objective i.e. a s  Cosm ic tim e, a s  a 
“recep tac le  an d  d im ension  of w h a tev er m ay  a p p e a r  an d  a s  a n  o rd e r and  
m e a su re  of th is  ap p earan ce" , o r  a s  Sub jective, th a t  being  tim e a s  lived and  
experienced  by a  su b jec t, o r  by  collective s u b je c ts75 (C asto riad is  1997: 374).
In e ith e r case , w h a t is p o s tu la te d  is th e  ex istence  of tim e a s  su ch , w hich 
p rov ides th e  g ro u n d in g  of th e  two a fo rem en tioned  categories o f tim e, an d  w hich 
m a k e s  possib le  th e ir  "m u tu a l a d ju s tm e n t, o r a t  le a s t  accom m odation  and  
co rresp o n dence"  (Loc.cit). It sh o u ld  a lso  be no ted  th a t  C asto riad is  in  the 
o p en in g  p a ra g ra p h s  of the  sam e  p a p e r  e x p re sse s  h is  in ten tio n  to  a rg u e  for the 
in sep arab ility  of tim e from  being, a n d  for th e  ac tu a l ex istence  of different
7' Actually the author treats the concept of the subject in the widest possible manner, so as to include 
individual human beings, distinct historical-societal formations, and different animal species. Thus the 
“various subjective times" refer to “mine [time], yours, the time of the Antics and the time of the 
Westerners, the time o f the whales and the time of the bees- that is, the varieties of private times or times 
for a subject" (Castoriadis 1997:374).
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categories of tim e (C astoriad is 1997 : 375). A ccording to  C asto riad is , th is  
m ultip lic ity  of tim es  is covered u p  b y  ph ilosophy , since from  Plato  to H eidegger 
the  com m on a tt itu d e  of p h ilo so p h e rs  h a s  b een  to w o n t w ith  a  "rad ical 
s e p a ra tio n ” betw een  su b jec t a n d  ob ject, a  s ta te  of affcors b ro u g h t to  its  
ex trem es w ith th e  em ergence o f id e a lis t an d  m a te ria lis t ph ilo sop h ies . More 
im portan tly , w h a t gets allegedly m ystified  by th e  positing  of th e  a fo rem en tioned  
"polarized couple" is the  social-historicaL  "bo th  a s  p ro p er d o m a in  a n d  m ode of 
being a n d  a s  th e  de ju re  an d  de fa c to  g round  a n d  m ed iu m  for an y  th o u g h t"  an d  
by im plica tion  a s  th e  dom ain  re sp o n sib le  for th e  c re a tio n  of “subjectiv ity” 
(C asto riad is 1997: 776-377).
C onsequen tly  ph ilosophy  finds i ts e lf  en tan g led  in the  aponxLS stem m ing  from  
the  p o s tu la tio n  of two incom p atib le  m odalities o f lim e, nam ely  one 
re if ied /id en tita ry  m ode76, w h ich  w ou ld  a c c o u n t for th e  to ta lity  of physical 
experience, a n d  a n o th e r  m ode, “su b jec tiv e  in th e  derogatory  se n se  o f th e  word". 
In a n  explicit reference to H eidegger th is  la tte r  m ode m a k e s  th e  ex istence  of 
b o th  a  "public” a n d  a  "cosm ic” t im e s  e ith e r a b s u rd  o r th e  sh e e r  o u tcom e of 
D ase in 's  fall in to  the  ev ery d ay n ess  a n d  in a u th en tic ity  o f " th e  they ” a n d  of th e  
s u b se q u e n t fo rgetfu lness of “B e in g ” in  D ase in 's  e n c o u n te r  w ith p a rtic u la r  
"beings".
76 In Castoriadis' terminology “identitary”, “enseidic”, and sometimes “ensemblistic/identitary" are used 
with reference to a certain modality of reason, allegedly dominant in the context of "Greco-Western" 
thinking, the essence of which is best exemplified in the mathematical logic o f “sets” or “ensembles". This 
modality is itself grounded on one of the dimensions of the social-historical institution, namely on the 
dimension which makes possible distinction, choice, assembly, counting and speech (see Castoriadis 1987: 
221-223). It should be noted that although this modality is according to Castoriadis the product of the self 
creation of the social/historical institution, it is still made possible due to the sta.e of affairs described by 
the thinker as "society's leaning on nature”. Castoriadis summarises this complex schema in the following 
manner: “...identitary logic, like [the institution of] legein is equivalent to an ontological decision 
concerning what is and the manner in which it exists...A  decision that is at the same time the expression of 
a creation, of an ontological genesis...We cannot think of this creation without a relation sui generis of
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By m a k in g  the  social h is to rica l th e  s ta r tin g  po in t f t r  an y  ph ilo soph ical 
endeavou r, C a sto riad is  w ish es to  d isso lve  one se t  of ap o rias  g en era ted  by th e  
ph ilosoph ical trad itio n  a n d  a t  th e  sam e  tim e to  b ring  to  light a n o th e r  se t  of 
ap o rias , p re su m ab ly  inaccessib le  to  inh erited  reaso n ing  (C asto riad is, 1997: 
378). The first ta sk  is th e n  to  be  perform ed th ro u g h  a  cu rso ry  d isc u ss io n  of 
A ristotle a n d  S t. A ugustine’s  th e o r ie s  of tim e, th e  form er being  u n d e rs to o d  a s  
a n  "em inen t p roponen t"  of th e  cosm ological/ob jective  defin ition  o f tim e, th e  
la tte r  a s  the  a rch e ty p a l figure for a n y  subjective theoriza tion  o n  th e  issu e . By 
w ay of a n tic ip a tio n  it c a n  be sa id  th a t  th e  b asic  s tra teg y  deployed by  
C asto riad is  in th is  sh o rt d isc u ss io n  o f th e  two th in k e rs , is to show  how  eac h  of 
th e  two a p p ro a c h e s  n ecessarily  h a s  to  ad m it e lem en ts  p e rta in in g  to th e  o th e r  
ap p ro ach . In th e  case of A risto tle, C asto riad is . n o t w ish ing  to  a d d re ss  all “th e  
in tricacies, r ic h n e ss , su b tle ty  a n d  solidity" o f A risto tle’s a rg u m en t, focuses  
m ain ly  in  w h a t is u sua lly  a cc ep ted  a s  A risto tle 's  defin ition  of tim e77 in  th e  
fou rth  book  of Physics, a n d  acc o rd in g  to  w hich  ‘T im e is a  n u m b e r [num bered  
n u m b er, m easu re ) of m ovem ent accord ing  to  before a n d  a fte r” (C asto riad is  
1997: 379). Now, a lth o u g h  tim e for A risto tle is n o t itse lf change , b u t  th e  
m e asu re  of ch an g e , C asto riad is  d is c e rn s  in  th e  abovem entloned  defin ition  no t 
only a  ce rta in  privileging of th e  s p a tia l  d im ension  -d esp ite  the  fact th a t  in th e  
A risto telian  ontology ch an g e  p e r ta in s  also  to essen ce , to  quality , to q u a n tity  a n d  
to  place- b u t  a lso  an d  m ore im p o rtan tly , a  belonging  to g e th er of som e “locally 
defined” m ovem ent an d  of tim e.
partial support on what was there before...[which] is the leaning of society on the first stratum, or natural 
stratum, of the given" (Castoriadis 1987: 227).
77 The relevant passage (Physics, book D, 219al6-219b6) reads: “6xav 6c to iporepov Kai uotcpov, t6te 
kfryopEV ypovov touto ytip eotiv o ypbvoc. aptOpb^ KtvfiaEUji; surd to np6Tepov ► ai t6 uaiEpov. Ouk dpa
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It is th is  sp a tia lity  o f tim e th a t  in  C asto riad is ' view b rings a b o u t  th e  “subjective" 
e lem en t in A risto tle 's  “cosm ological” na rra tiv e , s ince  -C asto .-iadis a s se r ts -  “any  
sp a tia l o rdering  is, of n ecess ity , a rb itra ry ”. T h u s  inevitable A risto tle is  forced 
to  ad m it th e  role of th e  ind iv id u al p syche  in  tak in g  co g n isan ce  an d  in  p u ttin g  
in to  o rd e r th e  experiences g e n e ra ted  by  sp a tia l a lte ra tio n s  (C asto riad is  1997: 
379-380).
Now, it h a s  to  be rem ark ed  th a t  it is by  n o  m e an s  evidem  how  c lea r-cu t the  
d is tin c tio n  betw een  a  cosm ological a n d  a  subjective th e o riza tio n  of tim e is in 
A risto tle’s  tho u g h t. Suffice i t  to  say  for th e  tim e being  tha t Aristotle w ish es  to 
a d d re ss  (Physics 2 2 3a20  ff) th e  ap o rta  concern ing  th e  possib ility  of the  
ex istence  of tim e in the  a b se n c e  of th e  psyche. T his a p o r ta  is o f co u rse  
p e rtin e n t to A risto tle’s defin ition  of tim e a s  n u m b er, since it is a b su rd  to  th in k  
of a  m ea surem en t in  the  a b se n c e  of an y o ne  endow ed w ith th e  ability  to  perform  
th e  a c tu a l ac t of m e asu rin g , o r for w hom  m e a su r in g  h a s  a m ean ing . 
C a sto riad is  tre a ts  th is  a p o re tic  s ta te  only cursorily , a n d  in  conclusion  he  
fo rm u la tes  A risto tle’s p o sitio n  in  the  following m anner: ” (a) th e  soul itse lf  c a n  
p roduce  a  n a tu ra l  s u b s tr a tu m  th ro u g h  its ow n m o v e m e n t...a n d  (b) th e  
ac tu a lisa tio n  of tim e a s  m e a su re  of th e  m ovem ent en ta ils  th e  activity  of th e  
soul" (C asto riad is. 1997: 384).
In a  s im ila r vein, th e  a tte m p t is  m ade by th e  ph ilosopher to  sh o w  the  inevitab le  
em ergence of a n  objective, o r  cosm ological d im ension  in A u g u s tin e 's  a c c o u n t of 
tim e. T he cen tra l apo ria  in  A u g ustin e’s  th o u g h t is tra c e d  in  the  fac t th a t  
A u g ustin e  h a s  to  p o s tu la te  again  a  m e a su re m e n t of t im e  by its d u ra tio n , 
b e cau se  of a  "s tre tch ing  of th e  m ind” [Distentía Anim t).
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T his m e a su re m e n t h a s  two p resu p po sitio n s, equally  s ign ifican t fo r C asto riad is ' 
critical p o sitio n . F irst, th e  p o stu la tio n  of tim e a s  a  "created  en tity , an d  second  
the  ad  hoc concep tion  of th e  eq u iv a len t of th e  a  priori capac ity  com m on to  all 
su b jec ts  to  experience tim e in  th e  sam e o rd e r a s  given in  th e  sch em a of 
expecta tion , a tten tio n , a n d  m em ory  (C asto riad is. 1997: 380-32).
The tre a tm e n t o f A ugustine  is revealing  w ith regard  to  C asto riad is ' 
in ten tions: It can  be clearly  seen  th a t  the  rea l ta rg e ts  of h is  c ritic ism s are  n o t 
the  th in k e rs  of an tiqu ity . A u g ustin e  prov ides C asto riad is  w ith  a n  excuse to  
a tta c k  K ant. H usserl a n d  Heidegger, no t on ly  -a n d  c e r ta in ’’, n o t prim arily- o n  
th e ir  id e as  on  tim e, b u t  on  th e  en tire ty  of th e ir  p h ilo sop h ica l p ro jec ts* 7«. 
Sim ilarly, A risto tle 's  allegedly “cosm ological accoun t"  serves a s  a  vehicle for 
C a sto riad is ' c ritic ism s ag a in st m o d em  m a th em a tic a l p h ysics : hence h is
aptOptu, Kivi|atv 8c nXcitn x'ai eXXazu) xp6va> aptOpbq dpu t(<; o xpdvoq” ( ApioTotiA.r|^, 1997:168-170).
7* II might even be possible to argue that Castoriadis does not criticise philosophers primarily on the 
grounds of their being unsuccessful regarding their conceptual labour, but on the grounds of their severing 
their ties with the body politic and of consequently assuming a role similar to that of the prophet. It should 
not be incidental that the major criticism raised against Plato by the thinker is that he allegedly wanted to be 
“above the city" and thereby “betrayed the spirit of his master" more than any other o f Socrates’ disciples. 
Indeed, this criticism informs Castoriadis' ambivalent position towards Plato (Castoriadis. 1991: 5-7). On 
the one hand the great ancient philosopher is either ridiculed or accused -in  what I personally find the least 
conceptually valid, aesthetically refined and historically informed of Castoriadis' points - as the conscious 
forger of the Athenian history, the disgraced enemy of Democracy and the lirst inventor of Stalinist 
methods in history (Ibid: 8), while on the other hand asserting that Plato has to bt regarded as being indeed 
the greatest philosopher of all times. More importantly though, Castoriadis considers Plato to be the 
inaugurator o f the philosophical school, an innovation allegedly alien to the etfxis o f the Greek world as 
exemplified by the concomitant emergence of democracy and philosophy within ihe polis  through the free 
and public interaction of independent/individual philosophers. Castoriadis is to my knowledge one of the 
few contemporary thinkers having some insight regarding the importance of the schools, although he 
mainly draws negative conclusions from this. To my knowledge, Kant (1787/1929: 32) -who speaks with 
sheer contempt and caution for “the ridiculous despotism of the Schools” meaning both ancient and 
contemporary ones- is perhaps the modern philosopher who stands closer to Castoriadis with regard to this 
issue, although with both thinkers one gets the idea that they focus primalily on one aspect o f the 
consequences o f the existence of schools, viz. the aspect concerning the lack o f  criticism in the 
development o f  their arguments, or what amounts to the same thing their introvert, anti-public character. 
It seems to me though that they do not fully explore the consequences logically following their common 
premise, namely that because of the prominence of the philosophical schools in antiquity, it is possible that 
we lack the means to adequately interpret the writings of ancient philosophers, not only due to the historical 
distance that separates us from them, or due to an ambivalence inherent in language, but also because -as  
products of the thought of schools- those writings might have been intended as r i lies for the non-initiated.
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co n ten tio n  th a t  tim e  conceived a s  a  “fo u rth  d im en sio n ” in d ica te s  n o th in g  m ore 
th a n  a  sp a tia liza tio n  of tim e, a n  “em pty" a b s tra c tio n  w hich . o u ld  be perform ed 
for a n  infin ite  n u m b e r  (n) of d im en sio n s  w ith o u t a lte rin g  an y th in g  in o u r 
concep tion  of th e  th ree -d im en sion a l sp ace , th a t  being  w ith o u t d is ru p tin g  the  
iden tita ry  co n cep tio n  of tim e (C asto riad is. 1997: 390-91). F u rth e rm o re , th is  
critique, in  o rd e r to  be m eaningfu lly  ca rr ied  o u t h a s  to be socia lly -h isto rically  
sign ifican t in tw o in te rre la ted  sen ses . In  o th e r  w ords, it h a s  to  a rg u e  for the  
possib ility  of a  d iffe ren t co ncep tion  of tim e an d  h isto ry , w hile g ro u nd in g  th is  
possib ility  on  th e  soc ia l-h is to rica l a s  su c h , so a s  to  accoui fo r th e  n ecessa ry  
a n d  co n seq u e n tly  b o un d in g  c h a ra c te r  o f su c h  a n  innovative concep tion . It is 
only in  th is  m a n n e r  th a t C a sto riad is’ p e rs is te n t re m a rk s  co n cern in g  th e  grave 
im p lica tions following th e  covering u p  o f th e  soc ia l-h isto rica l m a k e  an y  sense . 
In th e  p lace of th e  com m only  perceived po larity  betw een  a n  objective tim e 
a ttr ib u te d  to  n a tu r e  a n d  its  subjective c o u n te rp a rt, C a s to riad is  w ish es to 
in tro d u ce  a  th ird  an d  allegedly overlooked e lem ent, tha i be ing  th e  social- 
h isto rica l. F rom  the  o u ts e t  o f th is  in tro d u c tio n  C a sto riad is  em ph asizes  the  
need  to  avoid co llapsin g  th e  d ifferen t ca tego ries  of tim e, in  in s is tin g  th a t  “tim e is 
irreducib le  to so c ie ty ” (385).
T he p ic tu re  becom es m ore com plicated  w ith  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f an o th e r  
c ru c ia l e lem en t, th a t  of th e  p syche. We a re  told th a t th e  “t ru e  polarity" is no t 
th a t  betw een  soc ie ty  an d  ind iv idual- we m igh t a lso  ad d  nol even th a t  betw een  
th e  ph ilo sop h ica l "object" a n d  “su b je c t”- b u t  betw een  society a n d  p syche. T h is 
d isp lacem en t e n a b le s  C a sto riad is  to  in tro d u ce  fu r th e r  d is tin c tio n s  a n d  to
To my knowledge, no m.ijor contemporary philosopher has taken such an implication seriously, Castoriadis 
not being an exception in this respect.
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p o stu la te  a  difference betw een  c o n sc io u s  an d  u n co n sc io u - psychical tim es79, 
th e  p lu ra l in th is  con tex t being  c ru c ia l for the  ad m iss io n  of ¡he im possib ility  to 
p o stu la te  a  single tim e p erta in ing  to  every  s in g u la r h u m a n  p  yche.
A dditionally, “public tim e” is  ac c o u n te d  for in  two overlapping  ways: 
F irst, every socia l-h isto rical fo rm ation  is theorized  a s  a  “sub ject"  in  its  own 
right, a s  “a-being-fo r-itse lf’ (386), w h ic h  is u n d e rs to o d  a s  a  p recond ition  for its  
ex istence an d  -possib ly - for its  s u b s e q u e n t  developm ent. In 'h i s  con text, public  
tim e is prim arily  th e  p ro d uc t of th e  socia l-h isto rica l in s titu tin g , a n d  th is  
acc o u n ts  for the  in te rn a l d iffe ren tia tio n  betw een  a n  enseid i • an d  a n  im ag inary  
d im ension  th a t public  tim e u n d e rg o e s, in conform ity  v/ith  th e  respective 
“m om ents" of the  in s titu tio n  (387). S econdly , p u b lic  tim e is  m ade possib le , in 
th e  sen se  of being bo th  accep tab le  a n d  percep tib le  by th e  psyche th ro u g h  the  
p rocess of socia lisation , the  "p ro d uc t” o f w hich  is  th e  "social ind iv idual”.
T his sch em a  ac tua lly  p re s e n ts  u s  w ith  a  riddle, for the  
e n se id ic /id e n tita ry  d im ension  of so c io -h is to rica l in s ti tu tio n s  by an d  large, an d  
hence th e  iden tita ry  m om ent of th e  in s ti tu te d  pub lic  tim e, is sa id  to  have  “a 
m ysterious equ ivalen t” in the  w orld i ts e lf  (389). In o th e r w ords, we a re  h e re , a s  
in  m any o th e r in s ta n c e s  in  th e  w o rk  of C asto riad is , in tro d u ced  to  the  
conception  of a n  en igm atic  “lean ing  o n  th e  first n a tu ra l  s u b s tra tu m ” a s  the  
necessary , a ltho u g h  not a lso  su ffic ien t, p recond ition  for th e  ex istence  o f every 
socia l-h isto rical form ation. The en ig m a  do es n o t co n s is t of co u rse  in  the  
adm ission  th a t  the re  m u s t be so m e th in g  in th e  u n iv erse  “allow ing” h u m a n  life 
to  evolve, b u t in C a sto riad is’ a tte m p t to  exem pt th e  core im ag inary  d im en sio n s
79 It is only regrettable that Castoriadis did not pursue any further his thoughts on unconscious psychical 
times. As it is, we can only agree with him regarding the importance of further illumination of the issue 
and the difficulties involved in this effort.
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of b o th  th e  collective a n d  th e  psychical from  th is  "nature.I d e te rm in a tio n 80”. 
W ith th is  exem ption . C a s to riad is  w ish es to  in tro d u ce  th e  co n cep t o f tim e a s  the  
"em ergence o f o th e rn e ss” o r of tim e a s  c rea tio n , w hile secu rin g  m e an in g  a s  an  
exclusively h u m a n  a t tr ib u te 81.
If in  p h y sics  th e  co ncep tion  o f tim e a s  th e  “fo u rth  d im ension" a im ed  a t  a  
revo lu tionary  concep tion  o f th e  u n iv erse  th a t  w ould inform  a  b re a k  w ith  the  
confines o f E uclidean  geom etry , th e n  it co u ld  be sa id  of C a sto riad is  th a t  h is  
concep tion  o f tim e a s  a  s im u lta n e o u s  c re a tio n  an d  d e s tru c tio n  of form s a im s to 
be a  "fou rth  d im en sio n ” p ro p er w ith  regard  to  the  co n cep tu a lisa tio n  of h isto ry . 
In a  q u ite  illu m in atin g  p a ssa g e  C asto riad is  e m p h a s is e s  th a t  ' he fac t of c rea tion  
h a s  n o th in g  to  do w ith  th e  q u arre l a b o u t de term in ism " a n d  th a t  it only defies 
th e  "a b su rd  idea of a  h o m o g en eo u s u n iv e rsa l d e te rm in ism  th a t  cou ld  red u ce
811 Castoriadis is thus adamant that “ as for all nuclear social imaginary significations...[the content of 
imaginary time| is essentially independent o f any substantive leaning on the first natural substratum: it is a 
pure creation o f the society considered” (Castoriadis, 1997: 388). Leledakis (199°: 97) rightly underscores 
another aspect o f the aforementioned problem, namely that Castoriadis' emphasi.. on signification “both on 
the level of the social and on that of the individual unconscious”, the postulation in other words of “ a 
determinant -  but in itself indeterminate- level of social imaginary significations nehind and beyond social 
practice...seems to introduce a kind of underlying essence beyond the realm o f social phenomena, while it 
denies any specificity to the level of social practice, except to the extent that it is reducible to 
significations”.
81 Having established the multiplicity of social creations as a “fact” Castoriadis asserts that this indicates a 
certain quality o f the world, namely that it “is tolerant and indifferent to all thest creations”. The inference 
to be drawn from this is according to the thinker that “the world must be void of meaning. It is only 
because there is no signification intrinsic to the world that humans had, and wen ible to endow it with this 
extraordinary variety of strongly heterogeneous meanings” (Castoriadis, 199’. 389). Two things are 
striking in this conception First, the absence of any “dialogue” with, or even reference to the precursor of 
similar ideas in the context o f modern European thought, viz. Nietzsche. Second, the somehow hasty 
nature of the conclusion, which in itself is the product of a "disenchantment” o f ir,e world, since in the new 
polarity between society and psyche the world is "reduced" to a "mysteriously tolerant first natural 
substratum”. How is then the human ability to signify to be understood? If it is u part o f the “world”, what 
does it mean for signification to be exempt from "natural determination" and how is "nature” 
conceptualised? Castoriadis could be content in replying that history is possible “because there is no 
language of Being” (Loc. Cit), but in truth neither the existence nor the absence of meaning are subject to 
anything like a “proof’.
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levels o r s tr a ta  of being  (and th e ir  co rresponding  laws) to a  sing le  u ltim a te  an d  
e lem en tary  level"”2 (C astoriad is 1997: 393).
C onsequently , crea tion  ind ica tes th e  o p en ness  charac te ristic  of th e  social 
world- a n d  possibly of the  un iverse- th e  always-act.lv« possib ility  of the  
em ergence of new  eide, of “o th er determ inations" (Ibid- 392-393). T his 
conception  is su pp o rted  by two crucia l an d  in te rre la ted  d is tin c tio n s  es tab lish ed  
by the  th in k er, viz. the  d is tinc tio n  betw een  o th ern e ss  an d  difference, a n d  the  
su b se q u e n t one betw een  condition  an d  determ ination . T h u s , “o th e rn e ss"  
signifies a lte ra tio n  in the  gu ise  of th e  crea tion  of so m eth in g  "new ” an d  
unpreced en ted , of som eth ing  th a t  can n o t be  directly derive<* from  th e  ex isten t 
m ultip lic ity , in sh o r t it is p ecu lia r to  a  new  eidos.
In con trad is tinc tion , “difference” ind ica tes  the  in fin ite  d e te rm in a tio n s , 
com binations, an d  rep ro d u ctio n s of the  given, w hat C a sto riad is  calls "repetition  
of the identical", while its  n a tu re  is b es t exem plified by th e  logical o p e ra tio n s  of 
m a th em a tic s”3. *81
82 This passage makes clear lhat Castoriadis’ conception of creation does not v ish to dispense altogether 
with the idea of operative laws, but rather attempts to indicate the intricate character and complex nature of 
the laws pertaining to states of affairs of different orders. Arguably, the basic motive behind this move is 
the freeing o f historical praxis from a sterile conception of causality, imported to history from a domain 
radically alien to it, namely the domain of the first natural substratum. Castori.ulis formulates this in the 
following manner: “ This logic -  and the ontology that is homologous to it -  far liom exhausting what there 
is and its mode of being, touches only the first stratum; but at the same time. i!s internal exigency is to 
cover over or to exhaust every possible stratum...Physicalism and logicism, cuusalism and finalism are 
only ways o f extending the exigencies and the basic patterns of identitary logic to society and to history” 
(Castoriadis, 1987: 175). The alternative to inherited conceptions of society and history that Castoriadis 
proposes is to think of the mode proper of the social/historical as that of a magma or of “a magma of 
magmas". Interestingly enough, Castoriadis makes clear that with the introductior o f the magma metaphor 
he does not mean to identify the social/historical with chaos but to indicate the existence o f “the mode of 
organization belonging to a non-ensemblist diversity, exemplified by society, the imaginary or the 
unconscious” (Castoriadis 1987: 182).
81 The examples that Ca-tonadis offers to illustrate this distinction are quite illuminating. In order to 
highlight difference Castoriadis draws his examples from geometry and mathematics, while in order to 
indicate otherness he refers to literature and society: “ Thirty-four is different from 43. a circle and an 
ellipse are different. The llliad and The Castle are not different- they are other A horde of baboons and a 
human society are other". More importantly, human society is for Castoriaois the exemplification of
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Likewise, th e  em ergence of new  eide is theo rised  a s  cond iiioned  by the  p re ­
existing  fo rm s, b u t n o t d e term in ed  by  them , d e te rm in a tio n  u n d e rs to o d  
prim arily  in  th is  con tex t a s  n ecessity  a n d  g en era tion . A rguably  th e n , the  first 
te rm  of e a c h  o f the  a fo rem en tioned  co u p le ts  h a s  to fall w ith in  th e  do m ain  o f th e  
im ag in a ry /c rea tiv e  d im en sio n s, w hile th e  second  te rm s  co rresp o n d  to th e  
e n se id ic /id e n tita ry  d im en sio n s  o f being  a n d  the  an a lo g o u s  d im en sio n s  o f th e  
so c ia l/h is to ric a l. D oes th is  co n cep tua l sc h e m a  rem ove th e  d ifficulties involved 
in  C a sto riad is ' a t te m p t to free h is to rica l p rax is from  d e te rm in a tio n  via th e  
in tro d u c tio n  of the  co n cep t of a  h u m a n /s o c ie ta l  c re a tio n  g ro u n d ed  u ltim ate ly  
on  the  a b y s s  of sign ifica tions a n d  o f the  u n c o n sc io u s?
C a sto riad is ' (1997: 392) p a rad o x ica l defin ition  o f c rea tio n  a s  c re a tio n  e x  
nihilo84 b u t  n o t in nihilo  o r  cum  nihtio c a n  only be u n d e rs to o d  w ith  re c o u rse  to 
th e  d is tin c tio n s  d raw n  above, a lth o u g h  in  reality  little  does it su cceed  in 
rem oving th e  am b ig u o u s  ontological s ta tu s 85 of the  co n cep tio n  itself.
otherness since “it exists only as the emergence o f a new form (eidos) am! embodies such a form” 
Castoriadis, 1997: 392).
84 In order to illustrate some o f the conditions of this creation Castoriadis asset’s that “humans create the 
world of meaning or signification, or institution, upon certain conditions, namely that they are already 
living beings that there is no constantly and bodily present God to tell them what is the meaning o f the 
world and o f their life...But there is no way to derive either this level o f being- me social-historical- or its 
particular contents in each case from these conditions” (Castoriadis, 1997: 192-393). Useful as this 
sentence may be in concretely presenting Castoriadis’ argument, it does no', really shed light on his 
conception o f the nihil, since contrary to ordinary conceptions of it, nothing is pronounced to be something, 
though of a different order. Accordingly, although one cannot but agree with Kalyvas' (1999:111) 
insistence on the aforementioned Castoriadis’ distinction having often been ovc-cooked despite deserving 
especial attention on the reader's part, one finds it difficult to follow his somewhat hasty attempt to 
interpret the distinction exclusively as indicating Castoriadis’ awareness that ont: could not “dispense once 
and for all with the material effects of the capitalistic forms so as to permeate the entire flesh of the social, 
thereby infiltrating the structures of the material production of society as well is the mechanisms of its 
symbolic self-alteration". Useful as this interpretation may be, it re-inscr i es Castoriadis’ thought 
exclusively within the Marxist narrative, while overlooking the obscure bu' challenging ontological 
dimensions o f  Castoriadis’ argument.
Leledakis (1995: I IS) rightly senses this when referring to the problem coa.erning “the level o f the 
existence o f social imaginary significations”, although I find the word "level' rather inappropriate and 
misleading. The author furthermore suggests that it is possible to interpret the istence o f the magma of 
social imaginary significations and the moment of the institution as a “negative essence” o f the kind 
introduced by Derrida u .h  his notion of difference. Alternatively, always according to Leledakis the
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T rue, th e  ex p ress io n  'ex n ih ilo ’ does n o t indicate  th e  ab sen ce  of any 
g ro u n d 86 along  w hich c rea tio n  ta k e s  place a n d  the  c rea ted  is erected , since 
socio -h isto rica l crea tion  is  alw ays ta k e s  place in  the  m id si of cosm os an d  of 
p re -ex is te n t soc io -h isto rica l configurations. M ore im portan tly , the  creative act 
p re su p p o se s  a n d  is b a se d  upon  b o th  th e  m agm a-like n a tu re  of significations 
an d  th e  respective m odality  o f th e  u n co nsc io u s, a s  well a s  the 
co m m en su rab ility  betw een  the  enseid ic  d im ensions of th e  so c ia l/h is to rica l 
in s ti tu tio n  an d  th e  q u a litie s  of the  firs t n a tu ra l  s u b s tra tu m  C asto riad ls  w ishes 
to b y p a ss  th e se  prob lem s b y  po in ting  to  the  necessity  for a  rad ical a lte ra tio n  in 
the  co ncep tion  o f the  m e an in g  of “being"87.
The novelty  of th is  co ncep tion  lies in  th e  a ttr ib u tio n  of an  ontological s ta tu s  
p ro p e r to  the  very idea o f eidos. In  o rder to  philosophically  su s ta in  h is 
a rg u m e n t C asto riad is  develops a n  in te rp re ta tio n  of P lato 's Tim aeus, w hich 
fo cu ses  m ainly  on  P lato’s  concep tion  o f chora  a s  the  recep tacle  of “everything 
th a t  is ” an d  o n  the  ro le  the  an c ie n t ph ilo sopher a sc rib es  to th e  divine 
dem iourge. O n the  one h a n d , C asto riad is  (1987: 189) w ishes to d raw  parallels
magma could be ascribeu to individual unconscious and then projected to the social. Regardless of the 
usefulness of these formulations, especially viewed from the perspective of Leledakis’ argument, viz. the 
possibility of tracing elements pertaining to a structuration theory in Castoriadi',' writings, I would still 
prefer to put the question in a wider ontological context and not restrict it to the relationship between the 
social and human agency.
**’ Castoriadis explicitly refers to “the ground on which it (i.e. society] acts" in his discussion of the self­
concealment of the social/historical (Castoriadis, 1987: 213). Although it is not clear how philosophically 
rigorous the conception of the “ground” is in Castoriadis’ thought, the self-incurred play between 
concealment and unconcealment is an extremely interesting point.
1,7 The entirety of traditional philosophical discourse allegedly rests upon the assumption concerning the 
need to avoid the unnecessary multiplication o f beings. Castoriadis thinks that this attitude reveals the 
existence of another rule, operating at “a deeper level”, which can be formulated in the following manner: 
“do not multiply the meanings o f being; being must have a single meaning” (Castoriadis, 1987:168). In 
other words, according to the thinker, within the confines of inherited thought the multiplicity of the modes 
in which beings come to the fore has to be traced back to an origin. This origin is thus understood as being 
proper, inalterable and imperishable, while all other beings are conceptualised as deficient in this respect. It 
is on those grounds that Castoriadis places Heidegger’s questioning of the meaning of being within the 
discourse of the philosophical tradition, while characterising the Heideggerian conception of the
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betw een  P lato’s C hora, “visible a s  In  a  d ream , p a rta k in g  o f the  sensib le  a n d  the  
Intelligible b u t  being  n e ith e r  one n o r  the  o ther, fo rm le s s  form "* 88 a n d  K an t’s 
tre a tm e n t of space  an d  tim e a s  p u r e /  a b s tra c t fo rm s o f in tu itio n , in  o rd e r  to 
show  th e  im possib ility  of th in k in g  o f  tim e a s  a n  em p ty  form , w ithou t red u c in g  it 
to space . M oreover, th is  red u c tiv e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  allegedly re flec ts  the  
illegitim ate tra n sc rip tio n  of a  p o s tu la te d , fallacious, d e te n n in a n t. a -tem p o ra l 
aei on  tim e”9 itself, w hile it a m o u n ts  to  the  co n cea lm e n t of tim e a s  a lterity , 
supp o sed ly  exem plified by th e  in c e s s a n t  se lf-crea tion  o f th e  in s titu tio n .
O n th e  o th e r  h a n d , C a sto riad ls ' b rie f com m en tarv  o n  th e  P la ton ic  
concep tion  of a  divine crea to r, se rv e s  the  doub le  a im  o f u n d e rm in in g  in  one 
coup d e  fo rce  any  ontology o f b o th  a  C h ris tia n  a n d  a  G reek  origin, b o th  o f  w h ich  
accord ing  to th e  th in k e r  conceive o f c rea tion  solely in  te rm s of re -p ro d u c tio n 90. 
In o rd er to  exem plify h is  co n cep tio n  of C reation  C a sto riad ts  in  very G reek  a
ontological difference as “impossible to maintain”, and as just exposing “the limit of inherited thought” 
(Ibid: 182).
88 This is achieved via a contestable identification of the Platonic chora, the ancient conception o f topos and 
the modern conception o f space, which also serves as a vehicle for the thinker's .'.ttack on modern physics. 
Hence, according to Castoriadis “this separability-inseparability of the Receptacle...and of what is there 
shows up again in contemporary physics, with general relativity: energy-matter is ’ the local curvature of 
space-time and, moreover, the global properties of space time ‘depend’ on the quantity of energy-matter 
that it ‘contains’.”(Castoriadis, 1987: 189).
89 “For, once being has been thought of as determinacy, it has also, necessaiily, been thought of as 
atemporality. All temporality, henceforth can be but a secondary and derived modality; the only question 
that then remains (and continues to torture philosophy throughout its history) is ihe possibility o f different 
determinations that do not annihilate identity, hence of the Plural" (Castoriadis, 1987: 192).
m Thus Castoriadis (1987: 196) contents that “Creation, within the framework of inherited thought, is 
impossible. Creation in theology is obviously merely a pseudo-creation; it is producing or manufacturing”, 
while it is thus "predetermined and entirely determined starting from the elsewhere and the atemporal 
always of God; it takes place once and for all, once and for always”. Now, with regard to this last point it 
has to be remarked that not all philosophical accounts incorporating so-called “religious motifs” address the 
problem of creation in so static a manner. To my knowledge a good example of a more dynamic 
conception of creation is Max Scheler’s idiosyncratic interpretation o f Christianity and o f German 
Idealism. Now, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the complex issues stemming from 
Scheler’s thought, it might be interesting to note that for Scheler the shaping of the world by the Logos is 
theorised as an incessant process, as the outcome of historical praxis, which evidently requires the active 
agency of human beings, while the emergence of man and of God is viewed ai concomitant and the two 
terms as mutually dependent (see Scheler, 1989: 149-151).
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m a n n e r  in tro d u ces  the  im age of th e  scu lp to r, a rg u in g  th a t  by th e  a r tisa n 's  
giving form  to th e  row m a te ria l a  new  essen ce  o r eidos is  ere  i ed.
In case  th is  sh ap in g  is u n p reced en ted  a n d  original 1 it w ould th e n  be 
ap p ro p ria te  to sp eak  of a  c rea tio n  p ro p er, while th is  creative act is am enab le  to 
rep ro d u c tio n s  o r im ita tio n s. More im portan tly , th e  m a in  fea tu res  of every 
c rea tiv e  act a re  considered  to  be its  ind e te rm ina te  c h a ra c te r  an d  its  social- 
h is to rica l origin (C asto riad is. 1987: 197). Two in te rre la ted  an d  com plem entary  
is s u e s  a re  qu ite  im p o rtan t regard ing  th is  C asto riad is ' conception .
The firs t co n cern s C a sto riad is ' in s in u a tio n s  th a t  in h erited  ontology is b u t  the  
p ro d u c t of th e  se lf-concealm ent of th e  socia l-h isto rica l, w hich re su lts  in a 
p ro jec tio n  of th e  in s titu tio n 's  own q u a litie s  to a  p o s tu la te d  “beyond".
T he second  refers to th e  th in k e r 's  co n ten tio n  th a t  th is  “reversal" of the  
re la tio n sh ip  betw een  th e  C osm os a n d  th e  in s ti tu tio n  can  p rim arily  be 
u n d e rs to o d  on  the  level of ph ilo soph ical d isco u rse  a s  ihe  ou tcom e of an  
illeg itim ate identification  of Being w ith  m a tte r91 2 a n d  of the  h u m a n  being’s 
in ab ility  to c rea te  m a tte r93.
An ex trem e in te rp re ta tio n  of th is  th e s is  developed by C asto riad is  w ould 
a rg u a b ly  ascrib e  a  creative d im en sio n  solely to  the  socia l-h isto rica l, d im in ish ing
91 The main difficulty involved in such a conception of novelty and originality is arguably that the criterion 
employed for such a demarcation can be either itself the product of the core significations of a given socio- 
historical formation and hence o f relative value, or else it should be postulated ;,s normatively valid with 
reference to some trans-historical principle, e.g. with reference to universally valid principles of reason. It 
has to be remarked though, that this last possibility runs counter to Castoriadis’ line of reasoning.
It is important to note that according to the thinker this is a common feature of ad philosophical accounts, 
an unfortunate meeting point between idealism and materialism (see Castoriadis, 1987: 199).
91 It is very interesting that Castoriadis (Loc.cit) explains every interpretation of “tTian” as a finite being as a
lamenting of exactly this deprivation, of the human beings’ incapacity to create T speck of matter", which 
in turn gets mistaken as an inability to create in general. In my opinion this is an extremely important point 
made by Castoriadis, which could have been further developed towards a direction that the thinker did not
opt to follow, namely that of technology. In other words, it would be extremely interesting to investigate 
the extent to which the ".ore significations” constitutive of modern technology are immersed in a desire to 
surmount human finitude by “creating a speck of matter".
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the reby  th e  role of th e  C osm os to  th e  perform ance of m et t tanically  conceived 
p ro cesses .
N evertheless, in w h a t follows th is  line of a rg u m e n ta tio n  w on ' be p u rsu e d , since 
the  b e s t it could  achieve w ould  be a  m ere reversal ol w h a t the  th in k e r  
a tte m p te d  to libera te  th o u g h t from 94 *.
In stead , a n d  p e rh a p s  in  sp ite  of C a sto riad is- own in ten tio n s, we sh a ll d irec t o u r 
gaze to w a rd s  the  very concep tion  g ro u nd in g  C asto riad is  idea  of crea tion , 
nam ely  th e  ex trap o la tio n  of a  strugg le  betw een  au to n o m y  *3 a n d  heteronom y, 
the  two te rm s  of th is  po lar co u p le t signifying a concom itan t socie tal-ind iv idual 
s ta te  o f affa irs.
M oreover, we sh a ll pay  heed  to  th e  two c o rre sp o n d in g  m odes or 
"m om ents" of the  in s titu tio n , nam ely  th e  m om ent of in s ti tu tin g  an d  th a t  o f its  
being  in s titu te d . T he form er, being  d irectly  linked  to  th e  im ag inary  is 
u n d e rs to o d  a s  the  very exem plification  of w h a t th e  th in k e r  calls rad ical 
im ag in a tio n  an d  it cou ld  the refo re  be considered  a s  th e  in s ti tu tio n ’s  creative 
m o m en t p a r  excellence, a s  th e  ontological g ro u nd  of h is to rica l change  a n d  of 
revo lu tionary  activity, w hile being  th e  very exem plification of th e  la s t two; in  
sh o rt, in s ti tu tin g  is conceived by th e  th in k e r  a s  praxis.
On th e  o th e r  h an d , th e  m odality  of “hav ing  been  instituted"  is co n cep tua lised  a s  
the  so u rc e  of the  reification  a n d  au ton o m iza tio n  o f in s titu tio n s , cau s ing  
the refo re  c o n s ta n t o b stac les  to  the  e n a c tm e n t of h u m a n  au to n o m y .
94 II would be unfair both lo Castoriadis’ ethos and to the depth and scope o f his thought if we were hereby 
to arrive at the sterile conclusion that all the dimensions of the universe can be collapsed into the creativity 
of the social-historical, or alternatively to accuse the thinker of reductionism.
,5 Arguably, autonomy is the pivotal concept in Castoriadis’ thought, the centre wherefrom his whole 
conceptual apparatus is deployed and articulated, bearing at the same time a quite strong normative 
significance. On those grounds, 1 personally found Haritopoulos’ (2001: 261) description of Castoriadis’ 
oeuvre as “a metaphysics o f autonomy and imagination” both quite imaginative and illuminating.
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H isto rical freedom , the  freedom  to  b rin g  new  eide. new  law :, new  in s titu tio n a l 
form s in to  ex isten ce  sh ou ld  th u s  s te m  from a  socie ty 's  capac ity  to  con tinually  
re sh a p e  i ts  in s titu tio n s , from  its  cap ac ity  to  re s is t i ts  being  su b ju g a ted  to, an d  
a lien a te d  from , th e  p ro d u c ts  of i ts  ow n  doings.
If C a sto riad is ' theo risa tion  o f th is  d o ub le  m om ent o f th e  in s titu tio n  c a n  be here 
in te rp re te d  a s  h is  tr ib u te  to  th e  tragic d im ension  of h is to rica l ex isten ce96, th e n  
we co u ld  in te rp re t freedom  a s  a n  in c e s sa n t striv ing  tow ard s  tak ing  p lace  w ith in  
the  “fram e” provided by the  a fo rem en tioned  m om en ts . How sh o u ld  th e n  
"au tonom y" a n d  “heteronom y" b e  u n d e rs to o d  in  th e  coni ext of C a sto riad is’ 
th o u g h t, o r  to  p h ra se  it so m ew h at d ifferently  w h a t is  th e ir  pi oper s ta tu s ?
The q u e s tio n  seem s  crucia l to  th is  reader, m ain ly  because we e n c o u n te r  on  a 
d ifferen t p la n e  th e  sam e p a rad o x  th a t  we no ticed  ea rlie r regard ing  C asto riad is ' 
ex p la n a tio n  of novelty  an d  its  d ep en d en ce  on  th e  criterion  o f originality . In 
o th e r w o rd s, a  self-defeating  e le m e n t can  a rg u ab ly  be traced  in  C asto riad is ' 
co n te n tio n  th a t  th e  sign ifica tions em bodied  in in s ti tu tio n s  a re  specific socio- 
h is to rica l creations, so  th a t  the  “em ergence of p rim ary  sign ifications'' like those  
of th e  “H ebrew  God, th e  G reek  polls", e tc  c a n n o t be e ith e r “explained" or 
d e d u c e d  (C asto riad is  1 9 9 4 /1997b: 332).
96 1 think that this is vividly depicted in the tension between Castoriadis’ recognition of the fact that “almost 
all [known] societies have instituted themselves as heteronomous” and his Belief that there is in the 
universe “at least a type of being |i.e. the human being] capable of altering its inode of being" (Castoriadis, 
1991: 31). There is yet another important dimension of the “tragic" in history to which Castoriadis turns 
briefly his gaze in the discussion of the signification of a supposedly “internal” logic governing the 
development o f historical events, where he briefly questions the grounds on which “great historical events” 
are given the "appearance, which is more than an appearance, of a tragedy that is admirably worked out and 
staged, at which at times the obvious mistakes of the actors are absolutely unable to prevent the result from 
occurring” (Casloriadis. 1987: 46).
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U ndoub ted ly , C asto riad is’ p o sitio n  w ould Involve in t i 'p r e  ting  th e  form er 
signification  a s  th e  exem plification  o f heteronom y97 par excellence, while the  
sign ification  of th e  G reek polis w ou ld  re p re se n t for h im  th is  b reach  in  h isto rica l 
tim e th a t  m ade th e  in a u g u ra tio n  o f th e  pro ject o f autonom y possible. It w ould 
th e n  seem  th a t  a  se t of iden tifica tions is  hereby  p o stu la te d  by th e  th in k er, viz. 
th e  identification  betw een  h e tero n om y  a n d  se lf-concealm ent a n d  a  
com plem en tary  one, betw een  a u to n o m y  a n d  th e  -a g a in  self-referential- 
u n co n c ea lm en t o f the  soc ia l-h is to rica l in s titu tio n .
W hat re m a in s  u n c le a r th o u g h , is  the  so u rc e  w here !rom  th e  pro ject of 
au ton o m y  derives its  no rm ative  validity98, given th a t  th e  th in k e r  h a s
97 There are many instances in Castoriadis’ oeuvre where- in line with one of re major premises of the 
Enlightenment- religion is not only unambiguously interpreted as a manifestation of prejudice and 
heteronomy but where a stronger relationship between the two is identified and we are consequently told 
that "religion and the heteronomous institution o f society are of identical essence (Castoriadis, 1997: 319) 
It nevertheless seems to ibis reader that this explicit linkage between the project of autonomy and the 
demystification of religion is an element which brings Castoriadis’ thought particularly close to the 
positions expressed in Marx’s On the Jewish Question. The affinity between the two thinkers is especially 
strong regarding Marx’s intention to reverse the tables and to overturn the philosophical attitude by 
resolving "superstition into history” and the way he subsequently interprets the question concerning the 
relationship of political emancipation to religion as “the relationship o f political emancipation to human 
emancipation" (Marx. 1843/1974: 217). Let us recall that in Castoriadis’ case autonomy and the 
emancipation from religion are linked with society’s recognition of itself qua instituting agency, and in this 
sense it might not be against Castoriadis’ spirit if it was argued that "recorded ’ history exemplifies one 
major element characterising many o f the Greek tragedies, namely the element o f misrecognition. 
Additionally, religious institution always involves the positing, or the substituting, of some “extra-social 
source" for both the social institution and the magmas o f signification, while the theologically or 
philosophically often postulated “unity o f being”, religion, and heteronomy ire characterised by the 
thinker-in a rare instance where Castoriadis borrows a term from theology- as “consubstantial" 
(Castoriadis, 1997: 318). Similarly, Marx sees the first step of human emancipation -political 
emancipation- as emancipation “o f the sta te ...from religion in generaT' (Marx, 1843/1974: 218). The fact 
that political emancipation is for Marx an imperfect form o f human emancipatior. (Ibid: 218-220) and that 
the latter is ultimately conceived in terms of the abolishment of "market relations ’ (Ibid: 241), i.e. in terms 
of the abolishment o f capitalism does not crucially affect the comparison with Casioriadis, since it has to be 
borne in mind that with the term political emancipation- in the text under consideration- Marx wishes to 
designate the historical separation between the state and the church and the resultant emergence of civil 
society in the so-called "west" and not to repudiate the importance of politics coni eived as praxis.
9* An equally crucial aspect of the problematic status the concept of autonoins occupies in the work of 
Castoriadis has been rightly indicated by Wagner (2001b: 9) who detects in this Ccstoriadis’ conception the 
existence of an “ontological gap” between “the sociologically grounded obserntion o f the withering of 
autonomy and the ever-exislent possibility o f its emergence". It is furthermore rny understanding that 
Wagner attributes this “gap" to the elective affinities between Castoriadis’ own project and the project of 
the social sciences by and large. This point is quite convincing, especially cons'" hiring that historically the
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p ers isten tly  u n de rm in ed  th e  claim  to  un iv ersa lity  of ii'iy  tran s-h is to r ica l 
princip le  (e.g. the  alleged u n iv e rsa l validity o f th e  so-called  p i inc ip les  of reason). 
In th is  resp ec t, it is p e rh ap s  iro n ic  th a t  th e  position  C a s to n a d is  finds h im self 
in , can  be said  to be a n a lo g o u s  to th e  one faced by K a rt , w hose p ractica l 
ph ilosophy  develops from th e  p o stu la tio n  of a n  a n tith e s is  be tw een  au tonom y  
a n d  heterononom y, nam ely t h a t  “the  will m u s t  will its  ow n  will an d  th a t  its  
freedom  lies in th u s  being a  law  to  i ts e lf  (Caygill, 1995: 891. w hile  the  very act 
of lawgiving m u st alw ays be in d e p e n d e n t "of every p roperry  belonging  to  the  
object o f volition” (Kant, 1948: 101).
As a lready  rem arked  th o u g h , in  th e  co n tex t o f C a s io r ia d is ’ ph ilosophy  
p u re  re a so n  in its  critical fu n c tio n in g  is no  longer given th e  s ta tu s  of the  
u ltim a te  trib u n a l- to invoke K a n t’s  (1 7 8 7 /1 9 2 9 : 601) "jud icvd” m e ta p h o r in the  
Critique o f  Pure R eason. Nor i s  it conceived a s  th e  g ro u n d in g  princip le  for the  
possib ility  of e s tab lish in g  a  k ingdom  of en d s , a n d  in  th is  resp ec t99 the  
d isc rep an cy  betw een  the  tw o  th in k e rs  h a s  to be well acknow ledged. 
N evertheless, in so  far a s  th e  concep tion  of a  b in a ry  oppo sitio n  betw een  
au ton o m y  an d  heteronom y is  concerned , C a s to ria d is - p o sition  seem s to be  qu ite  
close to th e  K an tian  one.
emergence of the social sciences can be theorised in terms o f its being in many ways conditioned by 
autonomy constituting modernity’s core signification, while arguably the social sciences were themselves 
from the very beginning intended as, and they subsequently were seen as standing for, modernity’s self­
reflexive “moment" (for a more detailed exposition of this issue see Wagner 2001a: 3-4). 
w Castoriadis' insistence concerning the alleged “concealment of the social-historical” on Kant’s part and 
his purported “subjectivism" is no minor a difference between the two thinkers either, although it has to be 
remarked that both Castoriadis' points are open to contestation. It should therefore be borne in mind that 
the attempt to draw analogies between the two thinkers is only valid on the provision that Castoriadis’ 
position is not seen us a simple continuation of the Kantian prohlematique. Instead, I would like to suggest 
that despite the discontinuities, conflicting elements, and a certain degree o f incompatibility between the 
two philosophies, such a comparison is possible mainly because of Castoriadis’ commitment to one of the 
major premises o f Enlightenment, namely to the belief in the possibility of human autonomy conceived in 
terms of a project.
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T h is  resem b lan ce  becom es m ore a p p a re n t especially  in  the  case  th a t  th e  
very co n cep tio n  of a n  a u to n o m o u s  lawgiving of the  will it fu rtherm ore  linked  
w ith  K an t’s  ce leb ra ted  defin ition  of th e  E n lig h ten m en t a s  "m a n ’s  em ergence  
fro m  his self-incurred im maturity" (Kant, 1970: 54): im m atu rtty  be ing  prim arily  
conceived in  th is  con tex t in  te rm s  of th e  ind iv idual’s  su b ju g a tio n  to  som e 
allegedly ’’a lie n ” a u th o r ity 100. Indeed  it is  possib le  to suggest following F o u cau lt 
(1986: 38) th a t  K ant's  -b rie f b u t  crucial- an sw er to  th e  "au dacious" q u es tio n  
posed  by th e  Berlinische M onatschrift, b e c a u se  of i ts  benig  “located  a t  th e  
c ro ss ro a d s  o f critical reflection  a n d  reflection  on h istory" ct t b e  in te rp re ted  a s  
po in ting  to  a n  a t t i tu d e 101 c h a rac te r is tic  o f the  sp irit of the E n lig h ten m en t. 
P a ra p h ra s in g  F oucau lt we cou ld  say  th a t  th is  "negatively d efined” a tt itu d e  is 
prim arily  conceived in te rm s  o f a n  “ex it”, of a  "way out" (Ausgang).
It is  th e n  precisely  th is  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  p ro jec t o f the  
E n lig h ten m en t a s  a  "way o u t' a n d  th e  c ritica l func tion ing  th is  u n d e rs ta n d in g
That this subjugation to an authority alien to the subject is primarily linked with custom is of 
considerable importance, since with this move Kant does much more than simply affirming the principle of 
the necessity o f  rupture with the tradition. Rather, by acknowledging the difficulty involved in an 
individual’s attempt to “work his way out of the immaturity which has become almost second nature to 
him” (Kant, 1970: 54), the thinker pays due respect to the old Aristotelian conception of dpi; (habit). It 
would then follow- although Kant does not pursue the question any further in this text- that habit might 
play a significant part also in the attempt to liberate human beings from their self-incurred immaturity. It is 
furthermore possible to link Kant’s understanding of the imposition of “alien” authority with his definition 
of the heteronomous will, according to which “If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else 
than in the fitness of its maxims for its own making of universal law...the result is always heteronomy” 
(Kant. 1948: 102). See also Kant's (1787/1929: 603-604) meditations on the education o f youth according 
to the principles of "Critical Pure Reason” and the possibility of their forming a critical habit" out o f this 
instruction. It is also q cte interesting to note that Kant does not compromise his position regarding the 
need to free the youth -despite the alleged immaturity o f their age- from any sort of dogmatic "tutelage”, 
although Kant has to postpone this aim for the future (Ibid: 603).
101 Foucault extends this argument to the point of suggesting that it might be possible for the social sciences 
to conceive o f modernity rather as an “attitude than as a period of history”. Sin .e the present work is not 
concerned with providing a comprehensive framework for the conceptualisation and theorisation of 
modernity, emphasis is solely placed on whether this attitude identified by Foucault as "a mode of relating 
to .. .reality: a voluntary choice made by certain people. , a way of thinking and feeling; a way too, o f acting 
and behaving...like what the Greeks called an ethos” (Foucault. 1986: 39) can tie said to inform not only 
the Kantian reflections on morality and politics but also Castoriadis’ conceptualisation o f autonomy as the 
self-incurred unconcealmcnt of the social-historical.
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asc rib e s  to ph ilo sop h y  th a t  can  be  In terp re ted  a s  c o n s titu tin g  K ant’s legacy In 
th e  h e a r t  of C a stn riad is ' th o u g h t. In  sp ite  o f p ro p ag a tin g  th e  possib ility  of 
au ton o m y  a n d  m a tu rity , n e ith e r  K ant n o r C a sto riad is  fail prey to  naive 
op tim ism , s in c e  they  b o th  hold  fast a g a in s t  eq u a tin g  au ton o m y  w ith  the  
possib ility  of h u m a n ity 's  a tta in in g  a  s ta te  of h is to rica l ex istence  c h a rac te r ised  
by u nequ ivocal b liss  a n d  h ap p in ess , o r m ore p recisely  b ; th e  reso lu tio n  of 
co n flic t '02. K ant saw  qu ite  clearly  th a t  th e re  w as no  possib le  w ay of 
g u a ra n te e in g  th e  h a rm o n ic  sym biosis betw een  a n  "ideal" m d  for th is  reaso n  
p erp e tu a lly  "deferred" k ingdom  of e n d s  an d  th e  kingdom  o f n a tu re  a n d  he 
co n seq uen tly  a tte m p te d  to g ro u n d  th e  p o ssib ility  of h u m a n  freedom  on  a 
p rinc ip le  of d ifferen t o rder.
W h e th e r h is  a c tu a l choice o f p rinc ip le  -i.e . th e  alleged dignity  in h e re n t in 
h u m a n  re a so n  an d  in h u m a n ity 's  r e s u lta n t  ab ility  to give itse lf law s in 
conform ity  w ith  re a s o n 103 -g en era tes  a n o th e r  s e t  of in so lu b le  prob lem s, is a
1112 In this sense. Marx and Engels’ ( 1998: I ) definition of the “history of all hitherto existing society" in the 
opening paragraphs of their Communist Manifesto as “the history o f class struggles” can be said to contain 
a quite important element, namely the identification o f some irrevocable linkage between history and 
struggle or the conception o f history as struggle. The consequent postulation oy the two thinkers of a 
concurrent surpassing of alienation and conflict in the “higher phase of communism”, the famous 
anticipation o f the “end of prehistory" and the resultant entry o f humanity "into its true history" is arguably 
but the "negative” aspect of this identification of history with struggle. It is furthermore ultimately the 
hypothetical resolution of conflict -as it appears primarily in the guise of the struggle between life and 
death- that would signify humanity’s “emergence” or “deliverance” from what could be called “the realm 
at' duality" and that would consequently remove any trace o f ambiguity from human action. It has to be 
remarked that in this respect it makes little difference whether the binary opposition shaping the spectrum 
of human action is one between “good and evil” or one between “good and had” to recall Nietzsche’s 
famous distinction.
Indeed it might be even tenable to interpret Kant’s attempt to expel feelings, urges, and in general 
dispositions o f non-purely rational nature from the process that can arguably be described as the bedrock of 
his moral philosophy, i.e. the process whereby the will formulates its action maxims, in light o f his 
disillusion with the possibility o f the attainment of a state of unequivocal happiness. It can be thus said that 
despite the problems inherent in the Kantian project, and which cannot be discussed in detail here, the 
philosopher rightly foresaw the impossibility of grounding moral philosophy and legitimate social action on 
such a precarious principle. The following passage highlights quite clearly .de Kantian problématique 
indicated above: “Now a kingdom of ends would actually come into existence {'trough maxims which the 
categorical imperative prescribes as a rule for all rational beings, if these maxims were universally 
followed. Yet even if a rational being were himself to follow such a maxim strictly, he cannot count on
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qu ite  com plex an d  in tr ica te  issu e  th a t  c a n n o t be an sw ered  i; : the  co n tex t of th is  
ch ap te r, since any  a tte m p t a t  a  re sp o n se  w ould have to  be situated  w ith in  an  
evaluation  of K an t's  philosophical p ro jec t a s  a  whole an d  th is  lies certain ly  
beyond  the  scope of th e  p resen t w o rk 104.
Now, C asto riad is ' m is tru s t to w a rd s  any  unqualified  op tim ism  is p rim arily  
the  ou tcom e of h is  re len tless  ag o n is in g  w ith  an d  ag a in st th e  M arxist conception  
of h isto ry , while it is b es t exem plified by  h is  severe c ritic ism  a g a in s t w h a t he 
te rm s "com m unism " in  its  "m ythical s e n s e ” (C astoriadis, 1H37: 110). T his is a 
term  coined by th e  th in k e r to  e n c o m p a ss  som e d is to rt!  .n of th e  allegedly 
u n sy s tem a tic  id e a s105 p resen ted  by  M arx an d  E ngels m ain ly  in T he German  
Ideology, w here a  b re a k  w ith n ecess ity , th e  elim ina tion  o f the- div ision  of lab o u r
everybody else to be faithful to it on this ground, nor can he be confident that the k ingdom of nature and its 
purposive order will work in harmony with him, as a fitting member, towards a kingdom of ends made 
possible by himself-or. in other words, that it will favour his expectation of happiness...And precisely here 
we encounter the paradox that without any further end or advantage to be attuned the mere dignity of 
humanity, that is, of rational nature in man...should function as an inflexible p' .cept for the will” (Kant, 
1948: 100-emphasis added).
IIU Nevertheless, one cannot help making a cursory remark regarding the ¡ redeemable split and the 
inexhaustible conflict postulated by the philosopher between the natural and the rational realms within the 
human “subject”.
11,5 At bottom it could bi argued that Castoriadis is not at ease with a certain regaining in Marx’s view of 
history of a specific interpretation of ideas characteristic of the so-called Jucie i-Christian theological 
tradition, although it has to be remarked that even the compatibility between O  .istianity and Judaism has 
been often contested by thinkers having close ties with either of the .-.forementioned religions. 
Furthermore, the allegedly “unsystematic” character of Marx’s ideas on history . no less a debated issue. 
Accordingly, Karl Lowitli has offered a “strong” reading of Marx’s writings, which goes much further than 
simply tracing unsystematic messianic traces in Marx’s thought. It is exactly the messianic, prophetic 
aspect of Judaism that radically differentiates in Lowith's eyes Judaism ant Christianity from Greek 
philosophy and the ancient mode of historein, since it signifies a shift of the ten poral horizon towards an 
eschatological future that privileges “expectation and hope” (Lowith, 1949:6) This- quite common among 
modern historians and philosophers- understanding regarding the purportedly radical alteration in the mode 
historical time is thought and consequently in the way history is enacted informs i.owith’s severe criticism 
against Marx’s conception o f history in terms of class struggles, which he pronounces to be both 
unscientific and the exemplification of a "transparent messiamsm” having “its unconscious root in Marx's 
own being, even in his race " (Lowith, 1949: 43-44). It is quite important to m te that Lowith attributes 
what he calls Marx’s "idealistic materialism” to his being an enlightened, eman.-paled, "antireligious and 
even anti-Semitic" Jew and to his perhaps unconscious readiness to transform thi ‘religious righteousness” 
of the Jews into a secularised conception o f history. Furthermore, in this view, ti e postulation of the “last 
antagonism between the two hostile camps of bourgeoisie and proletariat” alle,- idly “corresponds to the 
Jewish-Christian belief in a final fight between Christ and Antichrist in the last e i >ch of history", while the
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an d  the  'en d  of p re h is to ry ’ a re  env isaged  for h u m a n ity  a n d  w hich a re  ev idently  
re la ted  to  th e  prob lem  of revo lutionary  activ ity , i.e. of p rax is
It seem s to  th is  re a d e r  th a t  in  so far a s  M arx  an d  E n ge ls’ positions a re  t re a te d  
solely a s  in sp iring  v is io n s106 a n d  they  a re  c o n seq u e n tly  not given th e  s ta tu s  of 
“scientifically  es tab lish ed "  a n d  the refo re  inevitab le  " law s’ g u a ra n te e in g  th e  
co u rse  of h is to rica l ch an g e , th a t  a s  far a s  th e  ou tcom e of h isto rica l ac tio n  is  n o t 
p re jud iced  form  the  o u tse t , a s  long a s  h u m a n s  do no t need  the  sh e lte rin g  a n d  
th e  re a s su ra n c e  of “u n iv e rsa l” h is to rica l law s  in o rd e r to  accep t resp o n sib ility  
for th e ir  ac tio n s , C a s to riad is  q u ite  read ily  e n d o rse s  th e m , o.' to  be m ore p rec ise  
he appropria tes  th e m  in  su c h  a  m a n n e r  a s  to  m ake th e m  com patib le  w ith  h is  
own c o n cep tu a l fram ew o rk .107 It is th u s  th is  m ystifica tion  th a t  acco rd in g  to  
C a sto riad is  tho se  e le m e n ts  have su ffered  p a rtly  in M arx an d  E ngels ' th o u g h t 
b u t  m ain ly  in  the  h a n d s  of M arx 's epigone, w hich is described  a s  "ill-defined 
m yth", a n d  w hich  p rim arily  en ta ils  th e  “ideological" construc  tion  o f a n  im age of 
th e  c o m m u n is t socie ty  to com e in  w h ic h  “all re s is tan ce , all d e p th  all 
o p a q u e n e ss  w ould be  ab sen t; a  socie ty  th a t  w ould be  purely  t r a n s p a re n t  to  
itse lf ' (C asto riad is , 1987: 111).
very conception on Marx's part of the redemptive and “universal function of tin most degraded class” is 
said to follow "the religious pattern of Cross and Resurrection" (Lowith, 1949: 44).
Ill<’ In this context, "vision" might not convey the exact meaning, but “intention” would be even more 
inappropriate. It is difficult to say against Marx and Engels' and Castoriadis' intentions that the abolition 
of classes has an "ideal” . tatus as opposed to the concrete enactment of historical praxis. Marx and Engels’ 
“materialism” is notorious in this respect and occasionally the two thinkers seem quite anxious to establish 
the “reality” o f their revolutionary aspirations, as e.g. when they insist that communism "is not the stale o f  
affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself...[but it is instead] the 
real movement which abolishes the present state of things"(Marx and Engels, I97t>: 56).
117 This is easily recognisable in Castoriadis’ contention that there are " numerous elements of undeniable 
truth in Marx’s intuitions concerning the surpassing of alienation: first o f all...the necessity of abolishing 
classes but also the idea of the transformation of institutions to such an extent that a vast difference would 
indeed separate them from what institutions have represented up to now in history" (Castoriadis, 1987: 
III).  I think that the acknowledgement on Castoriadis’ part of a grave biiach  separating capitalist 
institutions and the postulated mode of institutions to be established via the enactment of revolutionary 
praxis retains a significant part of Marx’s postulations on history, especially whei- a "radical change in the
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C onsequently , In a  m a n n e r  c o n so n a n t w ith  th e  M arxist d is tinc tio n  
betw een  tru th  an d  ideology we e n c o u n te r  in th e  fragm ent c 'ted  ab o v e  a  fu rth e r 
e labo ra tion  of the  m o tif of society 's se lf-unconcea lm en t, th is  Ume in  th e  gu ise  of 
a  loose identification  b e tw een  au to n o m y  an d  tran sp a ren cy .
T his is indeed o n e  of the  very few in s ta n c e s  w here th e  th in k e r  h a s  to take 
reco u rse  to the  onto logical c h a rac te r is tic s  o f th e  s in g u la r h u m a n  psyche in 
o rd er to refu te  the  possib ility  of unequivocal o r ab so lu te  tra n s p a re n c y  on the  
socie tal level. “No society" in s is ts  th u s  C asto riad is  -in  a n  a p o s tro p h e  th a t 
b ring s  h is  reflections c lo se r to w h a t Is com m only  called  a  p h ilo sop h y  of h istory- 
“will ever be totally tra n s p a re n t, firs t b e cau se  th e  ind iv iduals th a t  m a k e  It u p  
will never be t r a n s p a re n t  to them selves, s in ce  the re  c a n  be n o  q u es tio n  of 
e lim ina ting  the  unconscious"  (C astoriad is, 1987: 111).
N evertheless, it is the  second , com plem en tary  rea so n  g iven  by the  
th in k e r  regard ing  Lhe im possib ility  o f p u re  tra n sp a re n c y  th a t  can  b e  sa id  to be 
even m ore con troversia l, since it Involves th e  concep tion  o f th e  so c ia l a s  the  
g ro u nd  of h isto ry  a n d  o f subjectiv ity , a s  th a t w h ich  is “never a b se n t"  b u t  w hich 
a t  th e  sam e tim e is n e v e r en tire ly  p re sen t, “ a  non-be ing  th a t  is m o re  rea l th a n  
any  being, th a t  in w h ic h  we a re  w holly im m ersed  yet w hich w e c a n  never 
ap p reh en d  in  person" (Ibid: 111). It seem s th e n  th a t  in th e  concep tua l 
fram ew ork devised by C asto riad is  th e  in s titu tio n  is th e  n ecessa ry  b u t  lim ited - 
an d  occasionally  lim iting- m an ifesta tio n  o f th e  social, while th e  la tte r  is 
u n d e rs to o d  a s  in h e rin g  in  the  in s titu tio n , a s  th e  paradox ical c re a to r, p reserver, 
an d  d estroyer of the  in s titu tio n .
mode o f existence of human beings” on both the collective and the individual I'lunes, the "limits of which
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T he very id e a  of a n  in te rp lay  be tw een  co n cea lm en t a n  t u n c o n c e a lm e n t10” 
prov ides th e n  C a sto ria d is  w ith  a  c e n tra l  concep tion  w herefrom  so c ia l-h is to rica l 
change  can  be b o th  a rticu la ted  a n d  theo rised , since h is to ry  is add itiona lly  
u n d e rs to o d  in te rm s  of the  socia l's  un fo ld ing  in  tim e, enactc d a s  it w ere via th e  
em ergence of th e  successive- a lth o u g h  no t m echan ica lly  eng en d ered - m odes of 
socio -h isto rical ex isten ce  a tta in e d  b y  th e  in s titu tio n .
It is w orth  no ticing  th a t  C a sto riad is  briefly sk e tc h e s  tw o in te rre la te d  b u t  
d istinc tive w ays in  w hich the  soc ia l th e  h is to rica l an d  ihe  in s ti tu tio n  are  
interw oven.
F irst, th e  ex is ten ce  of a flat s ta te  o f affairs th a t  th e  th in k e r  c h a ra c te r is e s  a s  
"ord inary  tim es" is  p o stu la ted , w h ich  is  - in  a  su rp ris in g ly  Traditional m a n n e r- 
closely linked w ith  the  idea o f “p re se rv a tio n ” a n d  w hen  th e  “in s titu ted "  m o m en t 
seem s to prevail.
are difficult to imagine” is postulated by the thinker (loc. Cit)
1118 One cannot help wondering whether this Castoriadis' conception can be seen js a displacement towards 
the “social" of the Heideggerian conception regarding the interplay of presence and absence or of 
concealment and unconccalment characterising the relationship of human beings with Being. Although it is 
not my intention to trace allegedly Heideggerian influences in Castoriadis thought. 1 cannot but refer to 
Ferry and Renaut’s argument concerning the alleged influence exerted by He degger’s thought -via the 
mediation of the philosophies of Hannah Arendt or the late Merleau-Ponty- on French writers "otherwise as 
disparate...as Claude Lefort. Cornelious Castoriadis, and Michel Foucault”. The authors go on to argue -in  
a polemic and one-sided manner- that in the case of Lefort the Heideggerian influence is traceable in his 
“criticism of the totalitarian world as the abolition of the primordial division of the social, and of ideology 
as a forgetting of the 'split'. ..(comparable with] Heidegger's reading of metaphysics as the obliteration of 
difference and otherness”. Now, with regard to Castoriadis' work the authors argue that Castoriadis’ 
"denunciation of the Soviet system as a ‘stratocracy’ that aims, in a new form of imperialism, at 'brute 
force for the sake o f brute force’ independent o f any reference to an idea" is reminiscent o f Heidegger’s 
“criticism of technology as the will to will, as the will to increase force for the sale of force outside of any 
objective or substantial end" (Ferry & Renaut, 1990: 14). In any case, if the 'r.esis o f the Heideggerian 
influence on Castoriadis can be maintained at all 1 would rather be tempted to trace this in Castoriadis' 
conception of the self-concealment o f the institution rather than in his critique of the Soviet regime as Ferry 
and Renault suggest. This aspect of Castoriadis’ thought seems to me closer to Max Weber's critique of 
bureaucracy -especially the Soviet type- and instrumental rationality than to Heidegger’s critique of 
technology. Despite this remark, it has to be said that Weber and Heidegger'i positions on the issue of 
science and technology do exemplify considerable similarities, as I attempt to she«” in the next chapter.
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T his is  com plem ented- an d  overtu rned- by  a  s ta te  of affa irs c h a rac te r ised  by 
upheaval, w h ich  is  th e n  in te rp re ted  by th e  th in k e r  a s  revo lu tionary , dynam ic, 
subversive, co rresp o n d in g  to th e  in s titu tin g  m om ent of th e  s  .•cial-historical.
It seem s th e n  th a t  by com m itting  h im self to th e  concep tion  of th e  
E n lig h ten m en t co n cern in g  th e  necessity  o f ru p tu re  w ith so called  “trad ition" 
a n d  th e  -b o th  theoretica lly  conceived a n d  h isto rically  expre ;sed- identification  
of th is  ru p tu re  w ith  revolution , C asto riad is’ th o u g h t h as  a lso  re ta in ed  th e  m ain  
e lem en ts  o f th e  M arx ist concep tion  o f h is to ry .
T he m a in  d ifference th e n  regard ing  the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f h is to ry  an d  
revo lu tionary  p rax is  betw een  C asto riad is , M arx, an d  th e  e V a y s  controversial- 
b u t  equally  p e rs is te n t-  c o n cep tio n /c la im  of a  M arxist “orthodoxy”, is  th a t 
C asto riad is  re fu se s  to com prom ise the  in s ig h t th a t h is to ry  is th e  ou tcom e of 
strugg le  by c ircu m scrib in g  struggle to so m e p rescribed  d y nam ics of e ith e r 
m a te r ia lis t/M a rx ia n  o r ide a lis t/H eg e lian  dialectics, i.e. by u ltim ate ly  
p o stu la tin g  a  m e an in g  in h e re n t in h is to ry  (C astoriad is. 1987 ’ 112).
C asto riad is ' s trug g le  a g a in s t th e  "ideological” e lem en ts  of p h ilo sop h ies  an d  
theo ries  th a t  in  v ario us w ays a ttr ib u te  m e an in g  to  h isto ry  c o n ta in s  arguab ly  
ce rta in  hero ic  overtones, p e rh a p s  a s  a  re s u l t  of a  concep tion  th a t  tra c e s  in 
ideology109 p rim arily  the  h u m a n  need to  flee in the  face o f fin itude w ith  th e  aid
llw Evidently u conception of ideology as “distorted” or “false” consciousness has to also account for the 
reasons that necessitate such a distortion. In the classic Marxian definition ideology is clearly linked with 
class membership, or in any case with the so-called “material conditions” of human existence and is 
consequently understood in terms o f a camera obscura, while its products, the 'phantoms formed in the 
brain” are seen as the products of a "sublimation” o f “material” life-processes (see Marx and Engels, 
1970:47). With Castoriadis there arguably occurs a complementary shift in emphasis towards a theorising 
of the links between “ideological" constructions and the fear of the "abyss" experienced by human beings 
irrespectively o f their class-membership, or class-consciousness. The following passage is quite 
illuminating regarding this shift but also regarding the retaining of the main motif o f ideology as distorted 
consciousness: ‘This ideology, which cannot accept inherence, finitude, limitation and lack cultivates the 
scorn for this all too green reality that it is unable to reach in two ways: by constiu .'ting a full fiction and by 
an indifference with respect to what is and to what one can do with it" (Castoriado 1987: I 12).
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of c o n s tru c te d  fictions. N evertheless, th is  co ncep tion  of h is to ry  a s  th e  
u n p red ic tab le , po ten tia lly  libera ting  self-un fo ld ing  of the  « >eial-historical a n d  
the  c o n c u rre n t hero ic  d en u n c ia tio n  o f -m e c h a n ic a lly  cono  .ved- c a u sa lity  a n d  
m ean in g  poses a  se t of p rob lem s, w h ich  1 w o u ld  like to  briefly h igh ligh t in 
conclud ing  the  d iscu ss io n  o n  C asto riad is:
F irs t, th e re  a rise s  th e  prob lem  co n ce rn in g  th e  c ircu la rity  of th e  
concep tion  itself, coup led  by th e  ex trem ely  am biv a len t on tological s ta tu s  
a ttr ib u te d  to th e  social. T h is is fu rth e rm o re  in tensified  by th e  occasiona lly  
o b scu re  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  the  p o stu la tio n  o f  a n  ind e te : m ina te  en tity  th a t  
could  be called “th e  social a s  su c h ” o r th e  e s se n c e  of the  socia l, a n d  i ts  alw ays- 
incom ple te  m an ifes ta tio n s , especially  a s  th e  la t te r  are  theo rised  a s  being  
a r tic u la te d  a ro u n d  core sign ifica tions” 0.
It rem a in s  q u ite  unqualified  tho u g h , in  w hat sen se - a n d  m ore 
im portan tly - u p  to w h a t ex ten t we could  th e o r is e  the  very p ro cess  of th e  
form ation  of d is tin c t socio -h isto rical an d  c u ltu ra l  fo rm atio n s  an d  th e  
in te ra c tio n s  tak in g  p lace  betw een  th e m  in te rm s  of th e ir  be ing  a r tic u la te d  
a ro u n d  th e  afo rem en tioned  sign ifications.
A rguably, it is m u c h  m ore ea s ie r  to  trace  o r to  p o s tu la te  in a n  ad  h o c  m a n n e r  
the  core s ign ifica tions of a  specific so c io -h is to rica l o r  "cu ltu ra l” fo rm atio n  th a t  
h a s  a lread y  d isp layed  som e en d u ra n c e  an d  c o n tin u ity  in tim e th a n  it w ould  be 10
110 In defence of Castoriadis though, one could point to the thinker’s recurient insistence that it is 
impossible to separate- “except in the most external way, obliged by the linear nature of discourse- a space, 
a time and that which unfolds”, since according to the thinker the “dimensionality of the social-historical is 
not a framework in which the social-historical is spread out and in which it unfolds... [but this 
dimensionality is rather] itself the mode of self-unfolding of the social-historicai. .the space-time (the R4) 
in which we situate all reality and social-historical reality itself when we posit it as mere exteriority, is 
itself a product of the social-historical institution and, beyond this, an unending ei’igma”(Castoriadis, 1987: 
219).
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to  pin  dow n its  em ergence a n d  th e  specifics of the  production  o f  su c h  a  
form ation.
Finally, th e re  is the  riddle  co n cern in g  th e  re la tionsn ip  b e tw een  the  
m agm a-like n a tu re  of sign ifications, th e  very p rocess of the  em erg en ce  of 
allegedly core s ign ifica tions o u t o f th is  m ag m atic  m aterial an d  th e  e n a c tm e n t of 
"concrete" h is to ry  b o th  collectively a n d  in d iv id u a lly "1, the  m ain  q u e s tio n  being 
w h e the r th e  em ergence of core sign ifica tions c a n  be given . ne s t a tu s  of p rax is 
p roper, a n d  th e  co n seq u e n c es  th is  possib ility  c a n  have on bo th  th e  conception  
an d  the  e n a c tm e n t of h is to rica l p rax is in  g en era l an d  of rev o lu tio na ry  p rax is in 
p articu lar. 1
111 The delineation o f the collective dimension of this “unconscious” activity is arguably far more difficult 
and problematic than its individual/psychical counterpart, especially considering that it is quite unlikely 
that Castoriadis would be willing to acknowledge any notion of a "collective unconscious” or of an 
"objective psyche" to recall just the two celebrated definitions given by Ka'I Jung in his attempts to 
produce an explanatory framework regarding issues and phenomena of the same order.
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2.2 Fate. Resolution. History: Heidegger and the Sphinx.
Eoxi 6inouv eni YHS Ka  ^ t£tpanov, ou p ia  cpcovr],
Kai ipinov'aAAdooei 6e (pupv povov ooo’ eni yaiav 
E pneia Kiveuai ava t ’ cn0£pa Kai Kaia nbvxov...
(The Riddle of th e  Sphinx)
...AvGpionov Kair.Ae§cis, o$ pviKa yaiav ecptpnei, 
npotov ecpu te tpanoug  vpm os ek Aavovcov.
TripaAeos 6e neAcov ip ita to v  no6a Pcncipov epeidei,
Auxeva ipopii^wv, YHPa  xaviniovievog.
(O edipus)112
To G reek m ythology a n d  the  v a rio u s  a p p ro p ria tio n s  It u n d e rw en t by  th e  
g rea t poe ts  o f c la s s ic a l an tiq u ity  we owe th e  h a n d in g  dow n of th e  c e leb ra ted  
riddle cited above, an d  w hich  w as acco rd in g  to  m y th  posed  by  th e  S p h in x 113 to 
anyone travelling  to  an d  from  T hebes. T he e n c o u n te r  w ith  the  S p h in x  h a d  -  
a lm ost invariab ly - fatal co n seq u e n c es  for th e  trav e lle r a n d  co n seq uen tly  th e  
m yth ical c re a tu re  w as seen  a s  a  so u rc e  of g rave financia l a n d  po litica l 
m isfo rtune for th e  c ity -s ta te  of T h eb es. It w as  O ed ipu s th a t  acc o rd in g  to 
trad itio n  freed th e  city from  th e  S p h in x  by su ccessfu lly  an sw ering  th e  rid d le , to 
th e  d e trim en t n o t only  of th e  m yth ical c re a tu re -  w h ich  a s  is well know n h a d  to 
suffer a n  im m ed ia te  dem ise- b u t  a lso  a rg u ab ly  o f h is  ow n self, s in ce  th e  
e n c o u n te r w ith  th e  S ph inx  m arked  b o th  h is  rise  a n d  fall.
The w ay in  w hich th e se  two e le m e n ts  a re  w oven to g e th er in  th e  O ed ipa l 
m yth  is qu ite  n o ticeab le , since w h a t c a n  be se e n  a s  a  m an ifes ta tio n  o f th e  
form er- i.e. O ed ip u s ' re ign  over th e  city o f T hebes- p re su p p o se s  th e
112 Both extracts are cited form the notes/comments to Sophocles' tragedy Oedipus Rex (for the whole text 
in Greek see Eo<j>okWi<;. 1992: 166).
112 The Sphinx was depicted as having the head of a woman, a lion’s body and wings (see the explanatory
notes in SotpoKA.f|i;, 1992: 170-171, n.52)
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u n b e k n o w n s t114 killing of h is  fa th e r a n d  re su lts  in  the  in c e s tu o u s  m arriag e  to 
h is  m other. 1 do no t in te n d  to  e n te r in to  th e  com plex a n d  in tr ica te  is su e s  
a ris in g  from  Sophocles ' t r e a tm e n t115 of th e  O edipal m yth  in n is  trilogy116 o n  the  
m isfo rtu n e s  of O edipus, h is  p rogen ito rs a n d  d e sc e n d a n ts , d e sp ite  th e  fac t th a t 
O edipus R ex  served a s  a  s ta r tin g  p o in t for th is  section , a n d  d esp ite  the  
re fe rences to, an d  the  b rie f d isc u ss io n  of, th e  A ntigone  in th e  p rev iou s ch ap te r. 
S u c h  a n  en d eav o u r w ould re q u ire  a  th o ro u g h  know ledge of th e  G reek  c u ltu re  in 
genera l a n d  of tragedy  in  p a rtic u la r, re fe ren ces to  -a n d  a s se s sm e n t of- th e  
h is to rica l con tex t w here S o p h o c les’ traged ies  w ere conceived a n d  crea ted , an d  
philological specialv .ation  th a t  I definitely lack.
I w ould  therefore like to  briefly consider- a n d  reflect on - the  riddle posed  
by the  S p h in x  an d  O e d ip u s’ an sw er w ith o u t ex h au stiv e  re fe ren ces to  th e ir  
“original" con text, hoping  n ev erth e le ss  th a t  I will refra in  h o rn  inflicting  som e 
so rt of “h erm en eu tic  v io lation” to  th e ir  in ten d ed  m ean ing .
T h u s , if we focus on th e  w ay  in  w hich th e  riddle  is p h ra se d  we can  arg u ab ly  
trace  a  ce rta in  trickery  th a t  re n d e rs  its  being  an sw ered  in  the  co rrec t m a n n e r  
a lm ost im possib le.
114 Sophocles lays due emphasis on this Oedipus’ “blindness” by sharply contrasting him with the 
renowned blind soothsayer Teresias. There is a beautiful passage in Oedipus Re (verses 416-418), where 
this contrast is explicitly spelled out in Teresias’ response to Oedipus’ insults: “ Acyto 8’, £it£i8i| teat 
rutpkbv p' u)V£(8r|ou(;'a6 teal ficoopsa^ kou pkbtEu; tv’ ei kukou, ou8 ‘ EV0a vatEv. ou8’ ortov oiicek;  p i ta " .  
This can be roughly translated " Since you took insult on me for being blind, 1 ti ll you that although your 
vision is unimpaired you do not see the evil you are in, nor where you abide and whom with” (see 
LotpoKkf|i;, 1992: 80-translation mine). It should be remarked that Oedipus’ “blindness” is all the more 
ironic if one takes into account that by solving the Sphinx’s riddle Oedipus established himself as a man of 
considerable intellectual ability.
115 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an assessment of the impact this myth had on the 
development of Freudian psychoanalysis either, despite the fact that psychoanai tical terms like “Oedipal 
complex", “patricide", etc. have acquired an almost “canonical” status in the social sciences and in certain 
contemporary philosophical schools.
116 The third tragedy Sophocles dedicated to this myth, is of course the celebrated Oedipus at Colone, "the 
last poetising of the last poet in the dawn o f the Greek world” as Heidegger ( ( I 43) 1998: 238) famously 
characterised it. As is evident by Heidegger’s reference, Oedipus at Colone is considered to be the last of
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To be m ore precise, th e  u se  of th e  verb “to  b e ” in the  p resen i ten se  (rad) gives a t 
first s igh t th e  -illu so ry - im pression  th a t th e  in ten d ed  en ti y is d escrib ed  an d  
co n seq uen tly  po in ted  o u t by th e  S ph inx  in  exclusively  sy n c h .o n ic  te rm s.
It is  therefo re  possib le  th a t th e re  is a  te n d e n c y  to  dep ic t the  en tity  th a t  is 
described  a s  hav ing  "two, th ree , four, leg s  a n d  one voice”, a s  d isp lay ing  all 
th e se  -co m bin ed - qualitie s a t  th e  sam e tim e , o r a t  one m o m en t in  tim e. 
N evertheless, th e  u se  of the  verb  “to  c h a n g e ” in  the  second  verse o f the  ridd le  
(aAAaooei) p a rtly  rem oves th is  im pression , b y  add ing  b o th  a  sen se  of su ccess io n  
in  tim e o r d iach ro ny  an d  - in  G reek- a  se n se  o f  d u ra tio n .
Tim e is th e n  partly  d isclosed  an d  p a r t ly  concealed  by ihe  very  m a n n e r  in 
w hich  the  riddle is ca s t, w hile its  d isc lo su re  signifies th e  c o n c u rre n t em ergence 
o f the  "h u m a n  be ing”117 a s  th e  en tity  in te n d e d  by the  riddle. C onsequen tly , one 
sign ifican t im plica tion  of th e  w ay in  w hich  th e  riddle is fo rm ulated  refers to  th e  
acknow ledgm ent o f th e  am b ig u o us n a tu re  o f  bo th  sy nch ron y  a n d  d iach rony , 
especially  reg ard in g  the  way in  w hich  th o s e  tem poral d im en sio n s  a re  a rg u ab ly  
in terw oven in  th e  case  of h u m a n  beings.
T h us, if w e say  th a t  h u m a n  beings ‘h a v e ' - th e  p re se n t ten se  being  qu ite  
im p o rtan t in  th is  con tex t- two, th ree , a n d  fo u r  legs -  1 purposively  refra in  from  
m ention ing  th e  "one voice”- an d  in  the  s a m e  b re a th  we dep ic t tim e  exclusively 
a s  a n  en tity  ex te rn a l to th e  h u m a n  being, a n  en tity  again si w h ich  th e  v a rio u s
Sophocles's writings, while the Antigone is by contrast considered the oldest (for a brief account o f this 
issue see BAriaaottoukou. 1993: 19).
117 Although I am not aware of any direct etymological affinity between the word vvQpuMtoi; (human being) 
and the word ttoui; (leg), in Greek, one cannot but point to a certain conceptual linkage between the two 
words, since the former literally means the one that is “able to look upwards" end this arguably involves 
being able to stand on two feet. It is quite interesting to note that the ver\ name Oedi-pus -literally 
translated as "swollen leg”- exemplifies this linkage in the most direct manner and Sophocles often 
capitalizes on that in his tragedies.
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“in s tan ces"  of h u m a n  life a re  to  be m e asu red , th e n  o u r  c o n te n tio n  w ould  be 
only partia lly  co rrec t.
T here is  alw ays th o u g h  th e  possib ility  of read in g  '.he aforem entioned  
riddle a s  a n  in s ta n c e  w here the  p ro b lem atic  n a tu re  of p a s t, p resen t, a n d  fu tu re  
is m ade  th e m a tic , w here th e  p ecu lia r re la tio n sh ip  betw een  th e  th ree  "ecstasies" 
of tim e-to  p a ra p h ra s e  H eidegger- is  d isclosed  an d  w h ere  b e in g -h u m an  is 
ac tu a lly  recognized in a  p ro p er m a n n e r , viz. a s  a  m ystery.
In w h a t w ay is it th e n  possib le  to  say  in  a  m e an in g fu l m a n n e r  th a t  the  
th ree  d im en s io n s  of tim e coexist, a t  least a s  far a s  h u m a n  b e ing s are  
co n cern ed ?  Evidently , th e re  is  n e ith e r  a  single n o r a n  u n eq u iv o cal a n sw e r to 
th is  q u es tio n  a n d  th is  is a rg u ab ly  w hy th e  a n c ien ts  p re se rv ed  an d  tra n sm itte d  
it a s  a  riddle , viz. a s  so m eth in g  req u irin g  a n  an sw er e v e r anew, a n d  for th is  
re a so n  a  very  p erso n a l one. H eidegger's fo rm u la tion s o n  tem pora lity  an d  
h isto ric ity  c a n  be 'h e re  to re seen  a s  one possib le  a tte m p t a t a  re sp o n se  to th e  
fu n d am en ta l q u es tio n  posed  by  th e  ridd le  of the  S p h in x , * om ely th e  q u estio n  
co n cern in g  th e  m ean in g  of being  h u m a n , th e  sign ificance  of w h ich  w ould 
fu rth e rm o re  have  to be a sse sse d .
In th e  firs t p lace, it h a s  to  be no ted  th a t  c r itic ism s  of H eidegger’s 
tre a tm e n t o f h is to ric ity  -how ever ju s tif ie d  they  m ay be in  o tn e r re sp ec ts-  o ften  
n eg lec t118 w h a t to  th is  read e r seem s to  be a  q u ite  im p o rtan t co n ten tio n  on the
118 It could be argued that Heidegger has significantly contributed to- even reinforced- this interpretation of 
his philosophy by agreeing “without reservation” with Karl Lowith's suggestion that “his partisanship for 
National Socialism lay in the essence of his philosophy” and by furthermor. attributing his “political 
engagement" to his “concept o f historicity” during the last meeting between the > o men in Rome in 1936 
(see Lowith, 1994: 59-61). A word of caution is indispensable here: In no wa; is it argued in the present 
work -in the manner of Victor Farias for example- that Heidegger's philosophy i Nazi, or even compatible 
with Nazism, although the philosopher’s involvement with National Socialism is at the same time 
undeniable. It seems t.. this reader that Francois Fedier (1988) has effectively dissociated Heidegger’s 
philosophy from Nazism by showing its incompatibility with the racist and anti-Semite principles that are 
essential to the later, although it has to be remarked that Ferry and Renaut (19* 0: 24-25) rightly accuse
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p h ilo so p h e r 's  p a rt regard ing  th e  im possib ility  of giving a n  "exhaustive" acc o u n t 
o f h is to ric ity 119. It is th is  recognition  o n  th e  ph ilo sopher’s  p a r t  th a t  essen tia lly  
lim its  th e  ta s k  H eidegger s e ts  to  h im se lf in  th e  fifth c h a p te r  of th e  seco n d  p art 
o f Being a n d  Time to the  m ere  ind ica tion  of “ the  ontological locus  o f  the  
p rob lem  o f h istoricality" (B&T: 429).
T he read e r m ight recall th a t  in  th e  conclud ing  p a ra g ra p h s  o f th e  p rev ious 
c h a p te r  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b etw een  tem pora lity  an d  h is to rica lity  - o r  m ore 
a c c u ra te ly  th e  g ro u nd in g  of th e  la tte r  o n  th e  form er- in  H eidegger's th o u g h t  w as 
briefly  ind ica ted , a lth o u g h  n o t d isc u sse d  in  detail. It is therefore n e c e s s a ry  th a t  
th e  d isc u ss io n  of th is  q u ite  c ru c ia l is su e  be resu m ed  a t  th is  point.
T h ere  is in  th e  first p lace - a s  H eidegger readily  recognizes- a  triv ia l an d  
seem ingly  “self- evident" m a n n e r  in  w h ich  tem porality  a n d  h is to rica lity  c a n  be 
sa id  to  belong  together, nam e ly  the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of tim e a s  th e  horizon  *19
Heidegger o f nol having publicly dissociated himself from an article authored by his wife Elfride 
Heidegger-Petri and published in 1935 with the title “On the German Woman”. In this article it is argued 
that it is a “fatal error” *o believe “in the equality of all human beings" and disregard the "diversity of 
peoples and races”. Indeed. Heidegger’s political involvement seems to be “too complex” as Sartre has 
commented in his “Critique of Dialectical reason”, we could even say it present' us with a real challenge. 
In response to the challenge Fedier offers a very interesting interpretation concerning Heidegger’s 
characterisation o f his political involvement and the rectorship years as a mistake or as the "grosste 
Dummheit” o f his life. Where Heidegger’s critics see a light-hearted, irresponsible, and unremorseful 
attitude on Heidegger's part. Fedier (1988: 236-237) -with recourse to the philosophical employment of the 
word "Dummheit" in Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason in the sense of a “lack of the power o f  judgement”- is 
able to detect the confession on Heidegger’s of a philosophical mistake, which contributed to the turn of 
Heidegger’s philosophy. For the sake o f “objectivity” though I feel the need -o inform the reader that 
Fedier's defence of Heidegger is often met with suspicion, as does anything associated with the circle of 
the French “orthodox Heideggerians”, i.e. the philosophers close to Jean Beaufret. Ferry and Renault 
(1990: 6) even call Fedier "Beaufret's student and right-hand man” and accuse the “Beaufret circle” for 
consciously distorting the 'facts’ associated with Heidegger’s Nazism and for hindering the access of the 
public to crucial documents (for a detailed discussion see the first two chapters in Ferry and Renaut, 1990).
19 Heidegger quite emphatically asks his readers -and perhaps also his own sell whether they “still need 
explicit assurance that the following investigation [on historicality) Joes not rest upon a belief that the 
problem o f history is to be solved by a coup de main?" (B&T: 429- emphasis added). There is o f course 
some ambiguity even regarding this contention, since it might be interpreted as arguing that despite the 
difficulties the problem of historicity is in principle solvable. In any case it seems to this reader that this 
contention shows that Heidegger was aware that -at least in Being and Time- the best he could attempt to 
come up with was a sort of "groundwork” on the issue, and this despite the somehow “triumphant” tone the 
philosopher adopts in the book’s introduction.
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w herein  h is to ry  is  b o th  e n a c te d  a n d  given m ean in g  (loc. Cii). N evertheless, it 
h a s  to  be rem in d ed  th a t  in  H eidegger's th o u g h t “tem porality" s ta n d s  for m u ch  
m ore th a n  a  s im p le  co n firm atio n  of th is  d im ension  of tim e o r th a n  a  “hero ic” 
confirm ation  of h u m a n  fin itu d e ”120 a s  It is  o ften  in te rp re ted .
T em porality  is on th e  co n tra ry  a  pivotal concep t th a t  is d es ig n a ted  by 
H eidegger a s  th e  "ontological m ean ing" of care , o r  in  o th e r  w ords a s  the  
ontological p reco n d itio n  for the  co n co m itan t d isc lo su re  of D asein  an d  of the  
"world" of its  co n cern . H eidegger d e sc rib e s  th is  s ta te  of affa irs  q u ite  vividly in 
te rm s  of th e  co n c o m ita n t sp ring ing  fo rth  of a n  “inside" of th e  h u m a n  being  an d  
of th e  " th ere” th a t  is p e c u lia r  to  D a-se ln ’s  be ing  12I(B&T: 416!.
Two is s u e s  -e q u a lly  crucia l for H eidegger's u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f h isto ricity - 
sh ou ld  n ev e rth e le ss  be clarified  reg ard in g  th is  "double” d isc lo su re : T he first 
co n cern s  th e  p h e n o m e n o n  th a t  H eidegger ca lls  D asein ’s  sp a tia lity 122 an d  w hich,
1211 It is true that Heidegger's designation of authentic comportment as being towards-death renders his 
project susceptible to an interpretation of temporality as indicative of human finitude. Needless to say that 
such an understanding o f temporality often presupposes an understanding of death -and birth- that runs 
counter to Heidegger's own intentions as I will attempt to show later in this text It should be nevertheless 
remarked at this point that Gadamer rightly suggests that the interpretation of ‘ being from the horizon of 
time does not mean, as it is constantly misunderstood to mean, that Dasein is radically temporal, so that it 
can no longer be considered as everlasting or eternal”, since this would amount to a mere radicalisation of 
subjectivism. Furthermore, always according to Gadamer, the question of temporality should rather be 
understood as a transcendence o f  “the horizon of self-understanding", which "in disclosing time as the 
ground hidden from self-understanding.. .opens itself to a hitherto concealed experience that transcends 
thinking from the position of subjectivity, an experience that Heidegger calls bting” (Gadamer, 1989: 99- 
1(X)).
121 In my opinion the expressions "inside” and “there” used by Heidegger should not be taken too literally, 
or at least they should not be interpreted as pointing to an irredeemable ontological split between a 
"subject” and an “objective” world. Thus the terms must be seen as a “phenomenological” description of 
the -arguably quite common among humans- experience of an "inside" and ol the "extant” alongside it. 
Besides it is not accidental that the "there" is one component of the very word Dasein. while Heidegger 
also describes the "inside" as Dasein's being “for the sake of itself" and the "there" as the "in-order-to”. In 
other words, he sees the world o f  one’s concern as a complementary dimension to being for the sake of 
oneself (see B&T: 416). It has to be noted that a quite significant consequence Teidegger draws from this 
complementary character o f the world and humans has to do with the alleged "transcendence" o f the world 
that the philosopher attempts to establish on the assumption that something like a “world” must be 
“already...ecstatically disclosed so that in terms of it entities within-the-world can be encountered" (B&T: 
417 ).
122 In his attempt to determine the nature of Dasein's spatiality Heidegger juxtaposes the mode o f spatiality 
peculiar to human beings with the spatiality of the extant, or more emphatically of "real things”. Thus, in
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being g ro u nd ed  on th e  p h en om en o n  o f care- a n d  hence  on D ase in 's  ecstatico - 
horizonal tem p o ra lity '“  signifies D a se in 's  "m aking room  l . r  i ts e lf '124, o r th is  
S itu a tio n  th a t  the  ph ilo sop h er d esc rib es  a s  “self-d irective d iscovery of 
som eth ing  like a region" (B&T: 420).
The seco n d -an d  com plem entary- issu e  aris in g  o u t of H eidegger’s  tre a tm e n t of 
tem porality  refers to th e  w ay in  w h ich  D ase in ’s  po ten tiality -fo r-being-a-w hole is 
linked w ith  tem porality  an d  care . In w h a t w ays -H eidegger a sk s -  is it possib le 
to  shed  light on the  p h en om en o n  of D ase in ’s  "co n n ec ted n ess  of life”, of the  
“stretching" betw een  the  "extrem e" m o m en ts  of D ase in ’s  “b i r  h  a n d  "death"?
Is it in o th e r  w ords b o th  desirab le  a n d  ph ilosophically  valid to u n d e rs ta n d  th is  
phen om en o n  in te rm s  of D ase in ’s  m a in ta in in g  som e so rt of iden tity  o r self- 
sa m e n e ss  w hile undergoing  a  se rie s  of ex p erien ces "in tim e”?
Is fu rth erm o re  the  ac tu a l legitim ately  conceived a s  “in  e a c h  case , j u s t  th a t 
Experience w hich is p re se n t-a t-h a n d  in the  current now", w hile p a s t  a n d  fu tu re  
experiences a re  conceived a s  be ing  respectively  “no  longer" a n d  “no t y e t” ac tu a l 
(see B&T: 425)?
In line w ith h is  earlie r d isc u s s io n  concern ing  th e  ec s ta tic  c h a ra c te r  of 
tem porality , H eidegger an sw ers  th is  q u e s tio n  in  the  negative, trac in g  even in 
“ordinary" w ays of sp eak in g  a b o u t th is  “co nnectedness" a  ta c it  ad m iss io n  th a t 
th is  phen om en o n  sh o u ld  be tra c e d  b a c k  to  D asein  itself. A gain, th e  ex isten tia l- *12
Heidegger’s formulation "Dusein does not fill up a bit of space as a Real Thmg or item of equipment 
would, so that the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define that 
space spatially. Dasein lakes space in ...In existing it (i.e. Dasein] has alread' made room for its own 
leeway” (B&T: 419).
121 Heidegger emphatically asserts “Only on the basis o f its ecstatico-horizonal 'emporality is it possible 
for Dasein to break into space". It has to remarked that since spatiality is hereby directly based on 
temporality and thus ultimately on care it is inevitably also linked with falling, i . with “losing-oneself’ in 
"making-present” and with the related phenomenon o f guilt (see B&T: 420-421).
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ontological p h en o m en o n  of care  serves a s  H eidegger's po in t o f d e p a r tu re  in h is 
a tte m p t to  a t ta in  deeper in s ig h ts  reg a rd in g  th e  is su e  in  question .
D asein  " a s  care" is  th u s  sa id  to  b e  th is  s tr e tc h in g  " etw een" d e a th  an d  
b ir th , w hile n e ith e r  the  form er n o r  th e  la t te r  sh o u ld  b e  u n d e rs to o d  a s  "actual" 
m o m en ts  o r “po in ts" in  “tim e". A g lim pse o f th is  a lte rn a tiv e , a n d  allegedly  "non ­
objectifying" m ode of being  th e  th in k e r  a t te m p ts  to  a sc r ib e  to b ir th  a n d  d ea th , 
cou ld  a rg u ab ly  be a tta in e d  only w ith  refe rence  to  D ase in 's  ow n ex istence . 
S ince, H eidegger co n tend s, D asein  a lw ay s  "ex ists a s  b o m  a n d , a s  b o m , it is 
a lread y  dying, in  the  sen se  o f B e in g -to w a rd s-d ea th ”. th e n  th< specific m ovem ent 
th a t  cou ld  be rightly  a ttr ib u te d  to  h u m a n  ex isten ce  -in  being  d is tin g u ish e d  from 
th e  m ovem ent p ecu lia r to  the  p re s e n t-a t  -h an d - is t h a t  of D ase in ’s h isto riz ing  
(B&T: 426-427).
It is im perative to pay d u e  a t te n tio n  to  th e  fact th a t  b e h in d  th is  
in te rp re ta tiv e  sh ift given to  b ir th  a n d  d e a th  by the  th in k e r  lies th e  in te n tio n  of 
giving a  defin ite  an sw er regard ing  th e  lo c u s  of th e  "problem  o f h isto ry", w hich, 
H eidegger in s is ts , h a s  w ith  th is  m ove "already  b e e n  dec id ed ” (B&T: 427). 
A ccordingly, a n d  in conform ity w ith  th e  d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  th e  on tic  a n d  the  
ontological levels of enqu iry , H eidegger w ish es  to m ove b ey o nd  th e  ep istem ic  
co n ce rn s  a b o u t-  o r even the  ep istem o lo g ica l124 25 th e o r iz a tio n s  of- h is to ry  in an
124 It is quite important to note that for Heidegger “making room for oneself is a directional awaiting of a 
region, and as such it is equipi imordially a bringing-close (de-severing) of the /eady-to-hand [i.e. of the 
equipment] and present-at-hand |i.e. of the disclosed extant]” (B&T: 420).
125 Accordingly, Heidegger insists that if history is “treated in accordance with a theory of science, not only 
aiming at the epistemological clarification of the historiological way o f grasping ihings (Simmel) or at the 
logic with which the concepts o f historiological presentation are formed (Rickiit), but doing so with an 
orientation towards the side o f the object, then, as long as the question is foimulated this way, history 
becomes in principle accessible only as the Object of a science.. land] th< basic phenomenon of 
history...has been irretrievably put aside” (B&T: 427).
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a tte m p t to u n co v e r126 127 the  “prim ordially  h isto rical" in th e  gu ise  o f D asein 's 
h is to ric ity  (B&T: 428).
O nce m ore the  d istinc tion  betw een  au th e n tic ity  n d  in a u th en tic ity  
s h a p e s  two d is tin c t m odes of historicity , an d  in  accord an ce  w ith  th e  way in 
w h ich  “h isto ricality  is rooted in care”, D asein  is sa id  to  ex ist a s  "au th en tica lly  o r 
in a u th en tica lly  h is to rica l” (B&T: 428).
D esp ite  the  seem ingly rigid -a n d  for som e even ideological- c h a ra c te r  of the  
d is tin c tio n , it h a s  to be rem inded  th a t  H eidegger w as carefu l n o t to  identify 
" in a u th e n tic  existence" w ith  "ap p aren t o r u n g e n u in e  ex isten ce”. Moreover, 
in a u th e n tic ity  is said  to belong to  th e  "essen tia l n a tu re  o f D asein", while 
a u th e n tic ity  is conceived in  te rm s of “a  m odification  b u t not a  to ta l ob lite ra tion  
of in a u th e n tic i ty '27 ” (B&T: 171).
T h is becom es even p la in er w hen  th e  p h ilo sop h er explicitly lin k s  in a u th e n tic  
h is to ric a l com portm en t w ith  the  very p h en om en o n  of e v e ry d a y n e ss '2« a s  the
126 This "uncovering" is deemed necessary since, for Heidegger, the "existential-ontological constitution of 
historicality has been covered up by the way Dasein’s history is ordinarily interpreted”, while the task 
Heidegger sets for himself is the recovery of this primordial dimension “in spite o f  all this". It is 
furthermore quite important to note that Heidegger attempts to ground the possibility of this uncovering on 
the assumption that “disclosing and interpreting belong essentially to Dasein’s historizing” (see B&T: 428).
127 Gadamer rightly suggests that the common root of authenticity and inauthenticity does not merely 
indicate "that ‘fallenness’ is as much "part of human life as ‘resoluteness’, sin I unbelief) just as much as 
b elief’. For Gadamer. this common origin rather points to the “first form in which, in Heidegger's thought, 
being itself has come into language as the antithesis of ‘disclosure’ and ‘concealment’” (T&M: 526). In his 
essay entitled “Heidegger and Marburg Theology”, Gadamer expresses this insight more specifically by 
contrasting Heidegger’s conception of the antithesis between authenticity and inauthenticity with Husserl’s 
concept of “anonymous inlentionalily”. In Gadamer’s view the Husserlian “constitutional analysis of the 
anonymous ‘accomplishments’ of transcendental consciousness proceeded from the unrestricted 
universality of reason", which is conceived as able to clarify "every thing intended in constitutional 
analysis”. This means that “things” can in principle be made “objects of an explicit act o f intending”, in 
other words they can be objectified albeit in a different manner than things are objectified by the scientific, 
instrumental reason. In contrast to “this [i.e. the phenomenological) objectification” Heidegger is seen as 
having pursued “another direction”, namely the inquiry into the indissoluble “interinvolvement between 
authenticity and inauthenticity, of truth and error, and the concealment that is essential to and accompanies 
every disclosure and that intrinsically contradicts the idea of total objectifiabili'; ” (Gadamer, 1964/1977: 
202-203).
I2* Although Heidegger acknowledges traces of "caledrical" significations in the very concept of 
“everydayness" he nevertheless wishes to designate with this concept “a way to tie" or "a definite how of
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"horizon th a t  is c lo se s t to  us", o r  even w h en  he acknow ledges som e -lim ited  
indeed- validity in  th e  com m on-sense  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of tem p o ra lity  th a t  sees 
D asein  a s  tem poral “in  th e  sen se  of [its] b e in g  in time" (B&T 428-429 ).
H eidegger n ev e rth e le ss  w ishes to  re fu te  th is  la tte r  in te rp re ta i ion  o n  th e  g ro u n d s  
th a t  it w ould en ta il th e  co n cep tu a lisa tio n  of h u m a n  beings in  te rm s  of the  
“p re se n t-a t-h a n d '’, i.e. a s  en tities  th a t  e n te r  in to  th e  flow oi tim e. His s tra tegy  
c o n s is ts  in  f ir s t  d e te c tin g  a  “privileging" o f th e  “past"  in  the  s ig n ifica tio n s arising  
from  com m on se n se  u s e s  of the  w ord “h is to ry" an d  in  su b se q u e n tly  p u ttin g  into  
q u es tio n  th e  w ay in w h ich  th is  “p as t"  is th e re b y  in te rp re ted  'B&T: 430-431). 
C rucially , th is  d eco n stru c tiv e  p rac tice  revolves a ro u n d  a n  inv es tig a tio n  in to  the  
"paradoxical" m ode o f being  of so -called  “a n tiq u itie s”, w ith e m p h a s is  p laced  on 
th o se  p reserved  a n d  d isp layed  in  m u se u m s. Indeed, if w ith  the  w ord  “past"  one 
w ish es to describ e  so m eth in g  “irre triev ab ly ” belonging  to som e “ea rlie r time", 
a n d  if a t  th e  sam e  tim e  the  p a s t  is s e e n  a s  th e  d im en sio n  p ro p e r  o f h isto ry , 
th e n  it is d ifficult to  see  w hat m a k e s  th e se  "an tiq u itie s” h is to rica l, s in ce  they  
a re  still "p re sen t-a t-h an d " , i.e. su b je c t to  tim e, w hile th e  w orld th e y  re p re se n t “ 
no  longer is".
T h u s , th e  h is to rica l q u a litie s, w h ic h  th e se  “th in g s” allegedly  display, 
c a n n o t be derived s im p ly  by th e ir  be ing  in se r ted  in  - a n d  m o s t p ro b ab ly  w orn 
o u t by- th e  co u rse  o f tim e, o r -w h a t  a m o u n ts  to  th e  sam e th in g - th is  trivial 
d im en sio n  of tem p o ra lity  does n o t in  itse lf inv es t ob jec ts  w ith  "h isto rical
existence by which Dasein is dominated through and through for life”. The “everyday” is furthermore 
often described by the philosopher with the terms “proximally and for the most part”, while it is strongly 
linked with the public, since it is said that the “publicly manifest” belongs to everydayness. It has to be 
said though, that for Heidegger everydayness holds sway over human beings, since it is “determinative for 
Dasein even when it has chosen the they fo r  its hero”, while even in the mommt o f  vision “indeed, and 
often just fo r  that moment, existence can even gain the mastery over the e\ rryday, but it can never 
extinguish if' (B&T: 422- emphasis added).
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significance". It is  in stead , th e ir  se rv ing  a s  “eq u ip m en t”, c ;  b e tte r  th e ir  being 
p a r t  of a  h u m a n  “w orld” in th e  w ider sen se  th a t  gives househo ld  gear, 
sc u lp tu re s , te m p le s  etc  th e ir  h is to r ic a l ch a ra c te r  (B&T: 43 2 '
H aving th u s  co n stru c ted  h is  a rg u m ent, H eidegger v en tu re s  to e s tab lish  
D asein  a s  th e  prim arily  h is to rica l being, while trac in g  the  reaso n  b eh in d  the  
privileging o f th e  p a s t129 in  everyday  concep tions of h isto ry  in the  very 
o rien ta tio n  to w a rd s  the  seco n d arily  h isto rical, viz. h isto rical “things" an d  even 
“N atu re” a s  th e  “very soil o f  h istory"  (B&T: 433). If th is  ’•overing u p ” of the  
prim arily h istorical c h a ra c te r  of D a se in  is the  p recond ition  oi w hat can  be called 
" in a u th e n tic ” h is to rica l c o m p o rtm e n t, Heidegger tra c e s  au th e n tic  h isto ricity  in 
th e  p h e n o m e n o n  of an tic ip a to ry  re so lu te n e ss  an d  in th e  au th e n tic  “an tic ip a tion  
o f death" th e  la t te r  allegedly e n ta i ls  (B&T: 435).
D ase in ’s  a u th e n tic  o r “p rim ord ia l"  h isto riz ing  is fu rth erm o re  "designated” 
by th e  p h ilo so p h e r in a  positive m a n n e r  in  te rm s  of D asein ’s h an d in g  itse lf 
dow n to itself, "free for d ea th , in  a  possibility  w hich  it h a s  inherited  an d  yet h a s  
chosen"  (Loc.cit). O ne c a n n o t fail to  d e tec t in  th is  p assage b o th  the  
p h ilo sop h er’s  d issa tisfac tio n  w ith  “cyclical” an d  “linear" concep tions of 
h is to rica l tim e, a n d  h is  a tte m p t to  elevate th o u g h t beyond (he rea lm  of a  m ere 
ju x ta p o s itio n  b etw een  “trad ition" a n d  histo rical “novelty". As a lready  ind icated
l2‘' The enigma Heidegger aspires to solve can be formulated in the following manner: If what makes 
history possible is the disclosure o f a “world" on Dasein’s part, and if this disclosure is ultimately grounded 
on temporality, how can we explain the privileging of only one of the three equiprinwrdial ecstatic 
dimensions, viz. o f the past, that characterises the common sense understanding of history? Heidegger 
thinks that this apparent paradox can be solved with reference to the “secondarily historical", and 
furthermore suggests that it is possible to show that "the ordinary conception of world history arises 
precisely from our orientation to what is thus secondarily historical”. It seems to this reader that the 
philosopher furthermore suggests that this “ordinary" attitude has in turn grave consequences for the way in 
which the science o f historiology "receives” its subject matter. This interpretation might be sustained in 
view of the philosopher's contention that so-called “world historical” entities “do not first get their 
historical character...by reason of an historiological Objectification; they get t rather as those entities 
which they are in themselves when they are encountered within-the-world’’(B&l 433).
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by the  long cita tion  from Being a n d  Tim e  w ith  w h ich  the  p rev ious c h a p te r  w as 
concluded , H eidegger's concep tion  of a u th e n tic  h isto ric ity  en ta ils  a  quite 
sign ifican t in te rp re ta tiv e  sh ift regard ing  th e  very n o tio n s  of la te  an d  repetition . 
In c o n trad is tin c tio n  w ith  o rd in ary  concep tions o f f a te  tha t u se  th is  w ord in 
o rd er to  signify the  unavoidab le  im p ac t of th e  w ork ings of "alien" pow ers on 
h u m a n  beings, H eidegger w ish es to  in te rp re t it a s  “a  m ode o f being" th a t is 
possib le , a tta in ab le , an d  m ost im p o rtan tly  d es irab le  for D asein , on  the  
provision th a t  "death , gu ilt, conscience, freedom , a n d  ffn it.ide reside toge ther 
equiprim ordially  in  the  Being o f a n  en tity  a s  th e y  do in c a re ” (B&T: 437). 
H eidegger's -seem ing ly  paradox ical- c o n te n tio n 130 th a t  irreso lu te  D asein  “h a s  
no  fa te” a n d  th a t  it therefo re  su ffers a  k ind  of "deg rad ed ” h is to rica l experience, 
m igh t en tice  th e  read e r to  su g g es t th a t  th e  p h ilo sop h er’s  concep tion  of 
a u th e n tic  h isto ric ity  exem plifies s tro n g  d ec is io n is t e lem ents.
It n ev erth e le ss  still seem s qu ite  p la u s ib le  to in te rp re t  H eidegger’s 
in tro d u c tio n  of the  d is tin c tio n  betw een  fate a n d  d estin y  a s  a n  a tte m p t to  ru le  
o u t sub jectiv ism  an d  decision ism , s ince  the  form er, by being  ontologically 
g ro u nd ed  on care  refe rs to  m ain ly  th e  sub jec tive  a s p e c t of "au th en tic  
h isto ric ity”, w hile the  la tte r  is derived by  th e  equ ip rim ord ia l p h en om en o n  of 
B e ing -w ith -o thers131 an d  is the refo re  conceived a s  being  d e te rm in ed  by D asein ’s 
co-historicity .
1111 Macquarrie and Robinson, the translators of Being and Time, note that the English speaking reader 
would be perhaps “less troubled if [s]he were to read that the irresolute Dasein has no destiny". They 
furthermore assert "Heidegger has chosen to differentiate sharply between the words Schicksal and 
Geschick, which are ordinarily synonyms. Thus Schicksal (our fa te ) might be described as the destiny of 
the resolute individual; Geschick (our destiny) is rather the destiny of a larger ;roup, or of Dasein as a 
member of such a group" (B&T: 436. n.l).
1,1 It is quite important to note that Heidegger designates co-historicity as “the his'orizing of a community, 
of a people”, while Dasein's “fateful destiny in and with its generation" is concei i ed as making up "the full 
authentic histori/.ing of Dasein” (B&T: 436). Now, although the categories of “community”, o f “a people” 
and of "generation” are seemingly derived from the equiprimordial -although • ivial- situation of Being-
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T h us, it c an  be said  o f th e  H eideggerian  em ploym en t o f fate th a t  it 
d isc lo ses  the  ind ispensab ility  o f p rax is, theorized  from  the  p o in t of view of the  
“ind iv id u al’' h u m a n  being. D estiny  th e n  arguab ly  re-in  'o d u c e s  a  level of 
collective d e te rm in a tio n , since it is n o t u s e d  in o rd e r to  sign.ly  a  m ere aggregate 
o f "individual fa tes”, b u t  it ra th e r  m a k e s  m anifest th a t  “o u r  fa te s  have a lready  
b e e n  guided in advance, in  o u r  Being w ith  one a n o th e r  in tV e s a m e  world an d  
in  o u r  re so lu te n e ss  for definite possib ilities"  (B&T: 436).
T h is  is coup led  by the  ph ilo sopher’s a t te m p t  to b re a k  w ith <=n u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
rep e titio n  th a t  w ould unequivocally  a d d re s s  th is  p h en om en o n  in  te rm s of e ith e r 
th e  re-em ergence, o r w h a t cou ld  be te rm e d  th e  “v en era ting  p re se rv a tio n ”, or 
even  m ore th e  recu rren ce  of a  reified p a s t .
By co n tra s t, repetition  is s e e n  a s  a n  explicit ¡lan d in g  dow n of 
in h e ritan ce , a s  th e  a c t o f “going b ack ” a n d  give new  m ean in g s a n d  co n ten t in to  
“th e  possib ilities of the  D asein  th a t  h a s -b e e n - th e re ”.
R epetition  is therefore said  to be a  “reciprocative rejoinder1' to  th e  possibility  of 
“th a t  ex istence  w hich h a s  b een -th e re”, a n d  w hich, b ecau se  lin in g  m ade possib le  
in  a  reso lu tio n  tak in g  place in a  m o m e n t of vision, shou ld  a t  th e  sam e tim e be 
se e n  a s  “a  d isavow al of th a t  w hich  in  th e  today, is  w ork ing  itse lf  ou t a s  the  
p a s t '  (B&T: 438).
with-one-another, Heidegger does not succeed in providing a rigorous conception —or even an adequate 
definition- of them, and consequently the boundaries between those categories r :main blurred, while the 
categories themselves are "mystified”. It should be made clear that I do not hereby evoke the 
indispensability or the purported "superiority” of a "scientific" -sociological or otherwise- clarification of 
the aforementioned concepts over some allegedly “naive” philosophical conceptions of them, since -as I 
attempted to show with regard mainly to Castoriadis and occasionally to Marx and Adorno- it is doubtful 
whether the very conception of “the social”, even- and perhaps especially- when " is theorised over against 
the "communal", is any less problematic or unambiguous.
1(H)
Having th u s  d iscred ited  o rd in ary  concep tions of tim e an d  h isto ry , 
Heidegger - in  conform ity  w ith  h is  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of a u th e n 'tc  c o m p o rtm e n t132- 
a tte m p ts  to  g ro u n d  au th e n tic  repe tition  a s  th e  m ode p -o p er of a u th e n tic  
h isto rica lity  o n  th e  ecstasy  of tim e u su a lly  le ss  asso c ia ted  w ith  h isto ry , nam ely  
on  th e  fu tu re . We can  p e rh a p s  b e tte r  explore the  region H eidegger w ishes to  
d isc lose  w ith th i s  move by ju x ta p o s in g  in a u th e n tic  to  a u th e n tic  repetition . A fter 
all, it is p recise ly  th is  in a u th e n tic  w ay of concern ing  onese'd w ith  o n e’s  h is to ry  
th a t  in  H eidegger's view m akes th e  q u es tio n  concern ing  tb< co n n e c te d n e ss  of 
D ase in  possib le . In o th e r w ords, it is only th e  d isp arity  a n d  th e  m u tab ility  of 
o n e ’s  lifetime exp erien ces th a t  re n d e r  th e  belief in a  p e rs is te n t a n d  c o n s is te n t 
“se lf ' ra th e r  p rob lem atic .
The is s u e  of D asein ’s  c o n n ec ted n e ss  seem s of g real im p o rtan ce  to  th is  
read er, s ince  b y  po in ting  to  th e  m ultip lic ity  of m a n n e rs  in w hich  the  “s e lf ’ is  
con tin u ally  d isp e rse d  an d  fragm en ted  in  th e  various affa irs  of D as M an a n d  in  
th e  "world h is to r ic a l” it a lso  reveals D ase in ’s  occasional - b u t  no  less  im p o rtan t-  
a tte m p t to a t t a in  se lf-constancy  in  an tic ip a to ry  re s o lu te n e s s 133. It is  n o  
acc id en t th a t  H eidegger in identify ing re so lu ten ess  a s  th e  so u rce  of - th e  
existen tie ll- se lf-co n stan cy  a n d  o f freedom 134 a tte m p ts  to define it in  n o n ­
132 In Heidegger’s formulation then, authentic Betng-towards death provide? also the ground for the 
authentic enactment and experiencing of history: “ Authentic Being-towards-death- that is to say, the 
fmitude o f temporality- is the hidden basis o f Dasein’s historicality. Dasein does not first become historical 
in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating”. It is 
furthermore important to note that this mode o f repetition is given a primordial n. originary status and this 
is why the philosopher insists that for repetition to take place “no historiology is os yet needed” (B&T: 438- 
emphasis added).
133 I think it is quite important to cite Heidegger’s exact formulation: “it [i.e the question concerning 
Dasein’s connectedness as it arises from inauthentic existence] asks rather in which of its own kinds o f 
Being Dasein loses itse lf in such a manner that it must, as it were, only subsequt ally pull itself together out 
of dispersal, and think up for itself a unity in which that together is embraced" (BAcT: 442).
1 J Heidegger's exposition of resoluteness allows for two complementary conceptions of freedom to 
emerge. First, freedom is conceived in a “negative” manner as ‘freedom from' the “they”, and in this sense 
Dasein can be seen as recovering itself from its “lost-ness” in the “they” and as thereby freeing itself from
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tem p o ra l te rm s 135, so a s  to  m a k e  it conceivable for it to c o n ta in  "every possib le  
m o m en t of v ision th a t m ay a r is e  from  it” (B&T: 443).
T h is en ta ils  th a t th e  c o n s tan cy  of th e  self is no t in te r ru p te d  by th e  
m o m en t of vision, s ince  it is  n o t  form ed of “m om ents" ad jo in ed  tog e th er in  a n  
ex te rn a l m an n er, b u t ra th e r  fo rm ed in  th e  b as is  of a  te m p o ra lity  “w hich h a s  
a lrea d y  been  stretched  along” (Loc. Cit). By co n tra s t, in  the  c a s e  of in a u th e n tic  
ex istence , the  very c o n cea lm e n t o f a u th e n tic  tem porality ’s s tre tc h in g  en ta ils  th e  
prevailing  of th e  ac tu a l over th e  possib le- exp ressed  also  b u T  n o t exclusively in 
te rm s  of a n  u n q u es tio n ed  conform ity  w ith  e stab lish ed  v iew s o n  the  w orld- 
h is to rica l. a n d  th e  inevitab le  in te rp re ta tio n  of the  “p a s t” from  th e  horizon o f a  
reified p resen t.
In a  qu ite  rem ark ab le  a p o s tro p h e  o f th e  text- th a t  co u ld  be  fu rth e rm o re  
In terp re ted  a s  a critical re m a rk  a g a in s t  the  unequivocal iden tifica tion  of 
m odern ity  w ith  ru p tu re  a n d  p ro g ress136- the  p h ilo so p h e r a sc rib es  th e  
p reo ccu p a tio n  w ith the  “m o d e m " to in a u th e n tic  h isto rica litv , w hile a ttr ib u tin g  
to  au then tic  historicality a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f h isto ry  in te rm s o f  “a  recurrence o f  
the  possible", gro u nd ed  on  D a se in ’s  o p e n n e ss  (B&T: 444). *156
the illusions and their way of being in general, and this is why Heidegger c ntends that resoluteness 
“constitutes the loyally o f existence to its own S e lf’. Secondly, freedom i-. positively conceived as 
'freedom of choice’ among the possibilities that are presented -and therefore a\ailable-to oneself, while it 
follows that this entails a sort of "sacrifice” or a “giving up” of other possibilities available to oneself, “in 
accordance with the demands of some possible Situation or another” (B&T: 443)
115 It is thus said of resoluteness that it would be “misunderstood ontologically if we were to suppose that it 
would be actual as Experience only as long as the act o f resolving lasts" (B&T: 443;.
156 For the identification o f modernity with rupture the following passage from Wagner (2(H) 1: 80) is quite 
illuminating: "The occurrence o f modernity assumes a rupture in time, the effect o f which is to produce 
both modernity and its antecedent counterpart: tradition.. .Since modernity however exists in and through 
opposition to tradition, the question of the relation to tradition remains part o f the discourse of 
modernity...Unlike modernists tend to think, this latter discourse does not wi tier away with modernity 
taking its course”.
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T his sh ift o f  e m p h a s is  from  th e  a c tu a l to  th e  possib le  is  , 'o t  confined to  the  
e n a c tm e n t a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of a u th e n tic  h isto rica l, y; it is in s tead  
sign ifican tly  ex tended  so  a s  to  e n c a p su la te  h isto rica l sc ien ce .
T h e re  is certa in ly  n o th in g  s c a n d a lo u s  in  th e  phenom enological 
co n ten tio n  th a t  in o rd e r for a  specifically "scientific" them atiz ing  to occu r, the  
rea lm  of th e  in ten d ed  en titie s  m u s t h av e  been  d isc losed  befo reh an d  in  pre- 
scientiflc a  m an n er. T here a re  n e v e rth e le ss  som e novel e lem en ts  in  H eidegger’s 
a tte m p t to  go beyond  th e  p o stu la tio n  o f a  “lifeworld” or th e  m ere  advocating  of a  
d ifference in  th e  m ethodologies of th e  n a tu r a l  an d  the  h is to rica l o r “hu m an e" 
sc iences in  acco rd an ce  w ith  th e  p u rp o rted ly  incom patif <e n a tu re  o f th e ir 
su b jec t m a tte rs .
If - i n  p o stp o n in g  the  q u es tio n  co n cern in g  th e  possib ility  of a  "h isto ry  of 
th e  p resen t"- one a ss ig n s  to  the  h is to ric a l sc iences th e  ta s k  of d isc losing  the  
"past", th e n  th is  p a s t  sh o u ld  be in  p rin c ip le  "accessib le”, th e  “w a y  to it m u s t  in 
general b e  open" (B&T: 445). S ince  th e  very "accessib ility  of th e  p a s t”137 is  a 
p rob lem  th a t  can n o t be solved w ith  re c o u rse  to the  p e rs is ten ce  in  tim e of 
“h is to rica l en tities"  like m o n u m e n ts  a n d  “rem ains" or even to th e  "recovery" of 
h is to rica l “traces"  a n d  “facts", H eidegger tu r n s  -so m ew h a t p red ic tab ly - h is  gaze 
to  D ase in  a s  w h a t is "p rim arily  h is to ric a l”, for a n  ex p lana tio n  o f th is  
p h en om en o n .
H istoriology being  therefo re  conceived a s  g ro u n d ed  on  D asein 's  
h isto ric ity , it is  fu rth e rm o re  sa id  to  au th e n tic a lly  tem poralize itse lf “in term s o f
137 The term is borrowed from Wagner (2001: 80 ff), while its use in this < intext is confined at the 
indication o f  the problematic ontological status o f the “past”, since a thorough e aboration o f the issue will 
only be undertaken with reference to the discussion o f  Gadamer’s notion o f the fusion o f horizons in the 
next chapter.
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the  fu tu r e ”138, while the  su b je c t m a tte r  proper  to  it is  so ug h t in  th e  d isc lo su re  of 
th e  possib ilities  of the  ex istence  w hich  h a s  b een  “th e r e ” (B&T. 446-447).
T h a t H eidegger aim s a t  m u c h  m ore th a n  offering th e  theore.«cal ju s tific a tio n  for 
th e  m a n ip u la tio n  of h is to rica l “facts" o r for su b je c tin g  h is to rica l “tru th "  to 
w him sical in te rp re ta tio n s  is p a te n t in  h is  c o n te n tio n  ‘h a t  th e  au th e n tic  
h istoriological d isc lo su re  o f th e  p a s t  is beyond  th e  com m on concep tions of 
“subjectiv ity” a n d  "objectivity", h is  c ritica l re m a rk s  o n  h isto ry  a s  a  recreation  of 
a n  e ra ’s  "world-view" an d  h is  rejection  of h is to r ic ism  a s  a  m o d e  of historiology 
th a t  allegedly a lien a te s  D asein  from  its  a u th e n tic  h is to ric ity  (B&T: 448).
W hat he  is th e n  in s e a rc h  of, is -w h at I w o u ld  allow m yself the  liberty  of 
calling- th e  “ouer-objectivity” a tta in e d  by th e  a u th e n tic  d isc lo sed n ess  of 
h is to rica l experience, w hich  accord ing  to  th e  th in k e r  even m akes possib le  w h at 
N ietzsche - in  the  second  o f h is  "un tim ely  m e d ita tio n s"  calls th e  u se  an d  ab u se  
of h is to ry  for life139.
Indeed, H eidegger a tte m p ts  to provide u s  w ith  a  v iew  of h istoriology th a t sees  its 
threefo ld  c h a ra c te r  p refigured  in  N ietzsche 's  d is tin c tio n  regard ing  the  w ays- 
m o n u m e n ta l. an tiq u a ria n , an d  critica l- in w h ic h  h is to ry  “belongs" to *38
1.8 Nietzsche’s influence is arguably quite strong in this Heidegger's formulation as the following passage 
suggests: “...history is written by the experienced and superior man...The past always speaks as an oracle: 
Only as master builders o f the future who know the present will you  understand i t . . .now it is proper to 
know that only the builder of the future has a right to judge the past. ..Form an image for yourselves to 
which the future ought to correspond and forget the superstition that you are enigonf' (Nietzsche, 1980:
38- emphasis added).
1.9 Although in the chapters on historicity Nietzsche’s influence on Heidegger is patent even in the manner 
in which certain terms are coined (e.g. “the recurrence of the possible" being most certainly an 
interpretation of Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence", as the latter is developed in e.g. aphorisms 55 and 
1053-1067 in Nietzsche, 1968: 35-36 and 544 ff.), it is still quite doubtful whether the concept of life is 
employed in the same fashion by the two thinkers. At times it seems that with the employment of the term 
“life” Heidegger moves more into the direction of Dilthey and has in mind more a "generic differentiation 
between the ontical and the historical" that is furthermore conceived as the iundamental task of “the 
philosophy o f life"(B&T: 455). This is not to suggest that Nietzsche's employment lacks this “historical”, 
or even "aesthetic"- not in the Kantian sense- dimension; I am just sceptical about the extent to which 
Heidegger would like to follow the biological connotations of Nietzsche's employment of the term, such as 
the references to “inner constructive” drives (see e.g. Nietzsche, 1980: 39).
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h u m a n s 140. In a  su rp ris ing ly  “fast"  d iscu ss io n  of th e se  th ree  k in d s  o f  h isto ry  
th e  claim  is m ade th a t the  allegedly  om itted  -b y  Nietzs.-he- p ro o f of the ir 
n ecess ity  or the  g round ing  of th e ir  u n ity  is to  be recovere .1 w ith re fe rence  to 
a u th e n tic  h isto ricity  an d  tem porality .
D esp ite  the  im pression  the  re a d e r  m igh t get th a t  H eidegger’s  sch em atic  
p re se n ta tio n  of the  a fo rem en tio n ed  u n ity  lack s  the  pow erful n a rra tio n , the  
suffering , an d  hence  the  p a rad o x ica l q u a litie s  of N ietzsche’s  ’m e d ita tio n ”, it still 
p re s e n ts  u s  w ith  a fru itful im ag ery  co n cern in g  historicity  an d  historiology, 
w h e re  N ietzsche’s d istinc tion  b e tw een  “use" a n d  “a b u se"  is silently  rep laced  by 
th e  co n tra s t betw een  the  "a u th e n tic ” an d  th e  " in a u th e n tic ”.
T h u s , in H eideggers in te rp re ta tio n , so far a s  D asein  "reso lutely  d isc lo se s” the  
“p a s t ” possibility  it h a s  c h o se n 141 an d  e n a c ts  it in  a u th e n tic  rep e titio n , it is 
co n sid ered  to be "open for the  m onum en ta l p o ss ib ilitie s142 of h u m a n  existence", 
w h ile  the  k ind  of historiology s tem m in g  from  th is  a ttitu d e  is a lso  sa id  to be 
m onum enta l (B&T: 448).
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Sim ilarly , s ince  ev en  a u th e n tic  repetition  req u ires  t.:\ ad m ira tio n  for 
possib ilities  p a s t, a u th e n tic  a n t iq u a r ia n  historiology is a d u m b ra te d  in  th e  
au th e n tic a lly  m o n u m e n ta l, w hile  w h en  historiology com bines th o se  tw o 
q u a litie s  it is  seen  a s  "necessarily  a  c ritique  of the  Pret-rnC, an d  h en ce  a s  
c ritica l (B&T: 449). T h u s  in a n  a tte m p t to  a sc e rta in  a g ra sp  of th e  h is to rica l 
th a t  re a c h e s  well b ey o nd  the  on tic  rea lm  of en tities , H eidegger co n clud es th e  
c h a p te r  on h is to ric ity  by "p u ttin g  in  practice" h is  a rg u m e n t concern ing  th e  
a u th e n tic  h is to ric ity  o f the  h is to r ia n  w ho only "ed its” so u rc e s143.
C o n seq u en tly  the  a n n o u n c e d  d iscu ss io n  on D ilthej a n d  C o u n t Y orck 
a c q u ire s  p rim arily  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f a n  “editing" o f p assag es  ¡rom  C o u n t Y orck 's 
le tte rs  to  D ilthey, w ith  the  p la in  in ten tio n  to  es tab lish :
F irst, th a t  the  q u e s tio n  of h is to ric ity  is  o f an  ontological n a lu re , secondly , th a t  
th e  q u e s tio n  c o n c e rn in g  the  o n tica l is ag a in  an  ontological one an d  th a t  th ird ly , 
th e  o n tica l be ing  o n e  dom ain  "of en titie s  o th e r th a n  D asein" th e  "idea of Being" 
m u s t  em b race  b o th  th e  on tical a n d  th e  h isto rical.
T h is la s t  co n se q u e n c e  is of c ru c ia l im p o rtan ce  s ince  by s ta tin g  the  n e c e ss ity  of 
a  "generic d ifferen tia tion" of th e  “idea of Being” it reaffirm s the  p rim acy  o f th e  
q u e s tio n  c o n c e rn in g  the  m ean in g  o f being  rig h t in  th is  sec tion  o f th e  book  
w h ere  it seem ed  to  be  m ostly losing  in  relevance (B&T: 455).
T h u s , th e  a n n o u n c e d  "d e s tru c tio n ” of trad itio na l ontology receives a  new  
fo rm u la tion  in  th is  fu rth e rin g  of th e  ontological q u estio n  th ro u g h  th e  *14
attempts to recover an over-conceptual attunment with being in the thought o f the pre-Socratics can be seen 
as vivid examples o f the way the philosopher understood -and enacted- authentic historicity.
141 Heidegger uses the following example in order to illustrate the manner in which authentic historiology 
might be enacted: "If the historian throws himself straightway into the world-view of an era, he has not thus 
proved as yet that he understands his object in an authentically historical way md not just aesthetically. 
And on the other hand, the existence of a historian who only edits sources, may be characterised by a 
historicality which is authentic" (B&T: 448).
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ju x tap o sitio n  betw een th e  "ontic" an d  th e  "h isto rica l” o f w hich  th e  ages 
rem ained  pu rported ly  ign o ran t.
Concluding Remarks
In th is  c h a p te r  it w as a tte m p te d  to ju x ta p o se  C a sto riad is  a n d  H eidegger’s 
concep tions of h isto ry  w ith  e m p h a s is  on  th e ir  c r itiq u e s  oo th e  trad itio n a l or 
inherited  concep tions of tim e  a n d  h isto ry . An analogy  w as traced  be tw een  the  
role of th e  couplet of a u th e n tic ity  a n d  in a u th e n tic ity  \u  th e  sh a p in g  of 
H eidegger’s th e o risa tio n  of h is to rica l p rax is  an d  th e  fu n c tio n  of th e  a n tith e s is  
betw een au tonom y  a n d  h e te ro n om y  in  C a sto riad is’ concep tion  o f h is to rica l 
creation . The positions o f th e  tw o th in k e rs  w ere  p resen ted  som ew hat 
separa te ly  an d  the  two a c c o u n ts  were n o t b ro u g h t explicitly  tog e th er for two 
im p o rtan t reasons. The firs t s te m s  from  th e  epistem ological p o sition  favouring  
’m app ing’ a s  a m ode of p re se n ta tio n  th a t  allow s for co n cep tua l ‘s p a c e s ’ to 
em erge m ore adequate ly  th a n  ‘trad itio n a l’ a n d  ra tio n a lis tic ’ m o d es of 
p resen ta tio n . The seco n d  - a n d  equally  im p o rta n t-  re a so n  c o n c e rn s  my 
d e te rm in a tio n  to m a in ta in  th e  difference betw een  th e  tw o acc o u n ts . T h is la tte r  
reaso n  becom es ever m ore  im p o rtan t in  light o f th e  fact th a t  th e  analogy  
betw een a u th e n tic ity /in a u th e n tic ity  a n d  a u to n o m y /h e te ro n  im y c a n  be  easily  
m isco n stru ed  a s  the  p o s tu la tio n  of a n  identity  b e tw een  th e  two. It is  th u s  
im p o rtan t to m a in ta in  th e  difference betw een  H eidegger’s concep tion  o f the  
‘collective’ an d  C a sto riad is’ concep tion  of th e  so c ia l-h is to rica l A lthough  in  bo th  
th in k e rs  all know n so c ia l-h is to rica l fo rm ations c a n  be c h a ra c te r ise d  a s  
prim arily  in a u th e n t ic (in th e  case  of Heidegger) o r h e te ro n o n  o u s  (in th e  case  of
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C asto riad is), th e re  is still a  huge difference in  e m p h a s is  I “tw een  th e m  th a n  
n e e d s  to  be acknow ledged . T h us, in  th e  case of C a s to riad is  ind  in  line w ith  the  
M arx is t trad itio n  h is to rica l p rax is is p rim arily  a d d re s se d  from  th e  perspective  of 
th e  so c ia l h is to rica l, w h ile  even au to n o m y  is conceived in  te rm s  of a  self­
reco g n itio n  of th e  social h is to rica l q u a  in s titu tin g  agency. It is  in  m y m ind  
im p o ssib le  to conceive th e  'collective' in  H eidegger in  sim ilar te rm s , a n d  th is  
d e sp ite  the  fact th a t  a n  a u th e n tic  m ode of collective h is to rica l e n a c tm e n t is 
im p lied  in H eidegger’s fo rm ula tion s. I have th u s  tr ie d  to show  th a t  H eidegger's 
a c c o u n t  on  h isto ric ity  is p rem ised  o n  the  s in g u la r  h u m a n  being’s  cap ac ity  for 
in a u th e n tic  a n d  a u th e n tic  co m p o rtm en t. F u rth e rm o re , by jux tap o sin g  th e  two 
a c c o u n ts  I a tte m p te d  to  tem porarily  c rea te  a  te n s io n  betw een  a  co ncep tion  of 
h is to ry  b ased  o n  rad ica l novelty a n d  a  co n cep tio n  b a se d  o n  a u th e n tic  
rep e titio n . It is th is  ten s io n , a s  well a s  the  one b e tw een  ‘c o n c re te ’ h is to ry  an d  
‘h is to ric ity ’ th a t  is  b ro u g h t u n d e r  c lo se r sc ru tin y  in  the  n ex t c h a p te r  w ith  the  
d is c u s s io n  of G ad am er 's  oeuvre. F inally , it w as sh o w n  th a t  for b o th  C asto riad is  
a n d  H eidegger th e  m ode of being  o f the  h u m a n  a n d  the refo re  h is to ric a l’ is 
rad ica lly  d ifferent th a n  th a t  of th e  ‘n a tu r a l ’ rea lm . T h is c n ic ia l  in s ig h t sh a re d  
by th e  two th in k e rs  d u ly  provides th e  g ro u nd  fo r the  firs t p a r t  of th e  nex t 
c h a p te r , w here G a d a m e r 's  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  h is to rica l c o n sc io u sn e ss  an d  
t r u th  is d isc u sse d  over a g a in s t  the  c la im s of sc ien tific  in s tru m e n ta l reaso n .
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Chapter Three
The problem of Historical Consciousness & the U niversality of
Hermeneutics
Introductory remarks
In th is  c h a p te r  the  in te rre la tio n sh ip  betw een  m e an in g  an d  h isto ric ity  is 
explored from  th e  perspective opened  u p  by G a d a m e r 's  e lab o ra tio n s on  the  
p h en om en o n  of the  effective h isto rica l co n sc io u sn ess  an d  h i-  general a tte m p t a t  
th e  fo rm ulation  of a  un iversal h erm en eu tics . In th e  beg inn ing  of th e  c h a p te r  
G adam er's  p ro ject of a  h e rm en eu tic  ph ilosophy is d is c u sse d  in close re la tio n  to 
H eidegger's u n d e rs tan d in g  of t ru th  a s  d isc lo su re  a lre a d y  p resen ted  in  c h a p te r  
one an d  in ju x tap o sitio n  to p reva len t epistem ological concep tions of tru th . It is  
a rg u ed  th a t  in  opposition  to th e  claim s of m o d em  epistem ology an d  scientific 
rea so n  the  phenom enon  of h is to ry  is m ade access ib le  in  a  m ore p rim ord ia l 
m a n n e r  in th e  very ac t of the  h e rm en eu tic  ap p ro p ria tio n  of the  u n d e rs ta n d in g . 
S ince G adam er's  views have often been  in te rp re te d  form  tiv; van tage  p o in t of 
m o d em  epistem ology, a non-reductive  in te rp re ta tio n  o f h is  positions w ould  
have to s ta r t  w ith a n  a ttem p t to  w rest h is  th o u g h t  from th e  claim s o f th e  
aforem entioned  in terp re ta tive  fram ew orks. T h is  is achieved by s itu a tin g  
G adam er in  the  w ider context of h u m an is tic  th o u g h t - s p a n r  ing from  Plato a n d  
A ristotle to G erm an  Idealism , Phenom enology an d  C ritical Theory- an d  show ing  
how h is concep tions of t ru th , m ean ing  an d  h is to ric ity  ire  irreducib le  to  
scientific a n d  epistem ological concerns.
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3.1 Truth Or Method? The Ambivalent Origins of Gadam^v's Ontology
G ad am er's  ph ilo sop h ica l h e rm en eu tic s , viz. h is  a ttem p t a t  providing a  
u n iv ersa l app lica tion  of th e  h e rm e n e u tic  c la im  to tru th  h a s  o ften  ra ised  critica l 
ob jec tions, m ainly  on th e  g ro u n d s  th a t  it allegedly reinfor. es a n  ill-conceived 
ep istem ological d is tinc tio n  b e tw een  th e  n a tu ra l  a n d  th e  social o r  -h u m a n e -  
sc iences. Significantly, th is  ob jec tion  h a s  b e e n  ra ised  b o th 144 145*from  w ith in  th e  
h e rm en eu tic  cam p, a n d  from  th e  c u rre n t “rep re se n ta tiv e s ' of Critical Theory, 
w hile it triggered critica l r e s p o n se s  in th e  A nglo-S axon  trad itio n  by  p ro p o n e n ts  
of Realism .
Specific in s tan ces  o f th i s  la tte r c u rre n t, exem plify a n  affin ity  w ith  th e  
p o sitio n s  exp ressed  by C ritical T heo ry ’s  a s se s sm e n t o f G a d a m e r’s 
h e rm en eu tic s , since it c o m b in e s  e lem en ts  o f H a b e rm a s’s  c ritiq u e  o f G a d a m e r 
w ith  th e  epistem ological p rin c ip le s  of Critical Realism . D esp ite  th e  in d isp u ta b le  
m e r i ts '45 of th is  ap p ro a c h , it  c an  be a lso  c ritic ised  o n  th e  g ro u n d s  th a t  it
144 Habermas’ (1986: 134) contention that Gadamer gives “the interpretive mode of Verstehen a peculiarly 
one-sided twist”, by allegedly remaining “bound to the experience o f the plulologist who deals with 
classical texts” (loc.cit), appears at first glance as being in fundamental opposition to Ricoeur’s (1981: 68) 
view that Gadamer overlooks the importance of the “text and exegesis” in favour of the dimension of 
“history and historicity". Nevertheless, since Ricoeur understands this alleged precedence of the historical 
as an act of unacknowledged “fidelity to Dilthey” on Gadamer’s part, it can be argued that both criticisms 
mentioned above re-inscribe Gadamer’s hermeneutics to either a "methodical ’ or a “methodological” 
plane, form which it strived to escape. It has to be noted though, that in contradistinction to Habermas who 
in his Theory o f Communicative Action discusses Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as a specific 
instance of “understanding meaning” in the social sciences, Ricoeur rightly acknowledges Gadamer’s 
attempt at universalising (or de-regionalising) the hermeneutic claim but feels that Gadamer’s project 
somehow remains bound to both the Romantic tradition and to the fallacious distinction between 
understanding and explanation as distinct -and ultimately mutually exclusive- modes o f knowledge.
145 Hence, while recognising the universal scope of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, an i while dissociating it from 
merely methodological concerns Outhwaite (1987:67) paradoxically concludes in stressing the similarities 
between Habermas and Gadamer and seeing an allegedly anti-naturalist attitude as providing the starting 
point for both philosophical enterprises. It furthermore seems to me that Gadamer’s assertion that the 
existence of the “thing in itself’ distinguishes the natural from the human sciences, should not be
understood as denying the existence o f  a “historical event in itself’ as Outhwaite (1987: 66) seems to 
suggest, but should rather be interpreted as postulating a degree of proximity w th  the historical that does 
not apply to the human being's relationship with the realm of “nature”. It follows that if Gadamer can be
red o u b les  its  d is tan ce  from G ad am er’s  project, w hich it u ltim ately  in te rp re ts  
from  th e  perspective of B h a s k a r’s  com paratively  recen t revo al of the  positiv ist 
ideal concern ing  the  possib ility  of na tura lism 146.
To no avail h a s  G ad am er s tre ssed  tim e an d  tim e aga., i147 148th a t h is  version  
of h e rm en eu tic s  a s  it is m a in ly  a r ticu la ted  in h is maj-.vr w ork Truth a n d  
M ethod14*, sh o u ld  be u n d e rs to o d  n e ith e r  a s  a n  interven tion  in m ethodological 
d eb a te s , n o r a s  a  revival of th e  n in e teen th  cen tu ry  Methodev.-.treit, b u t r a th e r  a s  
a  rad ica lisa tio n  of H eidegger’s  unveiling  of the  “herm eneutics o f  facticity", a
accused of reproducing a dualistic conception of nature and history, this has t > be traced on a different 
plane than the one indicated by the aforementioned author.
J<’ Although the term has a long history and quite a few meanings attached to it, >n this context it primarily 
denotes the acceptance of the positivist principle on the unity of method between die natural and the human 
or social sciences. According to the positivist vision of science mathematical physics should provide the 
ideal for the development of all branches of science, which in some versions of logical positivism is seen as 
a unity for the addition, I reason that all empirical statements “can be expressed in a single language, 
[while] all states o f affaiis are of one kind and are known by the same method' (Carnap, 1934: 32). The 
contemporary, "epistemological” significations of the term, which has been introduced in epistemology by 
Quine (Audi. 1995: 518-519) are quite alien to the meaning given to it by Kant (1787/1929) in his 
scandalously brief -or “cursory" as the philosopher himself opted to put it (lb I: 667)- "history o f pure 
reason”, i.e. of metaphysics. Kant (Ibid: 668) distinguishes there between natur :!ist and scientific methods 
prevailing in the field of enquiry he has previously inscribed to the jurisprudence of pure reason. 
Importantly then in contradistinction with the contemporary epistemological connotations, Kant depicts 
somewhat derogatorily the “naturalist o f pure reason” as adopting as “his principle that though common 
reason, without science, that is, through what he calls sound reason, he is able in regard to those most 
sublime questions which form the problem of metaphysics, to achieve more han is possible through 
speculation” (loc. cit).
1 7 See Gadainer's explicit statement that the hermeneutics developed in Truth an i Method “is not therefore 
a methodology o f the human sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, 
beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience 
of world" (Gadamer. 1989: xxiii- hereafter referred to as T&M). Equally enlightening is his contention that 
he “did not wish to elaborate a system o f rules, to describe, let alone direct, the methodical procedure of the 
human sciences”, or to “revive the ancient dispute on method between the natural and the human sciences" 
(T&M: xxviii, xxix).
148 Ricoeur rightly highlights the concealed disjunctive dimension of the title, winch in his view “confronts 
the Heideggerian concept o f truth with the Diltheyan concept of method" and wonders to what extent the 
work “deserves to be called Truth AND Method, and whether it ought not inste *1 to be entitled Truth OR 
Method". Ricoeur makes this provocative proposal since he sees Truth and M triod  as a whole mirroring 
this conflict between Heidegger's fundamental ontology and the epistemological problematique posed by 
Dilthey. What is more, d Heidegger "was able to elude the debate with the human sciences by a sovereign 
moment of transcendence" -i.e. by postulating a cleavage between the antic and 'he ontological levels of 
inquiry, Gadamer is according to Ricoeur (1981: 60-61) bound to "plunge hinvtli into an ever more bitter 
debate, precisely because he takes Dilthey’s question seriously", and in this sense he is seen as effecting -in 
relation to Heidegger's work- “a movement of return from ontology towards epistemological problems" 
(Ibid: 60).
d im ension  of H eideggerian  ph ilosophy  G ad am er tr e a ts  ay being  e ssen tia lly  
unaffected  by H eidegger’s  la te r  ph ilosoph ical "tu rn".
Indeed in view o f th is  H eideggerian in fluence , it w e a ld  be a rg u ab ly  a s  
unw ise  to  a d d re ss  G ad am er’s  h e rm e n e u tic s  from  th e  perspective  of 
co n tem porary  epistem ology, a s  it w ould be to in te rp re t  H eidegger's d isc u ss io n  of 
D ilthey an d  C oun t Y orck in Being a n d  Tim e a s  a  c o n tr ib u tio n  to N eo-K antian  
sch o la rsh ip . O ne cou ld  be even tem p ted  to  d ra w  a fu r th e r  analogy  w ith  
Heidegger’s  fu n d a m e n ta l ontology a n d  call G ad am er’s  ph ilo sophy  a  fu n d a m e n ta l  
herm eneutics, a s  A y lesw orth149 seem s to  su g g es t in  h is  c o n tra s t  b e tw een  th e  
h e rm en eu tica l p ro jects  o f G ad am er a n d  R icoeur.
G ad am er's  a tte m p t to  go beyond  th e  co n fines  o f epist- nological c o n c e rn s  
c a n  be a rg u ab ly  tra c e d  even in  h is  in te rp re ta tio n  of H u sse r l’s ce leb ra ted  
c a tc h p h ra s e 150 "to the th ings them se lves".
In th is  “com m on b a ttle  cry  of all phenom eno log ical re s e a rc h e rs” th a t  H eidegger 
“still re p e a ts” in Being arid T im e151, G ad am er p rim arily  d isc e rn s  th e  d es ig n a tio n  
o f “a  p rog ram  a g a in s t th e  su b tle  a rg u m e n ta tio n  o f ep istem o logy w hich  so u g h t to  *50
149 Indeed Aylesworth (1991: 63) successfully highlights Gadamer’s departure from the strict concerns of 
epistemology by providing a contrast with Ricoeur. In this brief yet elucidating account, hermeneutics is 
said to be for Gadamer “more fundamental than the methods of the Geisteswiss- ’ischaften" while proving 
“a corrective for the methodological alienation of their subject matter”. In contrast, Ricoeur is seen as 
championing the idea that "philosophical hermeneutics must serve an epistemological function vis-à-vis the 
human sciences, and must incorporate their critical practices into its own discourse”. Although as I will 
attempt to show below it is arguable whether Gadamer's hermeneutics ultimatrlv fails to account for the 
critical dimension allegedly characteristic of epistemology, the contrast drawn above is still valid in 
highlighting the importance attributed to the detachment from epistemological concerns in Gadamer’s 
philosophy.
50 Husserl’s overall philosophical trajectory, and especially the coinage of the concept of the lifeworld is - 
in hindsight- seen by Gadamer as expressing an antithesis with the “dominant philosophies o f Neo- 
Kantianism and positivism", as a break with strict epistemic concerns, and consequently as an extension of 
philosophical claims and investigations “to the wide field of everyday experience" (Gadamer, 1969/1977:
183).
1,1 ‘Thus, the term ‘phenomenology’ expresses a maxim which can be formulated as ‘To the things 
themselves!’ It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking 
over any conceptions wl ,ch only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed lo those pseudo-questions 
which parade themselves as ‘problems’, often for generations at a time” (B&T: 50).
ju s tify  science in te rm s o f tra n sc e n d e n ta l  philosophy" (G adam er, 
1 9 6 3 /1 9 7 7 :1 4 4 -1 4 5 ; G adam er. 1991:14).
O f eq u al im p o rtan ce  is G ad am er’s  conviction  th a t  it w ould  be a b su rd  to 
in te rp re t th is  slogan a s  signifying a  so rt o f  "phenom enological realism " and  
co n seq uen tly  G ad am er a tte m p ts  to d isso c ia te  Max S c h e ie r an d  A lexander 
P fänder from  in te rp re ta tio n s  th a t  see in  th e ir  u sage of th e  te rm  a n  opposition  of 
object a n d  su b jec t an d  a  “realistic d e p a rtu re  from  idealism " (G adam er. 
1 9 6 3 /1 9 7 7 : 145).
T he "th ings th em se lv es” of phenom enology, G a d a r:v i a rg u es, are  no t 
"objective entities p osited  a s  tra n s c e n d e n t”, b u t r a th e r  intentional entities  
experienced  in th e  "filling o u t of in ten tio n a l a c ts ”: tney a re  therefore 
"im m ediately  perceived", an d  n o t rep re se n te d  “by s igns o r symbols" (loc. Cit). 
A pparen tly , far from  occupy ing  itse lf p rim arily  w ith s itu a tin g  an d  clarifying 
H u sse rl’s  ph ilosoph ical p ro ject, th is  in te rp re ta tio n  fu n d am en ta lly  concerns 
G ad am er’s  a p p ro p ria tio n  of h is  ph ilosoph ical in h e r ita n c e  an d  consequently  a 
d isc lo su re  of h is  ow n ph ilosoph ical ag en d a . A rguably , rhis se a rc h  for an  
a lte rn a tiv e  to th e  co n cep tu a l fram ew ork of m o d em  “m atnem atica l"  n a tu ra l 
science, a n d  the  horizon  of i ts  “technical" ap p lica tio ns a n d  ru les- w h a t H usserl 
h a s  te rm e d  techn iza tion152 - c h a ra c te r ise s  m o st vers ion s o f phenom enology, if in 
vary ing  degrees.
In its  negative, critica l d im ension , th is  a tt itu d e  of phenom enology  provides u s  
w ith  a  m o s t welcom e link  w ith  so-called  “critica l” v e rs io n s  of social ph ilosophy -
1,2 Husserl (1970: 46) employs this term to indicate the process whereby the “original experience” that in 
being directed at "the subject matter it se lf  gave birth to a specific mode of theorising (say geometry or 
mathematics) becomes merely a “sort of technique”, performed “according to rules o f the game” and 
thereby excluding the original act of thinking. Husserl, of course, posits the /■ ' rpose of science in pre- 
scientific life and thus to the lifeworld (Ibid: 50 ff).
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especially  w ith  c lassica l Critical Theory153- a n d  m o st certa in ly  w ith  c e r ta in  
a sp ec ts  o f W eberian  sociology. 1 do n o t m erely re fe r to the  < rucial role t h a t  the  
concep t o f th e  "progressive" ra tio n a lisa tio n  o r d ise n c h a n tm e n t of the  w orld  
played in  th e  form ation  of th e  concep t o f instrum enta l ratio a lity154, b u t  to  the  
overall a t t i tu d e  exp ressed  by M ax W eber in  a  good n u m b e r oi h is  w orks.
F o r th e  p u rp o ses  of th e  p re se n t s tu d y  it sh o u ld  suffice to  briefly re fe r  to 
W eber’s  (1991: 138) u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f the  "exact" sc iences a s  “th e  m o st 
im p o rtan t fraction  o f the  p ro cess  of in te llec tu a lisa tio n ”, h is  a ttem p t to  h ig h lig h t 
ca lcu la tio n  a s  the  m ain  princip le  Inform ing th is  te c h r .c a l  an d  th e re fo re  
d ise n c h a n te d  percep tion  of th e  world, a n d  finally to  h is  pao.sionate ad v o ca tin g  
of the  irreducib ility  o f the  d im ension  of m ean in g  a n d  of all a n im a te  q u e s tio n s  in 
general to  th e  calcu lative fu n c tio n s  of th e  te ch n ica l/sc ien tif ic  a p p a ra tu s 155.
153 Thus, there are evident linkages between the criticisms raised by Husserl against the mathematical 
sciences and the interpretative twist given to Max Weber's sociology with the coinage o f the concept of 
instrumental reason by Adorno & Horkheimer. It is certainly not accidental rhat in their Dialectic of 
Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer (1986:25-emphasis added) introduce their discussion on 
“objectified thinking" after having quoted a large passage form Husserl’s Crisis, where the philosopher 
discusses what he called the “Galilean mathematization of the world”. In their view then, mathematical 
procedure is seen as becoming ever since “the ritual for thinking”, thereby establishing itself as “necessary 
and objective”, by turning "thought into a thing, an instrument-v/hicb is its own rerm for it”. The affinity 
between Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse’s “critique of the positivist concept of modern science" to 
borrow Held’s description of the issue- and Husserl’s critical stance towards science as spelled out in The 
Crisis o f European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, has not escape I the attention of scholars. 
For a brief but substantial account on the issue see Held, 1990: 166 ff.
154 It has been remarked that the concept o f "instrumental rationality” incorporate . both Weber’s concept of 
disenchantment and his methodological concept o f “ends-means" rationality, ¡.e. the ideal typical 
construction that Weber introduced in order to describe the pursuit of practical nds with methodological 
accuracy and precise calculation of means performed by social agents in modern societies. In this respect 
the concept o f instrumental reason is seen as depicting reason as being deprived r f its autonomy, given up 
its self-reflective power and being adapted to “successful operations, applications arid control similar to the 
applications o f technological knowledge” (Teigas, 1995: 5-6).
Weber’s remarks on the issue are quite caustic: “Who- aside from certain bi-; children who are indeed 
found in the natural sciences”, asks the thinker in addressing his university audience, “still believes that the 
findings o f astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could teach us anything about the meaning of the 
world"? I furthermore find indispensable both his insight regarding the impossibility of seeing science, or 
rather “the technique of mastering life which rests upon science” as the 'way to happiness" after 
Nietzsche’s “devastating criticism of those last men who invented happiness’ and his appropriation of 
Tolstoy’s answer to the question concerning the meaning o f science, accord', g to which “Science is 
meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question imp« itant for us: What should 
we do and how shall we live?" (Weber, 1991: 142-143).
It n eed s  be  rem arked  th o u g h , th a t  th is  critica l d is tan c in g  from  the  w orld  of 
science a n d  technology d o es  no t n e c e s sa r ily '56 en ta il a  sim ple rejection  of 
science, o r even a naive  “fa ith” in th e  possib ility  of a  “tran scen d en ce"  o f the  
horizon  g en era ted  by technology .
T h is  so rt o f a ttitu d e  is a s  u n c h a ra c te r is tic  of G ad am er a s  it is  of H u sserl an d  
Heidegger, desp ite  co m m o n  w isdom ’s  conviction  a b o u t the  co n tra ry  b e ing  the 
case . It will be recalled  t h a t  H eidegger (1993: 333) in  h is  -fo r  som e celeb ra ted , 
for o th e rs  no to rious- e s s a y  on  technology explicitly re jec ts  th e  view th a t m o d e m  
science  a n d  technology  a re  "dem onic”. More im portan l ly, Heidegger even 
re fu ses  to theorise  th e  te c h n ic a l a p p a ra tu s  a s  po ten tia lly  de -.ructive, p referring  
to  place in s tead  b o th  “d a n g e r” a n d  "red em p tio n ” w ith in  teen  nology’s en fram ing  
pow er (Ibid: 334).
Indeed, the  very  co n c e p tu a lisa tio n  of m o d e m  tech n iq u e  in  te rm s  o f an  
“en fram ing ” show s th a t  H eidegger cou ld  no t have even env isaged  a  sim ple “way 
o u t” of th e  technolog ical “fram e”. For how  else a re  v e to  in te rp re t h is  
co n ten tio n  th a t the  am b ig u ity  of technology’s  e s sen ce  p o in t- “to  th e  m ystery  of 
all revealing [and h e n ce  a lso  of all concealing), i.e., of t r u th ” (/bid: 338), if n o t a s  
a n  acknow ledgem ent t h a t  tru th  a n d  falsity a re  in m o d ern ity 156 57 only possib le  
w ith in  -an d  ag a in st- th i s  "enfram ing”?
156 Ii is true that very often the critics of modern science give the impression tha they unequivocally reject 
the “scientific worldview". Adorno and Horkheimer (1986: 30) for instance -cent to perceive science 
exclusively as a means of domination over both nature and human beings, while ,cientific reason is said to 
be “the mere instrument of all-inclusive economic apparatus...(which) serves a- a general tool useful for 
the manufacture of all o.her tools, firmly directed toward its end, as fateful u> the precisely calculated 
movement of material production, whose result for mankind is beyond all calculation”. This is an already 
“strong" anti-scientific statement, which becomes even bolder when the autho sarcastic remark that "at 
last” reason's "old ambition, to be a pure organ o f ends, has been realised". In any case we should not fail 
in tracing the impact of the devastation caused by the historical advent of Nazn m behind the boldness of 
this statement.
1,7 I here use “modernity” in a quite conceptually "loose” manner. It has to be ¿ marked that Heidegger’s 
treatment o f technology does not really square with a “historiological" understanding of the emergence of
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M oreover, how  shou ld  w e In te rp re t H eidegger’s view '- ia t  technology Is 
e ssen tia lly  a m ystery  (Ibid: 334), w hich re m a in s  h id d en  in sj ite of the  c o n s ta n t 
pro liferation  of th e  techn ica l a p p a ra tu s e s  a n d  of o u r  ever-in  creasing  fam iliarity  
w ith  it?  Is it not tru e  th a t  technology is  th o u g h t a s  the  destiny  of h u m a n  
beings, a lbeit one  th a t n ecessa rily  concea ls  th e  essen ce  of b e in g -h u m a n 158, 
p e rh a p s  in  the  sam e  m a n n e r  it conceals i t s  ow n essen ce?
F u rth e rm o re , is  it no t of co n sid erab le  sign ificance th a t  H eidegger (Ibid: 340- 
341) p o in ts  to  th e  rea lm  o f a r t 159 a s  th a t  w hich, in  being  "fundam entally  
d ifferen t” from  technology b u t  a lso  "ak in” to  it, m a k e s  possib le  o u r  
con fro n ta tio n  w ith  technology’s  elusive e ssen ce?
A lthough  H eidegger's tre a tm e n t o f technology can  only be roughly  
sk e tc h e d  here , it is still o f g rea t im p o rtan ce , for it sign ificantly  sh a p e s  
G ad am er’s  ow n claim  reg ard in g  th e  un iv ersa lity  of h e rm en eu tic s . T h is 
in fluence becom es even m ore  a p p a re n t if one co n sid ers  th a t  th e  h e rm en eu tic  
claim  re a c h e s  its  u tm o s t in ten s ity  r ig h t in  th e  m id s t of a n  e ra  su pp o sed ly
modern science. In a passage reminiscent of -and consonant with- the distinction between authentic 
historical science and common historiology in Being and Time, Heidegger ¡.'marks: “Chronologically 
speaking, modern physical science begins in the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power 
technology develops only in the second half of the eighteenth century. But mode rn technology, which for 
the chronological reckoning is the later, is from the point of view of the essence holding sway within it, 
historically earlier” (Heidegger. 1993: 327). It nevertheless seems to me that Vatdmo (1998: 81) employs 
the term in a more straightforward -although not really clarified- manner n his understanding of 
“modernity as an epoch of technoscience, or in Heidegger’s words, as the epoch >f the world-picture”. In 
other words, this identification o f modernity with techno-science arguably missc* the ambivalent nuances 
still preserved in Heidegger’s reflections on the issue that I tried to preserve intact above.
Ii8 Yet, as remarked above, this endangering of “man’s essential unfolding” and .if “all revealing us such” 
that Heidegger attributes to technological “enframing’ is simultaneously understood as the “grant” or the 
"saving power" that has the potential o f letting “man see and enter into the high, t dignity o f his essence”. 
What is more, this “dignity” is said to lie “in keeping watch over the unconce ilment- and with it...the 
concealment of all essential unfolding on this earth” (Heidegger, 1993: 337).
159 It has to be remarked that Heidegger does not wish to substitute a mere preoccupation with the aesthetic 
experiencing of art for what he perceives as a “preoccupation with technology”, but rather evokes 
“reflection upon art" to the extent that it does not for its part “shut its eyes to 'he constellation of truth, 
concerning which we are questioning" (Heidegger, 1993 : 340). It should also be noted that Heidegger 
links technology directly with the Greek Techne, to “bringing-forth, to poiesis" and therefore to something 
“poetic" (Ibid: 318-319).
sh a p e d  a lm o st exclusively by th e  in s tru m e n ta l fu n c tio n in g  an d  in te re s ts  of 
scien tific-techn ical reaso n .
The "problem " G ad am er in h erits  a lm o s t d irectly  from  the  
phenom eno log ica l-herm eneu tic  trad ition , acq u ire s  th u s  t b i  c h a ra c te r  of an  
u rg en t ta sk . W hat is ac tu a lly  requ ired  is th e  legitim a ing of th e  alleged 
un iversa lity  of w h at G ad am er calls th e  h e rm e n e u tic a l co n d ition ed n ess  of 
h u m a n  beings in the  face o f m o d em  science, w h ic h  "s tan d s  o r falls w ith  the  
princ ip le  of being  u n b ia se d  an d  p re jud iceless” a n d  o f th e  "technological a ttitu d e  
tow ard s the  world" it allegedly b reeds. G ad am er (1 9 6 6 /1 9 7 "7: 10) is well aw are 
o f th e  im possib ility  of theo ris in g  th is  p ecu lia r s ta te  of affc r s  in te rm s  of the  
viability  of an y  a tte m p t a t  tu rn in g  “o u r  h u m a n  co n sc io u sn ess"  a g a in s t  the  
"world of sc ience” on  th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  we c o u ld  thereby  develop a  k ind  of 
an ti-science. In fact, we ca n n o t even conceive o f the  possib ility  o f sim ply 
h in d erin g  th e  unfo ld ing  of technology 's im m a n e n t d y n a m ics  for even  in  case  we 
w ished  to oppose o r confine scientific a n d  technolog ical dev io p m en ts , it w ould 
be  im possib le  to su cceed  in m an ip u la tin g  tech n o -sc ien ce .
In o th e r  w ords, G ad am er invites u s  in th is  p a ssa g e  to  recall H eidegger’s 
fu n d am en ta l insigh t o n  th e  essen ce  o f technology  a n d  keep g u a rd  a g a in s t  the  
oversim plified no tion  th a t  m o d em  science a n d  technology' can  be tre a te d  a s
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m ere "tools"160 a m en ab le  for “u s e ” -or "m isuse"- In th e  service o f h u m a n  
vo lition161.
How Is it possib le- a sk s  G ad am er in a  p a ssa g e  ih a t s o u n d s  m ore 
con tem porary  an d  c ru c ia l now adays th a n  a t  the  tim e of w riting in  1966- to 
im agine th a t we cou ld  for in s ta n c e  “h in d e r  a genetic  re se a  ."her b e c a u se  su ch  
re se a rc h  th re a te n s  to b reed  a  su p e rh u m an "(G ad am er, 1 9 6 6 /1 9 7 7 : 10)?
G ad am er even a t te m p ts  to go beyond  a  concep tion  of m o d em  sc ience  an d  
technology in te rm s  o f the  rea lisa tio n  of a  specific m ode oi in te re s ts , an d  it is 
a rg u ab ly  for th is  re a so n  th a t he re fra in s  from  even asc rib in g  a n  in s tru m e n ta l 
in te re s t  to the  g en u in e  sc ien tist. Indeed , he  d e p ic ts  in s te a d  th e  “genu ine  
resea rch er"  in the  field of th e  n a tu ra l  sc iences, a s  b rin g  fu n d am en ta lly  
ind ifferen t to "techn ica l app lications" a n d  accord ing ly  a s  m otivated  b y  “a  desire  
to know ledge an d  n o th in g  else"162 (loc. Cit).
16,1 Gadamer's treatment is in this context also quite reminiscent of Heidegger s reflections on the issue, 
especially of his attempt to think the essence of technology beyond its instrumental and anthropological 
definitions, which for Heidegger “belong together”. It could be said that these definitions are thought as 
being complementary dimensions of a single conception of technology, since the former conceptualises 
technology as a means to an end and the latter sees it mainly as a “human activity”. Furthermore, both 
aspects of the “instrumental-anthropological” conception arguably represent technology as something 
neutral and such a representation of technology is thought to be quite perilous, ince it “makes us utterly 
blind to the essence of technology” (Heidegger, 1993: 311-312).
161 This does not mean though that the development of technique and the ever increasing immersion of the 
late-modern world in the so-called "technological attitude’ cancels the human will to control and master 
technology. I think that .me of the unmistakably correct insights expressed by Heidegger in his treatment 
of technology, is that on the contrary "the will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology 
threatens to slip from human control” (Heidegger, 1993: 313).
162 There is an interesting parallel between this Gadamer’s contention and Popper’s attempt to secure the 
scientific process from the intrusion of other kinds of interests by seeing scitnce as guided by what he 
termed the “scientific interest in truth”. Consequently, despite being well aware o f the multiplicity of 
social interests interfering in scientific investigation and which he explicitly acknowledges in his fourteenth 
thesis on the logic of the social sciences, he nevertheless sees science mainly in terms o f resisting “the 
confusion of value spheres" and therefore as the attempt to "separate extra-scientific evaluations from  
questions o f truth" (Popper. 1976: 96-97). It has to be remarked though that the parallels between Popper 
and Gadamer should not be extended beyond this point, which is quite at odd- with the more “critical” 
approaches of say Adorno and Habermas, since even the notion o f “truth’ has quite distinct and 
incompatible meanings for Popper and Gadamer. Indeed, the volume of the differentiation between the 
perspectives mentioned above is amply given by Gadamer’s thesis that the dialogue “between philosophy 
and the philosophy of science never really succeeds”, since it is premised on a “philosophy of the sciences 
that understands itself as a theory of scientific method” and which therefore “ i smisses any inquiry that
How c a n  tho u g h  t he  ta sk  of h e rm en eu tic s  a s  fo rm u la ted  by . lad am er still m ake 
an y  sen se  in face of th e  “objectivity” th a t  re p re se n ts  the  ideal o f m odern  
sc ien ce?
A threefo ld  s tra te g y  can  be detected  in  G ad am er's  w ork in  t ic s  respect:
F irs t, th e  tra c in g  of a  h e rm en eu tic  d im en sio n  in the  Vies’ ow n territo ry , 
second ly  the  reca stin g  of H eidegger’s in sig h t regard ing  th e  p rim acy  of the  
question , an d  finally  the  p o stu la tio n  o f a  developm ent allegedly overshadow ing  
th e  em ergence a n d  im pact of m o d em  science a n d  techn ique.
Let u s  have a  c lo se r look to th e  logical th re a d  connecting  th e se  in te rtw in ed  
s te p s , s ta r tin g  from  the  th ird  a ssu m p tio n . T he developm e t G a d a m e r sp eak s 
a b o u t  s ta n d s  for no th ing  else  th a n  th e  em ergence of m o d em  historical 
c o n sc io u sn ess , w h ich  in being  sh a rp ly  c o n tra s te d  to p re-m o dem  co n cep tio n s  of 
h is to ry  is sk e tc h e d  a s  the  m o d em  su b jec t's  allegedly deep in s ig h t in to  the  
rad ica l h isto ric ity  ch a rac te r is in g  every “p re se n t” tim e a n d  the  re su ltin g  relative 
v a lu e  a ttr ib u te d  to  the  v ario us tru th -c la im s , beliefs, a n d  opinions.
It w ould  n ev e rth e le ss  be a  m istak e  to  u n d e rs ta n d  the  em ergence o f th e  effective 
h is to rica l c o n sc io u sn e s s163 a s  a n  exclusively m o d e m  phenom enon .
G ad am er (1998: 86) p refers to th in k  of it in s te a d  a s  i re la tive , tho u g h  
“revolutionary", tran s fo rm a tio n  of a  p rim ord ia l h u m a n  a ttitu d e  to w a rd s  the  *16
cannot be meaningfully characterised as a process of trial and error” disregarding at the same time that “by 
this very criterion it is itself outside science”. Gadamer then sees the “Adorno Popper debate, like that 
between Habermas and Albert" as exemplifications of this tension, while observing that by "raising ‘critical 
rationality’ to the status of an absolute measure of truth, empirical theory of science regards hermeneutic 
reflection as theological obscurantism” (T&M: 554).
161 In his translation o f Gadamer’s essay 'The Continuity of History and the Existential Moment", Thomas 
Wren translates the German wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein as “historically operative 
consciousness". More importantly. Wren points to the difficulties associated w th translating in English 
"this favourite expression of Gadamer” and recommends to his readers Richard E. Palmer's Hermeneutics 
"(Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1969), p. 191” for a substantial discussion o* the issue (see Gadamer. 
1972: 237, translator's note).
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p a s t '64. Now, ever s in c e  the  a p p e a ra n c e  of N ietzsche 's second  “u n tim e ly ” 
m editation , it is h a rd ly  su rp ris in g  t h a t  th is  “effective” h isto rica l c o n sc io u sn ess  
shou ld  be tho u g h t a s  being s im u ltan eo u sly  a  gift an d  a  cu rse , a s  an  
unpreceden ted  privilege a n d  b u r d e n '65 an d  indeed  G ad am er (1998: 35) do es no t 
fall sh o rt of the  re a d e r 's  ex p ec ta tio n s  by paying d u e  heed uo th is  am bivalence 
p ecu lia r to the p h e n o m e n o n  of h is to rica l co n sc io u sn ess .
It is reg re ttab le  th o u g h  th a t  th e  specific re la tio n sh ip  ch arac te riz in g  the 
two allegedly u n p re c e d e n te d  a n d  “rival” developm ent! is  n o t d irectly  
a d d re sse d 164 566, being in  fac t ra th e r  su p p re sse d  in favou r of th e  ex ten sio n  of the  
herm eneu tic  claim  to  the  d o m a in  of th e  sc ien ces  ar,d th e ir  tech n ica l 
app lications. In th is  co n te x t, s ta tis tic s  a re  n o t invoked  by th e  th in k e r  m erely  a s  
a  specific in s tan ce  o f  m a th e m a tic s  an d  o f scien tific  re sea rch , w h ich  by 
m an ipu la ting  “q u es tio n s"  are  am en ab le  to  p ro p ag an d a  p u rp o se s ; m ore 
im portan tly  they  a re  tre a te d  a s  p roviding a  link  betw een  no th  " n a tu ra l” an d  
"social” scientific e n d eav o u rs . In o th e r  w ords, s ta tis tic s  po in t u s  to  “w hat" is 
considered  to be sc ien tific  in b o th  th e  n a tu ra l  a n d  the  social sc ien ces a n d  they  
the reb y  facilitate th e  p a ssa g e  from  a  d iscu ss io n  o n  science to  a  reflection  on 
m ethodology. T his is indeed  a  sh if t  of e m p h a s is  th a t  w ould have a rg u ab ly  re ­
164 See also Gadatner's remark in Truth and Method that "we would do we): not to regard historical 
consciousness as something radically new -a s  it seems at first- but as a new element in what has always 
constituted the human relation to the past” (T&M: 283).
165 We need only recall -for example- Nietzsche’s quite vivid metaphor on the Human being who would 
attempt to “feel everything historically”, whom he likens with “someone forced to refrain from sleeping, or 
an animal expected to live only from rumination”. There is though "a degree o f insomnia, o f rumination, of 
historical sense’’, Nietzsche professes, which "injures every living thing and finally destroys it, be it a man, 
a people, or a culture", and therefore the unhistorical and the historical ar, seen as being “equally 
necessary” for the “health" o f cultures, peoples, and individuals (Nietzsche, 1980 '0).
166 Indeed, if Gadamer’s claim that modernity witnesses the co-emergence of tv.o antagonistic but largely 
novel modes of being, namely a radically historical and an equally radically tecl uological comportment, is 
to be taken as disclosing a fundamental insight regarding the very essence of modernity, it would be quite 
appropriate if the specific> o f  the relationship were addressed in full. Is there an clement belonging to any
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in sc rib ed  G ad am er's  th o u g h t a lm o s t en tire ly  to  th e  Diltb. y an  problem atique  
w ere it no t for th e  pivotal position  a ttr ib u te d  by  th e  p h ilo sop h er to  questioning  
a s  su ch  an d  for a n  a c u te  a w a re n e ss  of th e  in te rn a l conflict be tw een  a 
ph ilosophy  of life an d  th e  e n d o rse m e n t of th e  epistem ological ideals of the 
E n ligh tenm en t c h a ra c te r is tic  of D ilthey’s  p ro jec t (see Go lam er, 1998: 67). 
T h u s , the  m ethodological literacy  w ith  w hich scientific a p p ren tice s  strive  to 
eq u ip  them selves is se e n  a s  b o th  a n  in d isp en sa b le  an d  a  confin ing  e lem en t for 
th e  productive en g ag em e n t w ith  th e ir  su b jec t m a tte r . Given he  am ple evidence 
o f the  s te rility  th a t  m ay  follow th e  r ig o rou s em ploym ent of a u s te re  
m ethodological p rinc ip les , a n d  w h ich  m ay be m o re  easily  d isce rn ib le  in  th e  field 
o f  the  social o r  h is to rica l sc iences, G ad am er's  a tte m p t to b a se  th e  fecund ity  of 
a n y  enqu iry  on  a n  a lte rn a tiv e  g ro u n d  is in  p rinc ip le  hard ly  ob jectionable.
It is th e n  im ag ination , endow ed  w ith th e  fundam e n ta l h e rm en eu tica l 
fun c tio n  of d isc lo sing  original q u e s tio n s  th a t  is  theorized a s  providing the  
" sp ark  of scien tific  in sp ira tio n ” w hile po in ting  to  th e  lingu is tic  d im ension  a s  
th a t  w hich c a n  po ten tia lly  b ring  a b o u t  th e  fu lfilm ent of th e  h isto rically  effected 
c o n sc io u sn ess  (G adam er, 1 9 6 6 /1 9 7 7 : 11-13). W ith th is  move, th e  m ost 
e lem en ta l -o r  " n a tu ra l”- m ode of en g ag em en t w ith  “lan gu ag e” a s  exem plified in 
o u r  im m ersion  in  co n v ersa tio n  s u b s t i tu te s  for m ethodological rigour, given th a t 
"u n d ers tan d in g "  is th e o rised  a s  b e in g  "language bound", while any  “v en tu re  
in to  the  a lien ” is se e n  a s  su p p o rte d  by o u r  “fam iliar an d  com m on 
u n d e rs ta n d in g "  (G adam er, 1 9 6 6 /1 9 7 7 : 15).
F a r from  being  theo rised  from  th e  all too  fam iliar epistem ological 
perspective o f "relativism ", lan g u ag e  a n d  in te rp re ta tio n  sei ■ e -in  a m a n n e r  a t
o f the two modes o f comportment that triggers the emergence o f the other, or do '.ley both belong to a third
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once  fam iliar an d  d is tan ced  from D ilthey’s o w n  investiga tions- a s  th e  very 
exem plification of the  h isto rical c o n sc io u sn ess . The em ergence of the  
“h isto rica l co n sc io u sn ess” designates the  m o d e m  aw are n e ss  of the  h isto rica l 
ho rizon  in its  en tire ty  an d  the  re su lta n t a b ility  to free o n ese lf from  the  
unreflective an d  naïve im position of the  s ta n d a r d s  of th e  "p re sen t” w hen  
ju d g in g  the  "p ast”. It follows th a t “m odem  c o n sc io u sn e ss ' c a n n o t escap e  the  
prob lem  posed by trad ition , the  “m ate ria l” o f  w hich it h a s  to  reflectively 
ap p ro p ria te .
G adam er d raw s o u r a tten tio n  to th e  fact th a t ihe  sam e  w ord, 
interpretation, is u sed  for bo th  the  u n co ve rin g  of the  rea l m ean in g ” or 
im p o rtan ce  of a  specific h isto rical event an d  fo r the  ap p ro p ria tio n  of tex ts . If it 
c a n  be sa id  th a t a tex t is in need of in te rp re ta tio n  w hen  it is n o t d irectly  
accessib le  in the  fu llness of its  m eaning, w h en  it  re s is ts  our in te llec tu a l efforts 
by re ta in in g  a degree of alienation , th e n  to  say  tha'. h is to ry  req u ires  
in te rp re ta tio n  would am o u n t to adm itting  t h a t  the re  is so m eth in g  h id d en  
b eh in d  the  "surface" of the  h istorical, w hich s h o u ld  be b ro u g h t to  light.
W hat is m ore, in te rp re ta tio n  is seen  a s  m u c h  m ore th a n  a  m ethodological 
princip le, an d  is consequently  understood  a s  a  catchw ord , v. h ich  in function ing  
like a sym bol a tte m p ts  to g rasp  and  rep re sen t th e  overall a ttitu d e  of a  h is to rica l 
e ra  (see G adam er. 1998: 38-39).
The problem  posed by in te rp re ta tio n  in  th is  w ider se n se , is the refo re  a  
problem  of a  co n cu rren t proxim ity w ith, a n d  d is tan c in g  from , tra d itio n  an d  is  
consequently  closely bo un d  w ith the  p e c u lia r  tw ist given i.y  G ad am er to th e  
no tion  of prejudice. T his link  is m ore a p p a re n t  if we co n sid e r th a t  th e  aim  of
development, and if so in what sort of manner?
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philosoph ical h e rm e n e u tic s  a s  se t by G adam er, is forme ir.ted in  te rm s  of a 
" transcendence" o f the  p re ju d ices  in h e ren t in th e  “a e s th e tic ’ an d  th e  “h isto rical" 
co n sc io u sn ess, a n d  u ltim a te ly  of th e  elevation  of the  "h erm en eu tic  
co n sc io u sn ess"  from  th e  s ta tu s  of a  m ere tech n iq u e  for avoiding 
m isu n d e rs ta n d in g s"  an d  overcom ing “alienations". A pparen tly , th is  en ta ils  a n  
am biva len t concep tion  of p re ju d ices , viz. b o th  a s  "d isto rtio n s” a n d  "errors" o f 
the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  an d  a s  p roduc tive  c o n s ti tu e n ts  of "our b r in g ”, o f “th e  in itia l 
d irec ted n e ss  of o u r  whole ab ility  to  experience” (G adam er, 1 9 3 6 /1 9 7 7 : 9).
Now, a lth o u g h  G ad am er u n d e rs ta n d s  th e  ep istem ological o rien ta tio n  o f 
th e  m o d em  socia l sc iences a n d  the  h u m a n itie s  a s  p rim arily  im p reg n a ted  a n d  
sh a p e d  by a N ietzschean  in s ig h t regard ing  th e  ideological d is to rtio n  inevitab ly  
befalling every lingu istic  a s se r tio n , he  in s is ts  th a t  the  i o n fin em en t of th e  
a t tr ib u te s  p e rta in in g  to h is to rica l co n sc io u sn ess  w ith in  the  lim ited  co n cern s  o f 
m ethodology c a n n o t b u t im poverish  th e ir  ph ilo soph ica l im port.
In effect, G ad am er a tte m p ts  to  reverse th e  com m only  held a t t itu d e  regard ing  
th e  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  scien tific  a n d  ph ilo soph ica l rea so n in g  by a s su m in g  
th a t  th e  h is to rica l c o n sc io u sn ess  is n o t m erely  m ethodologically  re levan t to  
ph ilosophy  or even  to the  "ph ilosophy  of science", b u t  th a t it r a th e r  p re se n ts  
ph ilosophy  w ith  a real challenge. Indeed, th e  co n cep tua lisa i o n  o f th e  "sc iences 
of th e  sp irit” a s  im perfect m a n ife s ta tio n s  of th e  allegedly rig o rou s a n d  “e x a c t” 
n a tu ra l  sc ien ces a m o u n ts  accord ing  to G ad am er to  tak in g  rhe u ltim a te  risk  of 
re legating  ph ilo sophy  itse lf to  th e  s ta tu s  of a  m ere organum  of th e se  sc iences. 
Viewed from th is  perspective  an y  a tte m p t to m erely  e s ta b lish  a  d is tin c t 
m ethodology  for th e  h u m a n  sc ien ces is seen  a s  insufficien t.
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T h u s, trad itio n a l h e rm en eu tic s  a re  accused  of h av  tg " inappropria te ly  
narrow ed  th e  ho rizon  to w hich u n d e rs ta n d in g  belongs" in sim ply affirm ing  the  
hom ogeneity b etw een  “the  know er an d  th e  known" an d  the ic lo re  by u ltim a te ly  
red u cin g  “h is to rica l h erm en eu tics"  to “a  b ra n c h  of psychology", a s  D ilthey  “had  
in  m ind" (T&M: 260-261).
O n th e  one h an d , it could be sa id  th a t  th e  con tem porary  no t o n  of m e th o d  -a n d  
th e  logic it su pp o sed ly  serves- are  inextricab ly  linked w ith the  sc ien tif ic167 
worldview. O n th e  o th er h a n d , th is  a ttem p t to  sim u la te  -he m ethodological 
p rem ises  of the  n a tu ra l  sc ien ces can  arguab ly  conceal who- G ad am er se e s  a s  
th e  m o st im p o rta n t d im en sio n  of the  challenge posed b y  the  
G eistesw issenschaJ 'ten . nam ely  the  fu n d am en ta l in sig h t regard ing  the  ex isten ce  
of a  concep tion  o f know ledge a n d  truth, w hich is radically different t h a n  th a t 
ch am pio n ed  by th e  sciences (G adam er, 1998:40-41).
T h is a lte rn a tiv e  m ode of know ing, a s  long a s  It rem ain s  insu ffic ien tly  
acknow ledged  -o r reflected u p on - p re se n ts  a source  of p ro b le m s  for 
h e rm en eu tic  ph ilosophy  a n d  th e  h u m an itie s . For first, G adam er (1998 : 42) 
c o n te n d s  in a  c ru c ia l reference to Hegel, th e re  is an  “elective affinity" betw een  
th e  theoretica l fram ew orks of th e  h u m a n  sc iences a n d  the  Hegelian ph ilo sophy  
of th e  “sp irit"166, w hich h a s  m oreover h ad  a  p ecu lia r im pact on  th e  ac tu a l 
developm ent of th e  G cistesw issenschq ften .
167 Gadamer makes emphatically this point in his discussion of Dilthey and Helmholtz’s attempt to discover 
and establish the appropriate "method” for the social sciences, by stressing that what is called method in 
modern science remains me same everywhere and is only displayed in an especially exemplary form in the 
natural sciences” (T&M: 7). It is thus in this context that Gadamer's provocative statement that the human 
sciences "have no method of their own” (T&M: 7-8) should be understood.
1(111 Gadamer has mainly in mind primarily Hegel’s attempt to grasp and justify in a philosophical manner 
both the several manifestations of human spirit in its crystallised, institutional forms of law, art. religion, 
etc for which Hegel uses the term “objective spirit". Hegel’s insistence upon the self-reflexive dimension 
of human spirit, which in Us ideal mode of perfect self-transparency is also termed “absolute spirit” is of
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The “undesirab le"  a s p e c t  of th is  p roxim ity  co n cern s th e  'a th e r  u n fo rtu n a te  
linkage betw een  the  tra jec to ry  o f th e  “h u m a n itie s” an d  th e  fate of Hegelian 
philosophy, w hich s a w  the  form er getting  involved in to  a  h i’ * e r  s trugg le  ag a in st 
m e taph y sic s  once H egelian ism  grew  o u t o f  favour. It w ould  be  a  m istak e  
th o u g h  to in te rp re t th i s  G adam er’s  co n te n tio n  a s  p ro p ag atin g  a  sim ple return  to 
th e  m otifs -le t alone th e  convictions- of H egelian  philosophy.
The problem  occupy ing  h is  th o u g h t is  of a  ra th e r  d ifferen t o rd er a n d  it 
specifically co n cern s - a s  can  be a lso  inferred  by h is  reference to  th e  G reeks an d  
especially  to A ris to tle 169- th e  possib ility  of d is tinc t m o d es of know ing 
co rrespond ing  to d iffe ren t su b jec t-m a tte rs .
M ethod  in  th is  view co u ld  only be  developed an d  e s ta b lish e d  in a n  a  posteriori 
fash ion , while it s h o u ld  also be d ic ta ted  by th e  n a tu re  of th e  “th in g -itse lf’170.
In the  case  of the  h u m a n  sc iences the  very  notion of follov ing th e  m ethodical 
co n sid era tio n s an d  a tte m p tin g  to  rep lica te  th e  "objectivity" allegedly a tta in e d  by *69
equal importance for Gadamer. since it designates one o f the most important dimensions of both the 
philosophical hermeneutics and the Geisteswissenschaften.
69 Gadamer primarily refers to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where the philos ipher postulates different 
ends corresponding to the various “arts” and different applications of the very i ition o f exactitude for as 
diverse "arts" as mathematics and oratory. It is important to note that the mod. of questioning should be 
according to Aristotle in accordance with the nature of the “thing” under scrutiny as the following passage 
plainly reveals: “jtEttcSeupcvou yctp Eariv eni toooutov raKptptq emipiTEiv Ka0’ Waarov ycvoc, etp' ooov q 
tou npayparoi; ipuau; EJtifiExETUt". Rackham’s translation o f this passage reads: "for it is the mark of the 
educated mind IpersonJ to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which toe nature of the particular 
subject admits" (Book one. 1094b 25). It should be emphasised that in Gadamer s reading of Aristotle the 
emphasis is placed on the nature of the “subject-matter" or "thing” (q rot) npdyp.uoi; (pitot«;), which should 
not only generate different expectations regarding the degree of exactitude to be attained by different 
sciences or "arts'' but should more importantly shape the whole orientation o f these sciences and arts.
1711 In linking Gadamer’s attempt to elevate hermeneutic consciousness beyond the realm of scientific 
reflection with his exchange with Habermas commonly known under the rubric o f "the Habermas-Gadamer 
debate”, Nicholson (1991: 161-emphasis added) observes that Gadamer’s argumt tit concerns the possibility 
of there being in moral and political life some “form o f reason, some form of knowledge, different from 
each and every special science, and different too from the logical form in which ‘deuces are articulated". 
According to this author, it is exactly this Aristotelian conception of phronesis “or practical reason” that is 
"operative" in Gadamer’s "hermeneutical enterprise” and that has allegedly “escaped Habermas’ grasp” 
due to the "dominant expectation in critical theory of an overlap of every form o f  eason with the scientific 
model”.
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the  n a tu ra l sc ien ces w ould accord ing ly  a m o u n t to incurrin g  .1 m ajor blow to the  
possibility  o f b ring ing  to th e  fore w h a t is essen tia lly  h u m an .
In a sen se  G ad am er u ses  th is  d ifferen tia tion  betw een  the  ep istem ic  co n cern s of 
the  sc ien ces of the  sp irit a n d  th e  n a tu ra l sc ien ces in ore* r  to tre a t  th e  old 
problem  of freedom  an d  n ecess ity  from  yet a n o th e r  perspective. T his exp la ins 
h is  reco u rse  to  a jux tap o sition  o f th e  tra jec to ries  of the  A nglo-Saxon an d  the  
G erm an ph ilosoph ical tra d itio n s  th a t  u ltim ate ly  leads G ad r m er to  a d d re ss  the  
issu e  in te rm s  of a c o n tra s t b e tw een  in d u c tio n  an d  freedom , w hich shou ld  be 
u ltim ately  in te rp re ted  in te rm s  o f a  p o s tu la te d  b reach  betw een  n a tu re  an d  
history.
G ad am er (1998: 44-45) tra c e s  in th e  th o u g h t of Mill an d  H um e the  
fu n d am en ta l princip le, acco rd in g  to  w hich th e  inductive m ethod  form ing the  
b as is  of every  em pirical sc ience  sh o u ld  a lso  provide the  g io u n d  for the  m oral 
sciences, s in ce  in bo th  c a se s  th e  a im  is to identify  reg u larities  an d  tre n d s  th a t 
could in tu r n  ren d e r th e  p red ic tion  of ind iv idual c a se s  possible. T his 
conception  a t  best a d m its  only of a  difference in the  dc gree of "predictive 
certain ty" w ith  w hich sc ience  tre a ts  n a tu re  an d  the  social an d  “ethical" 
p h en om en a, in the  sam e m a n n e r  th a t  it reco g n ises  a  d ifference of exactitude  
betw een p h y s ic s  an d  m eteorology. G ad am er does no t deny  i h a t the  adop tion  of 
th is  m ethodological m odel h a s  o ften  b ro u g h t su c c e ss  to th e  h u m a n  sciences, as 
for exam ple  in th e  case o f the  “psychology o f th e  m asses". He th in k s  though  
th a t it still o b lite ra tes  th e  “real" p u rp ose  o f h isto rical know ledge, nam ely  the  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h is to rica l ev en ts  in  th e ir  u n iq u en ess  (G adaoier. 1998: 46).
It cou ld  be a rg u ed  th a t  G adam er d isc lo ses h e re  a qu ite  im p o rtan t 
problem , w hich  a s  m en tio ned  in  th e  p rev iou s c h a p te r  v/as also  cursorily
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ad d ressed  by  C asto riad is . nam ely  the  possib ly  d ifferen t m oc'allty of the  la w s  or 
rules u n d e rp in n in g  h isto rica l experience, o n ly  to cover it v p  ag a in  by sim ply  
po in ting  to th e  u n iq u e n e ss  of h isto rica l p h en o m en a . It m ight indeed b e  the  
case th a t  h is to ry  is prim arily  concerned  w ith  u n d e rs tan d in g  the em ergence a n d  
developm ent of a specific natio n , s ta te , o r  peoples a s  G ad am er171 (1998: 47) 
suggests. T h is  hard ly  en ta ils  tho u g h  th a t  th e  way in  w hich peoples, n a tio n s  
an d  s ta te s  em erge a n d  change in  g en era l is irre levan t to e ith e r h is to rica l 
know ledge o r  even to h isto rica l experience.
G ad am er’s aw are n e ss  of th e  im p o rtan ce  of th is  m ore genera l or u n iv e rsa l 
d im ension  is  traceab le  in the  w ay in  w hich  he  pays d u e  heed  to  the  co n cep t of 
B ildung172 in  h is  d iscu ss io n  of th e  im p o rtan ce  of the  h u m a n  s t  trad itio n  a n d  its  
"guiding co n c e p ts“ for th e  developm ent a n d  o rien ta tio n  of co n tem porary  socia l 
science. G ad am er traces  h isto rically  th e  em ergence o f the  le rm  in K lopstock’s 
M essiah  a n d  its  first concre te  fo rm ula tion  in  H erder’s  defin ition  a s  " the  ris in g  
u p  to  h u m a n ity  th ro u g h  c u ltu re ” (T&M: 10). It is n ev e rth e le ss  in  the  w o rk  of 
Hegel, a n d  especially  in  the  sec tion  on th e  fo rm ation  of se lf-co n sc io u sn ess  in 
the  Phenom enology o f  Spirit th a t  acco rd in g  to  G ad am er the  concep t a t ta in s  its  
m a tu rity , s in ce  it is explicitly co rre la ted  w ith  th e  co n cep t of Geist.
W h at these  concep ts signify fs th e  b reak  w ith  the  “n a tu ra l” a n d  the  
"im m ediate" ch a rac te r is tic  of th e  h u m a n  b e ing , w hich  a t  th e  sam e  tim e im plies
171 In a quite illuminating passage of Truth and Method Gadamer claims that the. experience o f the socio- 
historical world “cannot be raised to a science by the inductive procedure of the natural sciences” mainly 
because “historical research does not endeavour to grasp the concrete phenomenon as an instance of a 
universal rule. The universal law does not serve only to confirm a law from which practical predictions can 
be made. Its ideal is rather to understand the phenomenon itself in its unique and historical concreteness" 
(T&M: 4-5).
172 It is important to note that Gadamer sees in the very concept o f Bildung e. the concept o f  "self­
formation, education, or cultivation" a new and quite promising interpretaoon o f the ideals of the 
“enlightened reason”, a "renewal of literature and aesthetic criticism, which overcame the outmoded
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a  m ovem ent from  the  ind iv idual to th e  universal. T h is p o s .v a te d  su p e rse ss io n  
is fu rth e rm o re  conceived in  te rm s of a  ta sk ,  given th a t th e  i i.jing to  un iversa lity  
alw ays en ta ils  sacrific ing  one 's  p a rtic u la rity  an d  re s tra in in g  th e  im m ediate  
sa tisfac tio n  of one 's  d e s ir e 173 (T&M: 12). R egarding practical B ildung  th is  
re s tra in t is b es t exem plified in work, w here  “in  form ing th e  ob ject” o r a s  
G ad am er h a s  it "in being  selflessly active an d  concerned  w ith  a  u n iv e rsa l” th e  
w ork ing  co n sc io u sn ess  is  sa id  to ra ise  itse lf “above the im m ediacy o f its  
ex istence  to universality : o r  a s  Hegel p u ts  it. by form ing th e  '.hing it form s i t s e l f  
(T&M: 13). G ad am er th e n  traces  even in  th is  "p ractical mo< ,e” of Bildung, even 
if in  a n  em bryonic form o f existence, th e  e lem en ts  th a t  in v s  in te rp re ta tio n  of 
Hegel becom e “com pletely c lear"174 in  th e  idea  of theoretical B ildung.
T here is evidently  no th in g  novel in  the  idea th a t even  in  its  m ore 
b la ta n tly  “practical" a s p e c ts  Hegel’s  Phenom enology  p o in ts  r lso  to  th e  w ork ings *14
baroque ideal of taste anil of Enlightenment rationalism”, and which more importantly "prepared the 
ground for the growth of the historical sciences in the nineteenth century" (T&M *>).
171 See Hegel (1977:1 IX): "Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby is 
unalloyed feeling of self. But that is the reason why this satisfaction is itself only x fleeting one. for it lacks 
the side of objectivity and permanence. Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved 
off: in other words, work forms and shapes the thing”. It would be indeed diftk ult to overemphasise the 
significance of the belonging-together of work and desire in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Indicative are 
Hegel’s (1977: 132-133) remarks on the "nullity” with which the world o f work and desire is vested in the 
case of the "unhappy consciousness” and the subsequent sundering of actuality in two parts, one mill and 
one sanctified and unchangeable, in the same manner that in Hegel’s view the unhappy consciousness is 
itself breached in two.
114 One can detect a metaphorical dimension in the very manner in which Gadamer sees practical Bildung 
attaining a sort of self-transparency and maturing in its theoretical aspect. This becomes apparent once 
Gadamer’s discussion on Bildung is contrasted with one of the actual Bildung metaphors used by Hegel 
(1977:2) in the Phenomenology o f  Spirit and which has been already considered in relation to Heidegger in 
footnote 60 of chapter one. Here, for purposes concerning the clarity o f the presentation it was deemed 
necessary to reproduce verbatim the entire metaphor, which reads: "The bud disappears in the bursting- 
forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter similarly, when the fruit 
appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant and the fruit now emerges 
as the truth of it instead”. The reader should be reminded that this metaphor is used by Hegel to refer to the 
supersession of philosophical systems and has been often criticised as offering at. account of a progressive 
realisation of truth. Hegel’s absolute spirit and his by now infamous motto “what is rational is actual; and 
what is actual is rational” (Hegel. 1991: 20) have not exactly worked in favour of an alternative 
interpretation of the place Bildung occupies in his work. It seems quite challenging though that Hegel uses 
a metaphor from the realm of nature, with its unending cycles and where it i- nonsensical to speak of 
"progress” in order to draw an analogy with the workings of the spirit.
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of th e  "sp irit”, the  ce leb ra ted  “lab ou r o f th e  concep t” being ct- ta in ly  m o re  th a n  a 
linguistic  lapsus, or a figure of speech . G ad am er wis es n o n e th e le s s  to 
critically  ev a lu a te  the  inex tricab le  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  the  p ra c tic a l  an d  the  
in te llec tual sp h e re s  in  Hegel’s ph ilosophy  w ith o u t rep roducing  s te reo typ ical 
ob jections ag a in s t specu la tive  idealism . H ence he re fra in s from  ad o p tin g  a 
s ta n d p o in t th a t  w ould in te rp re t Hegel’s tre a tm e n t of labou r a s  b e in g  prim arily  
concerned  w ith  theoretica lly  justify ing  the  la b o u r of p h ilo so p h ica l tho u g h t. 
T his s ta n c e  is p e rh ap s  b e s t  exem plified in h is  un favoura  ble t r e a tm e n t175 of 
M arx 's critique  of Hegel's Phenom enology, w hich  he  sees a; be ing  d is to rted  by 
the  "dogm atic conception  o f c o n sc io u sn ess  an d  o f idealism  th a t  in  G adam er’s 
view M arx "sh ared  w ith  h is  con tem poraries", a n d  w hich re s tra in e d  M arx from 
recognising  th a t  “Hegel cou ld  have never d ream t for a  m om en t th a t  w ork  is only 
the  w ork o f th o u g h t an d  th a t  w h a t is reaso n ab le  w ould be re a lise d  solely by 
th o u g h t” (G adam er. 1976: 73).
It cou ld  be th u s  co rrec t to  a ssu m e  th a t  G adam er w o u ld  like to 
acknow ledge a  ce rta in  “precedence" of the  in te llec tua l over th e  m ateria l 
d im en sio n s in  Hegel’s tre a tm e n t of lab o u r w ith o u t accusin g  h im  o f  n o t read ing  
“sp irit a s  a n  iso lated  asp ec t"  of lab ou r, b u t  in s tead , “conversely", d issolving 
lab o u r “in to  a m om ent o f spirit", a s  A dom o (1993: 24) a n d  th e  w hole o f th e  
M arx ist-insp ired , critical trad itio n , w ould have it.
175 Gadamer’s statements regarding Marx’s interpretation o f the master anti slave parable in the 
Phenomenology are quite bold. The thinker thus states that Marx’s critique has only added confusion to the 
attempt to understand this chapter and that his use of this celebrated metaphor is in reality nothing but a 
misuse. This does not mean though that Gadamer rejects in iota Marx’s critique o f Hegel’s philosophy 
since he rightly acknowledges that Marx “found the point at which to apply his criticism o f Hegel” not in 
the Phenomenology “but rather, as seemed more appropriate, in Hegel's philosophy of right” (see 
Gadamer, 1976: 72-73).
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W hat ts tho u g h  th e  real sign ificance o f G adam er’s  a tte m p t to acknow ledge 
B ildung a s  a n  e le m e n t of sp irit w ith o u t a t  th e  sam e tim e "Being tied  to  Hegel’s 
ph ilosophy  of a b so lu te  sp irit, j u s t  a s  th e  insigh t in to  the h is to ric ity  of 
co n sc io u sn ess  is  n o t tied to  h is  ph ilosophy  of w orld  h istory" (T&M: 15)? 
Arguably, h is  in te n s io n  is b u t  to  u n e a r th  th is  "basic” an d  allegedly “co rrec t” 
idea beh in d  th e  “c la ss ic is t 's  p re jud ice" echoed in th e  w o rd s176 of Hegel, “th e  
G ym nasium  d ire c to r” (T&M: 14).
T his “idea" is  fu rtherm ore  recogn isab ly  s im ilar to  G ad am er’s ce leb ra ted  
th e sis  on th e  fu s io n  o f  horizons a n d  c o n s is ts  precisely in  recogn ising  oneself in 
th e  alien, in  h a v in g  the ability  to  becom e “a t hom e" in  the  un -hom ely . More 
im portan tly , th is  idea  b ring s to  th e  fore th e  phenom enor, th a t  for G adam er 
co n s titu te s  the  “e ssen ce  of B ildung ’’, nam ely  the  return  to  on ese lf o u t of the  
alien, w hich m o reover certa in ly  “p re su p p o se s  a lie n a tio n ”. T hus, every  single 
“individual" ra is in g  oneself o u t of o n e ’s  “n a tu ra l  being" to  th e  “s p ir i tu a l” sp h e res  
is b o u n d  to  find  in  the " language, cu s to m s, an d  in s ti tu tio n s ” of o n e 's  "own 
people a  p re-g iven  body of m a te ria l w h ich, a s  in le a rn in g  to  sp e a k ” one h a s  to 
m ake one 's  o w n 177 (T&M: 14).
If H erder’s  d raw in g  of B ildung  w ere recalled  it w ou ld  be m ade  c lear th a t  
G adam er w ish es  to  d ispense  w ith  th e  idea  of an  origin, an d  u ltim ate ly  w ith the
116 Gadamer’s (T&M: 14) quotation is from Hegel’s Nürnberger Schriften, ed. Hoffmeister, p.312 (1809 
Address).
177 Gadamer (1966/1977: 16) believes though that there is “no eaptivity within a :anguage not even within 
our native language”. "To master the foreign language", says Gadamer in the same essay, “means precisely 
that when we engage in speaking it in the foreign land, we do not constantly consult inwardly our own 
world and its vocabulary.. .and only because we never know foreign languages well enough do we always 
have something of this feeling (i.e. the feeling of constantly translating from our own" language). But it is 
nevertheless speaking, even if perhaps a stammering speaking”. More importantly, this "stammering 
speaking” attests according to Gadamer to the infinity of language and it is precisely on those grounds that 
the philosopher rejects as unfounded the assumption that the existence o f various languages signifies a 
fragmentation of reason. In opposition to this assumption Gadamer counter-po.es that “precisely through
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idea p rev a len t in th e  ph ilo soph ies o f th e  age, accord ing  to  w .'ich  th e  progressive  
developm ent of reason  could be e s ta b lish e d  a s  a  law  of natur •
In h is  prize-w inning  e ssa y  of 1770 on  th e  “origin of la n g u a g e ", H erder identifies 
rea so n  a s  the  e lem en t th a t  confers u p o n  th e  h u m a n  sp ec ies  a  “p ecu lia r 
d irec tion  of its  own". D raw ing a n  analogy  betw een  the  :hild grow ing in to  
ad u lth o o d  an d  the  h is to ry  of th e  h u m a n  species, H e rd e r al < em p ts  to  e s tab lish  
the n o tio n  of a  g ra d u a l developm ent o f re a so n  from  th e  early s ta g e s  of h u m an ity  
to m odern ity .
Is n o t “th e  whole tre e ”, a sk s  H erd er (1 7 7 2 /1 9 8 6 : 133-134 ' m  a  m e ta p h o r th a t  
seem s to have in sp ired  Hegel’s u se  of th e  s im ila r Im agery  i r  J ie  Phenom enology  
“a lready  con ta ined  in  th e  seed”? In  a  s im ila r vein, h u m a n  beings a re  seen  a s  
being n a tu ra lly  p red isp o sed  for th e  a cq u irem e n t o f  language , w h ich  in  
com pliance w ith  w h a t H erder ca lls  th e  “first law  o f natur« ” is sa id  to  sp ring  
forth in  a  sp on ta n eo us  m ann er, "as th e  im p u lse  of a n  em bryo  tow ard s b ir th ”. 
T hus H erd er u n d e rs ta n d s  the  o rig ination  o f language  a s  the  s ta te  of affa irs th a t  
impels h u m an ity  to develop in  a  c o n tin u o u s  a n d  u n b ro k e n  m a n n e r its  m en ta l 
faculties, in a  str iv in g  "tow ards” th e  a tta in m e n t o f “full m anhood” (Herder, 
1 7 72 /1 9 8 6 : 155). It is  exactly th is  p rogressive u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f h is to ry  th a t  
G adam er w ishes to d isp en se  w ith, w ith o u t hav ing  to  sacrifice H erder’s  In sigh ts 
on th e  im p o rtan ce  o f language  a n d  o f cu ltu re .
T h u s , G ad am er gives a n  in te rp re ta tiv e  tw ist to  th e  . ge-old q u es tio n  of 
a lienation  an d  ap p ro p ria tio n , w h ich  is now  m odelled  a lm o s t explicitly on  th e  
“m any-layered p ro b lem  of t ra n s la tio n ”, from  th e  “s tr u c tu re ” o f w h ich  th e
our finitude, the particularity o f our being, which is evident even in the variety if languages, the infinite 
dialogue is opened in the direction of truth that we are” (loc. Cit).
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"general problem  of m aking  w h a t is a lie n  o u r  own" c a n  be allegedly form ulated  
in a  m ore  tra n sp a re n t m a n n e r (G adam er, 1 9 6 7 /1 9 7 7 : 19).
S ignificantly , th e re  a re  strong  H eideggerian  echoes in  t h f  a tte m p t to  a tta in  
h ig h e r  in sig h ts  from  those  e n te r ta in e d  by critica l re a so n in g  in  G adam er's  
p o in tin g  to the  inseparab ility  of a lie n a tio n  a n d  app rop ria i ion a s  phenom ena 
o ccu rrin g  in language, an d  in  h is  s u b s e q u e n t  a tte m p t to  m ake th is  couplet 
p ivo tal for ph ilosophical reflection.
T h is ta s k  becom es even m ore com plex  by th e  explicit d em a n d  to  gu ard  
h e rm en eu tica l reaso n ing  ag a in s t a  m ere  re lap s in g  in to  a  pre critica l s tand p o in t, 
a s s u m in g  of co u rse  th a t  th is  k ind  of re lap s in g  is still ev en  th in k ab le . One 
n e e d s  only recall H eidegger's early  co ncep tion  of t r u th  a s  a-Ar)8eia, a s  
em ergence  o u t of the  forgetfu lness o r o f th e  co n cea lm en t o f be ing  in  o rd er to pay 
d u e  h eed  to  G ad am er's  (1 9 7 2 /1 9 7 7 : 94) claim  th a t  th e  t r u th  a tta in ed  by w hat 
he ca lls  the h e rm eneu tica lly  en lig h ten ed  c o n sc io u sn ess , i.e. “th e  tru th  of 
tra n s la tio n "  is of a  h igher o rder th a n  t h a t  e s ta b lish e d  by a n y  ph ilosophical or 
sc ien tific  acc o u n t b ased  on a  “naïve” b e lie f in  objectivity. It is  indifferent to 
G a d a m e r w h e th e r th is  claim  an d  th e  c o n se q u e n t striv ing  for th e  a tta in m e n t of a 
s ta te  o f affairs th a t  could  be “com pletely  free of p re jud ice '' s te m s  from  “the  
d e lu s io n  of an  ab so lu te  en ligh tenm en t" , o r  from  th e  equally  ..illacious vision “of 
a n  em piric ism  free of all prev ious o p in io n s  in  th e  trad itio n  o f m e tap h y sic s”, or 
even from  the  ill-destined  a tte m p t a t  u n m a sk in g  a n d  “g e ttin g  beyond  science 
th ro u g h  ideological critic ism ”.
In all th o se  cases , the  alleged su p e rio rity  of th e  h e rm e n e u tic a l m ode of t ru th  is 
en tire ly  d ep en d en t on the  event o f appropriation, w hich "allow s th e  foreign to
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becom e o n e 's  own" w ithou t an n u llin g  It In a  critical m a n n e r178 o r even 
“rep ro d u c ing  it uncritica lly”.
C on trary  to  these  a ttitu d e s , h e rm en eu tica l reflection  is s ;a d  to p reserve  and  
en rich  th e  alien  by "explicating It w ith in  o n e 's  ow n h o rizon s w ith o n e’s  own 
concep ts a n d  th u s  giving it new  validity" (G adam er, 1972/11177: 94).
T h u s , far from being  th e o rised  solely in  te rm s  of a  rad ica l opposition  to 
scientific reaso n ing  an d  to th e  a lienation  from  "natu : al c o n sc io u sn ess” 
e n c a p su la te d  in the  concept o f scientific m e th o d , h e rm en eu tica l reflection  can  
be ind irectly  of service even to th e  m ethodological co n cern s o-' science.
In G ad am er's  view th is  can  be  effected by m a k in g  explicit the  "guiding" pre- 
u n d e rs ta n d in g s  in scientific e n d eav o u rs  an d  th e reb y  “open new  d im en sio n s  of 
q u estio n in g ”, a ltho u g h  th is  o p en in g  of new  d im en sio n s  n ecessa rily  involves also 
bringing to  aw aren ess  the  c o s t  en ta iled  by th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f rigorous 
scientific m eth o d s. G adam er h a s  here  in m ind  th e  ob lite ra tio n  a n d  expu lsion  
effected by  scientific a b s tra c tio n  to  certa in  d im en sio n s  of life experienced  by the  
so-called “n a tu ra l  c o n sc io u sn e ss”, an d  to  w h ich  n a tu ra l co n sc io u sn ess  is
178 However, this attempt to surmount the confines of critical reflection should not be interpreted as a 
rejection of the critical faculties of reason on Gadamer's part. In an interview with Christian Gehron and 
Jonathan Rèe, Gadamer explicitly identifies critical reason as the principal socio-political and personal 
resource against the "new forms of slavery” in the industrialised, “mass-societies ’ of the west. “We need 
critical courage”, says the philosopher as he reflects on the possibility of emancipation from the forms of 
political oppression and obedience resulting from the industrial revolution. In fact, he emphatically points 
that “the only way to combat” this alienating state of affairs is to “exercise our critical intelligence" and to 
"create free spaces for creative behaviour”. Also in a reference to his own country he asserts that the mass 
media “in Germany are i.ot really prepared for the challenge o f stimulating critical thinking. They lack a 
training in judgement, in self-criticism, criticism of institutions, criticism of government” (Gadamer, 1995: 
31). Although parts of tile reflections cited above might seem slightly dated or even inaccurate to 
sociologists specialising in debates on post-industrial societies, or on “information societies” etc., still these 
passages are invaluable in that they weaken unfavourable interpretations of Gadamer’s work, based on 
allegations that his work promotes an uncritical stance towards political institutions. It seems to this reader 
though that accusations o f this kind are the results of a fundamental misunderstanding o f the role and 
meaning the concept of tradition has in Gadamer’s thought.
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fu rth e rm o re  alw ays t ie d 179 180by v ir tu e  o f its  being  "the c o n su m e r of th e  inven tions 
a n d  in form ation  a t ta in e d  by sc ience” (G adam er, 1 9 67 /1 9 7 7 : .39).
D esp ite  the  easily  identifiab le ten dency  to rep roduct a  tension  be tw een  
th e  n a tu ra l  a n d  the  socia l sc iences, w h ich  is u ltim ate ly  n o 'h in g  b u t  a  ten sio n  
betw een  sc ience  an d  p h ilo so p h y '80, it  is  still difficult to m iss  th e  im portance  o f 
G ad am er’s po in t reg ard in g  the irreducib ility  of th e  p h en o m en o n  of life to s tr ic t  
ep istem ic  co n cern s, th is  “s tr u c tu ra l  correlation b e tw e e n  life a n d  self- 
consciousness"  th a t  he  sees a s  hav ing  b een  “already  developed  in  H egel's 
Phenom enology"  (T&M: 252).
G ad am er is o f the  op in ion  th a t even  th e  preserved  m a n u s c r  o t frag m en ts  o f th e  
Phenom enology  a t te s t  to  the  c e n tra l im p o rtan ce  th e  co n cep t of life ho lds in 
Hegel’s ph ilosophy  even  a s  early  a s  d u rin g  h is  la s t  y e a rs  in  F ran k fu rt. T he 
p h en om en o n  of life is th u s  u n d e rs to o d  a s  m aking  the  decisive tra n s itio n  from  
co n sc io u sn ess  to se lf-co n sc io u sn ess , w hile th is  co n n ec tio n  far from  being  
"artificial” o r p reca rio u s  reveals a n  in d isp u tab le  a n a 'o g y  betw een  self- 
co n sc io u sn ess  an d  life.
179 Gadamer ( 19(S7/1977: 39) expresses this also in Wittgenstein’s terminolog) in the following manner: 
“The language games of science remain related to the metalanguage presentee in the mother tongue”, a 
claim he supports with references to the way in which scientific advancements enter the “societal 
consciousness" through the educational institutions, and with the aid of “modern informational media". It 
has to be remarked that this is a slightly disappointing elaboration both from a ohilosophical and from a 
sociological perspective.
180 See again Gadamer's remark in the interview cited above, according to which the main source of his 
political disagreement with Habermas is that in Gadamer's opinion Habermas believes in science as a 
means of solving all the problems of society”. Gadamer is adamant that he has no belief in that and that he 
on the contrary thinks that “without friendship and solidarity nothing is possiole”. More importantly, 
Gadamer spells out his “problem” with the position held by the “Frankfurt school" and “also of Marx 
himself', which was "always too idealistic” in his eyes. The "problem” for Gad.imer is that human beings 
“are not angels", while although it is true that the “Frankfurt School and the communistic vision of the 
world had something great in them, something fascinating”. Gadamer feels he has learned from his “life 
experience" that human nature is different. “I was not particularly Christian”, s iv s  the philosopher, “but I 
learned something about original sin. and I have found it confirmed" (Gadamer, 1995: 34).
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Som ew hat p red ictably  th is  analogy is  d raw n  from (lie perspective o f 
ap p ro p ria tio n , since on the  one h an d  th e  “fundam en ta l fac t o f  being alive” is  
u n d e rs to o d  in te rm s of assim ila tion , w h ere  d ifferentiation  is  a t  th e  sam e tim e 
"non-differentiation" an d  th e  “alien" g e ts  the reby  a p p ro p ria ted . Sim ilarly th is  
"s tru c tu re  o f being  alive” is on  the  o th e r h a n d  sa id  to  have its  correlative in  th e  
“n a tu re ” o f se lf-co n sc io u sn ess  the  being o f w hich co n sis ts  - a s  sh ow n  by Hegel- 
in the  ab ility  to m ake everything th e  “object" of its  know ledge an d  “y e t in  
every th ing  th a t it knows, it know s i ts e lf ’. In o th e r w ords, .raving in th e  f irs t 
in s tan ce  lo st itse lf to the  ob jec ts  of the  w orld  of its  concern , se lf-co n sc io u sn ess  
“folds b a c k ” an d  re tu rn s  to itse lf (T&M: 252-253).
F u rth e rm o re , the  Phenom enology  h a s  the  m erit of show ing  how life is  
really g ra sp ed  -even if in a  “prelim inary" a n d  “incom plete” a  m a n n e r-  a t th e  very  
m om ent w hen  one a t ta in s  “in n er consc io u sn ess" , i.e. a w a re n e ss  of one 's  ow n  
living. It follows th a t desire  is bo th  th e  so u rce  a n d  the  co n su m m a tio n  of th is  
prim al aw aren ess , since th e  becom ing  conscious of o n ese lf  in  d esire  is  
a n n ih ila te d  w hen a specific desire  is s a tia ted .
T his is th e  point w here in  G adam er’s view  the  w ork of C o u n t Yorck, w ho in  a  
D arw in-insp ired  im agery is p ronounced  to  be the  "m issing lin k ” betw een  H egel’s  
Phenom enology o f  Spirit an d  H u sse rl’s  Phenomenology o f  Transcenden ta l 
Subjectivity , is  acclaim ed a s  becom ing “m o s t fru itful” (T&M: 253-254).
More specifically, the  derivation  of “a  m ethodological s ta n d a r d ” from  th e  
co rre la tion  betw een life a n d  se lf-consc iousness  e labo rated  tn  Y orck’s defin ition  
of th e  n a tu re  an d  ta sk  of ph ilosophy in  te rm s of projectior. a n d  a b s trac tio n  is 
seen  a s  a  su p e rio r ach ievem ent com pared  to the  philosophic al investiga tions o f 
D ilthey a n d  also  to the  w ork of the "H istorical school”.
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In p a rtic u la r , Y orck is seen  a s  an a ly sin g  th e  phern « n en o n  of life in a  
m a n n e r  th a t  goes beyond D ilthey 's epistem ological inten tion .'.181 a n d  therefore a s  
m a in ta in in g  th e  "m etaphysical connection  betw een  life anc se lf-consc iousness 
w orked o u t by  Hegel", w hile paving th e  w ay for H eidegger’i. con fron ta tion  with 
“H u sse rl’s e id e tic  phenom enology" a n d  w ith  th e  en tire  ph ilosoph ical trad itio n  of 
th e  W est (T&M: 253-254).
H eidegger's renew al of the  q u es tio n  co n cern in g  th e  “n lean ing  of being" is 
th e n  seen  a s  recognition  of th e  u n reso lved  p rob lem  of m etaph y sic s  in its  
“u ltim ate  cu lm ination", nam ely  in  the  gu ise  of th e  concep t o f sp irit “a s  
conceived by  specu la tive  idealism ". H eidegger's “g ro u n d in g  : f  th e  h e rm en eu tic s  
of facticity" is  th u s  sa id  to  have p rogressed  beyond  b o th  the  concep t of sp irit a s  
developed in  c lassica l idealism  an d  th e  “th e m a tic  o f tra n sc e n d e n ta l 
c o n sc io u sn e ss  purified by phenom enological re d u c tio n ” (T&N1: 258).
At th e  sam e  tim e, an d  a lth o u g h  it is  acknow ledged  th a t  h is  co n cern s w ere no t 
in  th e  least m ethodological H eidegger’s  investiga tions in  th e  h isto ric ity  of h u m a n
181 Gadamer’s main criticism o f Dilthey is that his whole philosophical oeuvre is permeated by an 
irreconcilable breach between his philosophy of life and his adherence to the ideals of “scientific 
Enlightenment’, i.e. the adoption o f the “standpoint of reflection and doubt'' fiat allegedly inform "all 
forms o f scientific reflection" and which run counter to the forms of reflection that are “immanent in life”. 
The scientific mode of certainty, namely the one established by the process of \erification that has been 
forged on the anvil of “Cartesian doubt" is then said to eradicate the more “imme Hate, living certainty that 
all ends and values have when they appear in human consciousness" (T&M: 23k'. It is quite important to 
note that Gadamer extends this criticism further in detecting in Dilthey’s adheience to the ideals of the 
Enlightenment and especially to the Cartesian way of proceeding through douttt, a covering up of the 
specificity of historical knowledge and experience. In Gadamer’s reading of Dilthey this concealment of 
the historical is exemplified in Dilthey’s attempt to harmonize the mode of knowledge peculiar to the 
human sciences with the methodological criteria of the natural sciences. Gadamer does not mean to say 
that the search for scientific certainty and objectivity characteristic of Dilthey could be interpreted as a sign 
of Dilthey’s unawareness of the general state of uncertainty brought about b> the historical forces of 
modern life. Nevertheless. Dilthey's taking recourse to Romantic Hermeneutics with its emphasis on the 
philological interpretation o f texts and the fundamental assumption concerning the possibility of a 
congenial understanding to be achieved in the relationship between the “I and Thou” is seen as resulting to 
the obliteration o f the historical nature of experience. Thus, Dilthey’s conception of the historical world in 
terms of a text amenable to interpretation entailed in Gadamer's view a reduction of history to intellectual 
history since by resembling to a text everything in history becomes in principle intelligible, while the
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ex istence  a re  seen  a s  t ra n sc e n d in g  the  C a rte sian  concepU on of sc ience  th a t  
p lagued  D ilthey’s own investiga tions an d  th a t  w as allegedly responsib le  for the  
aporias o f  historicism. w ith  reg ard  to  w hich Heidegger “a tta in e d  a  fu n d am en ta lly  
new  position" (T&M: 259).
H u sse rl's  investiga tions had  a lre a d y  placed d o u b t on  the  d ifferen tia tion  betw een 
h is to rica l a n d  n a tu ra l sciences b y  u n d e rs ta n d in g  b o th  a s  “ .chievem ents of the  
in ten tio n a lity  of un iversal life, i.e. of ab so lu te  h isto ric ity”. N evertheless, w ith 
H eidegger u n d e rs ta n d in g  ceases  to  be a  m ethodological g round ing  o f ph ilosophy  
a s  w ith  H u sserl o r “ a resigned  ideal of h u m a n  experience adop ted  in  th e  old 
age o f th e  sp irit” a s  w ith D ilthey. It ra th e r  becom es th e  original fo r m  o f  the  
realisation o f  Dasein, w hich is being-in-the-w orld", it is D asein ’s  very  m ode of 
being , "insofar a s  it is po ten tiality -for-being  an d  possibility"  n& M : 259). 
G ad am er identifies the  unco verin g  of D asein ’s  tem pora l s tru c tu re , an d  
especially  Heidegger's th e o r isa tio n  of the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  an d  o f h isto rical 
ex istence  a s  projection or a s  tra n sc e n d e n c e  "beyond th e  e x is ten t” an d  the  
fam iliar, a s  the  ph ilo sopher’s  m ost im p o rtan t co n trib u tio n  to  the  de- 
co m p artm en ta lisa tio n  of the h e rm e n e u tic  claim . We have a lready  ind icated  
H eidegger's a ttem p t to g ro u nd  th e  h isto rica l sciences on  D ase in 's  a u th e n tic  
h isto ric ity . If we accep t th is  rea so n in g , it th e n  follows th a t  h isto rica l know ledge 
is for H eidegger also a p ro jection , a ltho u g h  no t a  p ro jection  “in  th e  sen se  of a  
p la n ” the  im position  of the  h is to r ia n ’s will or th e  reshuffling  o f “th ings" in 
conform ity  w ith  the  “w ishes, p re ju d ices , or p rom ptings o f th e  powerful".
T his projection  is on th e  co n tra ry  seen  a s  “a d a p te d  to  th e  object", an d  it 
is th u s  p ro n ou n ced  to be a “m e n su ra tio  ad  rem ”. T h is th ing , th e  historical, is
inquiry into the historical past takes up the mode of decipheriiix the “hieroglyph, o f history" and it is not
137
certa in ly  no t a  "fac tum  b ru tu m ”, n o r is It so m eth in g  m erely "p resen t a t  h a n d ”, 
b u t  it u ltim ate ly  h a s  “th e  sam e m ode of b e in g  a s  D ase in ” (T* M: 261). G ad am er 
rightly  a sk s  h is  re a d e r  to pay a tte n tio n  to  th is  last s ta te m e n t, w hich is a rguab ly  
a s  o ften  repeated  a s  it is m isu n d e rsto o d . If we in te rp re  th is  s ta te m e n t a s  
signify ing a "hom ogeneity” betw een  the  know er an d  th e  m o w n  th a t  m akes 
em pa the tic  u n derstand ing  possib le , th e n  h is to rica l h e rm en eu tic s  w ould have to 
sim ply  be a specific b ra n c h  of psychology.
N evertheless H eidegger's position  is righ tly  show n to  h a v -  the  ad v an tage  of 
d isc lo sing  th is  p ecu lia r  s ta te  of affa irs w h ere  the  know er am i the  know n a re  not 
“p re s e n t-a t-h a n d ” in a n  ontic m a n n e r  b u t  they  sh a re  the "m ode o f being o f  
historicity" (T&M: 261).
T h u s , to  s tu d y  h is to ry  inso far a s  we are  "ourselves h isto rical", n ay  b ecau se  "we 
are" h isto rica l, w ould  m ean  th a t  the  “h isto ric ity  of h u m a n  D asein  in  its  
exp ec ta n cy  an d  its  forgetting  is th e  condition" of th e  h u m a n  ability  to  “re ­
p re se n t the  past"  (T&M: 262). H ere we e n c o u n te r  a  specific ap p rop ria tion  of the  
H eideggerian  co ncep tion  of a u th e n tic  h isto ric ity , nam ely  one th a t  p rim arily  
e m p h a s ise s  the  d im en sio n  of belonging to a tradition  a s  a  p re req u is ite  of 
h is to rica l action  a nd  o f  the  h is to rica l sc ien ces.
Im portan t th o u g h  th is  in te rp re ta tio n  m ight be, it still does no t p lace d u e  
e m p h a s is  to the  fact th a t H eidegger explicitly  saw  th e  e n ac tm e n t an d  the  
c o n tin u o u s  re-w riting  of h isto ry  a s  s te m m in g  from th e  co n sc io u s repetition  of 
th e  possib ilities  in h e ren t in th e  h isto rica l ac tion  of a n o th e r  h u m a n  being  w ith 
w hom  th e  h isto rica l ag en t "identifies” a n d  th a t H eidegger provocatively ca lls  a
treated as a mode o f historical experience in its own right (T&M: 240-241).
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heroIS2. T he im plica tions of th is  s ta te m e n t are  sign ifican t, specially if we ru le 
o u t the  possib ility  of th is  concep tion  being  the  resu lt o f  ideological p rejudices 
on  H eidegger's part a s  th e  re a d e r  m ight be inclined to  th in k  in the  first 
in s tan ce .
F irst, th e  h isto rical is in  th is  m a n n e r  em phatically  sh o w n  • o be d ifferent from 
th e  on tic  o r the  ex tan t, a n d  th is  n o t in  te rm s of a b s tra c t foi m s o r system s, b u t 
in  a  ra th e r  concrete, p e rso n a l m an n er.
Secondly , it can  be a rg u ed  th a t  s u c h  a  conception  e n ta i ls  th a t th e  historical is 
prim ord ially  accessib le  th ro u g h  identification .
If th is  in te rp re ta tio n  is co rrec t, th e n  th is  identification  m  < st p recede a  m ore 
“objectified” u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  h isto rica l p a s t an d  its  h en ta g e , le t a lone the  
refined theore tica l e lab o ra tio n s  o f th e  “past" , “trad ition", e tc .
G ad am er p laces m ore im p o rtan ce  on th e  first co n seq u e n c e  d iscu ssed  above, 
a n d  th is  m ay well be d u e  to a n  acknow ledged difference o ’ em ph asis  betw een 
th e  ph ilosophical tra jec to ries  of th e  two th in k ers . G a d a m e r is a d a m a n t th a t  
H eidegger’s in ten tion  in  Being a n d  Tim e w as n e ith e r  to  co n trib u te  to the  
developm ent of “a h is to rica l herm eneu tics"  n o r to ch am p io n  a  p a rtic u la r 
“h is to rica l ideal of ex is ten ce”, a n d  th is  is the  reaso n  th a t  G adam er g u a rd s  
h im self from  draw ing  “o v erh as ty  conclusions" from  H eidegger’s  ex isten tia l 
ana ly tic  o f D asein.
D esp ite  th is  w ord of cau tio n , for G adam er th e  m a in  ad v an cem en t of 
H eidegger's h e rm en eu tic s  of facticity  in relation  w ith H u s s e n ’s phenom enology, 
is th a t  we can n o t env isage a  s ta te  of affairs w here a  “freely ch o sen  relation  
tow ard  o n e 's  own being  can  get b eh in d  th e  facticity of th is  being”.
182 See e g. Heidegger's explicit identification of the "authentic repetition o f a possibility that has been"
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The p h ilo so p h e r feels th u s  ju s tif ie d  to  say  th a t  h e  m oves on firm g ro u n d  by 
following Heidegger's in sig h t th a t  If the  " s tru c tu re  of D asein  is  throw n 
p ro je c tio n ” an d  therefo re  “in rea lis in g  its  being D ase in  is u n d e rs tan d in g " , th e n  
th e  s a m e  m u s t hold tru e  of th e  m ode of u n d e rs ta n d in g  p ecu lia r to th e  h u m a n  
sc ien ces . More explicitly p u t, th e  “ex isten tia l s tru c tu re  o / D asein  m u s t  be 
e x p re sse d  in  the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h is to rica l trad itio n  a s  wel (T&M: 264).
Is it a  m ere coincidence th o u g h  th a t  w ith  th e se  w o id s an d  w ith  the  
a n n o u n c e m e n t th a t h is  "e lem en ts o f a  theory  of h e rm en eu tii experience" would 
be w orked  o u t following Heidegger, G ad am er co n c lu d es  the  • c r tion  of Truth  and  
M ethod  en titled  "overcom ing th e  ep istem ological problem "(lo! cit)?
with Dasein’s ability to “choose its hero” (B&T: 437).
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3.2 The Hermeneutic Functioning of Prejudice & Historical Distancing
This n a tu re  of th e  struggle of th e  E n ig h te n m e n t with 
E rrors, th a t of fighting itself in th e ir .  and  of condem ning 
In them  w hat it Itself asse rts , is explicit f o r  u s, or what 
E nlightenm ent and  its strugg le is  ir. itself. It is the first 
A spect of th is  struggle, however, th< defilement of 
E nlightenm ent th rough  th e  ado p tio  . by its self-identical 
P urity  of a  negative attitud e, th a t  is ,'n  object for faith. 
W hich therefore com es to know  it as alsehood, unreason. 
And a s  ill-intentioned, ju s t  a s  E nlig .v en m en t regards faith 
As erro r an d  prejudice.
(Hegel, 1977: 333).
“S c ie n ce " a s  a  P rejudice...
A "scientific" in terp retation  of th e  wo: Id ...m ight therefore 
Still be one of th e  m ost s tu p id  o f  all possible in terp retations 
Of th e  world, m eaning th a t it w ould  be one of the poorest 
In m eaning.
(Nietzsche, 1974: 334-335)
It h a s  a lready  b een  rem ark ed  th a t  G a d a m e r’s  concep tion  of the  
h e rm en eu tica lly  derived truth  en ta ils  th e  a ttr ib u tio n  o f a n  am biva len t s ta tu s  to 
th e  no tion  o f prejudice. A nyone fam iliar w ith  N ietzsche’s (1974: 335) 
d em olish ing  critique o f “scientific reason" a n d  h is  d efence  ol the  "rich ambiguity" 
in h e re n t in  h u m a n  ex isten ce  w on’t  be ta k e n  ab ack  by  G ad am er’s  a tte m p t to  
derive  positive re su lts  from  th is  s ta te  of affairs. It is  a lso  h a rd ly  su rp ris in g  th a t  
th e  p h ilo sop h er a t te m p ts  to theoretica lly  ju stify  h is  p o sitio n  w ith  recou rse  to 
H eidegger's e la b o ra tio n s  on  the  p rob lem  of fore-hav ing , lore-concep tion  an d  
fo re-sigh t, a s  integral p a r t s  of a s se r tio n  a n d  in te rp re ta tio n  lhrV M ore specifically 
G a d a m e r ta k e s  re c o u rse  to H eidegger’s w orking o f  th e  prob lem  of th e  
‘h e rm e n e u tic  circle' in section  3 2  of th e  first p a r t o f  B eing  a n d  Time, w hich 
ta c k le s  th e  p h en o m en a  o f “u n d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  in te rp re ta tio n " . U ndoubtedly . 
H eidegger's inqu iry  in to  the  n a tu re  of u n d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  in te rp re ta tio n  is in
141
th is  co n tex t perform ed from the  v a n ta g e  po in t o f the  quesi on  co n cern in g  the  
m ean ing  o f being.
It is the refo re  “coloured" by the  th in k e r ’s a tte m p t to  show  ro w  th e  ontological 
q u es tio n  c a n n o t be answ ered  th ro u g h  a  sim ple c o n tra s t  of B ring  w ith  entities  or 
even by a s su m in g  Being a s  a  g ro u n d  su p p o rtin g  tho se  en tities . F u rth e rm o re , 
the  very n o tio n  of a  ground  is s h o w n  to becom e accessib le  “only a s  m eaning, 
even if it is  itse lf th e  ab y ss  of m e an in g le ssn ess"  (B&T: 193-1‘ >4).
U n d ers tan d in g  is therefore s e e n  a s  p e rta in in g  to “th e  vhole b e ing -in -the- 
w orld” d u e  to  its  hav ing  the  sp ec ia l p roperty  of d isc losing  D a-se in ’s  “th e re ” an d  
its  ex istence . T h us, every in te rp re ta tio n  th a t  c a n  c o n tr ib u . • to u n d e rs ta n d in g  
m u s t  beg in  w ith a  p reco n cep tio n  o f th a t  w h ich  h a s  to  be in te rp re ted . T his 
“fac t” h a s  accord ing  to Heidegger a lw ay s  been  rem ark ed , even th o u g h  m ainly in 
“th e  a re a  of derivative w ays o f u n d e rs ta n d in g " , especially  in  th e  field of 
philology. H eidegger fu rth erm o re  su g g e s ts  th a t  s ince  philclogy is trad itiona lly  
regarded  a s  a  specific b ra n c h  of sc ie n c e  it is  a lm o st invariab ly  seen  a s  hav ing  to 
com ply w ith  the  ideal of sc ien tific  resea rch , nam ely  the  pu rifica tion  of the  
p rocess  o f d em o n stra tio n  from u n g ro u n d e d  p resu p p o sitio n s. It follows, th a t  
since u n d e rs ta n d in g  an d  in te rp re ta tio n  n ecessarily  d ep en d  on  fo re-conceptions 
an d  "expectations", no t only ph ilo logy  b u t  even  histo rio log’.cal in te rp re ta tio n s  
have often  been  rep resen ted  a s  defective m odes o f scientific enqu iry .
T his re p re se n ta tio n  Heidegger re m a rk s , is a lso  reinforced  by th e  fu n d am en ta l 
positions o f certa in  ph ilosophical c u r re n ts ,  given th a t  th e  circle in  w h ich  every 
in te rp re ta tiv e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  is e n ta n g le d  is "according  to  toe  m o st e lem en tary  
ru les  of logic”, n o th in g  b u t  “a  circu lus vitiosus" (B&T: 194). 18
181 "Like any interpretation whatever, assertion necessarily has a fore-having, a ft e-sight, and a fore-
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It is tru e , th a t  a lth o u g h  h isto rio logy  is in th is  m a n n e r  exc luded  a  priori from  
w h a t is considered  to be r ig o ro u s  a n d  valid know ledge it is  nev erth e le ss  
"perm itted  to  co m pensate"  for th i s  defect “to  som e e x te n t th ro u g h  th e  spiritual 
signification  o f its  object (B&T: 194).
M oreover, H eidegger righ tly  su g g es ts  th a t  th e  view accord ing  to w hich  
th e  h e rm en eu tic  circle is b u t  a  negative  an d  defective s ta te  oí affa irs, sh o u ld  n o t 
by an y  m e an s  be co n sid ered  th e  exclusive privilege o f the  p h ilo so p h er o r th e  
n a tu ra l  sc ien tis t. To th e  c o n tra iy , it r a th e r  f in d s  its m ore  p e rsu as iv e  
ex p ress io n  in  the  p e rso n  of the  zea lo u s  h is to r ia n  w ho w ould h ap p ily  try  to  s te p  
“o u ts id e ” the  circle in the  ex p ec ta tio n  o f c re a tin g  a  h isroriology equally  
in d e p e n d e n t from  th e  observer's  s ta n d p o in t a s  n a tu ra l  scie ace w as  th o u g h t to  
be p rio r to  th e  ad v an cem en t of q u a n tu m  physics.
It is th is  deep -roo ted  conviction  th a t  sees  th e  h e rm e n e u tic  circle a s  a  v ic ious 
one th a t  H eidegger w ish es to s u b v e r t  by in s is tin g  th a t  th e  d ecis ive  move w ould  
be to  e n te r  th e  circle in th e  c o rrec t m a n n e r  ra th e r  th a n  a ttem p tin g  to  avoid i t * 184. 
How does H eidegger w ish  to  e s ta b lish  th e  positive sign ificance o f the  
h e rm e n e u tic  circle?
Prim arily , by  show ing  th a t the  "circle of the  u n d e rs ta n d in g ” uoes n o t involve the  
p ro d u c tio n  a n d  c ircu la tio n  of a rb i tra ry  form s of know ledge a n d  th a t  the refo re  
far from  being  a  v ic ious circle o r  "even a  circle w h ich  is m erely  to lera ted", it
conception as its existential foundations” (B&T: 199).
184 In a discussion with Eugen Fink and one of the participants in the Hercrlitus Seminar Heidegger 
responds in the following manner to Fink's incitement to “enter” the hermeneutic circle in order to interpret 
the meaning of ra navra in Heraclitus’ fragments: “Wittgenstein says the following. The difficulty in 
which thinking stands compares with a man in a room, from which he want- to get out. At first, he 
attempts to get out through the window, but it is too high for him. Then he attempts to get out through the 
chimney, which is too narrow for him. If he simply turned around, he would see that the door was open all 
along. We ourselves are permanently set in motion and caught in the hermeneut cal circle” (Heidegger & 
Fink. 1993:17).
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c o n ta in s  the positive possib ility  of th e  “m ost p rim o rd ia l d n d  o f knowing", 
a lth o u g h  in a  h id d en  m a n n e r  (B&T: 195).
T h is  move allows H eidegger to show  th a t  th e  h e  in e n e u tic  circle is 
g ro u n d ed  on the  existentia l c o n s titu tio n  o f D asein  an d  thu.-. convincingly  a rgue  
th a t historiology a s  a  specific ex p ressio n  of the  “en tity ” w h ic h  a s  b e ing -in -the- 
world “h a s  itself a  c ircu lar s tru c tu re "  is n o t less rigo rous th a n  m a th em a tic s , b u t 
ra th e r  th a t  m a th em a tic s  is a  n a rro w er m ode of know ing , “b e c a u se  the  
ex isten tia l fo unda tions re levan t for it lie in  a  n arrow er ra n g e ' (B&T: 195).
As rem ark ed  above though , H eidegger do es no t w ish  to  s u b v e r t  th e  ideal of the  
E n lig h ten m en t a n d  m erely su b s t i tu te  fancy an d  m yth  fo r scientific certa in ty . 
T his is  w hy he s tre s se s  th a t  we sh o u ld  g u ard  a g a in s t ou : fo re-having, fore­
sight, a n d  fore-conceptions being  p resen ted  to  u s  in  th e  gu ise  o f "popular 
conceptions" an d  fanciful m y th s a n d  th a t  we sh o u ld  tire le ss ly  re-w ork  these  
fo re -s tru c tu re s  in  te rm s o f th e  th in g s  them selves so a s  to  ■ nake " th e  scientific 
them e secure" (B&T: 195).
In  h is in te rp re ta tio n  of the  p a ssa g e s  d iscu ssed  above G ad am er rightly 
su g g e s ts  th a t the  ontologically positive significance of th e  h e im e n e u tic  circle a s  
e s ta b lish e d  by H eidegger en ta ils  th a t  th e  c o n s ta n t t a s k  of in te rp re ta tio n  is 
explicitly  seen a s  d ic ta ted  by th e  th in g s  them selves, w hile in te rp re ta tio n  an d  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  a re  explicitly fo rm ulated  in  te rm s of projecting. H eidegger is 
th u s  s e e n  a s  describ ing  a n  in terp re tive  p rocess w here every  rev ision  of fore­
p ro jec tions is capab le  of g en era tin g  a n o th e r  p rojection  th e re b y  m a k in g  possib le 
bo th  th e  co-existence of rival p ro jec tions an d  th e  a rriv a l a t  m ore  su itab le  
in te rp re ta tio n s , i.e. in te rp re ta tio n s  th a t  do m ore ju s t ic e  to th e  “u n ity  of 
m ean ing" (T&M: 266-267).
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M ore im p o rtan tly , by fo rm ula ting  the  h e rm en eu tica l >ask in  te rm s  of “a  
question ing  o f  things" Heidegger show ed in  G ad am er’s  view th a t  m ean ings 
"canno t b e  u n d e rs to o d  in  a n  a rb itra ry  way" (T&M: 268-269 ;, T h u s , th e  ta sk  of 
secu rin g  th e  scien tific  them e w ith  reco u rse  to  the  th in g s  th em se lv es  po in ts  u s  
d irectly  to  th e  p rinc ip a l h e rm en eu tic  req u irem en t, viz. th e  sen sitiv ity  of the  way 
in  w hich  o n e ’s  ow n fo re-concep tions interfere  in  th e  a c t of in te rp re ta tio n . It 
follows t h a t  th is  in te rfe ren ce  d is to r ts  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , w h ic h  is  seen  a s  
ideally in fo rm ed  d irec tly  from th e  th in g s  them selves.
At th e  sam e  tim e, th is  o rien ta tio n  to  th e  th in g s  th em se lv es  is seen  a s  a 
d is ta n c in g  from  th e  trad itio na l, irreconcilab le  sp lit betw een  su b je c t a n d  object 
c h a ra c te r is t ic  of m o d ern  ph ilosophy . If D ilthey’s d iscu ss io n  )f th e  h e rm en eu tic  
circle se rv ed  a s  a  m e a n s  of se p a ra tin g  h is  ow n position  from  "the post- 
S c h le ie rm a c h e ria n  scien tific  epoch", th e n  H eidegger's d iscu ss io n  o f  th e  issu e , in 
being  d ire c te d  "tow ard the  s tru c tu re ” o f being-in-the-w orld . :a n  be  in te rp re ted  
a s  c o n c u rre n tly  p o in tin g  to w a rd s  th e  overcom ing of (he "subjec t-ob ject 
b ifu rc a tio n ”, w hich  w a s  anyw ay th e  “m a in  th ru s t"  o f H eidegger’s  an a ly tic  of the  
D asein .
G ad am er d ra w s  a n  analogy  be tw een  H eidegger’s  an a ly sis  o f to o ls  in the  first 
p a r t  of B eing  a n d  T im e  in o rder to  show  how  th e  circu larity  of th e  h e rm en eu tic  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  can  be  a  p roduc tive  ra th e r  th a n  a  lim iting con d ition . In the  
sam e  m a n n e r  in  w h ich  "one w ho  u se s  a  tool does n o t tre a t  t h a t  tool a s  an  
ob ject”, G a d a m e r a s s e r ts .  D ase in ’s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f itse lf "in i ts  Being a n d  in 
i ts  w orld” c a n n o t be  ad eq u a te ly  g rasp ed  it te rm s  of a  co m p o rtm e n t tow ard 
"definite o b je c ts  of know ledge", b u t  h a s  to be seen  a s  "the ca rry in g  o u t of Being- 
in -th e -w o rld  itse lf’ (G adam er, 1989b: 22-23).
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D espite  acknow ledging  th a t H eidegger's Kehre  signified th e  abandonm en t of the  
h erm en eu tic  q u e s tio n  on H eidegger's p a r t, m ainly  d u e  to  h is conviction th a t  the  
h erm en eu tic  th e m e  w ould “never en ab le  him  to  b re a k  o u t of th e  sp he re  of 
tra n sc e n d e n ta l reflection", G ad am er w ish es  to  explore th e  possib le p a th s  th a t 
w ould legitim ate H eidegger's d isc u ss io n  of “th a t Being, w hich is n o t the  Being of 
beings".
Im portan tly , G ad am er u n d e rs ta n d s  h is  own co n tr ib u tio n  a s  co n sis tin g  in th e  
d iscovery th a t  “n c  concep tua l lan gu ag e , no t even w h a t H eidegger called the  
language of m e taph y sic s, re p re se n ts  a n  u n b reak ab le  c o n s tra in t u p o n  th o u g h t if 
only a  th in k e r allow s h im self to  t r u s t  lan gu ag e” (G adam er, 1989b: 23). T h u s  in 
G ad am er's  eyes th e  ta sk  of h e rm e n e u tic  u n d e rs ta n d in g  is  n o t to effect a  rad ical 
b re a k  w ith tra d itio n  a s  th e  E n lig h ten m en t185 w ould  have it, b u t  to exclude 
every th ing  th a t  h in d e rs  o u r  a tte m p t to  ad eq u ate ly  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  e lem en ts  
tra n sm itte d  to  u s  by  trad itio n  (T&M: 269).
F u rth erm o re , th e  recognition  of th e  unavoidab ly  p re jud ic ia l c h a ra c te r  of all 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  c o n s ti tu te s  th e  th r u s t  of the  h e rm en eu tic  p rob lem , w hich 
in sc rib es  h is to ric ism  w ith in  th e  co n cep tu a l fram ew ork  o f the  E n lig h ten m en t 
d esp ite  h is to ric ism ’s  c ritique  of ra tio n a lism  an d  o f n a tu ra l  ph ilo sophy  (see T&M: 
270). O ne of th e  "p re jud ices” h is to ric ism  sh ares  w ith  th e  w nole E n ligh tenm en t 
m ovem ent is acco rd in g  to G ad am er the  w itless concep tion  o f “h isto rica l 
d is ta n c e ” (1998: 126-127) a s  a  h u rd le  th a t  sh o u ld  be s u rp a sse d  if th e  h is to rian  
is to  in te rp re ta tiv e ly  g rasp  th e  past.
185 Thus the principal difference between the movement that culminated in the fin nation of classical Greek 
philosophy and is known under the rubric Greek Enlightenment and the modern European Enlightenment is 
in Gadamer's view their stance towards tradition. Gadamer even thinks that the classical ethics -in  effect 
Aristotle's ethics- are superior to modern moral philosophy since classical ethics “grounds the transition 
from ethics to 'p°'i,lcs', as the art of right legislation, on the indispensability o f ti idition” (T&M: 2 8 1 ).
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T h u s, accord ing  to h is to ric lsm ’s  p rem ises , objectiv ity  w as a tta in a b le  for th e  
G eis te sw issen sh a ften  to th e  e x te n t  to  w hich  th e  h is to rian  w ould  be ab le  to 
tra n sc e n d  th e  "p re sen t” in o rd e r to  e n te r  the  h o rizon  of a  “pa  it” epoch.
It w as fu rth e rm o re  th o u g h t th a t  in  so  doing, th e  h is to rian  w ould  be  ab le  to 
th in k  u s in g  concepts  an d  collective represen ta tions  p e r t in e n t  to th e  ep o ch ’s 
sp irit a n d  the reb y  "objectively” re c re a te  th is  h is to ric a l era.
N evertheless, G ad am er w ishes to  sh o w  th a t  th is  idea l of h is to ric ism  is b a se d  on  
a  concep tion  of h is to rica l tim e in  te rm s  of a  v a c u u m  th a t  h a?  to  be covered  o r of 
a  breach  th a t  is alw ays in n eed  o f being  b ridged . M ore im p o rtan tly , su c h  a  
concep tion  h a s  the  fu r th e r  d isad v an tag e  th a t  it co n cea ls  th e  p roductive  
d im en sio n  of h is to rica l d is ta n c e  a n d  th e  living co n tin u ity  o f th e  m ultip le  
e lem en ts  th a t  becom e p a r ts  of a  tra d itio n , in  th e  lig h t of w h ich  th e  p a s t  is itse lf 
a lw ays m ade available.
T here  is tho u g h  one m o re  sign ifican t d im en sio n  o f th e  beneficial 
co n seq u en ces  o f h isto rica l d is ta n c in g  G ad am er b rin g s  to  th e  fore u s in g  a n  
exam ple  from  th e  sp here  of a r t , n am e ly  th a t  th e  very  a c t o f tree ing  o n ese lf from  
th e  p re ju d ices  of th e  p re se n t is p rem ised  on th e  h u m a n  ab ility  to  ecsta tica lly  
d is ta n c e  oneself from  the  p re se n t. T h us, th e  w ork  of m o d e m  a r t  c a n n o t be 
really  ju d g e d  aesth e tica lly  solely  form  th e  p ersp ec tiv e  o f th e  p re se n t a n d  th e  
p re ju d ices  th a t  in  G ad am er's  view  conceal its  a u th e n tic  o r in a u th e n tic  qua litie s, 
b u t  h a s  ra th e r  to  be looked from  th e  w ider p ersp ec tiv e  of th e  w hole h is to ry  of 
art.
T rad ition  in  th is  case  fu n c tio n s  a s  th e  in d isp e n sa b le  e lem en t th a t  effaces 
-ev en  if m om entarily - the  re la tio n s  o f th e  p re se n t, an d  w h ich  m a k e s  therefo re  
possib le  the  tra n s itio n  to th e  u n iv e rsa l (see G ad am er, 1998: 127). In th is
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m a n n e r  tem porality  reveals itse lf a s  the  p recond ition  of u n i ; ;rsa lity  a n d  a s  the  
cond ition  providing u s  w ith  th e  criterion  of d em a rca tin g  bel .veen confining an d  
p roductive  prejudices, o r a s  G adam er inventively p u ts  it oetw een  p re jud ices 
en lig h ten in g  a n d  p rejudices b lind ing  u s . It is  th is  th u s  historical d istancing  th a t  
m a k e s  possib le  the d is tin c tio n  betw een t r u e  and  false p re ju d ices  thereby  
g ro u nd in g  the  critical func tion ing  of h e rm e n e u tic  ph ilosophy (G adam er, 1998: 
128).
It is fu rtherm ore  exactly  th is  h is to rica l d is tan c in g  th a t  inform s 
G ad am er's  ow n reflections on the  d isc red iting  of p re ju d ice  by the  
E n lig h ten m en t, w hich he fo regrounds by a  b r ie f  exposition  of th e  h isto ry  of the  
co n cep t of p rejudice.
P rejud ice a s  a  ju rid ica l exp ression  m e an s  in  G erm an  a “prov isional legal 
verdict", w hile the  F rench  préjudice  an d  th e  Latin praejud icium  m ay  m ean  
“d isad v an tag e”, “harm ", "adverse effect”, b u t  th e se  negative sign ifica tions a re  for 
G ad am er derivative of the  positive validity  a ttr ib u te d  to  the  “value o f the  
prov isional decision  a s  a  p re judgem en t, like th a t  of any  p receden t"  (T&M: 270). 
G ad am er som ew hat u n su rp ris in g ly  links th e  m odem  concep tion  of p rejudice 
w ith  one of th e  g reat fo re ru n n e rs  of the  E n lig h ten m en t, O escartes, an d  h is  
m ak in g  doub t th e  pivotal m ethodological p rinc ip le  for b e lli ph ilo sophy  an d  
science.
F u rth e rm o re  if sub jected  to  closer s c ru tin y  th e  E n lig h ten m en t doc trine  of 
p re jud ice  is sa id  to d isclose a  d istinc tion  betw een  p re jud ice  re su ltin g  from  
h u m a n  au th o rity  and  p re jud ice  resu lting  from  overhastiness.
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A pparently , th is  d is tin c tio n  co n ce rn s  th e  origin of p re ju d ice , w hich  is tra c e d  
respectively e ith e r  o u ts id e  o n ese lf in  p e rso n s  o r in s t i tu t io n s  endow ed w ith  
au th o rity  o r in  oneself.
Sapere aude. K an t's  fo rm ulation  of th e  “m axim " in form ing  the  ac tio n s  of th e  
“en lig h ten ed ” co n sc io u sn ess  is seen  by G ad am er a s  b e ing  p rim arily  - th o u g h  n o t 
exclusively- d irec ted  ag a in s t th e  d im ension  of p re ju d ice  m a t is linked  w ith  
alien, in s titu tio n a l authority  (T&M: 271).
D espite the  fact th a t  no t all v e rs ion s o f th e  E u ro p e an  E n lig h ten m en t c a n  be 
sa id  to  p rom ulgate  w h a t a re  for G ad am er th e  "extrem es" ol "free th in k in g ” a n d  
“atheism " a s  in  "E ngland  o r France", th e  E n lig h te n m e n t prejudice a g a in st  
prejudice  is rightly  seen  a s  p rim arily  d irec ted  a g a in s t th e  a n  h o rity  of the  Bible 
an d  of sch o lastic  ph ilosophy. Even in  th e  case  of th e  R eform ation  m ovem ent 
an d  th e  theology it p ro d uced  an d  w here th e  Bible w as still seen  a s  th e  
canon ical tex t p a r  excellence, it cou ld  be sa id  th a t  it c h a m p io n s  a  p u rif ica tio n  of 
the  tex ts  from  dogm atic  in te rp re ta tio n s , an d  th u s  it d e m a n d s  "to u n d e rs ta n d  
trad itio n  correctly- i.e. ra tiona lly  an d  w ith o u t p re ju d ice”. T h is  m ove en ta ils  the  
tre a tm e n t of th e  Bible like every o th e r  tex t a s  a  h is to r ic a l d o c u m e n t th e  
tru th fu ln e ss  o r falsity  of w h ich  c a n  be  a s se r te d  only  w ith  reco u rse  to  ra tio n a l 
p rinc ip les an d  it therefo re  e s ta b lish e s  th e  acc ep tan ce  o f th e  au th o rity  of re a so n  
over th a t  of tra d itio n  (T&M: 272). N evertheless the  m o s t im p o rta n t ou tco m e of 
G adam er's  in tr ica te  an d  de ta iled  e lab o ra tio n s  on  th e  is su e  c o n ce rn s  h is  
persuasive  a rg u m e n t th a t R om anticism  sh a re d  the  fu n d a m e n ta l p rem ises  o f th e  
E n ligh tenm ent, th e  va lues of w h ich  it sim ply  a tte m p te d  to  reverse.
G adam er tra c e s  the  affinity  betw een  th e  rival p h ilo sop h ica l m ovem en ts 
especially  in  R om an tic ism 's ad o p tin g  -ev en  if in a  negative  m a n n e r- th e  view of
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u n iv e rsa l h isto ry  in  te rm s of a  p rogressive su p e rse ss io n  of -iyth by reaso n . As 
a lre a d y  h in ted  in  re la tion  to  th e  concep t of d isen ch an tm e n t o nd  irrespectively  of 
the  positive o r negative ev a lu a tio n  a ttr ib u te d  to it, th is  s .h e m a  a c q u ire s  its 
va lid ity  by conform ing to w h a t p re se n ts  itse lf a s  th e  self-eviuent p resu p po sitio n  
of th e  "progressive re trea t of m agic  in the  world".
W ith in  the  b o u n d a rie s  of th e  R om antic  m ovem ent the  accep I an c e  of th is  w orld- 
h is to rica l sch em a  acq u ires  th e  gu ise  of a  longing for the res to ra tio n  o f the  
m y th ica l, a  nosta lg ia  for the  bygone sim ply for th e  sake  c ' i ts  being an c ien t, 
w h ich  neverthe less reinforces th e  a b s tra c t c o n tra s t betw een m yth  a n d  reaso n  
(T&M: 273). G ad am er righ tly  claim s th a t  th e  imager;, o f a  m y sterio us, 
d a rk e n e d , collective m yth ical co n sc io u sn ess  th a t  allegedly preceded  the 
em erg en ce  o r ligh tning  of th o u g h t is equally  a b s tra c t an d  dogm atic  a s  th e  very 
co n cep tio n  o f a  s ta te  of perfect en lig h ten m en t o r of ab so lu te  know ledge.
T h u s , w hat c a n  be term ed  "m yth ical consc iousness" is for the  th in k e r  “still 
know ledge" while if th is  c o n sc io u sn ess  “know s ab o u t divine powers" th e n  we 
cou ld  confer th a t  it h a s  a lread y  d ifferen tia ted  itse lf from  m ere “trem bling” before 
pow er. M ythical co n sc io u sn e ss  th u s  c a n  be sa id  to  nave som e s o r t  of 
know ledge "abou t i ts e lf ,  w hile in  th is  know ledge of itse lf "it is no longer sim ply  
o u ts id e  i ts e l f  (T&M: 274).
It sh ou ld  no t escape o u r  a tten tio n  th a t  a t  th is  point G ad am er feels the  
n eed  to  define h is  own p o sition  w ith  reference to  Adorno a n d  H orkheim er's  
a rg u m e n t concern ing  a n  inev itab le  re lapse  to the  m ythical c h a ra c te r is tic  of 
in s tru m e n ta l a n d  su pp o sed ly  en ligh tened  reaso n  in  th e ir  Dialectic o f  
E nligh tenm ent. It is qu ite  in te re s tin g  to  n o te  th a t a lthough  G ad am er s ta te s  he
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Is in ag reem en t w ith  the  m a in  th r u s t  of th e ir  an a ly sis  he  stii! m a k e s  som e room  
for d isag reem en t.
G a d a m e r’s ob jection  co n cern s the  ap p lica tio n  of sor-ological ca tegories, 
su c h  a s  th e  category  of th e  “bourgeois to  O dysseus", w hich  th e  p h ilo so p h er 
reg a rd s  a s  “a  fa ilu re  of h is to rica l reflection, if n o t, indeed  a  con fusion  of H om er 
w ith  J o h a n  H ein rich  V oss [au th o r of th e  s ta n d a rd  G erm an  tra n s la tio n  o f 
Homer], w ho h ad  a lready  been  criticized by G oethe”' 86 274, n . 198).
G ad am er is  a lso  q u ick  to  identify  th e  w ays tn  w hich  th is  sc h em a h a s  in form ed  
v ario u s  socia l a n d  political ph ilosoph ies, a s  in  th e  case  o f M.rrx w here  a  “k in d  o f 
relic of n a tu r a l  law" is sa id  to lim it “the  valid ity  of h is  socio- econom ic theory  o f 
c lass-strugg le", o r in the  ca se  of R o u sseau ’s p o s tu la tio n  of socie ty  w here th e  
d ivision of la b o u r an d  p riva te  p roperty  have n o t yet b een  in tro d u ced .
18,1 Arguably, the schema of the abstract antithesis between myth and reason is s i deeply rooted in modern 
consciousness that it is not completely shaken off even in the case of critic..1 accounts that explicitly 
attempted to ascend beyond the confines of the Enlightenment and of Rom. nticism. In addition to 
Gadamer’s point it can be thus said of the Dialectic o f Enlightenment that despite its demolishing critical 
power against both the process o f the Enlightenment and the "re-enchantment ’ it inevitably creates, this 
collection of articles is still characterised by an antithesis between myth and reason and by an extreme 
enmity towards both the mythical and the instrumental dimension of reason. I'ertainly in this case, the 
schema discussed above is given a new twist and myth is seen from the outset rs contaminated by reason 
and vice versa, or as the authors boldly put it “myth is already enlightenment: and enlightenment reverts to 
mythology" (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1986: xvi). It has already been mentioned above that Odysseus, the 
central figure of Homer's epic, "one of the earlier testimonies o f Western Bourge.vs civilization” according 
to the authors (Loc. Cit). is also seen as the prototype of the modern bourgeoi. . It would not be a mere 
exaggeration if in addition to Gadamer’s remarks regarding the inappropriate u..■  of modern sociological 
categories it was noted that Adorno and Horkheimer’s reading exemplifies yet another anachronism in that 
in effect it traces in the Homeric narrative a quite modern -if not the specifically Hegelian- concept o f  
cunning. This argument rests mainly on the tacit assumption that cunning is to be interpreted even in the 
Odyssey as “defiance in a rational form” (Ibid: 59). Furthermore. Odysseu ' introducing himself to 
Polephemus using the name “nobody" is interpreted as trickery performed b\ the sovereign "subject" 
against the “savage" who is not yet constituted as a self, and ultimately as a disposition towards the 
manipulation o f nature It is true, that this argument is sustained by a quite interesting linguistic 
observation regarding the similar sound -and the possible common root- between Odysseus and udeis 
(ouSetq), the Greek word for nobody (Ibid: 67-68), and it is a shame that the mthors did not attempt a 
similar semantic interpretation also in the case of Polyphemus, whose name 's a quite straightforward 
combination of the words rtoXu ("many”) and tpqpf (believe, make known, n uke manifest, etc). It is 
equally true though that the schema in question is reproduced -even if in a m re refined manner- in the 
guise of an antithesis between pseudo-clarity, pseudo-individuation and myth o- the one hand and reason 
proper on the other hand. This tension arguably characterises even later de dopments within critical 
theory, and is especially traceable in Habermas' ideal of “rational”, “undistorted . immun ¡cation”.
151
C ertain ly , th e  postu la tio n  o f a n  in c o rru p t "sta te  o f n a tu re"  >s ch a rac te r is tic  of 
b o th  M arx a n d  E ngels’ m e d ita tio n s  on h is to ry 187 a n d  it a rg u ab ly  becom es even 
m ore rigid in  Engels' ow n “scientific" - a n d  oddly en o u gh - an thropologically  
inform ed exposition  of c a p ita lism  as  th e  p ro d u c t of a  long h isto rica l p rocess  of 
progressive div isions of la b o u r 188 an d  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f d ie  legal a p p a ra tu s  
conso lida ting  an d  leg itim ising  th e  respective re la tio n s of p roduc tion .
E nge ls’ acc o u n t in T h e  Origin o f  the Family, Private Property, a n d  the  
Sta te , p u b lish e d  after M arx 's  d e a th  h a s  often  b een  seen  a s  a tran sg ress io n  from 
th e  can o n  of M arx’s th o u g h t, a ltho u g h  it ironically  p layeu  som e role in the  
sh ap in g  of w h a t w as la te r  conceived to  be M arxist "orthodoxy”. The d istinctive 
quality  of th is  accoun t, w h ic h  is of in te re s t for the  p re se n t w ork - a  quality  
fu rth e rm o re  ch a rac te r is in g  som e of M arx’s  own w orks -s e e  e g. h is  p o s th u m o u s  
Pre-capitalist Formations- is  th a t  it p rov ides M arxism  w ith  a n  un likely  bridge 
w ith  R om anticism , by s h a r in g  w ith th is  c u rre n t of th o u g h t the  distinctively  
R om antic  m otif of “in n o c e n c e ”, “p ro jec ted” now  to th e  s ta te  of being  of 
“prim itive” peoples.
It h a s  to be re m a rk e d  th a t  I a m  n e ith e r  co n cern ed  .vith the  valid ity  of 
M arx a n d  E ngels’ co n cep tio n  of u n iv ersa l h isto ry , a n d  certa in ly  n o r  w ith  a
187 There is though in Marx and Engels (1970: 57) also a recognition of tradition as a constituent element of 
history, albeit one that is misinterpreted by Hegel’s speculative philosophy. History is thus seen as “a 
succession o f the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the 
productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand continues the 
traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances 
with a completely changed activity. This can be speculatively distorted so that later history is made the 
goal of earlier history”.
1,8 The division of labour is seen by Marx and Engels (1970: 51-52) as originating in a "natural” manner in 
sexual activity, while it is seen as attaining maturity in the division between mat,- ial and mental labour on 
which all the allegedly ideological constructions are based. Interestingly, the development of religion and 
the emergence of priesthood are seen as the first expression of false conscious11  ss, since they signify the 
capacity of consciousness to “emancipate itself from the world and to proceed 1 > the formation of ’pure’ 
theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc”. It goes without saying that this emancipation is for Marx and
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sy stem a tic  exposition  of th e ir q u ite  com plex a c c o u n t of s o c .d  change. My sole 
in ten tio n  is ra th e r  by  expand ing  o n  G ad am er's  m e d ita tio n s  on th e  issu e , to 
show  how  th e ir  a c c o u n t is inform ed by th e  cen tra! im agery  of the  
en lig h ten m en t. F u rth e rm o re , th e  a n tith e s is  betw een  m yth  :nd  re a so n  far from 
being  e x h a u s te d  in a  "realist" re p re se n ta tio n  of h isto ry , acq u ire s  a  sym bolic 
c h a ra c te r  traceab le  in  L ukács’ a s su m p tio n  th a t  “M arx a n d  E ngels ga ined  a 
v an ta g e  p o in t from w hich  they  could  se ttle  a c c o u n ts  w ith all m ythologies". 
L u kács (1971: 18) refe rs in  th is  co n tex t to  "concep tua l m ythologies" th a t  in  h is  
op in ion  p o in t alw ays to  the  “failure to  u n d e rs ta n d  a  fu n d am en ta l cond ition  of 
h u m a n  ex istence" w hile in  a  typically  M arx ist fa sh io n  he sees  Hegel's absolu te  
spirit a s  b e ing  “the  la s t  of th e se  g ran d io se  m ythologies".
Indeed  L ukács ' fo rm u la tion s a re  of specific in te re s t  in th a t  he  is still qu ite  
convinced  a b o u t th e  en ligh ten ing  pow ers of h is to rica l c r i 'ic ism '89, w hile h is  
e lab o ra tio n s  on  c la ss -c o n sc io u sn e ss  a re  p e rm ea ted  by the  belie f in  the  
possib ility  o f th e  a tta in m e n t of a  s ta te  o f com plete clarity . T h is belief is p e rh a p s  
b es t exem plified in h is  polem ics a g a in s t  th e  h is to rica l school a n d  especially  
a g a in s t R ank e 's  d ic tu m  th a t  “every age is equally c lo se  to God", w hich  L ukács 
t re a ts  a s  u ltim ate ly  being  an tith e tic a l to  th e  p ro cess  of "h isto rical developm ent" 
(Ibid: 48).
T he ten sio n  betw een  m yth  a n d  re a so n  p o stu la te d  by the E n lig h ten m en t 
a c q u ire s  in  L ukács' th o u g h t th e  form  o f a n  im p a sse  betw een  m yth  viewed a s  *
Engels both false and contradictory with regard to the "reality" o f “social relations”, because “existing 
social relations have come into contradiction with existing forces of production" ' Ibid: 52). 
lm The following passage is quite revealing in this respect: "This [i.e. Marx’s] critical philosophy implies 
above all historical criticism. It dissolves the rigid, unhistorical. natural appearam e of social institutions; it 
reveals their historical origins and shows therefore that they are subject to history ¡n every respect including 
historical decline" (Lukács, 1971: 47).
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deception  o r even se lf-d ece it '90 a n d  th e  p o ten tia lity  for th ; a tta in m e n t of an  
en ligh tened , collective co n sc io u sn ess . T his s c h e m a  Is best exem plified In th e  
c o n tra s t  d raw n  betw een  the  “trag ic  d ia lectics o f the  bourgeoisie", l.e. of th e  
bourgeo isie 's  Inability  to  h in d e r  its  se lf-d es tru c tio n  d ic ta ted  by th e  very 
n ecess ity  of th e  w orld h is to rica l p rocess  by w ay o f th e  sem i- r o n sc io u s  p u rsu in g  
o f its  in te re s ts 190 91, a n d  the  p ro le ta r ia t’s h is to rica l ta s k  to "transform  society  
consciously"  (Ibid: 65 , 71). T he ideological d is to r tio n s  o f an y  c la ss-b o u n d  
c o n sc io u sn ess  an d  especially  of th e  bourgeoisie  a re  fu r th e m o re  exp lica ted  in  a 
twofold m a n n e r , b o th  w ith  reco u rse  to  the  im p a sse  betw een  the  in te re s ts  of th e  
bourgeoisie  a n d  tho se  o f society  a s  a  whole a n d  to th e  im possib ility  to  rea lise  
th e  "insoluble c o n tra d ic tio n s” th a t  th e  bourgeoisie  sh o u ld  accord ing  to  theory  
develop “a t  th e  very zen ith  of i ts  pow ers” (Ibid: 61).
O n the  one h a n d , th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f th e  concept o f a  c la ss -b o u n d  
co n sc io u sn e ss  in tro d u c e s  a  s tro n g  e lem ent o f  a b so lu te  h isto ric ity , w h ich  is 
fu rth e rm o re  reinforced  by th e  invocation  of “a  c lass-co n d itio n ed  
unconsciousness"  of o n e’s ow n "socio-historical a n d  econom ic c o n d itio n ”. T h is 
is  a t  the  sam e tim e a  cha lleng ing  a n d  a  co n fin in g 192 -  especially  if c o n tra s te d  to
190 It is important to note that this self-deception is partly attributed to the ethical dilemmas the bourgeois 
face in pursuing their economic goals and which is seen as indispensable to the bourgeoisie. It follows that 
the false consciousness of the bourgeoisie is understood as the result of the need to “suppress their own 
moral feelings in order to be able to support with a good conscience an economic system that serves only 
their own interests”. Moreover, the “ideological history of the bourgeoisie” is defined as “nothing but a 
desperate resistance to every insight into the true nature o f the society it had t rented and thus to a real 
understanding of its class situation" (Lukács, 1971: 66).
191 Thus, although capitalism is seen as "revolutionary par excellence" a limitation is postulated regarding 
the “objectivity” of the class consciousness it generates and therefore the “fa d  that it must necessarily 
remain in ignorance o f the objective economic limitations o f its own system expresses itself as an internal, 
dialectical contradiction in its class consciousness”. The class-consciousness of the bourgeoisie is 
therefore said to be formally “geared to economic consciousness” and the product of the “irreconcilable 
antagonism between ideology and economic base”, or between “the stereotyped individual o f capitalism, 
and the ‘natural’ and inevitable process of development, i.e. the process not subject to consciousness 
(LukScs, 1971: 64).
192 This conception is arguably a one-dimensional, negative representation of the unconscious as the 
product of deceit or of lack of clarity, which furthermore seems to suggest that a complete elimination, or
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C asto riad is ' fo rm ula tion  on  the  issu e -  concep tion  of the  un onscious. s in ce  the  
la t te r  is theorised  a s  "a defin ite s tru c tu ra l  re la tio n ” an d  is the refo re  deprived of 
an y  d im ension  o f ind e te rm inacy  (Ibid: 52). In c o n so n an ce  w ith  M arx a n d  
E n g e ls193, L u kács (Ibid: 80) re g a rd s  the  fo rm ation  of th e  p ro le ta r ia t 's  c lass- 
c o n sc io u sn ess  a s  a  ta s k  to  be perform ed in  s ta g e s  along  ihe  unfo ld ing  of an  
"external" s trugg le  a g a in s t  the  bourgeoisie  a n d  a n  "in ternal one ag a in s t itself, 
viz. ag a in st th e  “d ev as ta tin g  an d  d eg rad ing  effects of th e  c a p ita lis t sy stem  u p o n  
its  c la ss  con sc io u sn ess" .
T h us, th e  p rob lem atic  s ta tu s  of th e  very  possib ility  ol a tra n sc e n d e n c e  of 
th e  socio -h isto rical co n tin g en cies  th a t  a re  in  theory  inex ltlcab ly  linked  w ith  
c la ss -m em b ersh ip  a re  ag a in  resolved w ith  recou rse  to  M arx an d  E ngels' 
ce leb ra ted  defin ition  of th e  p ro le ta r ia t a s  b e ing  a t  the  sam e tim e a  c lass  a n d  the  
cance lla tion  o f c lass . It is in th is  sen se  th e n  th a t  L ukács is able to in s is t  -  
a rg u ab ly  a g a in s t  th e  g ra in  of th e  m ain  th r u s t  of h is  in te rp re ta tio n  o f c lass- 
c o n sc io u sn ess  - th a t “the  p ro le ta r ia t is to be d is tin g u ish e d  from  o th e r  c la sse s  by 
th e  fact th a t  it goes beyond  the  con tin g en cies  o f h is to ry"194.
more precisely a complete transformation o f the unconscious is possible. Altltough the shortcomings of 
such a conception might well be attributed to the Marxist ideal of absolute transparency, one cannot but 
point to the fact that within the Marxist tradition Castoriadis' conception o f the unconscious presents itself 
as distinctively superior in attributing creative powers to the unconscious and in arguing as a consequence 
that the elimination of the unconscious as unthinkable.
19 Thus Marx and Engels (1970: 51) understand the phenomenon of consciousness as being a “social 
product” from the “beginning” o f history, while they emphatically argue that it “remains so as long as men 
exist at all". It is important to note that consciousness is seen as gradually developing, from a first stage 
where it is a concurrent, though immediate consciousness o f nature and other human beings. This stage is 
furthermore imagined as animalistic as indicated by the term “herd consciousness” attributed to it, while 
the authors (loc. Cit) maintain that at this point “man is only distinguished from dieep by the fact that with 
him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that the instinct is a conscious one- .
194 It is well known- although hardly feasible- that Lukács (1971: 70-71) treats the “relationship between 
class consciousness and class situation" as being “very simple" recognising at the same time grave 
difficulties only in regard o f the proletariat's practical struggle to “realise this consciousness". It is also of 
great importance to note that since revolutionary classes in earlier societies are seen as having acted mainly 
unconsciously i.e. without any understanding concerning the alleged “discrepancy between their own class 
consciousness and the objective economic set-up”, the enactment o f historical change on their part is seen 
as subjectively easier compared to the proletariat’s historical mission to consciously transform society.
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More im p o rtan tly , it seem s feasib le to  su gg est th a t  n  L u kács’ ca se  the  
fully developed c la ss -co n sc io u sn e ss  of th e  p ro le ta r ia t is th o u g h t a s  th e  apex  of 
the  en lig h ten ed  co n sc io u sn ess. T h is c a n  be derived from  ..ukács' a t te m p t to 
show  how  th e  p ro le ta ria t is th e  po ten tially  conscious a u th c  of soc io -h is to rica l 
change  an d  it is arguab ly  reinforced  by  h is  view th a t  th f so -ca lled  “vulgar 
M arxists" by d isrega rd in g  th is  “cen tra l p o in t of view” in  ’ heir a d o p tio n  of a  
“pe tty  Realpolitik" allegedly "place them se lves  on the  level o f  co n sc io u sn ess  o f  
the bourgeoisie" (Ibid: 68). G ad am er’s elusive reference  to  L u kács’ e la b o ra tio n s  
o n  c la ss -co n sc io u sn e ss  (see T&M: 274, n .200) m a k e s  it in 'o o ssib le  to  d isce rn  
h is  ow n, system atica lly  exposed  in te rp re ta tio n  of L ukács.
In an y  case , w ith  regard  to th e  w ider problem atique  o f M arxism , G a d a m e r is no t 
only ab le  to identify  a n  un likely  convergence betw een  the  “rev o lu tio n a ry ”195 an d  
th e  “conserva tive”, b u t  he a lso  rem in d s h is  re a d e rs  th a t  th e  “illusory  n a tu r e ” of 
the  p o s tu la tio n  of a n  inco rru p tib le  a n d  allegedly “n a tu ra l"  s ta te  o f affa irs is 
b rillian tly  d em o n s tra ted  by P lato  a lm o st two m illenn ia  before th e  ad v en t of 
m odern ity  “in  h is  ironic ac c o u n t of a  s ta te  o f n a tu re  in th e  th ird  b o o k  of th e  
Republic (T&M: 274-275).
Importantly, this added difficulty is seen -in  a quite convenient manner regarding the orientation of 
political struggle- as resulting to the necessary development of “a dialectical .ontradiction between its 
immediate interests and its long-term objectives, and between the discrete factor- and the whole”. In any 
case though, it has to be remarked that this conception of a break with wl at could be termed the 
“unconscious mechanics" of history attributed to the proletariat does not entail that it is conceived as 
entirely free from socio-historical determination and consequently the proletariat “as the product of 
capitalism" is seen as "necessarily" being "subject to the modes of existence o f its creator”, namely to 
“inhumanity and reification” (Ibid: 76).
1,5 I deliberately use here the terms employed in the Communist Manifesto to characterise the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie respectively: “Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the 
proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of 
the modern industry.. .The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper.. .are therefore not 
revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of 
history" (Marx & Engels, 1098: 10).
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T u rn ing  h is  gaze to  th e  R om antic m ovem ent, G adarr e r  is m oreover able 
to  identity  a n o th e r  m ajo r co n tr ib u tio n  of th is  ph ilo soph ica l trad itio n  in  its 
hav ing  given b ir th  to a specific m ode o f historiology, nam e iv to the  “h isto rica l 
school".
T his o b se rv a tio n  really b rin g s  u s  to  th e  c ru x  of th e  m a tte r, s in ce  by 
c o n stru c tin g  g enealog ies a n d  paying heed  to  paradox ical a llian ces  th e  th in k e r 
w ishes to m ake  th e m a tic  th a t  w hich cou ld  be called  the  p rob lem  of sovereignty, 
ru p tu re , he tero n om y , an d  p reserv a tion . T he s in g u la r ten se  is  delibera te ly  u sed  
above, since in  G a d a m e r 's  view the  “ind iv idual" in s ta n c e s  o f the  prob lem  form  a 
w ider, in te rc o n n ec ted  w hole, w hich cou ld  u ltim ate ly  be a d d re sse d  from  the 
perspective of th e  a n tith e s is  betw een  tra d itio n  a n d  reaso n  a s  e lab o ra ted  above. 
Two th in g s  a re  q u ite  im p o rta n t in reg ard  of G ad am er's  o b se rv a tio n s  o n  the  
prob lem  of a u th o rity .
F irst, if a u th o r i ty  is in the  co n tex t of th e  E n lig h ten m en t s e e n  a s  syno n y m o u s 
w ith  the  a lm o s t d ic ta to ria l, coercive, o p era tio n  of tia d itio n a l political 
in s titu tio n s  it th e n  follows th a t  trad itio n  is p rim arily  conceived a s  deprived  of, 
o r  even a n tith e tic a l  from , reaso n . It goes w ith o u t say in g  th a t  from  th is  
perspective R o m an tic ism ’s defence o f trad itio n  did  n o t really su cceed  in 
d isen tang ling  th e  notion  o f trad itio n  from  th a t  of b lind  au th o rity .
T he second  o b se rv a tio n  co n cern s  th e  p o stu la tio n  o f th e  E n ligh tenm en t 
accord ing  to  w h ic h  ind iv idual an d  collective m a tu rity  a re  conceivable in  te rm s 
of a  com plete r u p tu r e  w ith, a n d  libera tion  from , trad ition .
At th a t  po in t it  is  im p o rtan t to  observe th a t  th is  iden tifica tion  of m o d ern ity  w ith 
"reason" an d  h is to rica l " ru p tu re "  a n d  th e  re s u lta n t  iden tifica tion  o f trad itio n  
w ith  "repetition", “su p e rs ti t io n ”, an d  “coercion" is n o t th e  exclusive "privilege" of
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po litica l-ph ilosoph ica l a c c o u n ts , n o r is M arxism  its  only h e ir  a n d  in te rp re te r . 
A lthough  it  is beyond  th e  scope of th is  th e s is  to fully a s se ss  the  im p a c t th a t  the  
a n tith e s is  betw een  re a so n  a n d  tra d itio n  h ad  in  th e  w hole range o f th e  social 
sc iences, it  sh ou ld  be n o ted  in  b rie f th a t  it h a s  p e rm eated  s biological acc o u n ts  
in  th e  m o s t u n ex pec ted  w ays.
A specific in s ta n c e  of th is  in d irec t influence can  be a rg u ab ly  traced  in 
W eber's developm ent o f the  id e a l-ty p es196 of social ac tion , w h ich  d esp ite  its  
m erits  m oves exactly  w ith in  th e  sp e c tru m  defined by th e  lim it-ca ses  o f "reaso n ” 
an d  “custom ".
Indeed, W eber (1978: 28) defines socia l ac tion  a s  ratior.ul in  th e  sen se  of 
exem plifying th e  em ploym en t of “appropriate m eans to a  g iven  en d  
['zw eekra tiona t)"  a s  a n  in s ta n c e  w here th e  "agent” m ay us< o n e 's  ex p ecta tio n s 
c o n ce rn in g  the  “b eh av io u r o f ex te rn a l ob jects a n d  o thei h u m a n  beings a s  
‘c o n d itio n s’ o r 'm e a n s ' to  achieve" o n e 's  ow n “rationally  p u rs u e d  a n d  calcu la ted  
p u rp o se s”.
At th e  s a m e  tim e he se e s  traditional b eh av io u r a s  th e  "exp ression  o f a  se ttled  
custom ", w hile in  a n  even  c lea re r fo rm u la tion  of th is  d is tin c tio n  h e  m a in ta in s  
th a t  rational ac tion  is “neither  affectively d e te rm in ed ...nor  tra d itio n a l” (Weber, 
1978: 29).
It is well know n th a t  W eber w as -und eserv ed ly  in m y opin ion- c ritic ised  for th is  
defin ition  o f ra tion a l ac tion , a n d  th is  is a  “critical" p a th  I ce rta in ly  do  n o t in ten d  
to  follow. I th in k  th a t  th e  real challenge is no t to  acc u se  W eber for devising h is
l% Although it is not my intention to assess here the validity of the criticisms taised by Gadamer against 
Weber’s championing of the notion of "value-free inquiry”, it has to be observed that one o f the problems 
Gadamer (T&M: 561) identifies, namely “the blind decisionism concerning ultimate ends that Max Weber 
propagated" is not only "unsatisfactory” with regard to the scope and aims of :ne social sciences, but it 
actually “prejudices” -  in the hermeneutic sense- the whole construction of the id :nl-types o f social action.
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Ideal types from  the  perspective o f  a n  instrum enta l u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
rationality197, b u t ra th e r  to ex trica te  a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f trad itio n  im plied 
therein .
T hus, b eh av io u r w hich  is trad itio na l “in  the  stron g  sense" lies for W eber “like 
purely reactive im ita tion ...o ften  beyond  th e  b o u n d a ry  m a rk in g  of th e  a re a  th a t 
can  in genera l be called 'm eaningfu l' ac tion", since it is  o ften  "sim ply a  dull 
reac tion  to acc u s to m ed  stim uli", a l th o u g h  the  ag en t’s  “co n sc io u s  a w a re n e ss  of 
the  re la tion  to  cu s to m  m ay vary b o th  in  deg ree  an d  m eaning"! 1978: 28).
The m a in  im plica tion  th a t  co u ld  be d raw n  form  th is  p re se n ta tio n  of 
trad itio na l ac tio n  does no t really c o n c e rn  social ac tion , b u t  i . ra th e r  d isc lo ses  a 
conception  of trad itio n  a s  a  fu n d a m e n ta lly  unreflective. a lm o s t m ech an ica l s ta te  
of affairs. A rguably , th e  fact th a t W eber is  in th is  co n tex t s  m ply occup ied  w ith 
devising th e  ideal types of social action  u n d e r  cond itions o f m odern ity  an d  th a t 
he co n seq uen tly  is fully aw are of th e  trad itio na l, affective, o r even  irra tio n a l 19
191 Habermas (1984: 280 If) seems to raise this kind of objection, especially in his discussion of the 
“official typology of action" based on Schluchter’s interpretation o f Weber's types o f social action. 
Habermas maintains that Weber “chooses purposive-rational action as the reference point of his typology”, 
while "purposive activity” is defined as the “rationality of means and ends” and is seen as obstructing 
Weber from considering "different kinds of reflexive relations o f action orientations and thus also 
additional aspects under which actions can be rationalised" (Ibid: 280-281). Habermas (Loc. Cit) is 
nevertheless quite right in arguing that because of Weber's attempt to clarify different aspects or degrees of 
rationality, ''traditional action follows as a residual category that is not furthei ieterinined". The main 
implication of this omission is in Habermas' opinion that Weber ultimately ‘,'ils to carry through the 
consequences of the differentiation between rational and tradition-bound consensus. The main reason for 
this shortcoming is -always according to Habermas- Weber's narrow understanding of “rational 
agreement”, which is based on "the model of arrangements among subjects o f piivate law”. Had this not 
prejudiced Weber’s perspective. Habermas (1984: 284- emphasis added) suggest.', he would not have failed 
to realise “that action in society.. .is distinguished from action in community not through the purposive- 
rational action orientations o f the participants, but through the higher, post con rational stage o f moral- 
practical rationality". Now, although the merits o f  this critique are hardly disputable, one cannot fail to 
detect in Habermas' account a reproduction of the tension between tradition and reason, together with a 
strong notion of breach characterising the passage from pre-modern to modern so ial formations implied in 
the postulated tension between community and society. Apart from being simply reminiscent o f Tonnies’ 
classic work, this tension is in the case of Habermas apparently accompanied t>v strong moral overtones, 
especially since Habermas attributes a higher moral standpoint to praxis taking place in the context of 
modern societies. This deep-rooted conviction leads Habermas to the conclusion that an "ethics of
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in fluences o n  the  ag en t does n o t really  p reven t h im  -b o m  ad o p tin g  an d  
rep ro d u c ing  th e  a n tith e tic a l sc h e m a  “re a so n  vs. trad itio n"  n a n  ideal-rational 
le ve l
In a n y  case , th e  them e of th e  p e rs is te n c e  of tra d itio n a l e lem en ts  is a lso  
qu ite  im p o rta n t in  re la tio n  to  G a d a m e r 's  ow n a t te m p t ai a  renew al of th e  
q u es tio n  co n cern in g  th e  m e an in g  of tra d itio n . It cou ld  therefo re  be  sa id  th a t  
G ad am er's  reflec tions on tra d itio n  a re  p rem ised  o n  th e  d e m o n s tra tio n  of th e  
im possib ility  o f a  com plete  libera tion  from  trad itio n . /b is  ex p la in s  w hy 
a lth o u g h  a tte m p tin g  to  g u a rd  h im se lf a g a in s t  a  re la p se  to  ' rad itionalism " a n d  
in  c o n so n a n c e  w ith  th e  R om antics, G ad am er sees  in  trad itio n  th e  veritable  
"ground" o f th e  force an d  valid ity  o f m o ra ls  (T&M: 280-281).
T h is d o es  n o t m ean  th a t  G ad am er w ou ld  like to  su b sc rib e  to  th e  R om antic 
q u e s t for th e  "grow th of trad itio ns" , w h ic h  he re p u d ia te s  a s  be ing  a  m ere  
reversal o f th e  en ligh tened  p reo ccu p a tio n  w ith  rea so n . It is  t h erefo re  im p o rtan t 
to no te  th a t  a lth o u g h  G ad am er does n o t w ish  to re fu te  th e  no rm ative  cla im s of 
rea so n  h e  still s e n se s  the  im possib ility  o f m a in ta in in g  an  a -h is to rica l o r  a n  
ex tra  tem p o ra l concep tion  o f rea so n , a s  it  b ecom es a p p a re n t in  h is  rejection of 
a n  alleged u n co n d itio n a l a n tith e s is  b e tw een  tra d itio n  a n d  reaso n  (T&M: 281). 
Indeed, th e  h u m a n  sc ien ces  a re  for G ad am er th e  d isc ip lines  th a t  a re  in  
p rinc ip le  cap ab le  o f giving trad itio n  its  fu ll value s in ce  it is  th e re  th a t  re sea rch  
c a n n o t re g a rd  itse lf a s  be ing  in  "ab so lu te  a n tith e s is"  to  th e  very  m a n n e r  in 
w hich ind iv idual h u m a n  b e ing s re la te  to  th e  "past".
T h us, th e  a b a n d o n m e n t o f th e  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  “tradition a n d  historical 
research, b e tw een  history a n d  the kn o w led g e  o f  i t  is p laced  a t  th e  cen tre  of
responsibility" is only viable under conditions o f modernity, while commun ty is seen as exclusively
160
h is to rica l h e rm en eu tic s  (T&M: 282). T h is move slgnifio; n o th in g  b u t  the  
accep tan ce  of th e  essen tially  finite, o r cond itioned  perspect re, fro m  w hich  the  
h is to rica l can  be ad d ressed  an d  theorised , a s  ex p ressed  b y  G ad am er's  
a rg u m e n t th a t h isto rica l research  is “ca rried  along by the  b 's to r ic a l  m ovem ent 
of life itse lf an d  can n o t be u n de rsto o d  teleologically in tern  is of th e  object into  
w hich  it is inquiring" (T&M: 285).
T he correct m eaning  of the  p assag e  th a t  h a s  in trigued  G a d a m e r 's  c ritics, 
nam ely  the  rejection  of the  ex istence of a n  "object in  itse lf ' a s  th e  legitim ate 
su b jec t m a tte r  o f the h isto rical sc iences becom es now  m ort .ccessib le . In s te ad  
of denying  th e  tangibility  or the  "reality" of h is to rica l p h e n o m e n a  o r the  
“accessib ility” of the  p a st  -o r  of any  o th e r  d im ension  o f h is to rica l tim e198- th is  
re fu ta tio n  signifies - a s  ind icated  above- a  clo se r proxim ity b e tw een  th e  m ode of 
h is to rica l ex istence p ecu liar to the  ind iv idual h u m a n  being an d  th e  p ro cess  of 
h is to rica l enquiry .
T hus, if it is possib le to describe  th e  "object of th.? n a tu r a l  sc ien ces” 
idealiter  a s  “w h a t w ould be know n in  th e  p refect know ledge of n a tu r e ” G ad am er 
m a in ta in s  th a t it w ould be "senseless to  sp e a k  of a  perfect know ledge of h is to ry ” 
an d  th u s  "of a n  'object in  itse lf tow ard w hich  re sea rch  is d irec ted ” (T&M: 285).
characterised by an “ethics of conviction”.
1,8 As will be discussed in more delail in the next chapter in connection with i"adamer’s concept o f  the 
fusion o f horizons, and despite his emphasis on the concept of tradition that is so * asily associated with the 
ossified past, all three ecstasies of time are taken into account by the thinke. very much in line with 
Heidegger's elaborations in Heiny and Time.
161
Concluding Remarks
In th is  c h a p te r  I a tte m p te d  to  e s ta b lish  a  n o n -red u c tiv e  in te rp re ta tio n  of 
G ad am er’s  h is to rica l h e rm en eu tic s . T he d iscu ss io n  of th e  experiencing  of a r t  
w as fu n d a m e n ta l in  o u r  a tte m p t to  e lu c ida te  a n d  delineate, a  w ay  o f th in k in g  
tog e th er th e  p h e n o m e n a  of t ru th  a n d  h is to ry  th a t  is  no t confined  by  th e  false 
d ichotom y im p o sed  by th e  E n lig h ten m en t betw een  p rejudice a n d  re a so n . It w as 
a rg u ed  th a t  it is exactly  th is  d icho tom y  th a t  gives rise  to th e  a n tith e tic a l 
sch em a  ‘tra d it io n  vs. re a so n ’, w h ich  fu n d am en ta lly  o n cea ls  h is to rica l 
experience a n d  action . It w as a lso  a tte m p te d  to  free th e  n o tio n  o f tra d it io n  from  
the  negative  co n n o ta tio n s  it b e a rs  w ith in  th e  in te llec tu a l tra d it io n  of th e  
E n lig h te n m e n t a n d  to  p re se n t it in  a  positive light a s  th e  a lw ays living ‘m a te r ia l’ 
th a t  co n tin u a lly  s h a p e s  - a n d  is eq u ally  sh ap ed  by- b o th  th o u g h t a n d  p rax is. 
Finally, in  th is  c h a p te r  th e  w ay w a s  paved for a  d isc u ss io n  o f G ad am er’s 
celeb ra ted  c o n c e p t o f th e  fusion  o f h o rizon s ' a  full a s s e s sm e n t o f w h ic h  follows 
in  the  nex t a n d  final c h a p te r  of th is  th e s is .
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Chapter Four
Horizons, Appropriations, Events 
Introductory remarks
In th e  first p a r t of th is  ch a p te r G ad am er’s th e s is  on  the  ‘fu s io n  of ho rizons’ is 
closely exam ined  an d  largely in te rp re ted  a s  a  m e ta p h o r a im ing  a t  th e  d isc losu re  
of th e  p rim ord ia l experience  of h isto rica l existence. In th is  e sp e c t it is argued  
th a t  it sh o u ld  be s e e n  a s  b earin g  fu n d am en ta l affinities w ith  H eidegger’s 
e lab o ra tio n s  on  th e  n a tu re  of language an d  tru th  an d  -.specially w ith  h is  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  even t of t r u th  in  art. The p h en o m en o n  of t ru th  m ade 
accessib le  in  the  w ork  of a r t  is ag a in  evoked a s  a  specific -y e t  fu n d am en ta l- 
in s ta n c e  o f th is  'fu sion ' an d  poetic crea tion  is exam ined  a s  t : le m ost convincing 
in d ica tion  th a t  co n cep tu a l u n d e rs ta n d in g  can n o t em brace  th e  to ta lity  of 
m ean in g fu l sign ifications. More im portan tly  it is argued  th a t  the  p o stu la ted  
d icho tom y betw een ra tion a lity  a n d  irra tionality  d is to rts  th e  very no tion  of 
m ean ing . The second  p a rt of th is  c h a p te r  is a  m ore detailed  exp lo ra tion  of the  
is su e  of co n tin u ity  allegedly ch arac te ris in g  G ad am er’s dialogical m odel, w hich 
is ca rried  th ro u g h  v ia  an  a s se s sm e n t of the  G adam er-D errida  debate . 
C o n tin u ity  a n d  ru p tu re  are therefore m ade them atic  an d  th e  c h a p te r  duly  
co n c lu d es  by trac ing  kairological d im ensions in G adam erT  dialogical model. 
T h ese  a re  fu rth e rm o re  d iscu ssed  in  relation  to  H eidegger's a t te m p ts  to  b reak  
w ith  th e  w este rn  concep tion  of sp a c e /tim e  in h is  Parm enidis
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4.1 Accessing Historical Time: The Fusion of Horizons
Historical Knowledge is  cogn itio  e x  d a tis :
Rational knowledge is cogn itio  ex  prin cip iis .
However a mode of know ledge may be originally g iw  i.
It is still, in relation to th e  individual w ho p ossesses  it.
Simply historical, if he k no w s only so m u ch  of it a s  h a s  been given 
To him  from o u ts id e ...w h e th e r th rough  im m ediate experience or 
N arration, o r...th ro ug h  in stru c tion .
(Kant. 1787/1929: 655-656)
T his p assag e  from  the  section  o n  th e  'Architectonic' in th e  Critique o f  Pure 
R ea son  u n d e rp in s  K an t's  a tte m p t to th e o r ise  know ledge in  g en era l th ro u g h  the  
in tro d u c tio n  of two p a irs  of b in a ry  op po sitio n s, nam ely  by  p o s tu la tin g  a n  
a n tith e s is  b etw een  h isto rica l an d  ra tio n a l, objective an d  sub jec tive  m odes of 
know ledge. D esp ite  the  debatab le  n a tu r e  of the  d is tin c tio n , ¿.nd th e  p a rtic u la rly  
p rob lem atic  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  bo th  " ra tio n a l p rinc ip les" a n d  "H istorical fac ts” a re  
unaffected  by  h isto rica l change a n d  in te rp re ta tio n , th is  p a ssa g e  ex p resses  a  
qu ite  im p o rta n t insigh t, w hich b eco m e s c learer once  the  re a d e r  follows fu rth e r 
K an t’s a rg u m e n t.
T h u s , in  th e  ph ilo sop h er's  opinion, an y o ne  w ho h a s  " leu m t” a  “sy stem  of 
ph ilo sophy” h a s  no m ore th a t a "com plete  historical know ledge" o f th is  sy stem  
since  one h a s  only form ed one 's  "m ind  o n  a n o th e r’s, a n d  th e  im itative facu lty  is 
n o t itse lf p ro d uc tiv e”. T his so rt of know ledge is  the refo re  acco rd in g  to  K ant 
defective in  th a t  it h a s  "not a risen  o u t  of reaso n ", a n d  a lth o u g h  objectively 
considered  it is indeed th e  p ro d uc t o f re a so n , it is a lso  sim ply  h is to rica l from  a  
subjective p o in t of view (Kant, 1 7 8 7 /1 9 2 9 : 656).
It sh o u ld  n o t have escaped  th e  a tte n tio n  o f th e  read c . th a t  a lth o u g h  th e  
co n cep ts  o f trad itio n  a n d  effective h is to r ic a l c o n sc io u sn ess  have b e e n  explicitly
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exam ined  in  th e  p rev ious c h a p te r  th e re  w as a lm o s t no exp)-cit reference to  the  
m o st ce leb ra ted  of G ad am er's  fo rm ulations, viz. to  h is  corn op t of th e  fu s io n  o f  
horizons. T h is is n o t only d u e  to  th e  fact th a t  G ad am er I '.m se lf s tre s se s  th a t 
th e  purpose  of h is  giving a n  a c c o u n t of the  “fo rm ation  an o  fusion  of horizons 
w as  to  show  how  h isto rica lly  effective c o n sc io u sn ess  op i-rates” (T&M: 341) 
sh iftin g  th e reb y  th e  e m p h a s is  from  th e  idea of th e  horizon to th e  d iscu ss io n  of 
th e  prob lem  co n cern in g  the  alleged m edia tion  betw een  tru th  an d  h isto ry  tak ing  
p lace  w ith in  th is  c o n sc io u sn e s s1
T he m a in  re a so n  for “delay ing” th e  th e m atic  engagem ent v t h  th is  concep tua l 
fo rm ula tion  is th a t  a s  it is th e  c a se  w ith  all th e  ce leb ra ted  co n cep ts  th a t  becom e 
"ossified" o r “m erely  h isto rica l" in  th e  sen se  K an t u ses  Ih e  te rm  above, an  
u n tim e ly  d isc u ss io n  of th e  "fusion  of h o rizon s” m ight have h indered  o u r 
exp lo ra tion  in to  G ad am er's  th o u g h t.
Indeed , it cou ld  be a rg u ed  th a t  co n cep ts  like “tra d itio n ” an d  fusion  of ho rizons” 
q u ite  often  o p era te  a s  ca tch w o rd s  in th e  veiy sam e  w ay th a t G ad am er described  
th e  function ing  of th e  fam o us d ic tu m  “to the  th in g s  them selves” in  the  case of 
H u sse rl's  phenom enology. N evertheless, hav ing  show n th a t  the  concep t of 
tra d itio n  sh o u ld  be trea ted  a s  correlative to  th a t  of the  fb iitude , or in  o th er 
w ords of th e  h is to rica l cond ition in g  of h u m a n  beings a n d  no t a s  political- 
ideological b ia s, th e  w ay is paved  for a  closer exam ination  o f th e  even t of the  
fu sio n  of horizons. In effect, it is G adam er's  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of trad itio n  an d  of 19
199 Thus the claim of hermeneutics seems according to Gadamer "capable of being met only in the infinity 
of knowledge, in the thoughtful fusion o f the whole tradition with the present. \\<- see it based on the ideal 
of perfect enlightenment, on the complete limitlessness of our historical horizon...on the omnipresence of 
the historically knowing spirit", which finds “its justification in Hegel, even it the historians, filled with 
enthusiasm for experience, preferred to quote Schleirmacher and Wilhelm von H r.nbolt” (T&M: 341-342).
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th e  effective h isto rica l co n sc io u sn e ss  th a t  a rg u ab ly  sh a p e s  the  very 
co n cep tu a lisa tio n  of th is  “fu sio n ”.
It is  im p o rtan t to no te  once m ore th a t  G ad am er s e e s  trad itio n  a s  m u ch  
m ore  th a n  a  “p e rm an en t p recond ition" cond ition ing  h u m a n  u n d e rs tan d in g . To 
th e  con trary , h u m a n  beings a re  ra th e r  seen  a s  co n tin u ally  rc -p roducing  a n d  re ­
d e te rm in ing  trad itio n  in a sm u c h  a s  they  them selves p a rtic ip a te  in  its  "evolution” 
(T&M: 293). G ad am er w ishes to  fu r th e r  illum inate  th is  p e c u lia r  s ta te  o f being  
o f  trad itio n  by show ing how th e  h e rm e n e u tic  p h en om en o n  it self is b a se d  o n  th e  
"p re jud ice” o r fore-conception  of “com pleteness", w hich  is  a  fine exam ple  o f th e  
m ode of p re ju d ices  th a t  G ad am er u n d e rs ta n d s  a s  "p ro d u c tiv e”.
T h us, in  a n  e n c o u n te r  w ith  a  “trad itio na ry  tex t” u n d e rs ta n d in g  is  alw ays 
g u id ed  by th e  expecta tion  of com p le ten ess , no t only form ally , i.e. reg ard in g  the  
exp ecta tio n  of th e  exp ression  of a  com plete  m ean ing , b u t  a lso  in  te rm s  o f th e  
tru th -c la im s co n ta in ed  the re in . Like an y  fo re-concep tion , th e  p re jud ice  of 
“co m p le ten ess” is u n de rs to o d  a s  b e ing  g ro u nd ed  on  the  in t i  ¡p re te r’s  ow n “p rio r 
re la tio n  to th e  su b jec t m a tte r” a n d  it is in  th is  re sp ec t t h a t  G ad am er is  ab le  to  
defend  the  position  th a t  p reco n cep tio n s a n d  p re jud ices a r e  n o t su b je c t to  th e  
w h im  of th e  ind iv idual co n sc io u sn e ss  b u t  a re  ra th e r  th e  d irec t effect of 
belonging  to  a  trad ition .
W h a t is m ore, th e  “e lem en t of trad itio n"  in  an y  h is to ric a l-h e rm e n e u tic a l activ ity  
is  sa id  to be “fulfilled" in  the  com m onality  "of fu n d am en ta l, e n ab lin g  p re ju d ices” 
th a t  m ake possib le  th e  “co n n ec tio n  w ith  trad ition" th ro u g h  th e  p ro cess  of 
b e in g -a d d re ssed  by th e  " trad itio n ary  tex t” (T&M: 295).
It h a s  b een  a lready  rem ark ed  th a t  G ad am er sees  h is to iic a l  d is ta n c e  a s  a  
positive a n d  p roductive  cond ition  o f th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a n d  refe rences w ere
166
m ade to  h is  tre a tm e n t of ae s th e tic  experience. L iterary  a n d  h is to rica l 
ex p erien ces  are  a lso  b ro u g h t to  the  fore in th e  th in k e r’s  a tte m p t to fu r th e r  
clarify th e  beneficial w ork ings o f “h isto rica l d istance".
O n the  o n e  h an d , G ad am er u n d e rp la y s  the  idea  th a t  th e  “Temporal d is ta n c e ” 
betw een  th e  a u th o r  an d  th e  read e r of a  lite rary  te x t 'is responsib le  for 
m isu n d e rs ta n d in g s  an d  m is in te rp re ta tio n s , m ain ly  on th e  g ro u n d s  th a t  th e  
m ean in g  of a  tex t u su a lly  “goes beyond" the  in ten tio n s  a n d  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
of its  a u th o r  (T&M: 296).
In a  s im ila r  m a n n e r , the  o ft-rep ea ted  insig h t o f conven tional w isdom  accord ing  
to w hich  th e  p assag e  of tim e a lo ne  is  w h a t m a k e s  objective h isto rica l ju d g m e n t 
possib le , is given a  fresh  a n d  in te re stin g  in te rp re ta tio n . It w ould  n o t be 
in a c c u ra te  to c la im  th a t  G ad am er reg a rd s  th e  very concep tion  of "h isto rical 
d is tan ce"  a s  paradox ical, in  th e  sam e  m a n n e r  th a t  th e  concep tion  o f a  
h e rm e n e u tic s  of facticity  is sa id  to paralle l som eth ing  like th e  concep t o f a  
“w ooden  iron".
In o th e r  w ords, s ince  facticity  signifies the  "u n sh a k a b le  re s is tan ce  th a t  th e  
fac tual p u ts  u p  ag a in st all g ra sp in g  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g "  th e  concep tion  o f a  
“h e rm e n e u tic s  o f facticily" is  rightly  seen  a s  po in ting  to  th e  paradox ical m a n n e r  
in w h ich  th e  h u m a n  D asein  is  fu n d am en ta lly  d e te rm in ed  a n d  w hich  can n o t be 
ad eq u a te ly  g rasp ed  w ith th e  aid of th e  n o tio n s  of co n sc io u sn e ss  o r self- 
c o n sc io u sn e ss  (G adam er, 1994: 55).
T o  develop th e  analogy  fu rth e r, if facticity  a n d  h e rm e n e u tic s  jo in tly  
co n sid ered  po in t to  a c e r ta in  im penetrab ility  of th e  Self a n d  to th e  
u n a tta in a b ili ty  o f com plete  self-know ledge, th e n  o n e  could  suggest th a t  
“h is to rica l d is ta n c e ” signifies a  sim ilar m ode o f "resistance" c h a rac te r is tic  o f the
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h isto rica l realm . T his re s is ta n c e  is p e rh a p s  b es t exem plified in  the  “fact" th a t  a 
“relative c lo su re” of a h is to rica l event is often requ ired  before th is  event 
becom es accessib le  a s  a w hole. It is nev erth e le ss  q u es tio n ab le  if th is  
c h a ra c te r is tic  of h isto rica l ev en ts  e x h a u s ts  th e ir  s ig n d c a n c e  an d  th e ir 
re la tio n sh ip  w ith  the  h isto rica lly  effective co n sc io u sn ess. G ad am er ac tually  
u n d e rs ta n d s  th e  paradox  p re se n te d  by the  h isto ric;il even t a s  the  
epistem ological co u n te rp a rt of th e  old m oral q u es tio n  of w h e th e r  anyone could 
be called h ap p y  before one 's  d e a th .
Indeed, a s  th e  th in k e r  readily  acknow ledges, a ltho u g h  ce rta in  so u rc e s  of erro r 
a re  excluded  a n d  som e h e rm e n e u tic  req u irem e n ts  are  “au* ^m atically  fulfilled" 
w hen  a  “h is to rica l con text h a s  com e to be of only historic al in terest" , th is  is 
h a rd ly  th e  “en d  o f the  h e rm en eu tica l problem " (T&M: 298). The th o u g h t of 
so m eth in g  th a t  h a s  becom e “only  h isto rical" signifies th e  ten dency  of the  
h isto rica l to  show  itse lf a s  "dead" o r “ossified”, a s  irrelevam  to  th e  co n cern s  of 
th e  “p resen t" . At th e  sam e tim e, in  po in ting  to  the  inevitable “historicity" of the 
“p re se n t” it a c c e n tu a te s  th e  incom plete  c h a ra c te r  o f all h isto rica l 
u n d e rs ta n d in g . It is tru e  th a t  o n e  could q u ite  easily  p u t all th e  e m p h a s is  on 
th e  no tion  of incom pleteness  a n d  a tte m p t to  ph ilosoph ically  ju s tify  o r even 
celeb ra te  it.
G ad am er seem s  to  occasionally  move tow ard s th is  d irection , w h en  for exam ple 
he in s is ts  th a t  “rea l” h is to rica l th in k in g  “m u s t  tak e  a c c o u n t o f its  own 
historicity", o r  w hen  he p o in ts  tow ards th e  alw ays u n fin ish ed  w ork of 
in te rp re ta tio n  (T&M: 298-299).
T h is ten dency  is even sh a rp e n e d  in th e  w ay th a t  the  c o n cep t o f effective 
h isto rica l c o n sc io u sn ess  is fash ioned , since we a re  told th a t  reflection  on  the
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essen ce  of h u m a n ity ’s  h isto rical b e in g  “can n ev e r be com p  ctely achieved" an d  
th a t  correlatively  “to be historically m eans that kn o w led g e  o f  o n e se lf can  never  
be complete" (T&M: 302).
G ad am er is n ev erth e le ss  far fro m  being c o n te n t w ith  simply ce leb ra ting  
incom p le ten ess  w ithou t re in tro d u c in g  the e lem en t o f un iversa lity , a s  h is  
m odification  o f th e  concep t of th e  "horizon  ’ m a k e s  plain. T h is  becom es c lea re r 
in  th e  a tte m p t to secu re  the  very  no tion  of th e  horizon from  being identified  
w ith  w him sical a n d  un ju stified  su b jec tiv e  in te rp re ta tio n s , a n d  m ere cap rice  by 
e s ta b lish in g  its  dep en d en ce  to th e  w id e r co n tex ts  o f trad itio n
It is the refo re  im p o rtan t a t  t h i s  po in t to follow G a d a m e r’s  re in te rp re ta tio n  
o f th e  concep t of th e  horizon m ore closely. H is firs t s te p  is  to trace  in  th e  very 
co n cep t o f horizon  the  ind ica tion  o f  the  range  of v ision  a rtic u la te d  from  “a  
p a r tic u la r  v an tage  point", a  s ta te -o f-affa irs  c h a rac te r ize d  by  w hat cou ld  be 
te rm ed  th e  de term in acy  of fin itu d e  over th o u g h t. In th e  field of h is to rica l 
u n d e rs ta n d in g , th e  idea of an  h o riz o n  is often u se d  to in d i-a te  the  a tte m p t to 
b y p a ss  th e  c rite ria  an d  p re ju d ic e s  of the  "p resen t" so  a s  to  en ab le  the  
im m ersion  in to  th e  "past", w here fro m  the  tra d itio n a ry  te x t o r th e  h is to rica l 
even t a d d re sse s  th e  h isto rica l c o n sc io u sn ess . In th e  firs t in s ta n c e  th is  
p rev a len t u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h o riz o n s  in  te rm s o f a  tra n sp o s itio n  in to  th e  "alien” 
is in  G ad am er’s  eyes -u p  to an  e x te n t-  legitim ate, th o u g h  b y  no  m e an s  a d eq ua te  
(T&M: 302-303).
Leaving as id e  the  ob jec tio n s ag a in st th e  psychological a sp ec t200 of th e  
concep tion  of th is  tran sp o sitio n  t h a t  w as co n sid ered  in th e  p rev ious c h ap te r, it
21,1 This does not mean though that Gadamer fails to take into account the ubjective aspect o f this 
phenomenon. To the contrary, the centrality attributed to the dialogical process in Gadamer’s thought 
suggests that the communicative experience o f the individual human being -alongside the inter-subjective
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h a s  to  be sa id  th a t  th e  m a in  p rob lem  G ad am er finds w ith th is  m odel is the  
p o s tu la tio n  o f “closed h o rizon s”. In effect, th e  concep tion  •. f  a  c losed horizon 
th a t  su p p o sed ly  “encloses" a  cu ltu re  is accord ing  to G ad am er a  m ere 
abstraction  (T&M: 303-304).
It sh o u ld  be rem inded  th a t  a p rob lem  of sim ilar o rd e r w as identified  in 
c h a p te r  tw o w ith  regard  to  C a sto riad is ' co ncep tion  of “core  s ign ifica tions” 
ch arac te riz in g  specific socio -h isto rica l fo rm ations. It c a n  be sa id  th a t  G ad am er 
cap ita lizes on  th e  fleeting q u alitie s  of tim e in o rd e r to  show  th e  ind e te rm inacy  of 
th e  very n o tio n  o f the  horizon. In o th e r  w ords, if following H eidegger one p laces 
tem p o ra lity  a t  th e  cen tre  of h u m a n  ex isten ce  th e n  th e  m a in  co n seq uence  
following th e  p o stu la tio n  of D ase in ’s  rad ical h isto ric ity  is  th e  inab ility  to 
p e rm an en tly  f i x  a  s ta n d p o in t w herefrom  h is to ry  -b o th  in  th e  p e rso n a l a n d  the  
u n iv ersa l s e n se  of the  term - is experienced  a n d  h en ce  to  conceive of a  tru ly  
“closed" horizon.
C onsequen tly , b o th  the  s in g u la r h u m a n  being  a n d  the  h is to rica l ho rizons 
h u m a n s  a re  im m ersed  in  a re  sa id  to be in  a  s ta te  of c o n s ta n t m ovem ent. In the  
sam e  m a n n e r  th a t  “p a s t”, "presen t", a n d  "fu ture" a re  no t s e p a ra te d  d im en sio n s  
b u t  e c s ta s ie s  o f tim e, th e  tran sp o s itio n  of h is to rica l c o n sc io u sn ess  in to  "alien"
experience of dialogue that Gadamer attempts to wrest from its being sublated in the conceptual framework 
of speculative dialectics- occupies a prominent part in Gadamer’s construction o f the very notion of the 
“fusion o f horizons”. This becomes apparent in Gadamer's (1989b: 41) description o f the relation between 
text, interpreter and reader. For indeed, the interpreter tends to “disappeai in the very process of 
mediating between the text and the reader, but in Gadamer's eyes this is net a disappearance in any 
negative sense, but it rather signifies the overcoming of “what is alienating in the 'ext”. It therefore signals 
an "entering into communication”, which happens in “a way that the tension between the horizon o f the 
text and the horizon of the reader is dissolved”. Gadamer stresses that he has called this process “a fusion 
o f horizons (Horizontverschmelzung)", in other words the process where the “separated horizons, like the 
different standpoints, merge with each other”. In this context it should be also pointed out that Gadamer 
(1985/19K9b: 110) sees his own philosophy in terms o f a “hermeneutic turn teward conversation" as a 
move beyond the "dialectic of German idealism...to Platonic dialectic”, as a "recollection" that is not 
entirely dependent on the individual but also “to ‘the spirit that would like to unite us’-we who are a
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h is to rica l ho rizons do es n o t m erely im ply “p a ss in g  into a lien  w orlds 
u n co n n e c te d  in an y  w ay w ith o u r  ow n”. For G adam er, t h i s  1 -an sp o sitio n  ra th e r  
reveals  th e  fu n d am en ta l d im en sio n  of the  h isto rica l hori/.>n, nam ely  th a t  it 
c o n s is ts  a  sing le horizon , w h ich  in  its  m ovem ent em braces- the  p a s t  a n d  th e  
p re sen t, w h ils t keep ing  itse lf o p en  to th e  fu tu re  (T&M: 304).
It is  th u s  a lto g e th er q u es tio n ab le  w h e th e r it is p ro p er to  sn e a k  o f a  “fu sion  of 
horizons" ch arac te r iz in g  the  h isto rica lly  effective c o n sc io u sn e ss  a n d  no t o f a 
“fusion  of th e  e c s ta s ie s  of tim e” w ith in  a  single h is to ric a l \orizon. How else 
could  one in te rp re t th e  em p h a tic  s ta te m e n t th a t  “u n d e rs ta n d in g  is a lw a y s  the  
fu s io n  o f  th e se  horizons su p p o sed ly  existing  by th e m se lve s” (T&M: 306)?
Indeed  G ad am er acknow ledges th a t  th e  te rm  “fusion  of h o riz o n s” is p referab le  
th a n  th a t  o f th e  "form ation of one ho rizon” m ain ly  b e c a u s e  the  fo rm er d isc lo ses  
m ore explicitly the  h e rm e n e u tic  s itu a tio n . To be m ore p rec ise , th e  concep t of 
th e  "fusion of horizons" h a s  th e  ad v an tage  of exp licitly  recognizing th a t  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  "becom es a  scho larly  ta s k  only u n d e r  sp ec ia l c ircu m stan ces"  
a n d  th a t  th e re  is a n  acknow ledged  ten sio n  betw een  th e  tex t -o r  th e  h is to rica l 
even t- a n d  th e  p r e se n t
B ringing  th is  ten sio n  to  th e  fore an d  p ro je c tin g  a  ho rizon  th a t  is 
“d ifferen t form  the  ho rizon  of th e  p re se n t” is in G ad am er’s  view th e  m a in  ta s k  of 
th e  h e rm en eu tic  ap p ro ach . W h at is m ore, th e  re g u la te d  e n a c tm e n t o f th e  
fu sion  o f th e  horizons o f the  “p a s t” an d  th e  “p resen t" , th e  s im u lta n e o u s  p ro cess  
of p ro jecting  a n d  su p e rse d in g  is th e  p o stu la te d  ta s k  of th e  h isto rica lly  effected 
c o n sc io u sn ess , w hile being closely b o un d  w ith  th e  cen tra l p rob lem  of 
h e rm en eu tic s , th a t  be ing  th e  p rob lem  of app lica tion  (T&M: 3< >6-307).
conversation". We can see also how being in a conversation “means to be b eyor/ oneself, to think with the
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C erta in ly  th e  prob lem  o f ap p lica tio n  is in G adam er'- ph ilo sophy  tightly  
b o u n d  w ith  the  a ttr ib u tio n  o f p rim acy  to  language, a n d  w ith the  fash ion in g  of a 
p h ilo sop h ica l position  th a t  is the  ou tco m e of a  bold  a tte m p t to  m ed ia te  the  
n o to rio u sly  incom patib le  a c c o u n ts  of Hegel an d  K ierkegaart ■ . O n th e  one h a n d  
lan g u ag e  is b ro u g h t to th e  cen tre  o f ph ilo soph ical refleciion  a s  a  re s u lt  of 
G a d a m e r 's  a im  to  reclaim  th e  exem plarity  of theological an d  legal h e rm en eu tic s  
along  w ith  th a t o f philological h e rm e n e u tic s  in  reg ard  of the  n eed  to  recognize 
“ap p lic a tio n  a s  a n  integral e lem en t of a ll u n d e rs ta n d in g ” (T&M: 308).
Sim ilarly, a n d  w ith reference to  a  specific in s ta n c e  )f ap p lica tio n , viz. 
a e s th e tic  non-d iffe ren tia tion . G ad am er a tte m p ts  to  com bine H egel's concep t of a 
“relig ion  of art" w ith  K ierkegaard 's  n o tio n  of “con tem poraneity ", in o rd e r to 
e s ta b lis h  the  h e rm en eu tic  d im en sio n  o f the  "m ed iation  oetw een  p a s t  and  
p re s e n t” (T&M: 573).
More specifically, a r t  is u se d  by the  p h ilo sop h er to  show  th a t  m ean in g  can n o t 
be e x h a u s te d  by  co n cep tua l u n d e rs ta n d in g  a s  idea lis t ph ilo sophy  fam ously  
c la im ed . T hus, co n tem p o ran e ity  -  th e  s tr ic t re lig ious re fe ren t th a t  is the  
h a llm a rk  of K ierkegaard 's ph ilo sophy  being  carefu lly  rem iw ed- is  in te rp re ted  
no t a s  tem poral “om nipresence", b u t  a s  “to tal m ed ia tio n ’ o r “im m ed ia te  co­
inc idence" . At th e  sam e tim e, an d  in  full know ledge o f th e  ' fact" th a t  even the 
u se  o f  th e  term  m edia tion  m igh t seem  a s  a n  in su lt  to  the  essen tia lly  an ti- 
sp ecu la tiv e  K ierkegaard ian  reflection, G ad am er a lso  m a k e s  u se  of H egel's 
in s ig h t concern ing  the p a s t  c h a ra c te r  o f all a r t  in  a n  a tte m p t to  g ra sp  the  
p a rad o x ic a l n a tu re  the w o rk  of a rt, w h ich  ach ieves “ae s th e tic  s im u ltaneity" 
exactly  by being “ab so rb ed  by  h isto rica l, rem em ora tive  consc io u sn ess" .
other and to come hack to oneself as if to another".
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T his rea liza tion  e n a b le s  G ad am er to  devise th e  concept of a e s th e tic  n o n - 
d ifferen tia tion  to  “d is tin g u ish  the  real experience  o f a r, w hich  does n o t 
experience  a r t” q u a  art. from  th e  so-called  “a e s th e tic  co n sc io u sn ess"  a n d  from  
th e  pseudo -re lig ious ido lization201 o f a r t  th a t  th e  la tte r  en ta ils . G ad am er 
a sp ire s  to  e s ta b lish  a  co n cep tio n  of a r t  w h ich  goes beyond  th e  “false d ichotom y" 
betw een  e ith e r th e  p o s tu la tio n  th a t  a r t  is “co n te m p o rary  w itr. all tim es", o r  a s  a  
“w ay o f a tta in in g  c u ltu re  th ro u g h  the  experience  o f h isto ry" (T&M: 572-573).
It is reg re ttab le  th a t  in  th is  con tex t G ad am er gives h is  re a d e rs  only a  h in t  
co n cern in g  th e  recogn ition  of th e  "fu n d am e n ta l p a s tn e s s  of the  w ork of art"  In  
W alte r B en jam in ’s  co n cep t of th e  aura  o f th e  w ork  o f a r t  (T&M: 573).
T here  a re  indeed  s tr ik in g  sim ilarities  betw een  G a d a m e r’s  th o u g h t co n cern in g  
th e  em bedd ing  o f t r u th  in the  co n tex t of a  h is to rica l tra d itio n  a n d  B en jam in ’s  
reflec tions on “h is to rica l o b jec ts” in  genera l, a n d  o f th e  w crk  of a rt. F irstly , 
B enjam in  defines th e  a u ra  of a  h is to rica l ob jec t in  te rm s  o f d is tan ce , by d raw in g  
a n  in te re stin g  p ara lle l w ith  the  w ay th e  te rm  " a u ra ” is u n d e rs to o d  w ith  
refe rence  to “n a tu ra l  o b je c ts”.
It is of c ru c ia l im p o rtan ce  th a t  m ech an ica l rep ro d u c tio n  is linked  w ith  th e  
“d esire  o f co n tem p o rary  m a sse s  to b ring  th in g s  ‘c lo se r’ sp a tia lly  a n d  h u m a n ly ” 
a n d  h en ce  overcom e the  u n iq u e n e s s  of “every  reality  by accep ting  i ts  
re p ro d u c tio n ”. Leaving aside  the  ob jec tions co n ce rn in g  B en iam in ’s  p o s tu la tio n  
o f new  political fu n c tio n s  of th e  w ork  of a r t  in  th e  age of m ech an ica l
2111 Walter Benjamin (1992: 2 IS) expresses a similar concern in stating that ”/ ’ art pour / ’ art" is but a 
“negative theology in the from of the idea of ‘pure’ art, which.. .denied any social function of art”. It has to 
be observed though that this theological turn is seen as the product of the crisis following the "advent o f 
the first truly revolutionary means o f reproduction”. Gadamer seems to t ndorse the first part o f  
Benjamin’s argument in speaking of the "apotheosis of art into the religion o f culture, symptomatic of the 
bourgeois period”. Despite that, Gadamer wishes to show that “the hermeneutic constitution of the unity o f 
the work of art is invariant among all the social alterations o f the art industry” end that consequently, far
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rep ro d u c tio n  th a t  G adam er s e e m s  to  sh a re  w ith  A dorno,202 ■ ' is difficult to  m iss  
th e  affinities203 betw een the  th in k e rs  in B en jam in ’s identify ing the  u n iq u en ess  of 
th e  w ork of a r t w ith "its being im bedded  in  th e  fabric o f tra d itio n ”.
More im portan tly , th is  “tra d itio n ” is n o t  u n d e rs to o d  so m eth in g  “dead" 
a n d  “ossified” b u t  a s  being i ts e lf  " thoroughly  alive a n d  exlrem ely  ch an g eab le” 
(B enjam in, 1992: 216-217). To be su re , G a d a m e r’s link ing  the  experiencing  of 
a r t  w ith  h isto ry  and  tru th  h a s  its  p reced en t in H eidegger's ph ilo sophy  an d  is 
p a rtic u la rly  rem in iscen t of th e  la tte r 's  m e d ita tio n s  on  th e  “origin of th e  w ork  of 
a rt" . Given th a t  H eidegger's herm en eu tic -p h en o m en o log ica l p ro ject in  Being  
a n d  Time w as seen  a s  lim ited b y  form s of b e ing  th a t  a re  n o t s tric tly  sp eak in g  
h is to rica l, like the  su p p o sed ly  tim eless m a th e m a tic a l lorm s, th e  equally  
tim e less  rea lm  of n a tu re  w ith  i ts  "unend ing  cycles” a n d  th e  rea lm  o f a r t  th a t  
“s p a n s  all h isto rical d is tan ces" , Heidegger's a tte m p t to  "deal w ith  th e  w ork of
form being “a tool of the socio-political will", art "documents a social reality only when it is really art. and 
not when it is used as an instrument" (T&M: 579- emphasis added).
2,12 At least this is the impression given by the enigmatic “but” that links the first, more “positive” part with 
the remaining part o f Gadamer's brief reference to Benjamin as the following extract makes plain: "But he 
(Benjamin] proclaims a new political function for the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, 
one which completely revolutionizes the meaning of art and against which Theodor Adorno raises pertinent 
objections in his Aesthetic Theory" (T&M: 573, n.32).
2111 The fundamental difference between the two approaches is of course Benjamin’s incorporation of a 
Marxist perspective, which does not really square with Gadamer’s liberalism One has to recognise 
alongside Hannah Arendi that Marxism, as well as Zionism were no more than paths that Benjamin kept 
open not because he was interested in their “positive” aspects, but because they offered him a vehicle for 
carrying out the “negative" task of shaking off the “illusions" of bourgeois society (Arendt, 1992: 38-39). 
Nevertheless, the essay on the work of art bears strong Marxist connotations in the same manner that the 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History” exemplify elements of the Jewish tradition, or at least explicit 
biblical themes. As far as Marxism is concerned, one can for example refer to 'he need Benjamin felt to 
situate his text with regard to the canonical Marxist framework of economic base and cultural 
superstructure and thereby to establish the legitimacy of an inquiry into the “developmental tendencies of 
art under present [i.e. capitalist! conditions of production”, on the grounds that the dialectics between the 
base and the superstructure arc "no less noticeable in the superstructure than in the economy” (Benjamin, 
1992: 212). This certainly does not suggest that Benjamin’s thought suffered fr un the same shortcomings 
as “historical materialism", of which he was a very acute critic as his first "thesis on the philosophy of 
history” clearly shows: “The story is told o f an automaton constructed in such i way that it could play a 
winning game o f chess... A puppet in Turkish attire and with a hookah in its mouth sat before a chessboard 
placed on a large table...a little hunchback who was an expert chess player.. .guided the puppet’s hand by 
means of strings. One can imagine the philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet called
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art" in  several a d d re s se s  d u rin g  1936 cam e a s  a  su rp r is e  to  m any . The 
p h en o m en a  of th e  “u n c o n sc io u s , th e  n u m b er, th e  d ream , 'h e  sw ay of n a tu re ,  
the  m irac le  of a r t”, w ere all seen  a s  ex isting  “only in  th e  p  'r ip h e ry  of D ase in" 
an d  th u s  a s  co m p rehensib le  only a s  “lim iting  co n cep ts ' i.e. a s  c o n c e p ts  
exem plifying the  lim its  of D ase in ’s historicality  (G adam er, 19-14: 98).
D esp ite  th a t, H eidegger’s w ork  on th e  p h en o m en o n  of a r t  seem s to  have 
c a u se d  a  “ph ilo soph ica l s e n sa tio n ” long before its  p u b lica tio n  in 1950 w h e n  it 
becam e available  to  th e  g en era l public. T h is s e n sa tio n  m igh t be a t t r ib u te d  to  
the  fac t th a t  th is  new  th o u g h t-ex p e rim en t en ta iled  a  "s ta rtlin g  new  
co n cep tua lity  th a t  boldly em erged  in  co n n ectio n  w ith  th is  top ic”, a n d  w h ic h  is 
b e s t exem plified in  th e  co ining  of th e  e a r th  a s  a  c o u n te r-co n cep t to  th e  -fa m ilia r  
from  B eing  a n d  Time- co n cep t o f th e  w orld (G adam er, 1994: 98-99).
The p e c u lia r  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  a r t  a n d  th e  h is to rica l is m ade  m a n ife s t in  
B en jam in ’s  (1992: 214) link ing  of th e  “o rigin” of th e  w o rk  of a r t  w ith  th e  very 
co n cep t of a u th e n tic ity  an d  h is  co n ten tio n  co n cern in g  the  so c io -h is to rica l 
co n tex t th a t  is em bod ied  in  the  “o rig inal” b u t  n ecessa rily  a b s e n t  in  th e  
rep ro d u ced  copy. A ctually  th is  in s ig h t in to  th e  d isc lo su re  o f a  w hole h is to r ic a l 
epoch  c h a ra c te r is tic  o f the  w ork  of a r t  c a n  serve a s  a  poini of d e p a r tu re  for a  
fru itfu l d ia logue w ith  H eidegger an d  G ad am er’s  e lab o ra tio n s204 o n  th e  is su e .
'historical materialism ’ is to win till the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of 
theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to be out of sight” (Benjamin, 1992: 245).
;i,t See for example Heidegger’s critical remarks on how works of art become commodified and therefore 
torn from their native context and how this process involves apart form the “market”, several "modern” 
institutions, like museums, universities, professional bodies, etc. “Official agencies”, Heidegger observes, 
“assume the care and maintenance of works. Connoisseurs and critics busy themselves with them. Art 
dealers supply the market. Art-historical study makes the works the object of a science”. Yet the question 
persists: "in all this busy activity do we encounter the work itself’? Heidegger's answer is predictably a 
negative one and the "Aegina sculptures in the Munich collection”, or “Sophocles’ Antigone in the best 
critical edition”, are seen as torn from their “native” historical world. It is nevertheless important to note 
that the philosopher sees this "perishing of the historical world” that accompanies the work o f art as 
inevitable even in the case where there is a conscious attempt to “cancel or avoid such displacement”, as
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Let u s  first consider B e n jam in 's  (1992: 217) insigh t t h a t  a r  w as o rig ina ted  “in 
the  service of ritu a l- first th e  m agical, then  the  religious k in  !' -w h ich  co inc ides 
w ith  G ad am er's  link ing  o f the  'sac red ' w ith the  w ork  tho  w ork of a r t* 205 in 
genera] -  in co n ju n c tio n  w ith H eidegger’s u n u su a l iden tifica tion  of th e  w ork  
w ith  w h a t is 'in ten d ed ' in  it. Let u s  then  first tu r n  o u r  gaze to H eidegger's 
a tte m p t to show  how  a  specific type o f work, the  G reek tem p le  is n o t “a  p o rtra it"  
th a t  som ehow  show s how  “the god looks”, o r in o th e r w o rd s th a t represen ts  th e  
divine. In stead  H eidegger cham pions the  idea th a t th e  w ork  ra th e r  “le ts  th e  god 
h im se lf be p resen t an d  t h u s  is the  god h im se lf’ (Heidegger, 1975: 43).
T here is u n d o u b te d ly  m ore to  th is  though t-defy ing  fo rm ulation  th a n  th e  
in te n tio n  to m erely u p s e t  one 's  re a d e rs  by reverting to  a  to .em ic  iden tifica tion  
be tw een  'gods' a n d  'a r te fa c ts '. In d is tan c in g  h im self from  d ie  p reva len t a t  h is  
tim es  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f a r t  a s  th e  rep resen ta tio n  o f th e  beau tifu l H eidegger 
w ish es  to b reak  w ith  th e  fu n d am en ta l d istinc tion  b e tw een  m atter  an d  fo r m  
allegedly ch arac te r is tic  o f  "w estern m etaphysics”, a n d  w hich  he sees  a s  th e  
co n cep tua l sch em a a lso  op era tin g  “in the grea test va rie ty  o f  w ays"  in  “all art 
theory a n d  aestl\etics"  (Heidegger, 1975: 26-27).
In h is  c o m m en ta ry  of H eidegger’s essay  o n  a r t  G ad am er offers a n  
a c c o u n t of H eidegger’s  po in t of d e p a rtu re  in a n  a t te m p t to clarify w h a t
when one visits say "the Bamberg cathedral on its won square” (Heidegger. 1975: 40-41). This does not 
entail though that this perished historical world is no longer accessible, since as implied also by the 
principle o f aesthetic non-differentiation devised by Gadamer, “even if every ‘work’ belongs originally to a 
context o f life that has passed away...|the] relation to the past is, as it were, retained in the work itself' 
(T&M: 578).
205 It is important to note that first, in Gadamer’s view there is always something leligious about a work of 
art. and this "seems decisively proved by the fact that even pure aesthetic consciousness is acquainted with 
the idea of profanation” since it “always perceives the destruction o f work' of art as a sacrilege". 
Secondly, it should not escape our attention that Gadamer points to the relativity of the distinction between 
the sacred and the profane by reminding his readers that “the profane' is [originally] the place in front of 
the sanctuary” and that therefore the concept of the profane "and its cognate, profanation, always
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H eidegger h ad  in  m ind  in  sp eak in g  of th e  “es tab lish ed "  view ,f th e  w ork of a r t  in 
p a r t ic u la r  an d  o f th e  w hole d om ain  o f “a e s th e tic s” in  genera! By rem in d in g  h is  
r e a d e rs  th a t  in  the  b ack g ro u n d  o f H eidegger's reflection  o .ie  cou ld  trace  the  
K a n tia n  a tte m p t to  e s ta b lish  the  au ton o m y  of th e  a e s th e tic  sp h e re  w ith o u t 
com prom ising  th e  claim  to  its  u n iv ersa lity  by m e a n s  of th e  p o stu la tio n  of a 
“cong ru ity " betw een  th e  “b e a u ty  of n a tu re  a n d  th e  sub jectiv ity  o f th e  subject" 
e n a c te d  in  the  p e rso n  of th e  "creative g e n iu s”, G ad am er (] *>04: 101) ind irectly  
in fo rm s u s  of th e  m a n n e r  in w hich  h is  own p ro je c t w a • developed o u t of 
H eidegger’s in sigh ts .
G a d a m e r rightly  e m p h as izes  th a t  th e  K an tian  co n cep tio n  cs p rem ised  on  th e  
va lid ity  o f the  “n a tu ra l  o rd e r  th a t h a s  its  u ltim a te  fo u n d a tio n  in  th e  theological 
idea  o f  creation" a n d  th a t w ith  th e  d isa p p e a ra n c e  of th is  co n tex t of ju s tific a tio n  
th e  “g ro u n d in g  of a e s th e tic s  led inevitab ly  to  a  ra d ic a l su tje c tif ic a tio n ” in  th e  
m ode o f the  d o ctrin e  of th e  “freedom  o f th e  g e n iu s  from  ru les"  (Loc. Cit). 
U ndoub ted ly , a n o th e r  c ru c ia l p o in t of refe rence  for H eidegger’s  e ssa y  is  in 
G a d a m e r’s view Hegel’s a e s th e tic s  an d  th e  a tte m p t to  reconcile th e  subjective 
w ith  th e  u n iversa l, th e  fin ite w ith  th e  infin ite  by  recogn ising  in  a r t  the  
ex p re ss io n  of sp irit, w hich  cou ld  be g rasp ed  in  i ts  perfec tion  by ph ilosophy  in  a  
c o n c e p tu a l form. To th e se  in flu en ces G ad am er a d d s  -a lb e it <n a  negative sen se- 
th e  d o m in a n t at th e  tim e m ovem ent of N eo-K an tian ism , a g a in s t  th e  “p rejudices" 
of w h ic h  H eidegger is sa id  to  have b eg u n  h is  e s sa y  by  “ask in g  how  th e  w ork of 
a r t  is  d iffe ren tia ted  from  a  th ing" (Ibid: 102).
J e a n  B e au fre t (1970: 434-435 ) a d d s  a  final to u c h  to  th e  c a n v a s  by no ting  th e  
p e c u lia r  re la tio n sh ip  be tw een  H eidegger’s  reflec tions o n  th e  origin  of th e  w ork of
presuppose the sacred”, while this interplay between the sacred and the profane i- raid to take place also in
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a r t  w ith  w hat H usserl w rote a t th e  sam e period a b o u t  the  origin of G eom etry. 
In B eau fre t 's  view a c o n tra s t  betw een  th e se  tw o w orks Is e ssen tia l for a n  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  degree o f H eidegger’s d e p a rt urn from H u sserl’s 
phenom enology206, a n d  especially  o f the  specific co n n o ta tio n  - th e  concept of th e  
ph en om eno n  a cq u ires  in H eidegger’s philosophy. To be su re , bo th  th in k e rs  
a im ed  th e  "th ings them selves" a lb e it in a  q u ite  d is tinc tiv e  fashion. The m ain  
d ifferen tia tion  th a t  B eaufre t is ab le  to identify  is  th e n  th a t  in the  case  o f 
H eidegger concea lm en t is a co n stitu tiv e  p a r t  of th e  phenom enon , or th a t  th e  
"p ecu lia r c h a ra c te r  of a  p h en o m en o n  is to  be e ssen tia lly  ihe b eare r of a  Not 
(Nicht) w hich is n o t exclusively th a t  o f a logical n e g a tio n ” (Ib*d‘ 434).
H eidegger is th e n  seen  a s  ask in g  a  q u estio n  n o t ra ise d  by e ith e r H usserl o r 
K ant, nam ely  th e  q u es tio n  concern ing  w h y  th e  “th ing  itse lf ' is "heavily 
sh ro u d ed " . B eau fre t's  a rg u m e n t is th a t a lth o u g h  for K ara a n d  H usserl the  
“th in g -itse lf ' w as seen  a s  “sh ro ud ed " for the  sam e re a so n  th a t  "two right ang les  
a n d  th e  su m  of th e  ang les of a  triang le  is n o t im m ediate ly  ev iden t”, H eidegger 
w as ab le  to d em o n stra te  -following H erac litus an d  Schelling- the in te rre la tion  of 
d isc lo su re  an d  concea lm en t, w hich  is b es t exem plified in H eidegger’s 
co n cep tio n  of onto-theoloyy.
It is  especially  the  "onto-theological s tru c tu re ” th a t  fo r B eaufret is no t re la ted  to 
m e ta p h y s ic s  in the  sam e m a n n e r  “a s  the  equality  o f  two right ang les is re la ted  
to  th e  su m  of the  an g le s  of a triang le" b u t w hich e ssen tia lly  p o in ts  u s  to w hat
art (T&M: 150-151)
16 Beautret (1970) seems to argue that Heidegger’s reception in France was widely mediated by a 
misleading identification o f his understanding o f phenomenology with Husserl's approach. Although it is 
beyond the scope of the present work to assess this issue, it has to be remarked that there is a striking 
similarity between Beaufret's point and Gadamer’s criticism of Derrida’s perception of Heidegger and 
especially of Derrida’s argument against “the metaphysical concept o f logos" and against “the logocentrism 
that is inscribed even in Heidegger’s question about Being as a question about ti c meaning of Being". As
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h a s  the  tendency  to "rem ain unnoticed", viz. to th e  "undii-A osed harm ony"  of 
m e ta p h y sic s  itse lf (Ibid: 435).
At an y  ra te , H eidegger's m e d ita tio n s on  a r t  a re  p e n re a te d  th ro u g h  a n d  
th ro u g h  by the  a ttem p t to link  a r tis tic  c rea tio n  an d  ex p erien ce  w ith  th e  m ode of 
t r u th  (aÀ r|0E ia) th a t b eco m es accessib le  in unconcealnum t a n d  w ith  th e  
experience  of the  “histo rical". O n  the  one h a n d , th e  w ork-asirect o f th e  “w ork of 
a r t"  is show n to e n c a p su la te  th e  “p a th s  a n d  re la tio n s  in  w h ich  b ir th  a n d  d ea th , 
d is a s te r  an d  b lessing, victory a n d  disgrace, e n d u ra n c e  a n d  decline acq u ire  th e  
sh a p e  of destiny  for h u m a n  b e in g ” (see Heidegger, 1975: 42)
T h is  line of th o u g h t, w ith th e  e m p h a s is  it p laces  on  historical belonging  a n d  o n  
th e  d estin y  of a  peoples is re m in isc e n t o f th e  reflections o n  h is to ric ity  in  Being  
a n d  Time o r  in  the  In troduction  to M etaphysics, w hile it  c a n n o t escap e  th e  
in se r tio n  of the  odd "sp ecu la tiv e” rem ark  co n cern in g  th e  n a tio n 's207 " re tu rn  to 
itse lf  for th e  fulfilm ent of its  vocation" (Loc.cit).
D esp ite  ap p e a ra n c e s  p o in tin g  to  the  co n tra ry , it is d o u b tfu l w h e th e r th is  
fo rm ula tion  can  be trea ted  a s  ideological th ro u g h  a n d  th ro u g h , s in ce  H eidegger
Gadamer (1985/1989b: 112) emphatically puts it though this is “an odd Heidegger. a Heidegger interpreted 
back through Husserl; as if speaking consisted merely o f prepositional judgements”.
21,7 As observed in the second chapter, the "nation” is often confounded with the 'Volk”. In fact the same 
concerns are echoed in Heidegger's so-called “political writings”, i.e. in the writings from the period of 
Heidegger's "involvement" with "politics" and his "partisanship" for National Socialism, although in this 
context they are vested with a more "militant" tone. Accordingly in an address to the students of Freiburg 
University entitled "National Socialist Education”, Heidegger attempts to refute what he understands as a 
fundamental claim o f Marxism, namely that “the worker” is a "mere object of exploitation" by defining 
"work" as “well-ordered action that is borne by the responsibility of the individual, the group, and the State 
and which is thus of service to the Volk". Heidegger wishes to show how mental and manual labour are 
united in the very concept of work, while the whole discussion is articulated Tom a perspective which 
substitutes the concept of the Volk for that o f the social class, as the following lines of his speech show: 
“Worker and work, as National Socialism understands these words, does not divide into classes, but binds 
and unites Volksgenossen and the social and occupational groups into the o :e great will o f the State 
(Heidegger. 1993b: 59).
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h a s  elsew here20” show n th e  sha llow ness  o f com m on percept.ions of w h a t  could 
be te rm ed  a  “h is to rica l m iss io n ”.
T he w ays in  w hich  th is  h is to rica l vocation is fulfilled in th e  < n a c tm e n t o f h isto ry  
ta k in g  place a m id s t th e  s trugg le  betw een  th e  e a r th  an d  th e  w orld  a re  for 
H eidegger exem plified a lso  in  tragedy  in th e  form  of a  b a ttle  betw een  th e  new  
a n d  th e  old gods. T his does no t m ean  th a t  th is  “b a ttle ” Is explicitly d ra w n  in 
th e  linguistic  w ork "o rig inating  in th e  sp eech  of th e  people”, b u t  it is  ra th e r  
c loaked  an d  tran sfo rm ed . A fter th is  m u ta tio n  “th e  people 's saying" is  itself 
tran sfo rm ed  a n d  the  b a ttle  is hencefo rth  fough t by “every liv itg  w ord”.
W hat is  a t s ta k e  in th is  b a ttle?  A pparen tly , Heideggt t ’s poetical effusion 
b o o sted  by a n  elusive reference to fragm en t 53 o f H erac litus  se e s  in  the 
ou tco m e of th is  b a ttle  a decision  concern ing  “w h at is  hoi) a n d  w h a t unho ly , 
w h a t  g reat a n d  w hat sm all, w h a t brave an d  w h a t cow ardly, w hat lofty a n d  w hat 
flighty, w hat m a s te r  a n d  w h a t slave" (Ibid: 43). W hat is therefo re  accom p lish ed  
by th e  w ork is th e  e rec tion  of a  world; of th is  “ever-nonobjective to  w h ich  we are 
su b je c t a s  long a s  b ir th  a n d  death" hold “u s  tra n sp o rte d  in to  Being". Given 
th a t  in  the  h e rm e n e u tic  phenom enological ja rg o n  th e  “world w orlds"209, the  
w o rk  is sa id  to  “hold u s  op en  to the  O pen o f th e  world", w hich H eidegger also
2IH< See for example the following, quite illuminating remark: "Then the question would be whether man has 
ever been decisively given over into the realm of decision belonging to his own .'ssence, so that he shares 
in the grounding o f his historical essence and does not merely busy himself with his 'historical missions’. 
Then it would be completely doubtful whether we can already know who we are, whether we can know this 
at all with the present claims of thinking" (Heidegger, 1998c: 75-emphasis added!. I think that the tone of 
the passage, and especially the use of the verb “to busy” that Heidegger often uses to indicate inauthentic 
comportment suggests that when Heidegger speaks of a historical vocation he does not wish to merely 
replicate the ideological certainties characterising the political struggles o f his tin es.
21 However. Gadamer sees in this strange phraseology a break with the customary and a subsequent 
placement of language itself in the center of philosophical self-reflection. Alreat's in 1920 “as I myself can 
testify", writes Gadamer (I985/I989b: 103), “a young thinker- Heidegger to be exact- began to lecture...on 
what it might mean to say ‘es w e l l e t it ‘worlds'. This was an unprecedented oreak with the solid and 
dignified, but at the same time scholasticized, language o f metaphysics thai had become completely 
alienated from its own origins".
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te rm s "the  se lf-d isc lo sing  o p e n n e ss  of th e  b ro a d  p a th s  if th e  s im p le  an d  
e ssen tia l d ec is io n s  in  th e  d estin y  of a n  h is to rica l people" (Ibi.'J: 44 -4 5 , 48).
T he “ea rth "  is ev idently  u sed  a s  a lim itin g  con ep t in so fa r a s  it 
exem plifies “se lf-sh e lte rin g  a n d  closing off' th e re b y  co m p le tf g th e  H eideggerian 
concep t of t r u th  a s  in c e ssa n t in te rp lay  b e tw een  co n cea lm e n t a n d  
u n co n c ea lm en t, w hile p roviding H eidegger w ith  one m ore c h a n c e  to  a tta c k  
scientific co n cep tio n s  of t ru th  a n d  m a ste ry 210. It is t ru e  th a t  H eidegger's 
poeticising  lan gu ag e  seem s a t  tim es s tran g e , w h ic h  m igh. very well ind icate  
th a t  h is  th in k in g  “la c k s  a  language" a n d  it t h u s  “o ften  resem b les  a  to rm en ted  
s ta m m erin g ”.
Indeed, w ith  th is  p h ra s e  G ad am er (1994: 25) h a s  su ccessfu lly  ep itom ized  th e  
experience  of being  co n fro n ted  w ith  th e  H eideggerian  uixt. D esp ite  th e  
lingu istic  o b scu rity , w h ich  occasionally  b o rd e rs  w ith  ab su i iity 211, it cou ld  be 
qu ite  fru itfu l if som e th o u g h t w as given to  th e  w ay  in  w hicn th e  w o rk  of a r t  is 
sa id  to  d isc lo se  th e  “e a r th  a s  earth " , i.e. a s  essen tially  “u n d isc lo se d  an d  
u n ex p la in ed ”, a s  re s is ta n t  to  th e  m an ip u la tiv e  c a lc u la tio n s  o f sc ien tific  reaso n . 
More im p o rtan tly  it cou ld  be ask ed  how th e  w o rk  of a r t  m a k e s  m a n ife s t in 
genera l th e  “a b y ss” im plied  in the  very co n cep t o f  “t r u th ” rb o u g h t in  te rm s  of 
“u n c o n c e a lm e n t” (H eidegger. 1975: 51).
2111 As a phenomenological concept, the Earth is said to shatter "every attempt l > penetrate into it” and to 
cause “every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into destruction". Ii an explicit attack against 
the sciences Heidegger furthermore suggests that this destruction "may herald u elf under the appearance 
of mastery and of progress in the form of technical-scientific objectivation of nature, but this mastery 
nevertheless remains an impotence o f will". It is also important to note that th*. earth is also seen as the 
shelter upon which "historical man grounds his dwelling in the world” (Heideggr 1975: 47).
211 Jaspers (1993: 148-149) for example sees Heidegger’s use o f language as c o n 1, ining the “seriousness of 
nihilism with the mystagogy of a magician". Despite this remark, Jaspers is wiJ.ng to accept that in “the 
torrent of his language” Heidegger “is occasionally able, in a clandestine and remarkable way. to strike the 
core of philosophical thought".
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It is a n  e s ta b lish e d  fact t h a t  those  critica l o f H eidegger's ph ilosophy  
regarded  h is  a tte m p t to  th in k  the  possib ility  of a  m odality  o f t ru th  lying beyond 
th e  reach  of scien tific  re a so n  an d  a rg u m e n ta tiv e  logic w ith  g rea t su sp ic ion , or 
w ith  the  u n sh a k a b le  belief th a t  th is  w as a  m ere h o ax 21-' A lthough th e se  
ob jec tions have to  be ta k e n  in to  a cc o u n t, it is equally  im p o rta n t to fu r th e r  
reflect on H eidegger's a rg u m e n t b y  following the  exam ple  of th e  V an G ogh’s 
p a in tin g  dep ic ting  a  p e a sa n t 's  sh o e s  th a t  H eidegger offers in o rd er to  b es t 
i llu s tra te  h is  position  a n d  to sh o w  how it p refigu res  G ad am er’s  concep t of 
a e s th e tic  non-d iffe ren tia tion , an d  th e  event of t ru th  rnad r g en era ted  by the  
“fu sio n  of h o r iz o n s",
The m a in  scope of H eidegger's a rg u m e n t is o f co u rse  to e s tab lish  th e  
possib ility  of a  m ode of know ing w h ich  a s  d is tin c t of th a t  o f th e  sciences does 
n o t e x h a u s t itse lf w ith  the  p re se n t-a t-h a n d  an d  th is  is  w hy he beg ins h is  
in te rp re ta tio n  w ith  a  q u es tio n  co n cern in g  th e  th in g -c h a ra c te r  o f the  w ork of a rt. 
T h is  perspective ex p la in s  the  s tra te g y  o f iso la ting  a n  o rd in ary  “piece of 
equ ipm ent" , p e a sa n t sh oes, from  th e  re s t of V an  G ogh 's p a in tin g  an d  
com m en ting  excessively  on  it. D esp ite  th e  fact th a t  in  H eidegger's th o u g h t it 
w ou ld  be im p erm issib le  to tre a t th e  w ork of a r t  a s  'eq u ip m en t', h e  nev erth e less  
w ish es  to d raw  o u r  a tte n tio n  to th e  equ ipm en t-like  n a tu re  of th e  p a ir of sh o e s  
in  question .
H is stra tegy  is nex t to  show  th a t  th e  sh oes ex ist q u a  eq u ip m en t by belonging to 
th e  everydayness of, o r by being  u se fu l to, th e  p e a s a n t  w om an  w ho is dep ic ted  
w earing  them . It is  th e n  precisely  th e  q u es tio n  of u se fu ln e ss  th a t in  H eidegger's 
view d isc loses th e  field a s  the  p lace  w here th e  sh o e s  a re  i.se d  a s  equ ipm en t. 21
212 Gadamer (1994: 21) puts ¡1 quite mildly in saying that his critics simply thought that after the “so-called
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F u rth erm o re  th e  sh oes are  sa id  to be m o st originally  "w hat they  a re ”, w h e n  they  
fall to  claim  th e  p easan t w om an 's  a tte n tio n , i.e. w hen  sh e  Is no t really  aw are  
sh e  is w earing  them  b u t sh e  sim ply “s ta n d s  a n d  w alks in them ".
T h is re la tio n sh ip  w ith the  sh o e s  exem plifies on  the  one h.-.nd th e  m a n n e r  in 
w hich  th e  sh o e s  serve the  w om an, a n d  on  th e  o th e r  h a n d  th e  p rocess in  w hich 
th e  sp e c ta to rs  “e n c o u n te r th e  c h a ra c te r  o f e q u ip m en t” (Heidegger, 1975: 35). 
A ctually , th is  piece of eq u ip m en t is sa id  to  d isclose a  w hole world  o f an x ie ty  
co n cern in g  th e  certa in ty  of daily  b read , “th e  w ord less joy  of having o n ce  m ore 
w ith stood  w an t” an d  the  ever p re se n t th re a t  o f “d e a th ”.
It cou ld  be sa id  w ith G ad am er (1994: 103) th a t  th e  "whole world of ru ra l  life is 
in  th e se  sh o e s”. T his p a ir  of shoes, q u a  e q u ip m e n t is the  v seen  n o t o n ly  a s  
belonging  to th e  e a rth  an d  being  “p ro tec ted  in  th e  world  of th e  p e a sa n t w o m a n ”, 
b u t  a lso  a s  being  p e rh a p s  th e  only m e a n s  by  w hich  th e  “e a r th ” an d  th is  “w orld” 
c a n  even  be d isclosed. In p u rsu in g  h is  in te rp re ta tio n  of th e  V an Gogh p a in tin g  
a  s te p  fu rth e r, H eidegger a s s e r ts  th a t  th e  e ssen tia l consequence  o f  the  
u se fu ln e ss  ch a rac te r is tic  of e q u ip m en t is i ts  reliability.
H aving ten ta tively  "com pleted” h is  in te rp re ta tio n , H eidegger sees th e  p a in tin g  a s  
“th e  d isc lo su re  of w h at the  equ ip m en t, th e  p a ir  of p easan t shoes is in  tru th " , 
since th is  “entity" is su pp o sed  to em erge “in to  the  u n co n c ea led n e ss  of i ts  be ing” 
(Ibid: 36). More im portan tly , the  w ork of a r t  in  genera l show s itse lf a s  w h at 
allow s “the  d isc lo su re  of a  p a rtic u la r  b e ing  in  its  being" an d  c o n s ti tu te s  
therefo re  a  h ap p en in g  of t ru th .
The experiencing  o f  a r t  is for H eidegger a n  event of t ru th  in a sm u c h  a s  the 
in te rp re ta tio n  of V an G ogh's p a in tin g  e s ta b lish e s  first the  in a d e q u ac y  of
turn [Kehre] Heidegger’s thinking no longer stood on solid ground”.
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“d o m in an t th in g -co n cep ts” for th e  co rrec t in te rp re ta tio n  o'" w orks of a rt. an d  
second ly  th a t the  "m ost im m ed ia te  reality  of th e  w ork, its  th 'ig ly  s u b s tru c tu re " , 
does n o t belong to  it in th e  com m only  p o s tu la te d  w ay (Ibid: IV}).
T h a t is why th e  “ridd le” o f a r t  (Ibid: 79) c a n  in  p rinc ip le  - a n d  d esp ite  
H eidegger’s scep tic ism  reg ard in g  the  fu n c tio n ing  o f co n tem p o rary  a r t213- be 
linked w ith th e  p ossib ility  of the  even t of t r u th  th a t  H eidegger ca lls  clearvig214. 
In th is  con text H eidegger em ploys the  no tion  o f c learing  (Ibid: 54-55) in  a n  
a tte m p t to  exp ress  th e  t r u th  h ap p en in g  “in  th e  w ork-being  o f th e  w ork”, w hich 
he conceives a s  being  th e  ou tcom e of a  doub le  concea lm en t.
T h us, the  clearing  is w h a t em erges o u t o f concealm ent in  th e  m odes of 
d issem bling  an d  d en ia l, an d  w h ich  by being  conceived a- belonging  "to the  
nature o f  truth a s  unconcea ledness"  en ta ils  a  co m plem en tary  concep tion  of 
t ru th  a n d  u n tru th . In  a n o th e r  p a r t  of h is  w ork  H eidegger fo rm u la tes  the  
h ap p en in g  of t ru th  in  a  m a n n e r  th a t  p laces even  e rra n c y  in th e  m id s t of the  
in te rp lay  of co n cea lm en t an d  u n co n c ea lm en t. E rran cy  is th e n  u n d e rs to o d  a s  
belonging  to “the  o rig in a ry  e ssen ce  of tru th "  a longside  co n cea lm en t a n d  is th u s  
elevated  from the  o rd in a ry  defin ition  of a n  “iso la ted  m istak e  to b e ing  tre a te d  a s  
"the k ingdom  (dom inion) of th e  h isto ry  of th o se  en ta n g le m e n ts  in w hich  all 
k in d s  of e rrin g  get in terw oven" (Heidegger. 1 9 3 0 /1 9 9 8 : 150-151).
S ince H eidegger em ph a tica lly  p ro n o u n c e s  a r t  to  be  the  "becom ing a nd  
happening  o f  truth" it is  h a rd ly  su rp ris in g  w h en  he  a n n o u n c e s  th a t  t ru th  can  be
113 See for example the following remark made by Heidegger in the Spiegel inter lew: “I would like to say 
that I do not see how the modern art shows the way |to the task of thinking], especially since we are left in 
the dark as to how modern art perceives or tries to perceive what is most proper to art" (Heidegger. 
1966/1993b: 115).
214 Heidegger (1975: 53) importantly introduces his conception of lightning the t. Mowing manner: “In the 
midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting. Thought in reference to 
what is, to beings, this clearing is in a greater degree than are beings. This open centre is therefore not
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th o u g h t a s  a ris in g  ou t of n o th in g 215. A lthough n o t a  p ro p er co n cep t, the  
'no th ing ' signifies in  th is  con text th e  opposite  of a n  object c( /iceived a s  “p re sen t 
in  th e  o rd inary  way" w ith  w hich th e  w ork of a r t  m ight h, c o n tra s te d , while 
po in ting  to th e  'fact' th a t  t ru th  is n ever derived from  objects, i.e. from  the  
"present" an d  th e  "ordinary". “R ather" co n tin u es  Heidegger 'th e  o p en in g  u p  of 
th e  Open, a n d  th e  clearing  of w h a t is, h a p p e n s  only £■ .«■ . the  o p e n n e ss  is 
p rojected, sk e tc h e d  out" an d  m a k e s  "its advent" in the  m id st o f D ase in ’s 
‘th ro w n ess’ (Ibid: 71). Im portan tly , H eidegger fu r th e r  in tro d u ces  th e  co ncep tion  
th a t  all art is “essen tia lly  poetry"2'6 a n d  p laces language217, 4s w hat "n o m in a tes  
beings fro m  out of th e ir  being” in  th e  cen tre  of the  ad v en t o. t ru th . N ot only is 
language th o u g h t a s  syno n y m o u s w ith  the  clearing  an d  o p e n n e ss  p e rtin e n t to 
th e  h u m a n  D asein . b u t  a lso  it is c laim ed  -conversely- th a t w here “th e re  is no
surrounded by what is; rather, the lighting centre itself encircle all that is, li<e the Nothing which we 
scarcely know”.
215 There is o f course yet another dimension in which in Heidegger’s thought the "nothing” is linked with 
the event of truth, since it is argued that "in the clear light of the nothing the original openness o f beings as 
such arises”, namely in the recognition “that there are beings- and not nothing”. This “not nothing”, which 
is normally used as an "appended clarification” is seen as rather making “possible the manifestness of 
beings in general", while “the essence of the originally nihilating nothing lies in this, that it brings Da-sein 
for the first time before beings as such”. More importantly, few lines below Heidegger explicitly 
formulates his conception of Dasein's transcendence with reference to the nothing and anxiety: “Da-sein 
means: being held out into the nothing...Dasein is in any case already beyond beings as a whole. Such 
being beyond beings we call transcendence". It is no accident that therefore the possibility o f selfhood and 
freedom  is seen as grounded on the “original manifestness of the nothing”, while Heidegger formulates the 
relationship of anxiety with the “nothing” in terms of a question: “If Dasein ,jn  adopt a stance toward 
beings only by holding itself out into the nothing and can exist only thus, and if the nothing is originally 
manifest only in anxiety, then must we not hover constantly in this anxiety in order to be able to exist at 
all?" (Heidegger, 1929/1998: 90-91).
2lf’ It follows that Heidegger (1975: 72-73) wishes to dissociate his conception or poetry from the allegedly 
“vulgar" view that sees poetry as "an aimless imagining of whimsicalities” and “a flight o f mere notions 
and fancies into the realm of the unreal". Consequently Heidegger wishes to question whether the "nature 
of poetry" can be "adequately thought of in terms of the power of imagination ' Apparently, Heidegger 
adopts here-even if in a negative manner as a result of a polemical attitude against vulgar conceptions of 
art- a pejorative conception of imagination, which does not square with Castoriadis’ attempt to give a new 
dimension to this term.
217 There is an urgency concerning Heidegger’s (1975: 73) plea to wrest language out o f a conception that 
sees it as “a kind o f communication", or as a tool for "verbal exchange and agreement”.
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language" a s  in the  ca se  of the  re s t of an im a l a n d  in a n im a te  n a tu re , “th e re  is 
a lso  no  o p en n e ss  e i th e r  of th a t  w hich  is n o t a n d  of th e  em pty  ' (Ibid: 72-73).
G ad am er (1994: 108) in te rp re ts  th is  H eidegger’s  idenh fica tio n  of a r t  w ith  
the  p ro cess  of poetic ising  a s  th e  exposition  o f th e  fac t th a t th e  “n a tu re  of a r t  
does n o t co n s is t in tra n sfo rm in g  som eth ing  th a t  is a lread y  form ed o r in  copying 
som eth ing  th a t  is a lre a d y  in Being".
Is it a  m ere  co inc idence th a t  H eidegger a n d  G a d a m e r a tte m p t here  to  theo rise  a 
m ode of t ru th  p e r tin e n t to the  event of a rt. w h ic h  b e a rs  a p p a re n t s im ila ritie s  
w ith C asto riad is ' a t te m p t to theo rise  the  ra d ic a l n a tu re  of .m ag ination  a n d  of 
socio -h isto rica l c re a tio n ?
D espite th e  fact th a t  G ad am er’s  explicit a t te m p t  to  sa feg u a rd  th e  d o m ain  of 
a rtis tic  a n d  re lig ious experience218 from  i ts  b e in g  to tally  ‘co lon ised” by th e  
political a n d  H eidegger’s quasi-m y stica l a s p ira tio n  to  be the  "g u ard ian  a n d  
sh ep h e rd  of B eing” a re  h a rd ly  com patib le  w ith  C a sto riad is ' unequ ivocal 
rejection  of any  form  of religious o r q u a s i-m y stic a l experience  a s  ind icative of 
“heteronom y", th is  q u es tio n  sh o u ld  rem ain  o p en .
At an y  ra te , G ad am er (1994: 109) re in fo rces th e  H eideggeriun in sig h t in to  th e  
cen tra lity  of lan gu ag e  an d  th e  exem plarity  o f poetic c rea tio n  by e m p h a s is in g  
th a t th e  “poet is so  d ep e n d e n t u p o n  th e  la n g u a g e  he  in h e r its  an d  u s e s  th a t  th e  
language of h is  po e tic  w ork of a rt c an  only re a c h  th o se  w ho co m m an d  th e  sa m e  
language". T his e n a b le s  G ad am er to in tro d u c e  h is  co ncep tion  regard ing  “two
218 This attitude is perchance apparent in Gadamer’s agreement with Derrida and Vattimo regarding the 
"need to be free from all dogmatism, above all the dogmatism which refuses to see in religion anything 
other than the deception or self-deception of human beings”. It has to be emarked that behind the 
recognition regarding the “urgency of religion" that Gadamer traces in Derrida ai d Vattimo’s contributions 
to the Capri Dialogues lurks the "common ground” of Heidegger’s "search o f God” combined with his 
attempt to break with “western metaphysics”. Of particular interest is Gadamer’s assertion that perhaps 
“we are concerned here with a problem which cannot be solved through human -eflection” as “Heidegger
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projects" ch a rac te r is in g  the  w ork of a rt, viz. one project “th a t  h a s  a lready  
occurred  w here a language h o ld s  sway", a n d  a  second , co m plem en tary  pro ject 
th a t "allow s the  new  poetic c rea tio n  to com e forth from  th e  ‘i r s t  p ro ject”, while 
acknow ledging the “ w ork of language" a s  th e  "m ost p rim ord ia l poetry  of Being” 
(Loc.cit- em p h as is  added).
Now. w ith regard  to th e  linguistic  w ork, G adam et h a s  no p a rtic u la r 
difficulty in  es tab lish in g  firs t the  in e x h au s tib le  c h a ra c te r  of poetic o r 
ph ilosophical texts, an d  second ly  th e ir historical m ode of being, w hich  is 
fu rth erm o re  likened to  the  m ode of being o f a  h isto rica l event.
A pparently , th is  analogy is b a se d  on a  co n cep tio n  of language  itse lf  a s  a n  even t 
p roper (T&M: 427), a n d  indeed  on the  "ontological view” th a t 'be ing  is language- 
le ., self-presentation- a s  m a d e  accessib le  by  the  “h erm en eu tic  experience of 
being” (T&M: 487).
T hus, in  th e  sam e m a n n e r th a t  h isto rica l even ts c a n n o t be g ra sp ed  in  th e ir  
en tire ty  w ith  reference to th e  in ten tio n s  o f th e ir  p ro tago n is ts , th e  in te rp re ta tiv e  
a ttem p t o f th e  read er of a trad itio n a ry  tex t219 can n o t be red u ced  to  a  recovery of 
the a u th o r 's  in tended  m ean in g  (T&M: 373).
himself in the end (i.e. in the Spiegel interview] came to recognize” in saying that "only a God can save us" 
(Gadamer. 1998b: 207).
219 It has to be remarked that Gadamer ( 1989b: 37-39), acknowledges that neither all modes of writing, nor 
all "forms of linguistic communicative behaviour” exemplify the same mode of finality with regard to the 
opening up o f a world characteristic o f dialogical meaning. Gadamer therefore notes that “within the 
communicative event itself we find texts that offer resistance and opposition to textualization”, i.e. counter- 
texts. which can be distinguished in three broad categories, viz. as anti-texts [Antitexte] (e.g. jokes, irony), 
pseudo-texts (Pseudotexte) ('filling' material devoid o f authentic meaning) and pre-texts [Praetexte] 
(ideological constructions, dreams as theorised by psychoanalysis). Two major implications follow this 
Gadamer's distinction: First, that even behind the construction of counter-texts lurks a common socio- 
historical tradition, a “supporting mutual understanding" as the philosopher emphatically puts it, and which 
is explicit in the functioning of “antitexts” and implicit -surfacing only indirectly in the process of 
translation-in the case of "pseudotexts". Secondly, in an explicit reference to Habermas Gadamer takes the 
opportunity to note in relation to “pretexts” that the “critique of ideology” t an itself be criticised as 
ideological in that it “represents antibourgeois interests, or whatever interests th y may be”, while "at the 
same time masking its own tendentiousness as critique” (Ibid: 39).
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W hat Is the refo re  im portan t is th a t  the  “re c o n s tru c tio n ” of t>'e “q u e s tio n ”220 th a t 
gave rise  to th e  poetic, philosophical, or a n y  o th e r k in d  oi ex tu a l w ork  o f a r t  
c an n o t be sim ply  “retrieved” w ith  th e  aid o f a  "h isto rica l m e tro d ”.
T his reco n stru c tio n  is ra th e r  h in d e re d  by  th e  te x t’s r- d istance  th a t  often 
tak es  the  form  of the  read ers ' “being  perplexed" in  th e ir  e n c o u n te r  w ith  the  
“trad itio na ry  world", a n d  it therefore a lw ays a lready  triggers w h a t G ad am er 
calls a  “h is to rica l self-m ediation  betw een  th e  p re se n t an d  tra d itio n 221” (T&M: 
374). T his m edia tion  reverses th e  expected  "relation  o f q u es tio n  a n d  answ er", 
the reb y  forcing th e  read e r to go b o th  beyond  the  ho rizon  < / th e  “p re se n t"  an d  
the  h isto rica l horizon  p resen ted  by the  text.
As G ad am er fo rm ulates it in  a n o th e r  p a r t  of Truth  a i'd  M ethod, g en u in e  
or a u th e n tic  h e rm en eu tic  experience co n firm s th a t  trad itio n  “a s s e r t s  i ts  own 
t ru th  in being  understood", w hile in  so do ing  it a lso  “d is tu rb s  th e  h o riz o n  th a t 
had , u n til th e n , su rro u n d ed  us" (T&M: 486). T h is do es n o t m e an  th a t  G ad am er 
a ttr ib u te s  som e su prem acy  to th e  “origin"222, o r th a t  th e  p re se n t is in  a n y  sen se
2211 It has to be remarked that in Gadamer’s view the "original question” circumscubes an horizon in its own 
right, and thus the “openness of a question” is not conceived as "boundless" but as determined and "limited 
by the horizon o f the question", while a completely indeterminate question, a question lacking an horizon 
“is, so to speak, floating" (T&M: .163).
221 It has to be remarked that in speaking o f “tradition and of conversation with tradition” Gadamer 
(198571989b: Ill-emphasis added) does not really wish to "put forward a collective subject". Rather, 
tradition is said to be "the collective name for each individual text”, the very noti> n o f text being employed 
“in the widest sense, which could include a picture, an architectural work, even a natural event”. In effect, 
Gadamer’s attempt to avoid a reification o f tradition, results also in a more fluid conception o f the human 
“subject". As Aylesworth (1991: 64) observes, Gadamer finds -following Heidegger- in speaking a 
moment of belonging “in which we are already claimed and constituted by/as a tradition”, moreover a 
tradition that “is never, as such objectifiable”. Arguably, Aylesworth has found tne best possible manner to 
express the relationship between “tradition” and “humans” with the employment of this “by/as". He is thus 
able to infer that “just as we cannot objectify ourselves insofar as we belong to end are a tradition, so too 
with the text. As something that speaks, it is inalienable from its tradition and its concomitant 
historically".
222 It is mainly for this reason that I admit that I find it difficult to follow Van mo’s indirect critique of 
Gadamer's understanding of the process o f the fusion of horizons as performed by the "historically 
effective consciousness". More specifically, Vattimo (1998: 88) recognises rn the one hand that the 
“wirkungsgeschichte of every text, and of the biblical text above all" cannot be ignored. On the other hand 
he also seems to point to an omission on Gadamer’s part in asserting that "the tact that the sacred texts
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theorised  a s  "defective" in relation  to  trad ition , since in th e  ' dia lectic  of q u es tio n  
a n d  answ er" e lab o ra ted  by the  ph ilo sopher th e  “original q u es tio n  to  w h ic h  the  
tex t m u s t be u n d e rs to o d  a s  an  answ er" h a s  a  “originary  superiority  to  and  
freedom  from  its  o rig in s” (T&M: 577).
T his is b e s t  exem plified if one  tak es  in to  acc o u n t th e  exam ple o f  p re ­
em in en t tex ts  h a n d e d  down to u s  by trad ition , a s  it is th e  case w ith  c lass ica l 
tragedies. T h ese  traged ies were indeed  w ritten  “for a  ce rta in  festival" and  
ad d ressed  a “p a r tic u la r  social p resen t" , b u t th e ir  m eaning , th e ir  tru th -c la im s  
a re  in no  se n se  confined to the  socio-h isto rical m om ent o ' th e ir  c re a tio n  b u t 
they  ra th e r  a d d re s s  every su b se q u e n t h isto rica l age (T&M: 5 /7 ) .
G adam er is t h u s  ab le  to conclude th a t  a  "recon stru c ted  qu estio n  c a n  never 
s ta n d  w ith in  i ts  original ho rizon”, since the  “h is to rica l ho rizon  th a t 
c ircum scribed  th e  reco n stru c tio n  is n o t a tru ly  com prehensive  one”, b u t  is 
in s tead  "included  w ith in  the  horizon th a t  em braces u s  a s  th e  q u e s tio n e rs  who 
have been  e n c o u n te re d  by the  trad itio na ry  w ord” (T&M: 374).
More explicitly p u t. th e  " recon stru c tio n ” of the  original q u e sh o n  is only possib le  
in a sm u ch  a s  it e n ta ils  tha t the  co n cep ts  o f"  a  h isto rica l p a s t” are  “reg a in ed ” in 
su c h  a  m a n n e r  th a t  they  “also  inc lude  o u r own co m prehension  of th e m ”, i.e. a s  
long a s  they  a re  the  re su lt of th e  p rocess th a t  G ad am er calls the  fu s io n  o f  
horizons (T&M: 374). As rem ark ed  above though , an d  d esp ite  h is  in s is te n c e  
th a t the  fusion  o f horizons th a t ta k e s  place in  u n d e rs ta n d in g  "is actua lly  the  
achievem ent o f  language"  (T&M: 378), th e  d isc losu re  of a  “w e l d ” en ta iled  by the
which mark our religious experience are handed down to us by tradition" ent • Is that the mediation of 
tradition does not allow the texts “to survive as unmodifiable objects”. Vattimo seems then to suggest that 
Gadamer's account o f the fusion of horizons does not allow for an adequate theorisation of the changing 
character of the traditionary text -and perhaps of historical events in general- and therefore partly 
reproduces a reified understanding of the past.
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con fro n ta tio n  a n d  "fu sio n ” w ith trad itio n  is for G adam ei by n o  m e a n s  th e  
exclusive privilege of te x tu a l or lingu istic  w orks of a rt. R a th ri th is  d isc lo su re  is 
a lso  seen  a s  finding a n  ex p ress io n  in  all m odes of a rt, th e  "m ode o f being" of the  
w ork o f a r t  in  general be ing  conceived in  te rm s  of p re se n t s/tion223 (T&M: 138). 
S ta tu e s  a n d  h isto rica l m o n u m e n ts , b o th  of "religious" a n d  secu la r"  origin are  
th u s  sa id  to  d isp lay  th e  "un iversal ontological valence of p ic tu re s  m ore clearly  
th a n ...in tim a te  p o rtra its" , while m aking  p re se n t th a t  w hich  'h e y  re p re se n t in  a 
m a n n e r  th a t  differs sign ifican tly  from  th e  m ode of re p re se n ta tio n  fam ilia r to the  
"aesthe tic  co n sc io u sn ess" . T his is d u e  to  the  fact th a t  th e  n  o n u m e n t 's  "life” is 
evidently  n o t confined to  the  "au to n o m o u s expressive  p o w f; ' of th e  im age b u t  
ra th e r  a lso  by th e  q u a s i-p re se n c e  of th e  com m em orated  h is to rica l even t, o r  of 
the  relig ious a n d  cosm ic  pow ers it a t te m p ts  to  "g rasp” a n d  w h ich  a re  held 
p re se n t “in  th e ir  genera l sign ificance” by th e  very function ing  o f th e  m o n u m e n t 
(T&M: 149).
For G ad am er th e  p rinc ip le  of non-d iffe ren tia tion  is the  fu n d a m e n ta l in ten tio n  
b eh in d  even  th e  m ost e lem en tary  form s of religious experience  like th a t  of 
m agic224. T his p rinc ip le  is a lso  seen  a s  the  fu n d am en ta l c h a ra c te r is t ic  of the  
m ost "prim itive” m ode o f p ic tu res, viz. of m irro rs , w hile it is s e e n  a s  rem a in s  
essen tia l to  “all experience  of p ic tu re s” d esp ite  th e  progressive dev elop m en t of 
aes th e tic  d ifferen tia tion , i.e. of th e  ab ility  to perceive a  w ork of a r t  th ro u g h  the  
m ediation  of a e s th e tic  n o tio n s  an d  c rite ria  (T&M: 139).
225 As Gadamer explains lew pages below, this characterisation of the mode of being o f the work of art 
"includes play (Spiel) and picture (Bild), communion (Kotnmunion) and representation (Representation)” 
(T&M: 151).
'2J Gadamer proposes the thesis that although the identity and non-differentiation of picture and pictured is 
only found in the “prehistory” o f the picture, this hardly entails that “a consciousness o f the picture that 
increasingly differentiates and departs further and further from magical iden'ity can ever detach itself 
entirely” from this identity. It is important to note that Gadamer furthermore intc-prets the “sacralization of
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In effect, the  w ork o f a r t is conceived a longside lan gu ag e  as 'a n  ev en t o f being"
(Seinsuorgang) a n d  the refo re  a s  th is  "event o f p resen ta tio n " , v h ic h  c a n  ac tu a lly  
re su lt in  the  re so lu tio n  of “the  a b s tra c tio n  perfon  ,ed by a e s th e tic  
d ifferentiation" (T&M: 151).
W hat is th e n  “preserved", "re -approp ria ted" a n d  ' p resen ted "  in  th is  
fusion  of ho rizons c h a ra c te r is tic  of the  w ork  o f a rt?  If we a d m it th a t  the  
re la tio n sh ip  betw een  th e  artw ork  an d  lan gu ag e  is no t acc id en ta l th e n  each  
accom plishm en t th a t  re su lts  from  the  fu sio n  m u s t have th e  fu n d am en ta l 
c h a ra c te r  of a  'h a p p e n in g  in language’ an d  m u s t  the refo re  hr n o th in g  le ss  th a n  
a  "com ing-to- p re se n ta tio n  of Being" (T&M: 159).
F a r from d es ig n a tin g  a n  a b s tra c t an d  in d e te rm in a te  s ta te -o '-a ffa irs , th is  fusion  
is first an d  forem ost th e  exem plification of a  p rese rv a tio n  o the  “th in g -n e s s” of 
th ings, i.e. a  re te n tio n  of the  specific q u a litie s  th a t  ca n n o t he a n n u lle d  b u t  he 
ca lcu la tions of technological reaso n . In th e  s a m e  m a n n e r  th a t  Rilke “poetically  
illum inates  the  in n o cen ce  of the  th in g  in th e  m id s t of th e  general d isa p p e a ra n c e  
of th in g n ess  by sh ow in g  it to th e  angel", th e  th in k e r  is in p rinc ip le  cap ab le  of 
con tem p lating  "th is  very th ingness" in e n c o u n te r in g  th e  w ork o f a r t  (G adam er, 
1994: 108). P aradox ica l though  it m ight seem , G ad am er does n o t only recognise 
the  force of lan gu ag e , of th is  “p rim ord ial poe try  of Being" in  th e  poetic  a n d  the  
artistic: he ra th e r  e x te n d s  it to the  “very th in g -b e in g  of thing:- them selves". Is a 
th in k in g  th a t conceives of “all a r t  a s  poetry" a n d  th a t d isc lo ses  th e  iden tity  of 
the  w ork of a r t  w ith  language, “still on th e  w ay to  language" is G ad am er (1994: 
109) a s s e r ts  in a n  a llu s io n  to Heidegger’s la te  w ork?
art in the nineteenth century” as a specific manifestation o f the principle of 1 >n-differenliatinn (T&M: 
139).
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4.2: History, Continuity. Rupture: Fulfilled Time 6c the Existential Moment
It h a s  b een  re m a rk e d  above th a t  G ad am er’s concep t i in  of the  fu sion  of 
ho rizons, b u t a lso  th e  overall o rien ta tio n  o f h is  ph ilo sop ); y o ften  c rea te  th e  
im p ression  th a t  h is  co n cep tio n  of h is to rica l tim e p u ts  in a p p ro p ria te  em p h a s is  
on  co n tin u ity  a n d  c o n s e n su s  an d  th u s  overlooks d isco n tin u ity , d iscord , a n d  th e  
em ergence of new, u n p re c e d e n te d  form s in  h isto ry . C e n tra l to  th is  so rt of 
critic ism  w ould be th e  p a ra m o u n t im p o rtan ce  G ad am er a t t r ib u te s  to th e  no tion  
of trad itio n  a n d  w hich  c a n  be easily  in te rp re te d  a s  a n  ideol 'g ical opposition  to  
th e  m o d em  project.
A lthough  I have  a lread y  tried  to  show  th a t  th e  fu n c tio n  of trad itio n  a n d  
th e  idea  of th e  fu sio n  o f horizons in  G ad am er 's  th o u g h ' are  not p rim arily  
political, th e  issu e  re q u ire s  fu rth e r d isc u ss io n . O ne w ould  have su sp ec ted  th a t  
the  invocation  of th e  d ialogical m odel for th e  the o risa tio n  o f o u r  e n c o u n te r  w ith  
trad itio n  - a n d  th u s  even  w ith ou rse lves- could  have p a rtly  ap p eased  th e  
critic ism s.
For, conversation  is  indeed  seen  by G a d a m e r a s  th e  "m a n n e r  in  w hich  p a s t  
tex ts, p a s t  in fo rm ation  a n d  form s of h u m a n  creative effort r t a c h  us", a n d  s in ce  
no t only art “b u t  all h u m a n  tid ings [K u n d e ] w hich we per reive, sp e a k  to  u s ” 
(G adam er, 1972: 239). conversa tion  m u s t be  th e  m ain  fe a ia re  o f th e  fu s io n  of 
horizons.
In o th e r  w ords, th e  b ack b o n e  of th is  fu s io n  is  th e  d ia lec tic  o f q u es tio n  a n d  
answ er, a  d ia lec tic  m e d ia tin g  the  tra n sm iss io n  of trad itio n  a n d  th e  pro jection  to 
the  fu tu re  in a  n o n -a rb itra ry  m ann er, i.e. n o t by “endles.'-ly...ex p an d in g  th e  
horizon o f th e  p a s t”, b u t ra th e r  by "posing q u e s tio n s  a n d  find ing  answ ers", th a t
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a re  seen  a s  arising  o u t of “w h at we have becom e", w h ist b r n g  a lso  “g ra n te d  to 
u s  a s  possib ilities  of o u r  fu tu re ” (G adam er, 1972: 240).
D escrib ing  o u r  e n c o u n te r  w ith  th e  tex t, G ad = m er (1989b: 51)
re c o n s tru c ts  th is  dialogical m odel by the  p o s tu la tio n  o f an  “i.'.ner ear", a n  “In n er 
eye" a n d  th u s  we cou ld  a lso  say  of a n  “in n e r  voice" th a t m ake -a lo n g s id e  the  
c o n co m itan t d isap p ea ran ce  of "the in te rp re te r"225- possib le  the  very a c t  of 
u n d e rs ta n d in g . N evertheless, a s  expected  ob jec tio n s are  indeed  ra ised  a g a in s t  
th is  dialogical m odel, th e  first concern ing  i ts  alleged re liar i e on  K an t's  m oral 
ph ilosophy , an d  especially  on the  K an tian  ideal o f the  ‘good will” a n d  the  
“ab so lu te  com m itm en t for c o n se n su s  a n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g ' re su ltin g  from  it 
(D errida. 1989: 52).
Not only  is th is  p o s tu la tio n  in  D errida’s  (1989: 53) view a  re la p se  to  the  
"m etaph y sic s  of th e  will", b u t  it a lso  p o se s  fu r th e r  p rob lem s, th e  m ost 
im p o rta n t of w hich is th a t the  p recond ition  o f in terp re tive  d isco u rse  (Verstehen) 
“far from  being  th e  co n tin u ity  of r a p p o r t .. . is . . .r a th e r  th e  in te rru p tio n  of 
ra pp o rt, o r  in  o th e r w ords the  " su sp en d in g  of all m ed ia tiou ”(ibid: 52 -53). To 
th is  one cou ld  add  D errid a 's  ob jec tions co n cern in g  the  possib ility  of em ploying  
th e  co n cep t of “lived experience", “lived context" (L e b ens.'a sa m m en h a n g ). or 
even o f "experience" (Erfahrung )226 a t  all, on  th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  “u su a lly  
m e ta p h y s ic s  p re se n ts  itse lf a s  the  d esc rip tio n  o f experience a s  s u c h , of 
p re se n ta tio n  a s  s u c h ” (Ibid: 52-53).
This is evidently a prerequisite of the fusion, which we have seen addressed .wove in a slightly different 
manner in the discussion o f the principle o f ‘aesthetic non-differentiation’.
22(1 It has to be remarked that Gadamer uses the notion o f experience in what ne understands as a “non 
metaphysical sense”. Aylesworth (1991: 69) observes that Gadamer “is careful io characterise experience 
as Erfahrung. Unlike Erlebnis, Erfahrung includes a moral relation to another an other who speaks and 
calls upon us to respond. Thus for Gadamer, experience is always already linguistic’, and does not 
constitute a substratum that is only brought to language reflectively and sec< «darily”. It follows that
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Clearly, D errida’s b r ie f  b u t decisive in te rv en tion  su m m a rise s  the  m ain  p o in ts  of 
a  possib le  critique of G ad am er 's  ph ilosophy , w hich fu rth e rm o re  - in  a  m a n n e r  
qu ite  d e a r  to d e co n s tru c tiv e  p rac tices- is sa id  to  p roperly  belong to  th e  onto- 
theological fram ew ork, a  fram ew ork c o n cu rren tly  d o m in a te d  by ’p re se n c e ’, th e  
a ttr ib u tio n  of d ign ity  to  the  Will o f the  su b jec t, a n d  ce 'vain ly  a  sy stem  of 
m orality.
G ad am er h a s  q u ite  su ccessfu lly  - a n d  ra th e r  easily - sh a k e n  off D errid a ’s 
critic ism  regard ing  h is  alleged re liance  on th e  K an tian  concep tion  of th e  good 
will a s  the  g ro u nd  o f m ora l law. If we read  betw een  th e  lini :> a n d  we a lso  w ish  
to p a ra p h ra se  N ietzsche in o u r  in te rp re ta tiv e  a tte m p t, we could  say  th a t 
D errida seem s to su g g e s t th a t "old G ad am er’s" co n cep tio n  <• a  good will a s  the  
g round ing  p rinc ip le  for m oral, political, ep istem ic  o r a n y  o th e r so rt c o n se n su s  is 
a t bo ttom  qu ite  naive  a n d  overlooks d ifference.
G ad am er’s (1989b: 55) reply  th o u g h  m a k e s  th e  m o st o f  the dialogical c h a ra c te r  
of th e  exchange b e tw een  the  two th in k e rs  a n d  heavily  cap ita lises  on D errid a ’s 
asking  a  question, in o rd e r to show  how  h is  co n cep tio n  of th e  d ia le c tic s  of 
qu estio n  an d  a n sw e r “is  com pletely u n re la te d  to  K a n t’s  good will, b u t  it  does 
have a  good deal to  do  w ith the  difference b etw een  d ia lec tics  an d  soph istics" . 
O ne can  trace  h ere  o f co u rse  a  reversa l of th e  tab le s  a n d  sen se  th e  irony  b eh in d  
G ad am er’s reply: If D e rrid a 's  q u e s tio n  is n o t m ere so p h is try  it m u s t  be m a d e  in 
expecta tion  of a n  an sw er, an d  indeed  a n  a n sw e r it  gets. T here  is n o th in g  
m etaphysical o r naive  a b o u t it. It is th is  ex p ec ta tio n * 227 th a ‘ in  G ad am er’s  view
Aylesworth’s interpretation would then still ascribe a moral dimension to Gadamer's dialogical model, but 
one of Aristotelian, not Kantian origin.
227 Gadamer (1989b: 56) insists that it is "entirely justifiable to start with the process in which mutual 
agreement is shaped and reshaped in order to describe the functioning of language and of its possible 
written forms”, while asserting that this is "not at all a kind of metaphysics, but tne presupposition that any
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p reced es  any  so rt o f co n sc io u s  “sp eech  act" an d  m akes possib le  n o t only 
d ia logue, b u t a lso  th e  co n s titu tio n  of th e  in te rlo cu to rs  in  a  p rim ord ia l m a n n e r . 
Now, a lth o u g h  it w ould  be qu ite  feasib le to charge  G ad am er h im se lf w ith  
so p h is try  here , th e  po in t regard ing  th e  p rim ord ia l constitu te> n  o f th e  “S e lf ' an d  
th e  “O th e r” in  lan gu ag e  is q u ite  com pelling.
T h in g s a re  ra th e r  m ore com plicated  th o u g h  in  reg ard  of th e  alleged 
d o m in a tio n  of p re sen ce  in G ad am erean  d ia lectics, especially  n  th e  n o tio n  o f the  
fu sio n  o f ho rizons. F or is it n o t th a t  so m eth in g  “past" is by m e a n s  o f th e  fu sio n  
m ade  availab le  ag a in  in the  “now", th a t  th e  “past"  p re se n ts  itse lf  In  the  
“p re se n t"22«?
D oes th is  no t a lso  a m o u n t to a  co n cep tio n  of h is to rica l tim e w hich is u ltim ate ly  
b a se d  o n  co n tin u ity , o r w hich  sees  socio -h isto rica l change a s  the  o u tco m e of 
m ore o r  less sm o o th  ep o ch al tra n s it io n s  a n d  a p p ro p ria tio n s?
And w h a t a b o u t th e  incep tio n  of th e  rad ically  new  in  a  h is to rica l tim e  th a t 
seem s to  have been  th e o rised  m ain ly  from  the  perspective oi rad itio n ?
T here is  of co u rse  G a d a m e r 's  co m m itm en t to th e  infin ity  oi lan gu ag e  a n d  h is 
deep  se a te d  conviction  th a t  every "real sp eak in g  is a  language eve n t  o r to 28
partner in a dialogue must assume, including Derrida, if he wants to pose questions”. More importantly, 
Gadamer sees the expectation o f discord as just another way to “shape", or leave inconclusive the 
dialogical process, as the following caustic remarks make plain: “Is he [i.e. Derrida) really disappointed 
that we cannot understand each other? Indeed not, for in his view this would be .• relapse into metaphysics. 
He will, in fact, be pleased, because he takes this private experience o f disillusionment to confirm his own 
metaphysics" (Loc. Cit- emphasis added).
228 A word of caution is certainly required here. It is quite implausible that Gadaner's understanding of the 
fusion o f horizons would argue for the re-emergence of a reified “past”. This would mean that Gadamer 
would have radically distanced himself from the fundamental principles of F : idegger's conception of 
historical time, which is not at all plausible. Let us briefly recall that Heidegger ,n relation to his attempt at 
the recovery of the original meaning of Being suggests: “ However, we do not 1 ant to make a past being 
live again in the present. On the contrary, we want to become aware of Being. In reflection, we remember 
being and the way it inceptively presences, and presences still as the incept on, without thereby ever 
becoming a present being. The inception is certainly something that has been but not something past. 
What is past is always a no-longer-being, bul what has been is being that still presences but is concealed in 
its incipience”(Heidegger 1998c: 73). Finally one can also point to Heidegger’s '992: I6E) insistence that 
the “past” and the “authentic future can never become present".
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ex p ress  it w ith  H oelderlin , som ething infin ite ly  new "  (G a .am er, 1970: 353). 
C erta in ly  th o u g h , th e re  a re  no  easy  an sw ers  to  th e se  q u es tio n s, a n d  an y  so rt of 
reflection on  th e  is su e s  m entioned  above h a s  to  be ten ta tive . We can  
n ev erth e le ss  a t  le a s t trace  in G ad am er’s  ph ilo sophy  a  w illingness to  b o th  
a c c o u n t a n d  allow  for the  em ergence o f th e  new  in  h is to ry  a n d  even in  th e  
ind iv idual h u m a n  life, a t  least to the  e x te n t to w hich  th e  notion o f h isto ric ity  
can  m edia te  betw een  a  concep tion  of u n iv e rsa l an d  p erso n a l h istory .
Indeed G ad am er (1972: 232) w ish es to  ex p an d  th e  concep t o f h isto ricity , 
w hich  seem s to su gg est "no th ing  a b o u t th e  re la tio n sh ip  o f events - t h a t  it really 
w as so” b u t  r a th e r  in d ica tes  the  specific m ode of be ing  of h u m a n s  w ho s ta n d  
w ith in  h is to ry  a n d  "w hose ex istence  can  b e  u n d e rs to o d  ! u n d a m en ta lly  only 
th ro u g h  th e  concep t of h isto ric ity”, an d  th e  re la ted  concept of th e  "existen tial 
m om ent".
F u rth e rm o re  G ad am er su g g es ts  th a t  the  co n cep tio n  of contii m ity in  h is to ry  can  
be traced  b ack  to  A risto tle 's  m e d ita tio n s  on tim e a n d  especially  on  the  
"ontological e m b a rra ssm e n t w hich befell a n c ie n t G reek  th o u g h t w h en  it cam e to 
defining tim e”, d u e  to th e  inability  to m ake  p re se n t th e  sm alle r co n s titu tiv e  p a rt 
of tim e, viz. th e  "m om en t” exp ressed  in te rm s  of th e  "now ”.
A lthough G ad am er is very carefu l n o t to  identify  th e  expeiience  o f th e  flow of 
tim e w ith  the  p rim ord ia l experience of co n tin u ity  o f h is to ry  h e  n ev erth e le ss  
th in k s  th a t  b o th  co n cep tio n s belong to  th e  sam e ontological horizon , i.e. the  
horizon of the  G reek s229. R ather, the  experience  o f co n tin u ity  in  h is to ry  seem s 
to be g ro u nd ed  o n  th e  fact th a t desp ite  th e  irredeem ab ly  tra n s ito ry  c h a ra c te r  of
' This is one of the many instances where Gadamer's thought is reminiscent of Heidegger’s formulations. 
Gadamer (1972: 233) even suggests that the "ontological problematic of time consists in the fact that for
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h isto ry , indeed  in  the  m id s t of all perish ing , th e re  is a lso  a  “sim u ltaneous  
becoming" an d  vice versa . It follows th a t  th e  alleged c o n tin u ity  or in  g en era l the  
possib le  re la tio n sh ip s  betw een  th e  perceived h is to rica l “e v en ts” are  p rem ised  on  
the  tra n s ito r in e s s  o r on  th e  "en d less  flow of changes" o f h i s t . rical tim e.
Indeed, if th is  concep tion  of h is to rica l tim e c a n  be  up he ld  a t  all, does it 
follow th a t  we c a n  s u c c u m b  e ith e r  to  a n  ex trem e perspe-. dvlsm , o r  to sh ee r 
n o m in a lism ?  If every th ing  in th e  s tre a m  of h is to rica l tim e ' a n  be experienced  
e ith e r in  te rm s of becom ing  a n d  rise  o r of p e rish in g  a n d  fall th e n  th e  view one 
ho ld s o n  h is to rica l ev en ts  w ould  seem  to  be re levan t on ly  to o n e’s  positioning. 
A lthough  even th e  m ost su pe rfic ia l g lance a t the  s ta te  o f h i.-to riography  a n d  a t  
the  d ivergent, conflic ting  in te rp re ta tio n s  of so-called  great h is to rica l even ts 
w ould  su gg est th a t  one 's  p o sitio n in g  p lays a crucia l p a r t  in the  p e rcep tion  an d  
n a rra tio n  of h is to ry , the  q u e s tio n  p e rs is ts  w h e th e r th e  ap p i -ciation o f even ts is 
e ith e r com pletely  a rb itra ry  o r u ltim ate ly  red u ced  to  b e in g  s itu a te d  to  p a rtic u la r  
con tex ts .
A s G ad am er (1972: 233) rem ark s , even c lassificato i y sy s te m s  can  be 
seen  a s  th e  p ro d u c t of "our ad  ju d ica tin g  co n sc io u sn ess"  an d  in  th e  la s t  an a ly sis  
a s  a rb itra ry  a n d  the refo re  a s  hav in g  no  "genuine h is to rica l reality”.
This ev idently  p o s its  a n  irred eem ab le  b reach  be tw een  h is to rica l ev en ts  an d  
th e ir p e rcep tion  a n d  in effect dep rives th e  even ts th em se lv es  from  a n y  claim  to 
h is to rica l c o n sc io u sn ess . G a d a m e r a sk s  h is  re a d e rs  to  tak e  w ith  h im  a  s te p  
back  from  th is  view of h is to iy  allegedly b ased  on G reek  ontology a n d  from  the  
"e rron eo u s n o m in a lis tic  te n d e n c y  of th is  w ay of th in k in g " in o rd er to  allow  for a 
m ore p rim ord ia l experience  o f h is to ry  to em erge.
the ancients their own Being was neither expressible nor understandable within the framework of the
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T here Is th e n  for G ad am er ru p tu re 230 o r d isco n tin u .ly  in  th e  co u rse  of 
even ts, w hich is not reducib le  to th e  in terp re tive  w ork ings o f h u m a n  
co n sc io u sn ess , b u t  ra th e r  h a s  its  ro o ts  in th e  h is to rica l even ts them selves. 
More accura te ly  p u t, G adam er (1972: 233) p o s tu la te s  th e  o .is te n c e  o f a  k ind  of 
“original experiencing  of the  tim e-sp an  of a n  epoch  (e;:<>cheneinsch.nittes)", 
w h ich  inform s an d  g ro u n d s  the  d iffe ren tia tions a n d  classific v tio n s  p refo rm ed  by 
h is to rica l co n sc io u sn ess.
K an t's  d ic tu m  a b o u t the  F rench  revolution , nam ely  th a t  “s u c h  a n  ev en t does 
n o t le t itse lf be fo rgo tten”, is th e n  in te rp re te d  by G a d a n v r  (Loc. Cit) a s  a n  
ind ica tion  of th is  p ecu lia r pow er of h is to rica l even ts, w hich su g g e s ts  th a t  the  
“h is to rica l conste lla tion" m ark in g  a n  “epochal tim e-sp an  ¡s n o t a n  ex ternal 
m e asu re  from  w hich  one re a d s  tim e b u t  ra th e r  de te rm in es  ih e  c o n te n ts  of tim e 
itse lf ', of “w h a t we call history".
T h u s , a ltho u g h  th e  ac tu a l a ttr ib u tio n  of “ep o ch -m ak in g  s ign ificance” to  a  
h isto rica l even t is a  p rocess possib ly  flaw ed w ith  erro r, a n  ep o ch -m a k in g  event 
is sa id  to p ro d uce  in h u m a n  c o n sc io u sn ess  th e  experience of d ifference a n d  
d iscon tinu ity , “of cessa tio n  in the  m id s t of in c e ssa n t c h a n g e ” (Ibid: 234), in
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o th e r w ords it is  seen  a s  "estab lish in g  a  caesura"  (G a titm er, 1970: 349). 
A pparently , th e  m a in  fea tu re  of a n  'even t' of th is  o rd e r is th;<. it in te rru p ts  w h a t 
H eidegger u n d e rs ta n d s  a s  the  " in a u th e n tic ” experience  of tim e, i.e. th e  
“reckon ing  w ith  t im e ”231 th a t from  tim e im m em oria l h a s  allegedly  concealed  th e  
fu n d am en ta l p ro b lem  of th e  be ing  o f tim e w ith  its  em phasis, on  th e  u se  of tim e 
for th e  p u rp o se s  o f  tem poral m e asu rem en t.
It is well k n ow n  th a t th is  reck o n ing  w ith  tim e th a t  is  b es t exem plified by 
th e  h u m a n  b e in g 's  re la tio n sh ip  to  th e  clock c o n s titu te s  for b o th  H eidegger232 
a n d  G ad am er a lso  the  b a s is  for th e  developm ent of th e  sc ien tific  concep t o f 
tim e. G ad am er (1970: 343) sees  th is  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f tim e  in  te rm s  of a n  
“em pty  flow” a s  m o s t u sefu l for th e  p u rp o se s  of m e a su re m e n t an d  for “th e  
quan tify ing  o b se rv a tio n  of p ro c e sse s  of m otion" o f the  n a tu r a l  sc iences, a t  leas t 
before th e  developm ent of the  co n cep t of s im u lta n e ity 233 in m o d em  p h ysics
2.1 In Being and Time Heidegger attempted to show how the ‘time’ that is commonly accessible to Dasein 
is not primordial, but rather is concurrent with the phenomenon o f making-present, which is seen as the 
"primary basis for falling into the ready-to hand and present-at-hand”. Having established this, Heidegger 
aspired to designate as primordial time, authentic temporality, i.e. the temporality which is not an entity but 
rather “temporalizes itse lf’ and which manifests itself as the EKaxartKOV  pure anj simple”. Furthermore in 
an attempt to draw a distinction between the reified temporal dimensions thar result from inauthentic 
experiences o f time and authentic temporality. Heidegger opted to call “the phenomena of the future, the 
character of having been, and the Present, the 'ecstases' of [authentic] temporality". Authentic temporality 
is then for Heidegger “the primordial 'outside-of-itself in and fo r  itse lf, and thus not an “entity which first 
emerges from itself.; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity o f the ecstases” (B&T: 376-377). 
The importance of this distinction for Heidegger’s account of authentic historicity cannot be overestimated, 
since Dasein's being authentically "there" in the moment o f vision as regards the Situation [as opposed to 
the simple state-of-affairs] which has been disclosed” is premised on tempora.ity making possible “the 
unity of existence, facticity and falling” and in this way constituting “primov Jially the totality of the 
structure o f care" (B&T: 376).
2.2 Heidegger (1992: 4E) sees the clock, of what "shows the time”, as the exemplification of the manner in 
which the physicist encounters time, since it “is a physical system in which an identical temporal sequence 
is constantly repeated", while it “provides an identical [temporal| duration that constantly repeats itself’. It 
is important to nole that in Heidegger's view in this kind of reckoning with time no “now-point of time is 
privileged over any other. As now', any now-point of time is the possible earlier o f a later; as 'later', it is 
the later of an earlier".
2,1 Similarly. Heidegger (1992: 3H) has as early as 1924 identified a reawakening of interest in time in the 
natural sciences and especially in Einstein's relativity theory, which he des aibes as formulating the 
following propositions: “Space is nothing in itself; there is no absolute space. exists merely by way o f  
the bodies and energies contained in it (An old proposition of Aristotle). Time too is nothing. It persists 
merely as a consequence of the events taking place in it. There is no abso'ute time and no absolute
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“relativ ised  th e  problem  o f tem p o ra l m e a su re m e n t”. H istorical tim e is not 
tho u g h  originally  “m easu red  tim e”, a n d  w here it a t ta in s  th is  form  a s  in  th e  case 
of chronological c lassification  a n d  th e  d is tin g u ish in g  of h is to rica l periods, it 
does no t have th e  ch a ra c te r  of th e  a rb itra ry  “co -o rd ina tion  of a n  ev en t to  the  
periodicity  of n a tu re  or of heaven" (G adam er, 1970: 349).
D espite th e  fact tha t h is to rica l an d  n a tu ra l  tim es £»e sa id  to  differ in 
n a tu re , it w ould  be at least im p ru d e n t to  su rm ise  th a t  they  a re  radically  
incom patib le , a n d  p erh ap s  th is  ex p la in s  w hy G ad am er u s e s  a  m e ta p h o r from 
the  rea lm  of n a tu re  in o rd er to d escribe  th e  p ecu lia r c h a ra c te r  of th e  epoch. 
T hus, in as tro no m y  “a  ce rta in  co n ste lla tio n  w as originally  d es ig n a ted  for 
chronological p u rp oses , w hich by i ts  re a p p e a ra n c e  is a k in d  of c a e s u ra ”, an d  
w hich m a rk s  a  new  cycle of ce lestia l m ovem ents. S im ilarly , a s  a lready  
rem arked  above, the  p h ilo sop h er u n d e rs ta n d s  a n  ep o ch -m ak in g  even t a s  
e s tab lish in g  itse lf a caesura  in th e  flow of h is to rica l tim e in  o th e r  w ords a s  
dem arcating  b e tw een  th a t w hich p a s se s  aw ay a s  old an d  th.iv w hich  em erges a s  
new 234.
Accordingly, th e  experience of tim e a tta c h e d  to  the  daw n in g  of a  new  epoch 
m u s t have th e  ch a ra c te r  of d isco n tin u ity  a n d  tran s itio n , a n d  indeed  G adam er
simultaneity either". Even in the case of Einsteinean physics though, the problem of time remains in 
Heidegger’s opinion still thought from the perspective of measuring nature within a "system of space-time 
relations".
2,4 Gadamer (1972: 234) also calls the experience of historical time caused by an epoch-making event a 
“cessation in the midst of incessant change” and attempts to further clarify the nature of the “event” with 
recourse to the manner in which this experience finds its expression in everyday speech. Thus, in 
Gadamer’s understanding, when people designate their historical times say as the "epoch of atomic energy” 
what they indirectly indicate is that "something ‘new’ has happened such that it will not soon be cancelled 
out by some other ‘new’ and conversely, that in the light o f this ’new’ we must denominate the ‘old’ as old 
in a qualitatively distinct and unambiguous sense". Moreover, as Gadamer remarks a few lines below, 
when such an epoch-making event occurs, "it is as though time itself has grown old, not only in the sense 
that the past is something sunken and no longer actual and present -  a uniform and surveyable temporal 
stretch of oldness, so to speak- but also in the sense that its own future stands under the epoch-making 
significance of an epoch-making event"
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w ish es  to show  how  th e  no tion  of t r a n s it io n  ind ica tes  th e  ' »rue being  o f tim e”, 
a lth o u g h  in a  d ifferen t sen se  th a n  th a t  ind ica ted  by  th e  tra n s ito ry  an d  fleeting 
n a tu re  of th e  “now" (G adam er. 1970: 350).
T here is certa in ly  som e so rt o f p rox im ity  betw een  w h a t  cou ld  be called 
th e  “ex isten tia l” a n d  th e  “h is to rica l” e v e n ts  a s  G ad am er’s  a c c o u n t v e n tu re s  to 
show . On th e  one h a n d , ph ilosoph ical reflec tions on  tim e s in ce  A risto tle have 
in  G ad am er's  view a lm o st invariably  acknow ledged  th e  h u m a n  being  a s  the  
c re a tu re  w ho h a s  a  u n iq u e  sen se  of tim e  (aio0qoi§ xpovou). T h is sen se  of tim e 
p o in ts  a t  th e  sam e tim e to the  h u m a n  being’s ab ility  to  lave fo re s ig h t  an d  
the refo re  to an tic ip a te  th e  fu ture , a l th o u g h  -reg re ttab ly - G a s a m e r  b y p a sse s  the  
p rob lem  posed  by th e  lim it-case of fo res ig h t in  the  form  o f p iop h ecy .
It is tru e , sa y s  G ad am er th a t even a n im a ls  show  a  ce rta in  an tic ip a tio n  of th e  
fu tu re  in  p rep arin g  them selv es  in v a r io u s  w ays for d ifferent e a s o n s  of th e  year, 
b u t  th is  is h a rd ly  a  sen se  of tim e p ro p e r, w hile it s e e m s  to be en tire ly  
d ep en d en t o n  the  n a tu ra l  cycle of life235. F o resigh t in  the  c t '.e  of h u m a n  beings 
th o u g h , m e a n s  seeing  “an tic ipa to rily  t h a t  w h ich  is n o t y e t” a n d  th e reb y  bridg ing  
th e  “foreseen" w ith the  "presen t" an d  th i s  is why a  sen se  o f tim e  is sa id  to  be  “a  
s e n se  for w h a t is fu tu re"  a s  the A ris to te lian  no tion  o f “p ro le p s is” m an ifests .
Is n o t p u rp osefu l ac tio n  the in s ta n c e  w h ere  the  ‘fu tu r ity  ch a rac te r iz in g  the  
h u m a n  experiencing  of tim e seem s to  fin d  its  m o st p u re  e x p ress io n  a n d  w here 
h u m a n  b e ing s can  be seen  a s  b re a k in g  w ith  the  cycle o f n a tu r e  in  pro jecting  
a n d  p e rh a p s  even a tta in in g  th e ir ow n g o a ls?
235 So-called “collecting animals" like bees and ants are a limit case though .*nd they arguably pose a 
challenge to philosophy, since lliey “seem to have something analogous to hue .jn foresight” as Gadamer 
(1970: 343) readily admits. In any case the experience of time between aninals and humans seems to 
differ dramatically, although it is true that being relatively in the dark ev .v  with regard to human 
temporality it is extremely difficult to extrapolate on the animal sense of time with certainty.
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G a d a m e r's  a n sw e r to th is  q u es tio n  can  be ra th e r  seen  a s  am b ig u o us. 
For. in  th e  very  h e a rt of w hat is considered  to be a  positive a n d  u n iq u e  a ttr ib u te  
o f h u m a n  beings G ad am er -follow ing Heidegger- tra c e s  a n  in a u th en tic , or 
derivative m ode of tem porality . T he very a c t of envisaging he desired  s ta te  of 
affa irs th a t  p u rp osefu l ac tion  s tr iv es  to ac tu a lise  is sa id  to  g en era te  a  q u a s i-  
reified experience  of tim e, w hich p erm its  "tim e to a p p e a r  a s  so m eth in g  of w h ich  
m a n  can  d isp o se ”, w hile a lso  c rea tin g  a  p ecu lia r sen se  of "em pty" d u ra tio n .
T he la tte r , being  g ro u nd ed  on th e  h u m a n  being 's "an tic ip a to ry  d isposition" 
signifies fo r G ad am er ra th e r  a n  experience  of tim e a s  "tim e for” a n d  tim e u n ti l” 
th e  a c tu a lisa tio n  of th e  aim , w hich fu rth e rm o re  m akes tim e a p p e a r  a s  “em p ty ” 
s in ce  it is viewed prim arily  in re la tio n  to "w hat fills it” (G adam er, 1970: 343). 
Like H eidegger, G ad am er sees  the  possib ility  of a  p rim ord ia l o r a u th e n tic  
experience  o f tim e lying in th e  con fro n ta tio n  of h u m a n  b e ing s w ith  death , s in ce  
in  th is  c a se  tim e itse lf if experienced  in th e  form of a  “h o stile  opposition" th a t  
“d es tro y s  th e  illusion of a n  un lim ited  co n tin u a tio n  of th e  possib ility  of d isposing  
o f tim e”. D eath  is h ere  in ten d ed  in  the  w idest possib le  se n se  an d  far from  
referring  m erely  to biological dem ise, it a im s to e n c a p su la te  any  so rt  of 
“borderline-experience" th a t m akes accessib le  the  irreversibility  of tim e th ro u g h  
th e  “negative  experience of being  too  la te  o r past" (Ibid: 3+4). M oreover, th e  
experience  o f a  "prolonged” tim e is ag a in  seen  a s  possib ly  s tem m in g  from  the  
in a u th e n tic  experience of tim e a s  "em pty” an d  d isposab le , even  if in  a  "privative  
form ” a s  it  is  the  case  w ith the  w ay in  w hich  tim e is experienced  in  'boredom ', 
o r  conversely  u n d e r  a  m ore positive light, a s  in the  case  w h in  one w ishes tim e 
could  la s t  longer for th e  sak e  of a b eau tifu l m om ent (Ibid: 34b).
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It could  be th e n  arg u ed  th a t  in G ad am er’s  view, in  th e  c a s e s  referred  to 
above, tim e w ould  be experienced  in  a  derivative form  h respec tive ly  o f th e  
negative o r positive m oods linked w ith  th e  experience itself, s in c e  in  a  se n se  it 
w ould be  again  indirectly  accessib le  in  te rm s of a  m e a s u re m e n t236. As 
rem ark ed  above, G ad am er sees th e  en c o u n te r w ith  d e a th  raid  anx ie ty  a s  th e  
only possib le  p a th  th a t w ould open  u p  the  possib ility  o f  a n  a u th e n tic  
experiencing  of tim e.
In h is  view, the  m o st im p o rta n t inference th a t c a n  be drav rt fro m  H eidegger’s 
an a ly tic  of D asein  is not only the d em o n stra tio n  th a t  th e  m .d e  o f  being  of tim e 
is n o t th a t  of presence-a t-h a n d , b u t  a lso  th e  ack n o w ledg m en t th a t self- 
c o n sc io u sn ess  is no t th e  only so u rce  of th e  "horizon of tim e” R a th e r , the  “ev en t 
of B eing” th a t  becom es accessib le  in  a u th e n tic  tem poi a lity  involves th e  
“co n stitu tio n "  of D a-sein . i.e. the  m u tu a l c o n s titu tio n  of the  h u m a n  being a n d  
of th e  “reg ion” of Being th a t  becom es accessib le  th ro u g h  the p e rm e a tio n  of th e  
tem p o ra l ho rizons of p a s t a n d  fu tu re .
The tem p o ra l horizon available  to h u m a n  beings is th u s  e q u a lly  th e  region in 
w hich th e  h u m a n  being 's  "concern  for ‘c a re ’ u n d e rs ta n d s  i ts e l f ',  while a t  the  
sam e tim e "th is  horizon is “filled by  th is  u n d e rs tan d in g "  (G ad am er, 1970: 345- 
346). T h u s , th e  p ro p er experience of tim e a s  tra n s itio n  w ould  m e a n  th a t w h a t 
G ad am er calls th e  “indefin ite -defin ite” being  of tim e is reco g n ise d  a s  such , a n d  
th a t accord ing ly  h is to ry  is n o t m erely seen  a s  a  c o n c u rre n t "p a s s in g  away" a n d
m  Although Gadamer does not explicitly make this point, one cannot help inferring this argument by a 
simple comparison of his position wiih that of Heidegger, whom Gadamer follow s closely in his 
meditations on time. Having explicitly refuted the act of measuring as the “original way of dealing with 
time”, Heidegger (1992: I4E) ventures to show how authentic temporality supersedes boredom, since the 
coming back to the possibilities of the “past” can “never become what one call. boring”, i.e. "that which 
uses itself and becomes worn out”. More importantly, the authentic experience i f time signifies that time 
“never becomes long because it originally has no length”.
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"developing" o f perceived s ta tes-o l- affa irs, b u t  a s  the  em erg-m ce o f th e  new  o u t 
of a n  a c t o f reco llection  of the old a s  it h ap p en s  in th> m id st of i ts  very 
d isso lu tion  (Ibid: 346-347). As G ad am er rem arks, H oelcrrlin ’s  tre a tise  “On 
B ecom ing in  P assin g  Away" is exem plary  in  regard  )f th e  p rim ord ial 
experiencing  o f tran s itio n  in th a t it system atica lly  c o n tra s ts  two m odes of 
d isso lu tion , th e  "ideal" an d  the  “rea l”. The la tte r  refers to  w h a t is  m ost 
com m only perceived  a s  d isso lu tio n , th e  ac tu a l decline and  fall o f socio- 
h isto rica l fo rm atio n s, while the  form er in d ica tes  th e  recolle d o n  o f d isso lu tion , 
th a t  a t  th e  s a m e  tim e p erm its  the  fu tu re  “to be free in its  own, yet u n c e rta in  
d e te rm in a tio n "  (Ibid: 347). T his fo rm u la tion  b rings the  p rob lem  of h is to rica l 
tra n s itio n  c lo se r to th e  very p rob lem atic  of th e  fusion  of h o rizon s an d  to  
H eidegger’s  fo rm u la tio n s  on  the  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  th e  incep tion  o f h isto ry  
a n d  th e  “p re s e n t” tim e.
It d o es  n o t suffice to m erely in d ica te  the  evident re la tio n sh ip  betw een  
G ad am er’s u n d e rs ta n d in g  of the  ho rizon  of the  p re sen t a s  c o n s titu te d  by the  
m erging of th e  ho rizons of the  p a s t a n d  th e  fu ture , an d  H eidegger’s  concep tion  
of a u th e n tic  h is to rica l e n a c tm e n t a s  repe tition  of th e  p a s t’ in  i ts  ‘how ’ 
(Heidegger, 1992: 20E). We sh o u ld  a lso  tak e  no tice of th e  fact th a t  in  th e  sam e 
b re a th  H eidegger a lso  lays b a re  the  “Jlrst principle o f  all hei rneneutics", nam ely  
the  g ro u n d in g  of the  very possib ility  of accessing  h isto rica l tim e on  the  
“possib ility  according to w hich a n y  specific presen t u n d e rs ta n d s  h o w  to be  
fu tu ra T . T h is  fo rm ulation  h a s  in H eidegger's eyes th e  pow er to  reveal the  
fallacies of th e  “fan tas tica l p a th  to su p ra -h is to ric ity  th a t  we a re  su p p o sed  to 
find in the  W eltanschauung"  an d  to e s ta b lish  beyond d o u b t the  in s ig h t th a t  th e  
“en igm a of h is to ry "  is u n a p p ro a ch ab le  a s  long a s  h isto ry  is t ’ sated  a s  “a n  object
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of co n tem p la tio n  for m e th o d ”, since it  r a th e r  “lies in  w h a t it  m e an s  to  be  
h isto rical" (Loc. Cii).
W h at is  really in ten d ed  by th is  ‘how ’ th a t allegedly ‘p e rs is ts ’ in  the  
p assag e  o f h is to ry  a n d  w hy is the  “p a s t”, in  effect h isto rica l tim e itself, sa id  to 
be indeterm inate  by b o th  H eidegger a n d  G adam er?  Indeed, how  does th is  
allegedly novel concep tion  of h is to ric ity  re la te  to th e  “concealed  e ssen ce  of 
h is to ry ”?
O n th e  one h a n d , b o th  th in k e rs  u n d o u b ted ly  a tte m p t to  b re a k  w ith  th e  age-old 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h is to ry  th a t H eidegger - in  w h a t seem s to be  a n  a llu s io n  to 
Schelling ’s  The A ges o f  the  World- d e sc rib es  a s  the  "Ages tha i see in  h is to ry  only 
w h a t is p ast" , w hile d eg rad ing  th is  ‘p a s t ’ in th e  m ode o f “so m eth in g  th a t  ju s t  
n a tu ra lly  p re p a re s  in a d e q u a te  p re -fo rm atio n s of w h a t is a tta in e d  in  the  
p re se n t” (Heidegger, 1998c: 83).
T h is ossified  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h isto ry  e n ta ils  for the  p h ilo so p h er th a t  th e  “ages" 
have b een  -an d  still rem a in - "victim ” to  the  u ltim a te  conv ic tions of h istoriology 
a n d  th a t  they  co n seq uen tly  "busy  th em se lv es  w ith  the  tra n sfo rm a tio n  of 
historical depictions", w h ich  they ’ m is tak e  for "political d eeds" . H eidegger’s 
re sp o n se  to  th is  concep tion  w as ce rta in ly  to  g ra sp  h is to ry  by a n d  large in  te rm s 
of its  inception, a  p e rcep tion  th a t allow ed h im  fu rth erm o re  to define h is to ry  a s  
“the happen ing  /E reignis/ o f  a  decision ab ou t the  e s sen ce  o f  truth". T his p re se n ts  
u s  w ith  a  p rob lem , s in ce  th e  a tte m p t to move aw ay from  a  concep tion  th a t  sees 
in h is to ry  th e  su ccess io n  of a series  o f ev en ts  th a t a re  in te rlin ked  to  form  a 
"cau sa l n e x u s ”, is in H eidegger’s  case  n a tu ra lly  m ark ed  by a  sh ift from  the
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problem  of cau sa lity  to th a t of t r u th 237. As d isc u sse d  in  ea rlie r  c h a p te rs , an d  
especially  in  c h a p te r  two, the  inception  of h is to ry  is seen  a s  d e te rm in ing  the  
"presen t" a n d  indeed  even the  "fu tu re" of "W estern  h u m a r i ty ” a n d  th u s  the  
rem em b rance  of th e  incep tion  is n o t “ a flight into th e  p a s t” b u t  ra th e r  
"read iness  for w h a t is to come" (H eidegger, 1998c: 17).
The p ecu lia r m ode of being  of I lie “incep tion" is fu rth e r d isc lo sed  in  H eidegger’s 
in te rp re ta tio n  o f A naxim ander, w h ic h  a t te m p ts  to m ake the  m o s t of the  
h isto rica l d is ta n c e  sep a ra tin g  the  co n te m p o rary  read e r from  th e  p re-S o cra tics. 
Of p a rtic u la r  im p o rtan ce  for the  p u rp o se s  o f th e  p re se n t v o rk  is H eidegger’s 
in te rp re ta tio n  o f A nax im ander’s d ic tu m  “apxp  icov ovxcov <o dneipov”, w hich 
H eidegger (1998c: 92) re n d e rs  a s  "E n jo in m en t for th e  respectively  p re s e n t  is the  
repelling  of lim its”.
The p a re n th e s is  opened  by th e  th in k e r  a n d  h is  ad d itio n a l c o m m en ts  to 
th is  first, ro u g h , so ch a rac te r is tic a lly  id io syncra tic  tra n s la tio n  iden tifies m ore 
explicitly th e  "en jom m ent" (apxffi w ith  “the  repelling  of th e  lim it” (a-neipov) an d  
fu r th e r  tra c e s  a  p ecu lia r re s is ta n c e  to  d u ra tio n  in  the  very “inc ip ience  of being", 
w hich “w ith h o ld s  itse lf from  w hat h a s  been  com m enced" (Loi.cit). S e ttin g  aside  
the  sen se  o f princip ium  an d  “p rinc ip le" th a t  in  h is  view w as  only la te r  a ttach ed  
to  th e  w ord, H eidegger traces  in  th e  early  G reek  co ncep tion  of th e  apxf) a  
conception  of th e  “beg inn ing  an d  th e  place of beg inn ing  for a  p ro cess , a  re su lt”. 
From  th is  H eidegger infers th a t "being  a  beg inn ing”, in  o ih e r  w o rd s  the  very
237 Thus, the "decision” that marks the inception is said to determine, “transform” and “ground”, the 
“manner in which the whole of beings is revealed” and in which humanity itself “is allowed to stand in the 
midst of this revelation” (Heidegger, 1998c: 17). It is important also to note that Heidegger does not use 
the concept of “ground” in the sense of “cause” since this is perceived by the philosopher as a “premature” 
identification stemming from the conception o f  “a creator according to the Bible and Christian dogma”. 
The alternative would then he for Heidegger ( 1998c: 16) to think “the manner in / hich the ground includes 
us in its essence, not the manner in which we take the ground to be merely an object and use it for an 
explanation o f the world .
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m ode of be ing  o f th e  incep tion  involves "being left b eh in d  ii: the  co u rse  of th e  
[inaugurated] p rocess"  a n d  th u s  it is in  th e  very essen ce  of .he beg in n in g  to be 
“th e re  ju s t  to  be ab an d o n e d  a n d  p a sse d  over”.
The upxij is  th u s  theorized  a s  a  “w ay-m ak ing  for th e  ¡node a n d  co m p ass  
of em ergence" a n d  since  it is not really  “left b eh in d  in the  progression" th e  apxij 
is sa id  to re lease  “em ergence a n d  w h a t em erges". Indeed, th is  re lease  h a p p e n s  
in su c h  a  m a n n e r  tha t “w hat is re leased  is first re ta in ed  in  th e  apxij a s  
en jo inm ent" a n d  co n seq uen tly  the  apxij is  an  “en jo in ing  ey -ess” th a t  perv ad es 
transition. T he apx ij is an  eg ress  th a t  "everyw here p rev .'ls" . a n d  w hich  by 
inc lud ing  every th ing  in its en jo in m e n t “p red e te rm in es  a  dom ain" o r ra th e r  
m akes "an y th in g  like a d om ain  available  in  th e  first p lace ' It is  fu rth e rm o re  
suggested  th a t  b e cau se  "egress a n d  p erv asiveness  belong to g e th e r in th e  
essence  o f th e  ap x ij’’ a th ird  m om en t em erges, no t a s  “a re s u lt” b u t  a s  an  
"equally o rig inary  an d  e ssen tia l m om ent" . T h is  is precisely  “th e  dom ain- 
character  of th e  apx tj, the  m e a su ra b le  a n d  th e  m e a su re d ” (Heidegger, 1998c: 
93- em p h a s is  added). More im portan tly , th e  apx ij d isclosed  a s  the  “threefo ld  
u n ity  of egress, p erva s iveness , a n d  dom ain"  is d irectly  linked w ith  the  aneipov, 
w hich is u su a lly  tra n s la te d  a s  the  “lim itless" o r “in fin ite”.
C orrect th o u g h  th is  t ra n s la tio n  m igh t be, Heideggei n o te s  it still “say s  
nothing" a n d  for th is  rea so n  lie p refers to  in te rp re t  the  d n t ’pov a s  “th a t  w hich 
repels all lim its, a n d  re la tes  itse lf solely to  th e  p resen c in g  of w h a t p resences". 
This re la tin g  o f aneipov to the  e x ta n t h a s  the  c h a ra c te r  of an  incep tion  a n d  
therefore the  a-neipov  itse lf is th o u g h t q u a  apx ij, viz. a s  (he th reefo ld  u n ity
d iscu ssed  above.
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In o th e r w ords, in  H eidegger's in te rp re ta tio n  of A n ax im an d e r th e  anetpov 
is th e  apxf), a n d  indeed  “the  upxtj of be ing”; th e  in c e p tio n  is th e  repelling, 
conceived in th e  form o f a  repelling of lim ita tion  (H eidegger. 1998c: 95). T his 
in te rp re ta tio n  is heavily p rem ised  on  H eidegger's s tra te g y  to  'm is tru s t  g ram m ar 
a n d  stick  to th e  m a tte r  ”, i.e. in re fu sin g  to see in  th e  prefix - a -  a  m ere 
g ram m atica l privatum , th e  ex p ressio n  of m ere  lack  o r a b se n c e . R a th e r  in  the  
com m on com pound  of h is  favourite tr ia d  of a-px ij, d -ru tpov , a n d  a-Af)0£ia 
H eidegger sees  the  ex p ressio n  of the  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  "m ean s  a n d  the  
possibility" of th e  “away" an d  th e  “not" (Ibid; 95-96). Indeed, n o t only is 
H eidegger convinced a b o u t the  e ssen tia l u n ity  o f being  a n d  t r u th  a s  
“an n o un ced" in  th is  com m onality  betw een  aneipov a n d  a \r |0 e ia , b u t  m ore 
im p o rtan tly  he is ab le  to link  p resen c in g  an d  rep e llin g  w ith d u ra t io n  an d  
perm an en ce .
How is th is  p e rm an en ce  to be  th o u g h t if th e  p re ju d ice  of co n te m p o rary  -  
a n d  an c ien t- tim es th a t sees  d u ra tio n  o r la s tin g n e ss  (aei) a s  th e  “h ig h est 
d is tin c tio n  of th e  ov, of w hat p re sen ces” is to be su p e rse d e d ?  Let u s  briefly 
re tu rn  to  A n ax im an d er's  fragm en t an d  to  H eidegger’s  a t te m p t to  d iffe ren tia te  
h is  read ing  from  th o se  of N ietzsche a n d  Diels. In  o rd e r to  b e t te r  g rasp  
H eidegger's read in g  o f A n ax im an d er it is  im p o rtan t to  b e a r  in  m in d  th a t  in 
H eidegger's (1998c; 90) op in ion  d u e  to h is  in sis tence  o n  “the  em pty  o p po sitio n ” 
betw een  being an d  becom ing. N ietzsche h a s  m ade th e  g rasp in g  o f “G reek 
th o u g h t im possib le2™". A lthough a  detailed  a c c o u n t  o f H eidegger’s 218
218 It seems that Heidegger sees the opposition between being and becoming in Nietzsche’s translation of 
the fragment in his posthumously published lecture Philosophy in the Tragic \ge o f the Greeks, which 
Heidegger (1998c: 84) cites: "Where the source of things is. to that place they must also pass away, 
according to necessity, for they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices, in accordance with the 
ordinance of time". It should be noted that Nietzsche’s translation is not based .>:i the Diels-Kranz edition
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in te rp re ta tio n  of th e  frag m en t is beyond  th e  scope of th e  p re se n t w ork, it is  still 
im p o rta n t to cite below  bo th  A n ax im an d er’s fragm en t a n d  H eidegger's 
t ra n s la tio n :
E§’ ov 6c n y£v£oi$ ¿oil tig ouoi, Kai ir|v cp0opav eig tauta 
rivtoO ai Kata to  xpr.wv'6if)6vai yap auta  6iKr)v Kai tio iv 
AAArjAoig Kata tq v  to n  xpovou ia§iv
W hence em ergence is for w ha t respectively p resen ces also an  
E lu d ing  into th is  (as to the Same), em erges accordingly th e  com pelling 
Need; there is nam ely  what p resences itself (from itself), th e  fit, an d  each 
Is respected  (acknowledged) by the o ther, (all o f this) from overcoming 
T he unfit accord ing  to the allo tm ent of tem poralizing by tim e 
(Heidegger. 1998c: 87).
It certa in ly  d o e s  not take  a n  ex p ert in  Greek, o r even a n  in itia te  in  th e  
p ecu lia r itie s  of H eidegger's th o u g h t to recognise in  th is  " tran sla tio n"  a n  
in te rp re ta tio n , a n d  in  I h is  sen se  H eidegger w ould n o t And it d ifficult to 
exem plify the  valiiu iy  of h is  fam ous m otto  w hich  sees a n  in te rp re ta tio n  tak in g  
a lread y  p lace  in every  tra n s la tin g  ac t. In w h a t follows th e  a tte m p t will be m ade  
to  su m m a rise  the  m o st im p o rtan t p o in ts  o f H eidegger's e lab o ra tio n s  on th e  
in te rp re te d  fragm ent w ith  specific e m p h a s is  on  the p rob lem  of tim e th a t  a p a r t  
from b e in g  the m ain  them e o f th is  ch a p te r, co n c lud es a lso  th e  p assag e .
of the Presocratics (Fragmente tier Vorsokratiker) but on an earlier version, where the word u/./.Ty.ou is 
omitted and this explains why this dimension (i.e. the dimension of mutual pt nance, which Heidegger 
translates as “mutual acknowledgement) is lost in his translation (see Nietzsche. 1993: 28-29, translator’s 
note). Heidegger must have felt uncomfortable with Nietzsche’s interpretation, which sees Anaximander's 
fragment as disclosing that the primal being has to be indeterminate in orocr for becoming to keep 
unfolding. It might also be though that Heidegger mostly mistrusted the links Nie'zsche draws between the 
fragment and Schopenhauer's insight in the Parerga und Paralipomena, according to which all human 
beings are condemned to death and thus they can be said to pay for their birth a ft st time with their life and 
a second time with their death. Nietzsche furthermore understands Anaximander as the first who saw in 
the multiplicity of things an aggregate of injustices that have to be paid for and therefore as the first among 
the Greeks who grasped the moral problem regarding the origin of becoming and the perishing of that 
which —presumably by the very ‘fact- of its existence- has "the right” to be (see Nietzsche. 1993: 29-33).
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T he fragm en t s p e a k s  a b o u t yeveois a n d  rpGopa, a n d  these  G reek w o rd s  
have for H eidegger n o th in g  in com m on w ith  th e  N ietzscevn o r the  H egelian  
Ju x tap o sitio n  betw een  "being" an d  “becom ing". In  h is  read ing , yeveois a n d  
cpGopd, ren d e red  a s  em ergence  an d  e lu sio n  are  seen  a s  belonging to g e th er; 
em ergence is sa id  to ac tu a lly  em erge “a s  w h a t e ludes" , a n d  to a p p e a r  “in  th i s  
em ergence w hen  it is  a  tra n s itio n ”. H eidegger th u s  sh.fr.s once  m ore th e  
em p h as is  from  d u ra tio n  to tran s itio n , a lth o u g h  th is  is  a  tra n s it io n  u n d e rs to o d  
a s  p rese rv in g  “w h a t is en jo in ed  in th e  en jo in m e n t”, viz. to dn.apov.
A being, is  no t the re fo re  a  being  "to the  e x te n t to  w h ich  it is  som eth ing  d u rab le "  
b u t  b e c a u se  it is "so m eth ing  tha t p re se n c e s” a n d  ind eed  in  s jc h  a  m a n n e r  t h a t  
th is  p resen c in g  "does n o t decay  in to  m ere p resence" (Ibid: 9b ,.
In c h a p te r  one we have briefly co m m en ted  on  H eidegger’s  belief t h a t  
P a rm en id is  a n d  H erac litu s  u ltim ate ly  say  th e  “Sam e". In th is  c o n te x t, 
A n ax im an d er is th o u g h t to say: "em ergence a n d  e lu sio n  em erge from  a n d  go  
aw ay in to  the  S a m e”. T h is en igm atic  “S am e” do es nor “m erely c o n ta in ” 
em ergence an d  e lu sio n  “like a passive recep tac le”, b u t  it ra th e r  “co rre sp o n d s  to  
the  com pelling  need  [i.e. to the  xpc6v of A nax im ander] b e cau se  th e  la t te r . . . i s  
itse lf th e  S a m e”. In H eidegger's (1998c: 99) so m ew h at aw kw ard  fo rm u la tion , 
“T h is S am e, en jo in m en t (cxpxij), th is  Sam e, th e  aneipov , is  to  xpeov, need , w h a t  
com pels". “Need", to xpeuv, sh ou ld  n o t be u n d e rs to o d  a s  lack , w an t, or m ise ry , 
b u t a s  th e  “m ore fulfilled d e te rm in a tio n  of th e  e s sen ce  if th e  apx ij”, a n d  
therefore en jo in m en t in  the  un ity  of "egress, pervasiveness, d isc lo su re  fo r 
em ergence a n d  e lu s io n ” is seen  a s  hav ing  th e  “fu n d am en tf.l c h a ra c te r  of t h i s  
com pelling  n eed ” (Ibid: 100). F u rth e rm o re  th ro u g h  a n  in te ro re ta tio n  of a S u d a  
as th e  “unfit", a s  "w hat does not fit itse lf in to  e n jo in m e n t” and  respectively  o f
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6iKr) a s  w h a t “fits itse lf in to  en jo in m en t”, H eidegger arrives a t  a n  in te rp re ta tio n  
of “8i6ovai 6iKr|v Kai xiaiv aAAtjAAotg” th a t  sees in  giving “w h; > is fit a n d  g ran tin g  
m u tu a l acknow ledgm ent” a n  overcoming  of "the u n f it” (a&uc»..), w hich  is seen  as 
belonging “to  the  e s se n c e  of p resen c in g  a s  n o n -e sse n c  ’ (Ibid: 101-102). 
O vercom ing the  unfit is  th e n  seen  a s  belong ing  to  “th r  essen ce  o f  w hat 
respectively  p resen ces  a s  s u c h ”, for "as su c h  it fits  in to  t ra n s 't io n ”.
The la tte r  is  sa id  to be "alw ays p resencing , in w h ich  em ergence a n d  evasion  
p resence  above all” an d  to  th u s  c o n ta in  in itse lf “th e  Sam e w hence com ing  to 
be an d  w h ith e r p ass in g  aw ay  p re sen ce”, or it is  th e  “p in e  em erg ing  o f th a t 
S am e”, of "being i ts e l f  (Ibid: 103).
H eidegger h e a rs  in  A n ax im an d e r's  fragm en t th e  in s ip v n t  say ing  o f being, 
an d  sees  being  itse lf a s  “lingering, p resencing’', w hich  u rth e rm o re  in so 
p resencing  "h as  th e  e n jo in m e n t of its  e s se n c e  in tim e ' (Ibid: 104-105). 
N evertheless, th is  tim e, th e  tim e of th e  frag m en t is n o t .he  em p ty  tim e of 
m o d em  science: it is no t a  m e asu rab le  p a ra m e te r, a " s ta n d a rd  scale" w hich 
along  sp ace  m ay serve for m e asu rin g  a n d  e s tim a tin g  som eth  rig .
To th e  m odern  co n cep tio n  of a  unified  sp ace-tim e  H e.degger a t te m p ts  to 
ju x tap o se  the  G reek co u p le t of xpovog-iortog (Ibid: 103). A lthough H eidegger 
(1998d: 141) is well a w a re  of th e  fac t th a t a lread y  “am on g  th e  G reeks, in 
A risto tle 's Physics, th e  e s se n c e  of tim e w as u n d e rs to o d  on  th e  b a s is  o f num ber’’. 
he is convinced th a t th e re  is a p rim ord ial G reek  experience of tim e th a t  m ight 
be traceab le  in G reek m ythology219 an d  poetry. 21*
211 It has to be remarked that myth is for Heidegger the proper means to relate te the appearing being and
thus to the very essence of the divine: "Since t o  Oeiov and t6 5atp6vtov (the di - one) are the uncanny that
look into the unconcealed and present themselves in the ordinary, therefore pub:;; is the only appropriate
mode of the relation to appearing Being, since the essence of puBo.; is determine i just as essentially as are
0eiov and 8oup6viov, on the basis ofdiscloscdness.. .it is therefore that the legend ■ .f the gods is myth...[and
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In  H eidegger's Paim enid.es  it is th u s  a rg u e d  th a t  th e  G reek  "dictum " of tim e  
n a m e s  the  very re la tion  b e tw e e n  co n cea lm en t a n d  d isc lo su re , “a p p e a ran ce  a n d  
em ergence”, a s  it o c c u rs  in Sophocles ' tragedy  A ia g /A j ix  (V, 646f.). In 
co n clud in g  th is  c h a p te r  let u s  briefly co n sid e r th e  Gref k  tex t followed by  
H eidegger's tra n s la tio n :
AnavG’ o jaaKpog avapiO pniog xpovog 
O uei x’ a6rjAa Kai cpavEvrci Kpunictai.
The broad , inca lcu lab le  sweep of lime le ts  em erge everything 
T hat is not open a s  well a s  concealing (again) in itself 
W hat h a s  ap peared  (Heidegger. 1998d: 140)
H eidegger b eg in s  h is  in te rp re ta tio n  w ith  th e  v e rb  Kf/unieaQai, w h ich  he  
sees  a s  equivalen t to  h i s  c o n c e p t  of co n cea lm e n t co n c lud in g  th e reb y  th a t  th e  
p rim ord ia l a ttr ib u te  o f  t im e  (xpovog) is  th a t  it conceals . In  th  s  sense , tim e is n o t 
a  seq u en ce  o f “ind ifferen t n o w -p o in ts "  th a t  can  be  sp a tia lly  d eterm ined , b u t  is 
r a th e r  “so m eth in g  th a t  in  i ts  w ay b e a rs  beings, re lea s in g  th e m  a n d  ta k in g  th e m  
back". In H eidegger's view th e n  tim e is for th e  G reek s  pn tno rd ia lly  “in  every
that] man in the Greek experience, anil only he, is in his essence and according to the essence of aXt)0ciu 
the god-sayer" (Heidegger. I998d: I 12). Thus, not only is the "oblivion o f Being" allegedly characteristic 
of western metaphysics synonymous with a-theism "correctly understood”, i.e atheism viewed as “the 
absence of the gods”, but rather together they are thought as constituting the basic feature of the history of 
the West ever since the decline of "the Greek world” (Loc. Cit). Heidegger (1998d: III)  asserts that we 
can capture the essence of the Greek gods it we call them the "attuning ones", since from this "attuning and 
pointing light stems the brilliance of Octov", o f the “divine" that Heidegger translates as “the shining”. 
Heidegger also capitalizes on the common root of Octov (divine) and 0f:uov (the looking one, the one that 
shines into) to characterize the Greek gods as ouv-ioropc^ with humans, namely the "ones who ‘see- and 
have seen and as such have beings in unconcealedness and can therefore point to them”. Since nevertheless 
the gods are not mere "witnesses" Heidegger calls them also loropEC proper, i.e. as themselves bringing 
something into view, t his conception of the divine entails a fundamental understanding of imopia 
(history) as the bringing into view , as the act of placing “in the light, in the brightness”, as the “event o f the 
essential decision about the essence of truth" (Ibid: 111 and 113). It might be interesting to note in this 
context that Patocka sees Heidegger as grasping history mainly in terms of freedom. This conception 
means that history “is not a drama which unfolds before our eyes but a responsible realization”, or that 
history is never a mere perception on the part of an allegedly disinterested observer but a responsibility. 
However, as Patocka remarks. Heidegger does not understand freedom "either a, a liberum arbitrium or as 
a laxness in the realization o f duty. but...as a freedom of letting being be whai it is”, which presupposes 
“not only an understanding for being but also a shaking of what at first and foi l ie most part is taken for 
being in naive everydayness"( Patocka 1996:49). .
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case  only the  righ t or w rong tim e, the  app rop ria te  o r  in a p p ro p ria te  time", xpovog  
is th e  “favourable an d  g ran ted  tim e a s  d is ting u ished  from  the  un tim ely".
As rem arked  above, th is  p rim ord ial ex p erien ce  of “tim e" do es n o t 
co rrespond  to the  em pty  an d  hom ogeneous space  o f  physics or geom etry  b u t  to  
th e  G reek wnog  th a t  H eidegger tra n s la te s  w ith  the  w o rd  place. T h e  place is  “th e  
originally  ga thering  ho ld ing  of w h a t belongs to g e th e r”; tonoc is “specifically  th a t  
p lace  to w hich som eth ing  ap p e rta in s , e.g. fire an d  flam e and  a i r  up , w a te r  a n d  
e a r th  below” (Heidegger, 1998d: 117 & 140-141 ; Heidegger, 1998c: 103). 
M oreover, in the  sam e m a n n e r  th a t  to nog “o rd ers  th e  a p p u ite n a n c e  of a  be ing  
to  i ts  dwelling place" xpovog regulates  “the  a p p u r te n a n c e  oi th e  ap p earin g  a n d  
d isap p earin g  to th e ir d es tin ed  then  a n d  when".
In th e  excerpt from Sophocles xpovos is th e n  ca lled  paxpoc b ecau se  it h a s  th e  
capacity , “inde term inab le  by m a n  an d  alw ays g iven  the  s ta m p  of the  c u rre n t  
tim e”, to b ring  th ings in to  ap p ea ran ce  an d  to lead th e m  back  to co n cea lm en t.
It is th is  prim ord ial ch a rac te r is tic  of tim e t h a t  H eidegger feels is im m u n e  
to, o r “essen tially  rem ote" from all calcu lation , a s  the  ad jective avapiO pipos 
suggests . Heidegger (1998d: 141) even exp la in s th e  d eriva tion  of th e  G reek  
w ord for tim e from th e  n am e of the  h ighest of th e  Olympic go ds, the  “a n c ie n t 
fa th e r  of Z eus”, the  “im m em orial god" K ronos240 a s  exactly  a n  in d ica tio n  o f th is  
rem o ten ess  from ca lcu la tion  ch a rac te r is tic  of th e  o rig in a iy  experience  o f tim e. 
If xonog an d  xpovog m ake possib le  the  s u rp a s s in g  of th e  derivative an d  
in a u th e n tic  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of the tim e-space  co o rd in a tio n , th e n  they  m u s t  a lso
240 This interpretation r certainly at odds with the ordinary view that the derivation is based on the 
experience a t perishing characteristic of time, which squares with the fact that according to myth Kronos 
was devouring his own children. According to myth Zeus escaped and thus be ie the originator o f the 
line of the Olympian gods.
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p o in t to th e  d irec tion  o f the  o p e n n e ss  m ade availab le  in  th e  experience  o f t ru th  
a s  aAijSeta.
In  effect they  m u s t be p a rad ig m atic  in sh ak in g  th e  im m ed iate  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
be ing  m ak ing  th u s  possib le  a new, u n ex p e c te d  experience  of being. T his 
H eidegger (Ibid: 149) d e sc rib e s  as the  "aw aken ing  for th is  ‘it is' o f a  b e ing ” o r a s  
th e  “w atch ing  over th e  clearing  of beings”, w h ich  h a p p e n s  sudden ly , in  G reek  
e^aitpvrjg o r  a s  H eidegger w rite s  “e§acpavf|g”, tra c in g  in th is  la te r  w ord a n  
ind ica tion  o f “the  w ay th a t som eth ing  i r ru p ts  in to  a p p e a ra n c e , from  non- 
appearance".
Have we no t a rriv ed  h ere  in a n o th e r  w ay o f d escrib ing  G ad am er’s  fulfilled 
tim e an d  of jo in in g  to g e th e r  th e  idea of th e  ‘a c tu a l’ historic!.; even t w ith  th a t  of 
th e  ex is ten tia lis t m o m en t?  M oreover can  we say  th a t  H eidegger’s  co n cep tio n  of 
th e  inception  a n d  G ad am er’s  “ fusion o f  horizons"  a re  re fo rm u la tio n s o f th e  old 
P latonic in s ig h t accord ing  to w hich tim e is th e  m oving im age o f e te rn ity ?  A nd 
finally, is  no t the  a n sw e r itse lf h isto rical, i.e. b o u n d  to the rec ip rocity  o f the  
h isto ric ity  p e rtin en t to  an y  “p re se n t” age a n d  o f th e  "liberating" m o m en t of 
vision, o r is it n o t itse lf  a fusion?
Concluding remarks
In th is  c h a p te r  the  a tte m p t w as m ade to a d d re s s  th e  fu n d am en ta l q u e s tio n s  
posed by th e  p re sen t th e s is  from a d eep er perspec tive . The q u e s tio n  o f w h e th e r  
we can  still th in k  of h is to ry  -a n d  ac t h isto rica lly - in  a  m ore p rim ord ia l m a n n e r  
th a n  th a t  d ic ta ted  by th e  sc ien ces w as ag a in  an sw ered  in  (he affirm ative an d  
th is  desp ite  th e  fact th a t we conclude o u r  e la b o ra tio n s  on  tim e, h is to ric ity  a n d  
m ean ing  in  a n  ap o re tic  m a n n e r . I hope th a t th e  m ode of exposition  a s  well a s
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th e  a c tu a l co n te n t of th e  d isc u ss io n  on H eidegger's a tte m p t to  re p lace  the  
m o d em  conception  of tim e /sp a c e  w ith the  G reek  experience o f x p ov o § /to n o s  in 
th is  c h a p te r  provides a vivid accoun t of the  w ay in vhich  tra d it io n  is 
ap p ro p ria ted  in th e  dialogical p rocess.
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Co tclusion
‘E te rn a l R em em brance!’ th e  boys jo in ed  in again . 
‘K aram azov’, cried  Kolya, is  it t ru e  v h a t  religion 
teach es , h a t we sh a ll rise  ag a in  from  th e  d ead , 
th a t we sh a ll see o n e  a n o th e r  ag a in , a n d  Ily u sh en k a?  
‘C erta in ly ', we sha ll be re s u rre c te d , certa in ly  we sh a ll 
see  one a n o th e r  aga in , a n d  we s h a h  tell one a n o th e r  
happ ily , oyfully, ev ery th ing  th a t  h a s  h a p p e n e d ’, 
replied  A lyosha, h a lf  lau gh in g  a n d  h a lf  overcom e 
w ith  em otion  (D ostoevsky, The K ara .nazov Brothers).
Fyodor D ostoevsky co n c lud es the  K aram azov  B ro th  s  w ith  th is  verbal 
exchange betw een  A lyosha K aram azov a n d  Kolya, one of h is  u n d e ra g e  
com pan ions. W hat is  sa id  in the ex ch an g e  a n d  why is  i s ign ifican t for th e  
p u rp o ses  of th is  co n c lu s io n , o r for an y  co n c lu s io n  a t  a ll?  O f co u rse  th e  p assag e  
qu ite  d irectly  sp eak s  o f  relig ious cach in g s o f C h ris tian  o rig in , of life a n d  d e a th , 
indeed  of life after d e a th  an d  of th e  ex p ected  - in  C h ris tian ity - even t of 
resu rrec tio n .
R elig ious-doctrinal issue form  certa in ly  a  leg itim ate p a rt of 
con tem porary  ph ilo sop h ica l re lied  ion, b u t a lth o u g h  1 a m  favourab ly  d isp o sed  
tow ards th is  a ttitu d e . I will refr. in from co m m en tin g  - o r  massing an y  s o r t  of 
ju d g em en t- on  th is  d im en s io n  < the  text. I w ould  ra th e r  like to  p o in t to  a  
com plem entary  d im en sio n  of the  text, one th a t  sp e a k s  a b o u t  h a p p in e ss , be ing  
w ith  one an o th er, e te rn a l  d u ra l ion. In o th e r  w ords 1 am  in te re s ted  in the  
dep ic tion  of the  a -tem p o ra l in tc iporal te rm s , a lth o u g h  th is  in te re s t  do es no t 
conceal the  in ten tio n  o f  criticism
On the  co n tra ry , I w ould line to su gg est th a t  D ostoevsky  h a s  m asterfu lly  
c a p tu red  the  p ecu lia r  experience of tim e available  to  every h u m a n  being
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(rem em ber Kolya is a  kid) in the  inevitable en c o u n te r w ith  tune, i.e. w ith  d ea th . 
The p assag e  d isc lo ses a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of tem pora lity  a n c  h is to ry  th a t is no t 
g ro u n d ed  so m u ch  on a n  im p erso n a l concep tion  of c o m m an a l living an d  the  
m e ch an ic s  of h isto rica l tim e, b n  sp rin g s prim arily  from  th e  a c tu a l 'tem poral' 
experience of being  w ith  specify o thers. In the  re su rre c tio n  day  (again I am  
no t in te re s te d  in th e  fact th a t in lie 'p a tr is tic  theology ' the 'day ' an d  the  'aeon ' 
do n o t signify rad ically  d ifferent s ta te s  of affairs) w hat is  m ostly  desired  
accord ing  to the  p assag e  is tin  redem ption  an d  elevation  o f one’s p erso n al 
h isto ry .
A lyosha does no t say, "We will have  a  new  life, o r a  new  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of being" 
or an y th in g  s im ilar to  th a t, b u t sim ply “we shall tell one a n o th e r ... every thing 
tha t h a s  happened". It is difficult to com m ent on  th is  b ea u b fu l passage  w ith o u t 
destroy ing  its  poetic re so n an ce . N evertheless we c a n n o t p u t en o u gh  em p h as is  
on th is  ''everything'' an d  on the  ¡act th a t  again , the  b a s ic  ch a rac te r is tic  o f the  
‘afterlife’, o r indeed  of an y  'life' th a t  h u m a n  beings ('we’) arc. seen  a s  capab le  of 
is in d isp u tab ly  sto ry  telling (lam p«), ‘h av in g ’ a  h is to ry  (m iopia) in  th e  m ost 
p rim ord ia l sense .
The s to ry te lle r A lyosha h a s  in m ind , is p e rh a p s  n o t in  d an g e r of 
■ forgetting’ a  p a rt of h is  own o r  h is  la n d 's  's to ry ' like the  A th e n ian s  in  P lato 's 
Tim aeus, an d  he w ould c e rta in ly  no t be oblivious to  'Being' like ‘w este rn  
h u m a n ity ’ in H eidegger's ph ilosophy . The ob jection  could  be ra ised  th a t 
n o th in g  is new  ab o u t the  c o n cep tu a lisa tio n  of the  non-ter.ipo ra l in te rm s  of 
experienced  h isto ry  a n d  tem p o ra lity  in  th is  's ta n d a rd ' n in e teen th  cen tu ry  
ap p ro p ria tio n  of C h ris tian  theology  an d  m o d em  philosophy . Indeed, th e re  is 
so m eth in g  very fam iliar in D ostoevsky 's passage , so m eth in g  fu rtherm ore
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delivered in  th e  sam e s ta te  of m ind a s  th a t  o f A lyosha, viz. p a rtly  w ith  
'lau gh te r ', p a rtly  w ith  u n re s tra in e d  'em otion'. A nd y e t, if th is  so m e th in g  is  n o t 
u n im p o r ta n t th is  w ould be prim arily  b ecau se  it is  n o t • o n c ep tu a lised  b u t 
n a rra te d , by the  "half laugh ing , ha lf overcom e w ith  em o tio n ’ i-' lyosha.
In one se n se  th e n  th e  passage can  be s a id  to convey th e  feelings 
c h a ra c te r is in g  th e  en igm atic  re la tio n sh ip  of h u m a n  beings w ith  tim e b e  th is  
tim e 'h is to rica l', 'persona l', 'societal', 'n a tu ra l ', 'conven tional , o r  o th erw ise  an d  
th e  ap o re tic  s ta te  a tta in ed  by h u m an  th o u g h t in  i ts  a tte m p ts  to  co m p rehend  
the  m ystery  of tim e, the  riddle of existence.
At th e  sam e  tim e, th e  passage po in ts  to  th e  puzzling - b u t  p e rs is tin g  
u n d e r  m a n y  g u ise s  in the  h isto ry  of tho u g h t- re la tio n sh ip  b etw een  tim e  an d  
e tern ity , w h ich  I a ttem p ted  to m ake available in a  th e m a tic  m a n n e r  in th e  final 
p a r t  of th is  th e sis . C erta in ly , the  ind ication  of th e  ‘p e rs is ten ce  o f th e  o rig in ’ in 
H eidegger’s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f h istoricity  or th e  p e c u lia r  co n tin u ity  p e rtin e n t to 
G ad am er’s  the o risa tio n  of the  'fusion of ho rizons ' d o  no t have  th e  c h a ra c te r  of 
so m eth in g  'p resen t at h an d ', to use  the  H eideggerian  jargon. If th is  read in g  is 
correct th o u g h , n e ith e r  lim e' no r e te rn ity ’ have th i s  c h a rac te r , a n d  th is  d esp ite  
th e  fact th a t  'p resen ce ' is a  co n stitu tiv e  part o f th e  h u m a n  experience  o f tim e 
a n d  of o u r  p o s tu la tio n s  a b o u t eternity .
Indeed , th e  kairological u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f tim e  th a t  c a n  be  derived  from 
H eidegger's w ritings d esp ite  the  absence  of a n y  reference  to  th e  book  o f the  
E cclesia stes  on  the  p h ilo so p h e rs  p a rt s u p p o r ts  s u c h  a  le a d in g  b u t  clearly  
c u lm in a te s  in a n  ap o ria  regard ing  tim e. T im e 'for', ‘fulfilled tim e' d o es  no t 
n ecessa rily  en ta il a  cance lla tion  of an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of tim e a s  'em pty ', w hile it 
poses th e  ad d itio na l problem  of the 'origin ' an d  ‘m e a n in g ’ of the  'tim ely'.
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T his ex p la in s  p e rh a p s  why H eidegger refra ined  froi r. u sing  th e  no tion  
Kairos le s t he w ould  have to allow for e lem en ts  of th e  C h ris tia n  theological 
tra d itio n  to in terfere , som eth ing  th a t  he w ould  c e r ta r i ly  perceive a s  a  
coun terfo rce  a g a in s t h is  a ttem p t t o  overcom e m e taph y sic s. .1115 is certa in ly  no t 
to  su g g es t th a t H eidegger's th e o risa tio n  of Xpovog  a s  d isc u sse d  in th e  last 
c h a p te r  does no t tie him  u p  w ith  th e  G reek  on tology an d  th u s  w ith 
m e taph y sic s, b u t th is  is som eth ing  I c a n n o t p u rs u e  fu r th e r  here , inter alia  due 
to  severe lim ita tio ns of space .
Are we e n tan g led  in a  'hci len eu tic  circle', a re  we fa re d  w ith a n  aporia?  
In fact, is  it leg itim ate to end  u p  w ith  a n  ap o ria?  I believe th a t  the  an sw er is 
very m u c h  d ep en d en t on th e  defin ition  an d  th u s  o f th e  possib le  function ing  of 
a n  ap o re tic  s ta te  for th in k in g . For a n  ap o ria  to  be  g en u in e  be it conceived in 
te rm s  o f a n  'im p asse ' a s  w ith 1 le idegger o r in te rm s  of a  ‘lack  of w ealth ' a s  in  the 
P la ton ic  trad itio n , it h a s  to have a  twofold function ing . F irs t, it sh o u ld  no t 
in d ica te  a  loss -m o s t o ften  a los t  o f certa in ty - w ith o u t a lso  signifying a t  the  
sam e  tim e a  'gain '. T h is  'gain ' can  e i th e r  have th e  ch a rac te r  of a  ‘p a th ’ one h a s  
a lread y  travelled , o r of som e 'w ea lth ’ o f experiences a n d  know ledge th a t  have 
becom e ‘available ' in th e  p rocess o f  th in k in g . If th is  is th e  case , it sh o u ld  also 
in d ica te  th e  possib le  p a th s  for fu tu re  reflection, it sh o u ld  p o s it th e  very urgency  
of following th e se  p a th s . Indeed, we c a n  see the  ap o re tic  s ta te  a s  inextricab ly  
b o u n d  w ith  the  ph ilosoph ical lil . o r  a s  being th e  very p ro d u c t o f ph ilosophy  
conceived a s  'E ros'. It is doubtfu l w h e th e r  th e  experience  o f ph ilosophy  a s  E ros 
is a t  all accessib le  to th e  'm odern ' -  d is e n c h a n te d  o r to  th e  'po st-m od ern ' an d  
allegedly re -e n c h a n te d  d isp o sitio ns a n d  it is even m ore d o u b tfu l w h e th e r it h a s  
b een  accessib le  a t  th e  tim e of P la to 's  w ritings. In a  se n se  th is  ap o ria  can  be
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sa id  to have som eth ing  of the  c h a ra c te r  of the  're tu rn ' a s  ie the  ‘r e tu rn  o f the  
p h ilo sop h er' in  the  P laton ic  m yth of the  cave, a lth o u g h  a s  P a tocka  (1996: 60) 
re m a rk s  th is  re tu rn  d o es  no t m ean  a com ing b ack  “to  things, ’u s t  a s  th e y  were".
T h is 're tu rn ', is it not a m ystery? P a to ck a  (loc. Cit) rightly  n o te s  t h a t  it is 
n o t 'c lear' w hy the  p h ilo sop h er h a s  to  'r e tu rn ’ to  th e  rave . A g a in s t th is  
obse rva tion  1 felt the  u rge  to con! r ib u te  to  the  p ecu lia r d ialogue th a t t a k e s  place 
betw een  w rite r  an d  re a d e r  by offering th e  ‘a p p a re n t  so lu tio n ’, w h ic h  I a lso  
scribb led  o n  the  m a rg in s  of the  tex t (as n o  d o u b t all the  inexperienced  re a d e rs  
in  ph ilo soph ica l m a tte rs  do), lest my 'ing en io u s ' a n sw e r be c a s t in to  oblivion: 
“T he p h ilo so p h er re tu rn s  b ecau se  of Eros m y friend".
Little h ad  I realized a t th e  tim e of w riting  -p e rh a p s  even less lo I rea lise  it  now ’- 
th a t  m y 'ing en io u s ' a n sw e r does no t solve’ an y th in g  a n d  th a t  it o n  th e  c o n tra ry  
'say s  th e  sa m e ' a s  P a tocka. by po in ting  to the  m y ste rio us  r ode of b e in g  of the  
're tu rn ', ind eed  of h u m a n  ex istence  itself.
All it m ight suggest is th a t the  is su e s  of tim e a n d  h ,s to ry , of B e in g  an d  
b e in g -h u m a n , of Eros an ti Polcinos, of th e  'sac red ' a n d  the  p ro fan e’, o f  't ru th ' 
a n d  'e rrancy ', in sh o rt all th e se  'u ltim a te  q u e s tio n s ' a re  apo re tic  in c h a ra c te r .
It w ould  be p rep o ste ro u s  an d  indeed  p o m pous to  su g g es t th a t  the  p re s e n t  w ork 
h a s  in  a n y  sen se  a t ta in e d  -o r  even ap p ro x im ated - th e  ap t.re tie  s ta tu s  I have 
tried  to  d e lin ea te  above. N evertheless, like any  w ork  th a t  w ish es to  be delivered  
from  m ere  ab su rd ity , the  p resen t text sh o u ld  a t  lea s t be ab le  to a c c o u n t  for 
som e ‘g a in s ' tog e th er w ith the  -m a n y - 'losses '.
F irs t an d  forem ost. 1 hope th a t in sp ite  of all o th e r  possib le  failings, th is  
th e s is  did  no t fail to  convince th  ■ re a d e r  a b o u t th e  u rgency  w ith  w h ic h  the  
question  o f ‘m ean ing ' an d  ‘h isto ric ity ' a n n o u n c e s  itself, an d  th e  in tr ic a te  w ays in
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w hich  it is bo un d  w ith th e  co n cep tu a lisa tio n  of co m m u n al 1 ring a n d  individual 
ex istence . T his 'q u e s tio n ' becom es even m ore im p o rta r  : in  lig h t of bo th  
'm ean ing ' and  'h isto ric ity ', o r even o f ‘h e rm en eu tics ' a s  a  m ethod  o f th e  h u m a n  
sc ien ces having a t ta in e d  a  new  -y e t a rguab ly  u n critica l- credibility, p e rh a p s  a s  
a  re su lt of the  'r e tre a t ' of Hie d o m in an t d isco u rses  of M arx ism  an d  
F unctionalism . P e rh a p s  the  h u m a n  sciences, a n d  even ph ilo sop h y  a s  an  
academ ic  discipline unavo idab ly  d isp lay  w h a t a p p e a rs  to be a  ‘fu n d am en ta l 
h u m a n  need ' of 'be long ing ', so m etim es even of 'following' I s in ce re ly  hope I 
have m anaged  to  show  th e  in a d e q u ac y  of 'following a  school’ - to  p a ra p h ra se  
W ittgenstein - by ch a lleng in g  (he very a s su m p tio n  regard ing  th e  alleged 
incom patib ility  of p h en om en o lo g ica l-h e rm eneu tic  elabor; (ions a n d  of the  
M arx ist trad ition .
It is a lto g e th er q u es tio n ab le  w h e th e r 'u ltim a te  q u e s tio n s ' c an  be 
su p p re sse d  in favour o f  m ore 'tang ib le ' -ep is tem ic  o r political- o n es, o r  w h e the r 
a  th in k e r 's  d issa tisfa c tio n  with a  s ta te  of affa irs  h a s  a n  unequivocally  'socio­
po litical' or 'ex isten tia l' ch a ra c te r . I have th u s  d efended  th ro u g h o u t th is  th e s is  
th e  position  th a t  i‘ is p o ss ib le  to Ire ‘o pen ’ for th e  'ev en t of Being’ w ith o u t being  
n ecessarily  ‘u n critica l’, 'p re-C ritica l' or ‘h e te ro n o m o u s’. Indeed, I have also  
ind irectly  suggested  - a n d  hopefully a lso  m anaged  to show - t h a t th e  'socia l' itse lf 
p re se n ts  u s  w ith  no le s s  a m ystery  th a n  th e  n o tio n s  o f ‘Being’, 'm ean in g ' an d  
'h isto ric ity '. The d isc u s s io n  of th e  M arxist trad itio n  h a s  been  in s tru m e n ta l for 
th e  developm ent of th is  position , a lth o u g h  it h a s  to be  sa id  th a t m o re  th a n  any  
o th e r  th in k e r C a s to ria d is  is u n d o u b ted ly  the  one w ho allowed m e to  g rasp  th e  
‘re s is ta n c e ’ offered by th e  'social' in th e  a tte m p t to  co n cep tua lise  it. C asto riad is  
is  a lso  'responsib le ' for the  developm en t of yet a n o th e r  ‘in r-g h t’ o f th is  th esis ,
nam ely  the  d isen tan g lem en t of t i ic no tion  of ‘m ean in g ’ from  e ith e r ‘ra tio n a lis t’ 
or ‘p u rp osiv e’ co n n o ta tion s.
It c an  be ce rta in ly  suggested  th a t  the  ‘elusive’ n a tu re  of m ean in g  is 
a lready  acknow ledged  in W elter’s  fo rm ulation  of the  ta sk  of V erstehende  
Soziologie in te rm s o f a  reco n stru c tio n  of h u m a n  action  a s ij it w ere inform ed by 
‘ra tio n a l’ m otives a n d  m eanings. To anyone fam iliar w ith  th e  Critique o f  Pure 
R eason  (see e.g. K an t, 1 7 87 /1 9 29 : 560) the  K an tian  legacy in  th is  link ing  of 
‘purposive  u n ity ’ a n d  the  function ing  o f the  ‘a s  if  is m ore tr .a n  ev ident. T h is 
fo rm ulation  by W eber is nev erth e le ss  of g rea t im portance  ince it p o in ts  to  a 
ce rta in  ‘analogy’ b etw een  u n co n sc io u s  p a t te rn s  an d  co n sc io u s  decisions 
inform ing h u m a n  action , b u t it a lso  'n a rro w s’ the  o n cep tio n  of th e  
u n co n sc io u s, w hich is ideally seen  a s  am en ab le  to ‘re c o n s tru c tio n ’ in  purely  
ra tion a l te rm s.
It is exactly  th is  d isso c ia tio n  of the  u n co n sc io u s  from  the  ’ra tio n a l’ an d  th e  
defying of the  belie f in an  ab so lu te  se lf-tran sp aren cy  of th e  ‘soc ia l’ - a  b as ic  
p rem ise of M arxist th o u g h t tha t w ould supp o sed ly  dissolve the  'su b jec t-o b jec t' 
divide- th a t  C a sto riad is  g ra sp s  in all its sp len d o u r.
I a lso  a ttem p ted  to point the  re a d e r  tow ard s non-privative co n cep tio n s of 
h isto ricity , especially  th rou g h  the  in te rp re ta tio n  of Heidegger a n d  G adam er. 
This signifies a m ove aw ay from the  over-sim plistic  no tion  of ‘se lf-enclosed’ a n d  
’equally  valid ’ in th e ir  claim s worldviews, p o stu la te d  by ce rta in  c u r re n ts  of 
con tem porary  sociology an d  cu ltu ra l s tu d ies . It a lso  signifies a  d e p a rtu re  from  
the  m ode of cognition  and  t ru th ' available  in  analy tic  ph ilo sophy  a n d  
epistem ology, w hich shou ld  not be in te rp re ted  a s  a  so rt of ‘en m ity ’ tow ards 
e ith e r th e  social sc ien ces  or ce rta in  ph ilosoph ical trad itio n s  R a ther, it shou ld
be seen  -o r  a t  least th is  is the  scII-explication 1 a m  ab le to consc iously  offer- a s  
a  conviction  abou t th e  need  to radically  rev ise th e  'u n sh a k e a b le ' -o r  sh o u ld  1 
sim ply  say  fash ionab le- a s su m p tio n s  th a t ho ld  sw ay bo th  in  th e  socia l an d  
h u m a n  'sc ien ces ' a n d  in ph ilosophy , the  's c h o o ls ’ th a t  a re  m o s t favourab ly  
tre a te d  in  th e  pag es of th is  th e sis  included.
As th e  d iscu ss io n  o n  G ad am er in p a r t ic u la r  sh o u ld  nave m ade  clear, 1 
sincerely  hope to  have es tab lish ed  the need  for a  m u tu a l re o rien ta tio n  of 
ph ilo sophy  an d  th e  h u m a n  sciences, largely b a s e d  o n  the  acknow ledgm en t of 
th e ir  belonging  together. 1 w ould no t w ish to  s h u n  th e  n a tu ra l  sc ien ces  from  
th is  p ro ced u re , a n d  indeed  a  g reat challenge for th o u g h t wo old b e  to  a tte m p t to 
g ra sp  an d  redefine th e  'com m on su b je c t-m a tte r  o f ph ilosophy  a n d  th e  sc iences, 
be  they  ‘n a tu r a l ’ o r  'social'.
It is no t only  th a t th e  ‘n a tu ra l  sciences' a llegedly  are  a t  th is  very m o m en t 
- a n d  have b een  for c e n tu rie s-  the  h isto ry  of h u m a n ity , b u t  a lso  th a t  in  th e  case  
of n o tio n s  like th o se  of ‘bein;, , tim e’ a n d  ‘t r u th ’ the} p re s e n t  u s  w ith  
d im en sio n s  inaccessib le  ou lsi le the ir co n c e p tu a l a n d  m ethodological 
fram ew ork. 1 ad m it th o u g h  th a t 1 could no t live u p  to  th is  ta sk .
I only  w onder w h e th e r any  science o r a n y  sy stem atic  p h ilo sop h y  could  
have b e t te r  ex p ressed  o u r  re la tionsh ip  w ith  h is to ry  p a s t a n d  p re se n t, w ith  
m ean in g  a n d  the  re la tio n sh ip  betw een ind iv id u al a n d  collective b e ing  th a n  
C io ran  (1996: 5) in th is  sh o rt p a rag rap h  o f h is  H istory a n d  Utopia  w ith  the  
c ita tion  of w hich  I w ould like to pu t a ten ta tiv e  'en d ' to  the  im possib le ' ta s k  of 
conclud ing  th is  thesis :
W hat is th e  u se  of being known, if we have not been so to  th a t sap*.1 or th a t m adm an.
To a  M arcus A urelius o r a Nero? We sha ll never have existed for so  m any of o u r idols. 
O ur n am e will have troubled  none of th e  cen turies before us; and  th o se th a t come after- 
W hat do they  m atter?  W hat does the fu tu re , that h alf of time, m ailer to th e  m an  who is
Infatuated  w ith eternity?
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